Seguin v. Suttell et al

Filing 19

ORDER denying #2 Motion To Disclose Recusal Reasons on the Record and to Assign to the District of Massachusetts or Puerto Rico Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 291(b), 292(b), 294(c) or 295; granting #9 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint. -- Reset Answer Deadlines: Defendants' answers/responses to Complaint due by JULY 24, 2013. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Landya B McCafferty (New Hampshire) on 7/8/2013. (Duhamel, John) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/3/2013: #1 Exhibit A: Designation of District Judge For Service in Another District Within His Circuit) (Duhamel, John).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

Mary Seguin
v.

Civil No. 13-cv-095-JNL-LM

Paul Suttell et al.1

O R D E R
Before the court is plaintiff Mary Seguin’s “Motion to
Disclose Recusal Reasons on the Record and to Assign to the
District of Massachusetts or Puerto Rico” (doc. no. 2).
objection has been filed.

No

Also pending is defendants’ motion

for extension of time to file an answer (doc. no. 9), to which
plaintiff objects (doc. no. 11).

These motions are before this

magistrate judge for a ruling, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1), and prior orders in this case.

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In addition to Rhode Island Supreme Court Chief Justice
Paul Suttell, the complaint names as defendants: Providence,
Rhode Island Police Department Chief Hugh T. Clements, Jr.;
Rhode Island Family Court mediator and guardian ad litem Lori
Giarrusso; and the following Rhode Island state government
officials, all sued in their individual and official capacities:
Governor Lincoln D. Chafee; Health and Human Services Secretary
Steven M. Constantino; Child Support Office Director Sharon A.
Santilli and staff attorney Priscilla Glucksman; Family Court
Chief Judge Haiganush Bedrosian; and Associate Judges John E.
McCann, III, Stephen J. Capineri, and Michael B. Forte; Attorney
General Peter Kilmartin; and State Police Chief Steven G.
O’Donnell.

Background
Seguin has sued a number of Rhode Island defendants,
including the governor, the chief justice of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, and the chief judge and associate judges of the
Rhode Island Family Court.

Seguin characterizes this action as

involving allegations of corruption, retaliation for Seguin’s
exercise of her First Amendment rights, and discrimination on
the basis of race or ethnicity.

All of the federal judges in

the District of Rhode Island recused themselves, and the matter
was referred to the District of New Hampshire for assignment to
a district judge.

See Order (doc. no. 3).

The District of New

Hampshire chief judge concurred in the referral (doc. no. 4),
and the court assigned the matter to Judge Laplante.
Seguin’s motion (doc. no. 2) seeks a statement of the
reasons why the federal judges in Rhode Island recused
themselves in this matter, and further seeks re-assignment of
this case to a judge from either the District of Massachusetts
or the District of Puerto Rico, to avoid the “appearance of
impropriety” and to ensure that the presiding judge is familiar
with the “racial discrimination and diversity issues” she
alleges.

Plf’s Mot. at 5.

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Discussion
I.

Motion for Recusal Reasons and Reassignment
A.

Statement of Reasons

All of the judges in the District of Rhode Island recused
themselves sua sponte in this action, without detailing the
reasons therefor.

Seguin seeks disclosure of their reasons

because she suspects that those judges recused themselves
pursuant to a prearrangement with the District of New Hampshire,
whereby the receiving judge in New Hampshire agreed to dismiss
her claims, regardless of the merits.

She cites the dismissal

of her two prior actions by a judge in the District of New
Hampshire, sitting by designation,2 and the dismissal of a third
case, McKenna v. DeSisto, No. 11-cv-602-SJM-LM, 2012 WL 4486268
(D.R.I. Sept. 27, 2012), which the First Circuit affirmed “for
substantially the reasons set forth” in the district court’s

2

See Seguin v. Bedrosian, No. 12-cv-614-JD-LM (D.R.I.);
Seguin v. Chafee, No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I.). Judge DiClerico,
presiding in Bedrosian and Chafee, dismissed those two cases,
and Seguin’s appeals of the relevant orders are pending in the
First Circuit. See Bedrosian, No. 12-cv-614-JD-LM, 2013 WL
367722 (D.R.I. Jan. 30, 2013), appeal filed, No. 13-1242 (1st
Cir. Feb. 19, 2013); Chafee, No. 12-cv-708-JD, 2012 WL 6553621
(D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2012), appeal filed, No. 13-1241 (1st Cir. Feb.
20, 2013). A third case filed by Seguin naming similar
defendants, Seguin v. Textron, No. 13-cv-012-SJM-LM (D.R.I.
filed Jan. 10, 2013), is pending before Judge McAuliffe, who is
also sitting in the District of Rhode Island by designation.

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order.

See McKenna v. DeSisto, No. 12-2217, slip op. at 1 (1st

Cir. June 10, 2013).

Seguin further contends that the recusal

of the Rhode Island judges without a statement of reasons smacks
of an intent to cover up state judicial corruption in Rhode
Island.
It is not generally the role of the judge receiving a case
after a recusal to record the reasons why the recusal occurred.
Whether to detail the reasons in the first place is an issue
generally committed to the recusing judge’s discretion.

“Judges

are ‘under no obligation to provide a statement of reasons for
recusal,’ and typically do not make any record when, as here,
they recuse themselves sua sponte.”

United States v. Casas, 376

F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

“Indeed in some

circumstances a judge’s silence on such a matter would be
appropriate to avoid indirectly influencing other judges.”
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 1981).
Seguin’s assertion of a cover-up, based solely on speculative
claims of prejudicial agreements and an inter-judicial
conspiracy, not grounded in any facts to support her assertions,
does not provide grounds for granting her motion.

Accordingly,

the motion seeking a statement of reasons for recusal is denied.

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B.

Assignment to New Hampshire Judicial Officers
1.

Judge Laplante

Seguin asserts that this action is not properly before
Judge Laplante, and that the chief judge of the First Circuit
must act on her motion by assigning this case to another judge,
pursuant to authorities including 28 U.S.C. § 292(b).

Seguin is

mistaken on both counts.
When all of the judges in the District of Rhode Island
recused themselves, the matter was referred out of the district.
A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), authorizes the chief
judge of the relevant circuit, in the public interest, to
designate and assign a district judge within that circuit to sit
temporarily by designation in another district within the same
circuit.

On December 31, 2012, First Circuit Chief Judge Lynch

determined that the public interest warranted the designation
and assignment of Judge Laplante to sit in the District of Rhode
Island for cases (like this case) filed in 2013.

The relevant

order so designating Judge Laplante is on file in the clerks’
offices in the Districts of New Hampshire and Rhode Island, and
is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

See Ex. A, Designation of

District Judge Laplante for Service in Another District Within
His Circuit (Dec. 31, 2012).

Judge Laplante is thus authorized

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to preside in this case.

See McDowell v. United States, 159

U.S. 596, 601 (1895) (out-of-district judge’s orders were not
open to question because judge was qualified de facto by virtue
of circuit court chief judge’s order of assignment); see also
Riley v. United States, No. 1:12-CV-00047-GZS, 2013 WL 762358,
*2 (D.N.H. Jan. 28, 2013) (out-of-district judge’s authority to
preside in case in which he sat by designation derived from
judge’s underlying Article III powers), report and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 754861 (D.N.H. Feb. 25, 2013).
Furthermore, Seguin lacks standing to challenge the order
designating Judge Laplante to sit in cases in the District of
Rhode Island.

See United States v. Royals, 777 F.2d 1089, 1091

(5th Cir. 1985); Reynolds v. Lentz, 243 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir.
1957) (“it is well settled that [plaintiffs] have no standing to
question the validity of the designation of [an out-of-district
judge] or his right to sit as a Judge in the court below”).
Accordingly, the motion to reassign this action is denied, to
the extent it asserts that Judge Laplante lacks authority to
preside in this case.
2.

Magistrate Judge McCafferty

Seguin contends that the referral of matters to the
undersigned magistrate judge is unauthorized, and generates an

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appearance of impropriety.

A federal statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(f), authorizes the temporary assignment of a magistrate
judge from another district to perform duties under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 636(a), (b), or (c), on an emergency basis, and upon the
concurrence of the chief judges of the affected districts.

Such

a referral and concurrence occurred in this case, as the recusal
of all of the judges in the District of Rhode Island created an
emergency for purposes of applying § 636(f).
nos. 3 and 4).

See Orders (doc.

Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge is

duly authorized to perform duties in this action.
3.

Appearance of Impropriety

Seguin contends that the referral of matters to the
District of New Hampshire, and particularly to the undersigned
magistrate judge, generates an appearance of impropriety,
warranting reassignment.

A federal district judge or magistrate

judge must recuse himself or herself if the judge’s
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. §
455(a), or if the judge presiding over the matter would create
an “‘objective appearance’” of partiality.

United States v.

Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 63 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
avoid unnecessary delays and a waste of judicial resources,
unnecessary recusals are to be avoided.

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See United States v.

To

Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2000).

“Thus, under § 455(a)

a judge has a duty to recuse himself if his impartiality can
reasonably be questioned; but otherwise, he has a duty to sit.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
Seguin contends that (1) I am neither sufficiently
experienced, nor expert in Rhode Island law and corruption to
hear this matter; and (2) I have made recommendations to Judge
DiClerico, sitting by designation in related cases, to issue
orders which Seguin considers erroneous.

Even if all of

Seguin’s allegations were true, they would be legally
insufficient to justify recusal.

The court’s alleged lack of

expertise in a particular subject matter is not relevant to
whether the court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
and allegedly erroneous rulings or recommendations in related
proceedings do not give rise to any requirement that the judge
recuse herself or himself in a subsequent proceeding.

Cf.

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (“It has long
been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the
same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials
involving the same defendant.”).

Erroneous rulings may be a

proper ground for appeal, but not for recusal.

8

See id. at 554.

Nothing in the record generates any reasonable question as
to the impartiality of any judicial officer in New Hampshire.
Accordingly, the request to reassign the matter to judicial
officers in Massachusetts or Puerto Rico is denied, to the
extent it is based on Seguin’s contentions about an appearance
of impropriety.
4.

Populations

Seguin asserts that the racial components of the population
of Northern New England renders judges in Massachusetts or
Puerto Rico more familiar with “discrimination and diversity”
issues pertinent to her claims than judges from the District of
New Hampshire.

Seguin cited similar U.S. Census statistics when

she sought Judge DiClerico’s recusal in another case, arguing
that a decision in that case would impact a relatively small
number of Spanish-speaking homes in New Hampshire.

See Chafee,

No. 12-cv-708-JD, 2013 WL 124301, at *2 (D.R.I. Jan. 9, 2013).
This court, similarly, finds Seguin’s arguments based on
population statistics to be unavailing in her quest to have this
case reassigned to a judge from Massachusetts or Puerto Rico.
Accordingly, the court denies Seguin’s motion (doc. no. 2).

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II.

Extension
Defendants seek an extension, until July 24, 2013, to file

their response to the complaint.

Defendants assert that they

require additional time to examine the complaint, which includes
more than 150 pages and 160 paragraphs, and to evaluate the
suitability of an argument seeking this court’s abstention from
this action.

The court finds good cause for the requested

extension, and grants the motion.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion (doc. no. 2)
is denied, and defendants’ motion (doc. no. 9) is granted.
Defendants shall file their response to the complaint by July
24, 2013.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States Magistrate Judge
Sitting by Designation
July 8, 2013
cc:

Mary Seguin, pro se
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Esq.
Susan Urso, Esq.

LBM:nmd

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