Young v. Brown University et al

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Oral Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings: The motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts I, II, and XII. With respect to Count X, the motion is denied, pending additional fact finding by this Court at trial. So Ordered by Judge Mary M. Lisi on 10/22/2014. (Duhamel, John)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.

C.A. No. 12-937-ML

BROWN UNIVERSITY,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, CHRISTINA
PAXSON, AND FORMER PRESIDENT,
RUTH SIMMONS
EDWARD WING
MARISA QUINN
PAUL SHANLEY;
BROWN UNIVERSITY POLICE
OFFICERS, JOHN DOES,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The

plaintiff,

Christopher

Young

(“Young”),

filed

claims

against Brown University (“Brown”) and Deputy Chief of Brown’s
Department of Public Safety, Paul Shanley (“Officer Shanley,”
together with Brown, the “Defendants”)1 after Brown campus police
officers removed Young from the Brown campus for his disruptive
behavior during

a

public

forum

on

health care

reform. Young

alleged that the removal and subsequent arrest by the Providence
Police

Department

(“PPD”)

occurred

in

violation

of

his

constitutional rights (Count I); that he was subjected to an
1

On April 10, 2014, by stipulation, all claims against the
other named defendants were dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. No.
36).
1

unreasonable seizure by Officer Shanley, as a result of which
Young suffered bodily injuries and mental anguish (Count II); and
that Young was unlawfully detained by Officer Shanley (Count
XII). In addition, Young sought an injunction against a Notice
Not to Trespass (the “No Trespass Notice”) issued to him by
Brown, which prohibits him from entering the Brown campus and any
building

and

property

owned

or

leased

by

Brown

(Count

X).

Following an extended discovery period, the parties agreed to a
trial without a jury, which was conducted before this Court on
October 6, 2014. The matter before the Court in this case is the
Defendants’ motion for judgment on partial findings pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c).
I. Procedural History
On November 29, 2012, three years after Young was removed
from Andrews Hall on the Brown campus where he and his wife had
attended a roundtable lecture on health care reform, he filed a
pro se complaint (the “Complaint”) against the Defendants in
Rhode Island state court. On December 21, 2012, the Defendants
removed the case to this Court on the grounds of federal question
jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 1-1). Young filed an objection to the
removal on January 4, 2013 (Dkt. No. 6) and urged the Court to
abstain from the matter on January 22, 2013. (Dkt. No. 11). As of
February 4, 2013, Young was represented by counsel (Dkt. No. 14).
2

Young’s motion to remand the case was denied on March 18, 2013
(Text

Order),

after

which

the

parties

engaged

in

discovery.

Factual discovery, which was extended on Young’s motion for an
additional six months, closed on April 30, 2014. (Dkt. Entry
September 3, 2013). On March 26, 2014, the Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 24). On April 4, 2014,
Young sought to amend his Complaint (Dkt. Nos. 31, 32); his
motion to amend was denied (Text Order April 9, 2014)2.
On April 9, 2014, all claims against named defendants other
than Brown and Officer Shanley were dismissed, (Dkt. Nos. 35,
36), as were Counts III, IV, X, XIII, XIII, leaving Counts I, II,
XI, XII, and X.3
On

August

14,

2014,

Officer

Shanley filed

a

motion

for

summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 51, 52), to which Young responded
with an objection on August 26, 2014. (Dkt. Nos. 54-56). The
Court informed the parties on September 4, 2014 that the case
would be set for trial to commence on October 6, 2014. (Dkt. No.
59).
With the waiver of a jury by both sides, trial without a

2

Young sought to include several Brown police officers named as
“John Does” in his Complaint.
3

The ten-count complaint was improperly numbered, resulting in
duplication of Counts X and XIII. There are no Counts numbered VIX.
3

jury was held on October 6, 2014. Young and his wife Kara gave
testimony.

By

stipulation,

the

parties

entered

Exhibits

1-7,

which included a DVD with video footage taken by Young and his
wife

at

the

Brown

lecture.

Ex.

2.

Defendants

offered

an

additional videotape, a small portion of which—showing a scene
from the same event from a different perspective—was admitted
into evidence. Ex. A. Because Young’s only remaining witness was
acknowledged
liability,

to

address

Defendants

only

made

a

the

question

motion

for

of

damages,

judgment

on

not

partial

findings pursuant to Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
procedure.

The

Court

took

the

motion

under

advisement

and

instructed the parties to submit supplemental briefs as to Count
X of the Complaint, related to Brown’s No Trespass Notice. Count
XI was voluntarily dismissed by Young at the conclusion of trial.
II. Standard of Review
Pursuant

to

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

52(c),

a

Court

may

render

judgment on partial findings “[i]f a party has been fully heard
on an issue during a nonjury trial;” however, the Court may
decline to do so “until the close of the evidence.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 52(c). Judgment under Rule 52(c) is indicated “[w]hen a party
has finished presenting evidence and that evidence is deemed by
the trier insufficient to sustain the party's position.” Morales
Feliciano

v.

Rullan,

378

F.3d
4

42,

59

(1st

Cir.2004).

In

determining

whether

judgment

pursuant

to

Rule

52(c)

is

appropriate, the Court “need not consider the evidence in a light
favorable

to

the

plaintiff

and

may

render

judgment

for

the

defendant if it believes the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient
to make out a claim.” Geddes v. Northwest Missouri State Univ.,
49 F.3d 426, 429 n. 7 (8th Cir.1995). The Court is tasked with
resolving any conflicts in the evidence and “‘decide for itself
where the preponderance lies.’” Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378
F.3d at 59 (citing 9C Wright & Miller Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §
2573.1, at 497–99).
The following constitutes the Court’s findings of facts and
conclusions
evidence

of

law

introduced

after
by

considering

the

parties

all
in

the
the

testimony
course

of

and
the

plaintiff’s case.
III. Findings of Fact
The events leading to Young’s removal from the November 30,
2009 lecture at Brown are documented in the video footage taken
by Kara Young (Ex. 2); the videotape submitted by the Defendants
(Ex. A);

and

six

separate

incident

reports

written

by Brown

police officers following the event (Ex. 1). For the most part,
the

sequence

of

events

was

also

confirmed

by

Young’s

own

testimony.
On November 30, 2009, Young and his wife Kara attended a
5

lecture of a roundtable series on health care reform, taking
place at Andrews Hall on the Brown Campus. (Ex. 4). The Youngs
carried

two

large

homemade

signs—“No

Abortion

Funding”

and

“Abortion = Murder”—which they intended to bring into the lecture
hall. They were told by Officer Shanley and a Brown administrator
that, under Brown policy, no signs were allowed because they
could obstruct the view of other audience members and because the
signs

constituted

a

fire

hazard.

Young

and

his

wife

were

permitted to enter after they placed the signs in a corner.
Shortly after

entering

the

room

in

which

the

discussion

was

already ongoing, Young received a call on his cell phone and
continued to talk until he was told to end the call or leave.
Young began video taping Congressman Kennedy and various members
of the audience.

Young then handed his wife the video camera so

he could take his turn at the microphone that was set up in the
middle of the room for audience participation.
As soon as Young stepped up to the microphone, he began a
long, rambling narrative in which he stated, inter alia, that
health care reform was a subsidy of the pharmaceutical industry;
that he could not agree to fund abortion; that birth control
activists like Margaret Sanger were eugenicists; and that the
intent of forming Planned Parenthood was to bring about ethnic
cleansing. On the videotape taken by Kara Young, members of the
6

audience can be observed shaking their heads and beginning to
grumble at Young’s remarks; at least one audience member called
Young’s remarks “slanderous.” Young responded by addressing the
audience directly, stating that the event was a public forum and
that he should be permitted to ask a question. He then raised a
DVD case that he had been holding in his hand and explained that
the DVD contained a film on genocide he wished to give to then
U.S. Representative Patrick Kennedy, one of the members on the
forum

panel.

Young

stepped

away

from

the

microphone

and

approached the panel, flinging the DVD onto the table in front of
Representative Kennedy.
Young then returned to the microphone and continued his
monologue. Marisa Quinn, Vice President of Brown Public Affairs
asked Young to finish up and step back from the microphone, after
which two uniformed officers approached Young, who continued to
repeat his prior allegations. According to Young’s testimony, Dr.
Edward

Wing

(“Dr.

Wing”),

Dean

of

Medicine

and

Biological

Sciences, also told Young to “end this discussion.”
As documented on the Youngs’ videotape, one Brown police
officer—identified by Young as Officer Vinacco—touched Young on
his

right

elbow,

turned

the

microphone

away

from

him,

and

encouraged the next questioner behind Young to take her place at
the microphone. Undeterred, Young continued his narrative in a
7

louder voice, at which point three uniformed officers tried to
guide him towards the back of the hall. Young then began to shout
loudly: “This is not a free country anymore,” and continued to
resist the officers’ attempts to move him.
At this point, there is a gap in the videotape (Ex. 2),4
after which the camera appears to be swinging around in various
directions while Young is heard screaming in the background.
Young was moved by officers into a vestibule area where he was
placed on the floor and handcuffed.
After Young had been handcuffed, he was lifted up, removed
from the building and brought to the PPD station by patrol car.
According to Young, he was finger-printed and kept in a cell for
several

hours,

after

which

he

was

released

on

personal

recognizance. Young was charged with disorderly conduct, but the
charge was later dismissed. The day after the forum, Dr. Wing
issued a witness statement in which he acknowledged that the
Brown police officers removed Young at his request after Young
had asked inappropriate questions of Congressman Kennedy. Dr.
Wing also noted that he had asked Young repeatedly to “wrap up”
and that he had given Young, at first, a 15-second and then a 10second deadline for concluding his remarks. Ex. 1.

4

According to Kara Young, she briefly stopped recording because
she was afraid she’d run out of tape.
8

In December 2009, Young received a written notice from Brown
which informed him that he was forbidden from entering the Brown
campus. (Ex. 3). The notice, dated December 4, 2009, reads as
follows:
NOTICE NOT TO TRESPASS
RI STATE STATUTE 11-44-26
On November 30, 2009, you were arrested on the property
of Brown University and charged with disorderly
conduct. Based on that arrest, and in accordance with
the provisions of Rhode Island General Law 11-44-26 and
11-44-26.1, this letter is official notice that you are
hereby forbidden from entering the campus of Brown
University.
This
prohibition
includes
any
Brown
University building and property owned or leased by
Brown University. Be advised, that pursuant to Rhode
Island General Law 11-44-26 and 11-44-26.1, any
violation of this warning will result in you being
subject to arrest.
It is our sincere hope that you will respect the rights
of the University in this matter. Be assured that we
will take all appropriate legal action if you choose to
disregard this notice. (Emphasis added). Ex. 3.

On

March

16,

2010,

Young—who

has

been

campaigning

for

various public offices since 2000, including mayor of Providence—
was standing outside the Brown bookstore on Thayer Street, where
he was handing out pro-life literature. Young was approached by
an officer of the Brown police department who informed Young that
if he stood on the portion of the sidewalk that was owned by
Brown, Young would be arrested under the No Trespass Notice.
According to Young, there was no clear indication which part of
9

the

sidewalk

Following
determined

was

this

public

and

incident,

that

Brown

which

Young

owned

part

belonged

conducted

or

leased

some
a

to

Brown.

research

large

number

and
of

properties. Young explained that he had planned to distribute
pamphlets all over Brown’s campus and to canvass door-to-door for
signatures in order to be placed on the ballot. According to
Young, following this incident he discontinued campaigning in the
campus area because he was “terrified to go to a [Brown] building
and get arrested.”
IV.

Discussion
A.

§

1983

Claim

-

Deprivation

of

Constitutional

Rights

(Count I)
Young generally alleges that he was discriminated against by
Brown because he was not allowed to share his Catholic viewpoint
at the November 30, 2009 forum. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a
remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State....” Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hospital, 26 F.3d 254, 256
(1994)

(internal

quotation

marks

and

citation

omitted).

A

plaintiff seeking to maintain an action under Section 1983 must
establish two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
the

deprivation

of

a

right

or
10

privilege

secured

by

the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the
deprivation occurred under color of state law. Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1732–33, 56
L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).

An action may be dismissed if the plaintiff

fails to satisfy either necessary element. Id. at 166, 98 S.Ct.
at 1738-39.
Whether Brown qualifies as a “person” acting under color of
state law within the meaning of “constitutional guarantees,” is a
question currently before the First Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Klunder v. Brown University, C.A. No. 10-410-ML Slip Op., (D.R.I.
July 13, 2011), 2011 WL 2790178. As noted by this Court in
Klunder, “[p]rivate parties and ‘private institutions meet the
state action requirements only in rare circumstances.’” Klunder,
2011 WL 2790178 (quoting Rinsky v. Trustees of Boston University,
Civil Action No. 10cvl0779–NG, 2010 WL 5437289 (D.Mass. Dec. 27,
2010)). “‘In order for a private actor to be deemed to have acted
under color of state law, it is not enough to show that the
private actor performed a public function. The plaintiff must
show

that

the

private

[actor]

assumed

powers

traditionally

exclusively reserved to the State.’” Klunder, 2011 WL 2790178 at
*5 (quoting Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258).
Assuming, without deciding, that the Brown police force can
act under the color of state law, Young’s Section 1983 claim
11

nevertheless

fails

because

he

did

not

establish

the

second

necessary prong: that Brown deprived him of a constitutionally
guaranteed

right.

Young

was

given

an

opportunity

to

pose

a

question to the panel and he was allowed, without interruption,
to

speak

at

some

length.

As

is

evident

from

the

Youngs’

videotape, Young never asked a question, he merely voiced his
personal disagreements with certain aspects of health care reform
as he understood them; he approached the panel members and threw
a DVD onto the panel table; he began arguing with members from
the

audience;

and

on

the

whole,

he

conducted

himself

in

a

disruptive manner. As Young acknowledged at trial, members of the
audience yelled at him, interrupted his speech, and began booing
him. Young was led away from the microphone at the request of Dr.
Wing, Brown’s Dean of Medicine and Biological Sciences, only
after Young’s conduct became increasingly disruptive and after
Young had been given two opportunities to finish his statement.
Young still refused to yield the microphone and, as he was guided
towards the back of the room, he began to shout at an ever
increasing

volume.

The

videotape

excerpt

introduced

by

the

Defendants, see Ex. A, clearly shows that, notwithstanding the
testimony given by Young and his wife, Young did not “backpedal;”
rather, he resisted the efforts of the Brown officers to lead him
away

by

pushing

his

body

forward
12

and

straining

against

the

officers’ hold on him.
In

sum,

Young

made

no

showing

that

Brown

violated

his

constitutional rights or that the action of Brown police officers
was based on the content of Young’s remarks. Rather, Young was
allowed

to

share

his

views

until

he

became

repetitive

and

disruptive and he failed to cede the microphone after having been
asked to do so. Under those circumstances, the Court finds that
Young’s allegation of unconstitutional discrimination is entirely
unsupported.
B. Excessive Force (Count II)
Young
physical

alleges

seizure

establishing

that

by

he

Brown

excessive

was

subjected

Officer

force

is

a

to

an

Shanley.

The

rigorous

one,

unreasonable
standard

for

requiring

a

plaintiff to show "(1) significant injury, which (2) resulted
directly

and

only

from

the

use

of

force

that

was

clearly

excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3)
objectively unreasonable.” Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500
(5th Cir.1991). “Whether the force used to effect a particular
seizure is reasonable ‘must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable

officer

on

the scene,

rather than

with

the

20/20

vision of hindsight.’” Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 11 (1st
Cir. 2007)(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct.
1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)).
13

Although the narratives in the officers’ incident reports,
see

Ex.

1,

contain

some

minute

variations,

the

reports

are

generally consistent with one another and with the two videotapes
submitted by the parties. As such, neither the reports nor the
videotapes support Young’s version of the events.
Young insisted at trial that his legs were pulled out from
under him, whereas several of the incident reports state that
Young “lowered his weight in a pro-test [sic] manner,” and that
Young “became passive and fell to the floor . . . forcing the
officers to carry him from the building.” (Ex. 1, Reports of
Officers Remka and Pereira). Neither videotape shows how Young
eventually came to rest on the floor, nor do the videotapes
confirm Young’s assertion that he was grabbed and/or that his
balance was deliberately offset by the officers. As Young himself
acknowledged, he had general difficulties maintaining his balance
because of his considerable weight. Young contended at trial that
he was “backpedaling” as officers attempted to remove him from
the forum; however, the second videotape of the event, see Ex. A,
shows very clearly that Young was resisting the officers and that
he

was

pushing

his

body

forward

in

order

shown

on

to

remain

on

the

videotapes

and

premises.
Moreover,

from

the

events

the

related in Young’s own testimony, it is not clear whether Officer
14

Shanley ever touched Young. According to Young’s testimony, as he
was standing at the microphone, he was approached by Officers
O’Connor, Remka, and Vinacco, who later removed the microphone.
Young also

stated

that

Officer

O’Connor

grabbed

his

arm

and

offset his balance and that Officer Shanley had his hands on
Young

after

his

legs

had

been

pulled

out

from

under

him.

Notwithstanding Young’s insistence that Officer Shanley “touched”
him at some point during Young’s removal from the hall, Young
made no allegations that Officer Shanley used excessive force,
nor do the submitted videotapes provide evidence to support such
an allegation. In sum, Young’s claim of excessive force on the
part of Officer Shanley was entirely unsupported.
C. False Imprisonment (Count XII)
Regarding

the

false

imprisonment

claim

against

Officer

Shanley, Young alleges, without offering further details, that
Officer Shanley unlawfully detained him. In order to recover on
this claim, Young was required to establish that (1) Officer
Shanley intended to confine him; (2) Young was conscious of the
confinement; (3) Young did not consent to the confinement; and
(4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged. Beaudoin v.
Levesque,

697

A.2d

1065,

required

to

show

that

1067
he

(R.I.
was

1997).
detained

Young

was

without

also
legal

justification. Dyson v. City of Pawtucket, 670 A.2d 233, 239
15

(R.I. 1996). See also Mailey v. Estate of De Pasquale, 177 A.2d
376, 379 (1962)(“[t]he essential element of this tortious action
is the restraint of another person without legal justification or
without any color of legal authority”).
It is undisputed that Officer Shanley and other members of
the Brown police force were specifically requested by Dr. Wing, a
member of the Brown faculty, to remove Young from the premises.
The removal only occurred after Young began to disrupt the event
with his conduct; after he had been told by Brown administrator
Marisa Quinn to “wrap it up;” and after he had exhausted two
additional

deadlines

for

finishing

his

remarks.

Young’s

disruptive conduct is shown on his wife’s video recording, and
his

strenuous

attempts

to

resist

the

Brown

police

officers’

efforts to remove him from the premises are evident from the
videotape excerpt that the Defendants introduced at trial. Under
those circumstances, there was clearly probable cause to arrest
Young for his refusal to leave the premises peacefully after he
had been repeatedly requested to conclude his remarks; for his
continuing and escalating disruption of the event; and for his
resistance to Brown police officers’ efforts to remove him from
the lecture hall. Accordingly, Young failed to establish that he
was detained without legal justification.

16

Conclusion
After considering the testimony given by Young and his wife
and reviewing all the evidence submitted by the parties, the
Court finds that Young has failed to carry his burden to show, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that his constitutional rights
were violated by Brown or that Officer Shanley subjected him to
excessive force and/or false imprisonment. For all those reasons,
the

Defendants’

motion

for

judgment

on

partial

findings

is

GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The motion is granted with
respect to Counts I, II, and XII. With respect to Count X, the
Defendants’ motion is denied, pending additional fact finding by
this Court at trial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Mary M. Lisi
Mary M. Lisi
United States District Judge
October 22, 2014

17