Young v. Brown University et al

Filing 105

ORDER DENYING 94 Bill of Costs. No costs are awarded to Defendants. So Ordered by Senior Judge Mary M. Lisi on 1/8/2016. A copy of this Order was forwarded to Plaintiff via first-class mail.(Feeley, Susan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.

C.A. No. 12-937-ML

BROWN UNIVERSITY,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, CHRISTINA
PAXSON, AND FORMER PRESIDENT,
RUTH SIMMONS
EDWARD WING
MARISA QUINN
PAUL SHANLEY;
BROWN UNIVERSITY POLICE
OFFICERS, JOHN DOES,
Defendants.
ORDER
On November 6, 2015, this Court entered a Memorandum of
Decision

in

this

long-standing

litigation.

All

but

one

of

Plaintiff’s claims having been dismissed by stipulation and/or
decided in the Defendants’ favor after a one-day trial without a
jury, the Court found for the Defendants on the last remaining
claim. (Dkt. No. 92). Judgment was entered on the same day (Dkt.
No. 93).
On November 9, 2015, the Defendants submitted a bill of
costs (Dkt. No. 94), together with a supporting memorandum (Dkt.
No. 94-1), an affidavit from Defendants’ counsel, and an invoice
for transcription services (Dkt. No. 94-2). Pursuant to Rule 54
1

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants seek the
costs of preparing transcripts for Plaintiff’s deposition and
trial testimony in the total amount of $1,433.55.
On

November

opposition

to

16,

the

2015,

the

imposition

of

Plaintiff
costs

filed

(Dkt.

a

No.

motion
95)

on

in
the

grounds that (1) Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (“IFP”) motion had
been granted by a Rhode Island state court prior to removal of
the case to this Court; and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint was not
frivolous. In support of the latter contention, the Plaintiff
pointed to the Defendants’ decision to withdraw a No Trespass
Order—which

was

Count”—before

the

“the

basis

Court

made

of
a

Plaintiff’s

Injunctive

determination

on

the

constitutional validity of that order. Pltf.’s Mem. at Page 2 of
2 (Dkt. No. 95-1).
In response, the Defendants asserted that the No Trespass
Notice was

revised

after

the

parties

had

engaged

in

lengthy

settlement discussions in an attempt to arrive at a mutually
agreeable notice. Defendants maintained that, while the Plaintiff
was

initially

accorded

IFP

status,

his

complaint

alleged

constitutional violations that were neither factually nor legally
supported. Defs.’ Reply at Page 3 of 3 (Dkt. No. 96).
On December 3, 2015, while a determination on the bill of
costs was still pending, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal (Dkt.
2

No.

97),

together

with

an

application

to

proceed

without

prepayments of fees (Dkt. No. 98). In his application, Plaintiff
asserts that he has not worked in the past six years. On December
7, 2015, Magistrate Judge Almond issued a Memorandum and Order,
in which he advised the Plaintiff that, unless he provided the
requisite affidavit pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 24(a) by December
31, 2015, his application would be denied and his appeal would be
dismissed for nonpayment of the filing fee. Memorandum and Order
(Dkt. No. 100). On December 31, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the
requisite

affidavit (Dkt.

No.

101).

On

January 5,

2016,

the

Defendants filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s IFP
motion, (Dkt.

No.

102),

on

the

grounds

that

the

Plaintiff’s

appeal failed to raise any appealable issue. On January 7, 2016,
Magistrate Judge Almond issued a Memorandum and Order, in which
he accorded the Plaintiff IFP status in filing his appeal (Dkt.
No. 104).
I.

Standard of Review
The

award

of

costs

following

litigation

is

governed

by

Federal Rule 54. Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1), “[u]nless a federal
statute,

these

costs—other

rules,

than

prevailing party.”

or

a

attorney’s

court

order

fees—should

provides
be

otherwise,

allowed

to

the

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(emphasis added).

Rule 54(d)(1) further provides that “[t]he clerk may tax costs on
3

14 days’ notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the
court

may

review

the

clerk’s

action.”

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

54(d)(1)(emphases added). Local Rule LR Cv 54 sets forth, in some
detail, (1)

the procedure by which a party may request costs;

(2) how such costs are to be taxed by the clerk;1 (3) the process
of having the clerk’s action reviewed; and (4) the requirement
for parties to confer and resolve the matter.
Rule 54(d)(1) provides that “unless. . . a court order
provides otherwise,” costs should be awarded to the “prevailing
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The language of Federal Rule 54
indicates

that

the

allowance

of

costs

is

discretionary.

10

Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2665 at 203
(2014)(“The phrase ‘unless a court order directs otherwise’ makes
the allowance of costs discretionary...”); In re San Juan Dupont
Plaza

Hotel

Fire

Litigation,

142

F.R.D.

41,

46

(D.P.R.

1992)(noting that Rule 54(d) “provides that the award of costs to

1

The language of the local rule appears to indicate that the
clerk “shall” tax appropriately claimed costs, although such
taxation is made subject to possible modification by the Court. LR
Cv 54(c), (d). To the extent the local rule is inconsistent with
the Federal Rules of Procedure, the Federal Rules prevail. NEPSK,
Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002)(stating that
“a district court cannot enforce its local rules in a way that
conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1), Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir.
1983)(“Local district court rules cannot be construed in such a way
as to render them inconsistent with applicable provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”))
4

the

prevailing

party

is

not

obligatory

but

within

the

discretionary power of the Court”). In deciding whether to award
costs to the prevailing party, “the federal courts are free to
pursue a case-by-case approach and to make their decisions on the
basis of the circumstances and equities of each case.” 10 Wright,
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2668 at 235; In re San
Juan

Dupont

Plaza

Hotel

Fire

Litigation,

142

F.R.D.

at

46

(“Decisions shall be based upon the facts and equities of each
case.”)
The Court notes that, particularly if the losing party is
capable of paying the awarded costs, “‘the presumption in favor
of

awarding

costs

to

the

prevailing

party

is

difficult

to

overcome.’” BASF AG v. Great American Assur. Co., 595 F.Supp. 2d
899, 901 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 29, 2009)(quoting Weeks v. Samsung
Heavy

Indus.

Co.,

Ltd.,

126

F.3d

926,

945

(7th

Cir.1997)).

Accordingly, the burden is on the non-prevailing party “to show
circumstances that are sufficient to overcome the presumption in
favor

of

the

prevailing

party.”

10

Wright,

et

al.,

Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2668 at 236.
Usually, the party in whose favor judgment is entered is
considered

the

“prevailing

party.”

Tunison

v.

Continental

Airlines Corp., Inc. 162 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C.C. 1998). Where a
defendant successfully defends against a plaintiff’s substantial
5

claims and judgment is entered accordingly, the defendant is
generally

considered

the

prevailing

party.

Russian

River

Watershed Protection Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136,
1144 (9th Cir.1998).
Regarding

the

award

of

costs

against

in

forma

pauperis

litigants, courts that have addressed the issue have held that “a
plaintiff’s indigency does not require the court to automatically
waive

costs

to

an

unsuccessful

litigant.”

Cox

v.

Preferred

Technical Group, Inc. 110 F. Supp.2d 786, 792 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 15,
2000)(citing

McGill v. Faulkner, 18 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir.1994)

(noting that a district court may properly assess costs against
even an in forma pauperis litigant); Weaver v. Toombs, 948 F.2d
1004, 1008 (6th Cir.1991)).
Although a court may take into consideration whether the
non-prevailing party pursued the litigation in good faith, that
fact alone, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to deny costs
to the prevailing party. See Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 794
(5th Cir. 2006)(noting that the “Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth
and Tenth [Circuit]—has ruled that good faith, by itself, cannot
defeat the operation of Rule 54 (d)(1)”). Pacheco also lists a
“wide range of reasons...to justify withholding costs from the
prevailing

party”,

including

(1)

the

losing

party's

limited

financial resources; (2) misconduct by the prevailing party; (3)
6

close

and

difficult

legal

issues

presented;

(4)

substantial

benefit conferred to the public; and (5) the prevailing party's
enormous financial resources. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d at 794.
Keeping

these

reasons

in

mind,

the

Court

considers

the

Defendants’ request for an award of costs in this action.
II.

Discussion
It is undisputed that the Plaintiff prevailed on none of his

claims. Some were voluntarily dismissed by stipulation over the
course of the lengthy litigation; three (Counts I, II, and XII)
were decided for the Defendants on their motion for judgment on
partial findings after a one-day trial; and the remaining claim
(Count X) was decided for the Defendants after the parties rested
and had a final opportunity to argue their respective positions.
Eventually, judgment was entered in favor of the Defendants, who
had defended successfully against all of Plaintiff’s allegations.
The Court also notes that the Plaintiff’s suggestion that the
Defendants felt compelled to amend the No Trespass Notice in
order to preclude a determination on its constitutionality was
not supported by the record. Accordingly, Defendants are the
prevailing party in this case.
Although Defendants prevailed in this litigation, their
ultimate win does not establish that all of Plaintiff’s claims
were meritless ab initio, or that those claims were brought in
7

bad

faith.

The

Plaintiff

voluntarily

agreed

to

dismiss

the

majority of his claims by stipulation and he pursued only those
claims for which, he believed, he could provide adequate factual
or

legal

support.

After

conducting

a

bench

trial,

the

Court

denied the Defendants’ motion for judgment on partial findings
with

respect

to

Count

X

of

the

pro

se

complaint,

pending

additional fact-finding at the continuation of trial. After the
Defendants

were

successful

in

precluding

the

Plaintiff

from

introducing additional testimony by one of his physicians (Dkt.
No. 78), the Plaintiff rested. Although the Plaintiff failed to
carry his burden to prove his case, there are no allegations of
bad faith during the litigation leveled against him.
The fact that Plaintiff has only very limited resources has
been well established.

Based on the prior finding of indigency

by the Rhode Island state court (which was never challenged by
Defendants), the new finding regarding the Plaintiff’s IFP status
by Magistrate Judge Almond, and the information gleaned from the
Plaintiff’s filings and testimony at trial, it is evident that a
$1,433 award of costs would present a considerable hardship for
the Plaintiff. On the other hand, Brown University is known to
have

very

considerable

assets

and

resources

and

it

can

be

expected to bear the costs of defending itself against claims
such as those brought by the Plaintiff.
8

There

have

been

no

allegations

of

bad faith

during

the

litigation process against the Plaintiff and the remaining claim
at issue, although ultimately decided in the Defendants’ favor,
required

both

testimony

and

additional

briefing

for

a

determination of its validity. As such, the factors suggested by
Pacheco weigh in the Plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, the Court is
of the opinion that no costs should be awarded to the Defendants
under the circumstances of this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Mary M. Lisi
Mary M. Lisi
Senior United States District Judge
January 8, 2016

9