Seguin v. Textron, Inc. et al

Filing 157

ORDER denying #127 Motion Challenging Exclusive New Hampshire's Exclusive Designated Authority To Sit in Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Recusal Cases; denying #137 Emergency and Expedited Motion to Recuse and Re-Assign; denying #139 Expedited Motion to Compel Mandatory Conflict Screening and Enforce 28 USC Sec 291, 292 and 295. -- So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Landya B McCafferty (New Hampshire) on 10/17/2013. (Duhamel, John) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/21/2013: #1 Exhibit A: Designation of District Judge) (Duhamel, John).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

Mary Seguin
v.

Civil No. 13-cv-012-SJM-LM

Textron et al.

O R D E R
Before the court is plaintiff Mary Seguin’s motions seeking
the presiding district judge’s and magistrate judge’s recusal
and the reassignment of this action to another district court
(doc. nos. 127, 137 and 139).
Background
Seguin characterizes this action as challenging, among
other things, racketeering, fraud, corruption, and bribery in
the Rhode Island Family Court, and defendants include the Estate
of Gilbert T. Rocha, a Rhode Island judge.

All of the federal

judges in the District of Rhode Island have recused themselves,
and the matter was referred to the District of New Hampshire for
assignment to a district judge.

See Order (doc. no. 3).

The

District of New Hampshire chief judge concurred in the referral
(doc. no. 4), and the court assigned the matter to Judge
McAuliffe.

Seguin’s motions (doc. nos. 127, 137, and 139) seek

recusal of the undersigned magistrate judge and re-assignment of
this case to a judge from another federal district court.
Discussion
I.

Assignment to Judge McAuliffe
Seguin asserts that this action is not properly before

Judge McAuliffe, and that the case was assigned to Judge
McAuliffe via 28 U.S.C. § 636(f), without the issuance of a
designation order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292, or 295.1
Seguin is mistaken.
When all judges in the District of Rhode Island recused
themselves, the matter was referred out of the district.

A

federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), authorizes the chief judge
of the relevant circuit, in the public interest, to designate
and assign a district judge within that circuit to sit
temporarily by designation in another district within the same
circuit.

On December 31, 2012, First Circuit Chief Judge Lynch

determined that the public interest warranted the designation
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Seguin further asserts that this case was assigned to Judge
McAuliffe in a manner that bypassed the Judicial Conference’s
and First Circuit’s “mandatory conflict screening policy.” The
documents filed by Seguin indicate that she is referring to
conflict screening software that federal courts implement to
screen cases for conflicts before assignment to particular
judges. The practice in the district court clerk’s offices is
to screen cases for conflicts. There is no suggestion in the
record that such screening did not occur in this case.
Moreover, Seguin has made no showing that the case presents any
conflict requiring the recusal of any currently assigned
judicial officer.
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and assignment of Judge McAuliffe to sit in the District of
Rhode Island for cases (like this case) filed in 2013.

The

relevant order so designating Judge McAuliffe is on file in the
clerk’s offices in the Districts of New Hampshire and Rhode
Island, and is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

See Ex. A,

Designation of District Judge McAuliffe for Service in Another
District Within His Circuit (Dec. 31, 2012).

Accordingly, the

motion to reassign this action is denied, to the extent it
asserts that the case was assigned to Judge McAuliffe through 28
U.S.C. § 636(f).
II.

Appearance of Bias
Seguin contends that the referral of matters to the

undersigned magistrate judge and to Judge McAuliffe generates an
appearance of impropriety, warranting reassignment.

A federal

magistrate judge or district judge must recuse herself or
himself if the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or if the judge presiding over
the matter would create an “‘objective appearance’” of
partiality.

United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 63 (1st Cir.

2009) (citations omitted).

To avoid unnecessary delays and a

waste of judicial resources, unnecessary recusals are to be
avoided.
2000).

See United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.

“Thus, under § 455(a) a judge has a duty to recuse

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himself if his impartiality can reasonably be questioned; but
otherwise, he has a duty to sit.”

Id. (footnote omitted).

Seguin contends that (1) I am neither sufficiently
experienced, nor expert in Rhode Island law and corruption to
hear this matter; (2) I have made recommendations to Judge
DiClerico, sitting by designation in related cases, to issue
orders which Seguin considers erroneous, based on Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009); and (3) I have made rulings in this case, including an
order denying Seguin the ability to file electronically, which
she contends are erroneous.
Seguin further contends, as to both the undersigned
magistrate judge and Judge McAuliffe, that “all New Hampshire
magistrates and Article III judges” have demonstrated an
“institutional refusal” to apply the “bad faith” exception in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in the manner Seguin
considers proper.

That argument also boils down to a contention

that particular judges have issued rulings with which she
disagrees.
Even if all of Seguin’s allegations were true, they would
be legally insufficient to justify recusal.

The court’s alleged

lack of expertise in a particular subject matter is not relevant
to whether the court’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, and allegedly erroneous rulings or recommendations

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do not give rise to any requirement that the judge recuse
herself or himself in the same case, or from related matters.
Erroneous rulings may be a proper ground for appeal, but not for
recusal.

See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994).

Nothing in the record, and no ruling I have issued or
recommendation I have made here or in any other case, generates
any reasonable question as to my impartiality, and no ruling
issued by any other judge in the District of New Hampshire
generates such a question as to Judge McAuliffe.

Accordingly,

Seguin’s motions seeking recusal are denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motions (doc. nos.
127, 137 and 139) are denied.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States Magistrate Judge
October 17, 2013
cc:

Mary Seguin
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esq.
Susan Urso, Esq.
Erika J. Lindberg, Esq.
Mark W. Freel, Esq.
Rachel K. Caldwell, Esq.
Joseph Avanzato, Esq.
Leslie D. Parker, Esq.
Gordon P. Cleary, Esq.

LBM:nmd

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