Reiners v. The Providence Probate Court et al
Filing
41
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 31 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and sua sponte granting Summary Judgment for the defendants on all counts. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 9/12/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
THE PROVIDENCE PROBATE COURT; PAUL )
V. JABOUR, in his Official
)
Capacity as Clerk of the
)
Providence Probate Court; and
)
CITY OF PROVIDENCE,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
PATRICIA ROBISHAW, Executrix of
the Estate of H.E.R.,
C.A. No. 13-221 S
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
This
petition
matter
emanates
relating
to
from
H.E.R.
a
and
state
her
herself due to Alzheimer’s disease.
executrix
of
H.E.R.’s
Estate
court
capacity
guardianship
to
care
for
Patricia Robishaw, as the
(“Plaintiff”),
challenges
the
lawfulness and constitutionality of two fees associated with
the guardianship petition:
(1) the fees charged by H.E.R.’s
court-appointed guardian ad litem (“GAL Fee”); and (2) the
statutory
fee
for
filing
a
petition
Probate Court (“Probate Court Fee”).
in
the
Rhode
Now before the Court is
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”).
31.)
Island
(ECF No.
In it, Plaintiff asks the Court to hold that the two
1
fees violate Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (Counts I and V), the United
States Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
(Counts II, III and VI), and Article I, Section 2 and 5 of the
Rhode
Island
Constitution
(Count
IV
and
VII).
Mot., ECF No. 31; Am. Compl., ECF No. 10.) 1
reasons,
Plaintiff’s
Motion
is
DENIED,
(See
Pl.’s
For the following
and
the
Court
sua
sponte GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants. 2
1
In her opening Memorandum, Plaintiff claims to be
moving for summary judgment on only Count I (ADA claim as to
the Probate Court Fee), Count II (Federal due process claim as
to the Probate Court Fee), Count III (Federal equal protection
claim as to the Probate Court Fee), Count IV (Rhode Island
constitutional claim as to the Probate Court Fee), and Count V
(ADA claim as to the GAL Fee).
(See Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s
Rule 56(a) Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) 1, ECF No. 31-1.)
Both Plaintiff’s and the State’s briefs, however, include
argument
on
her
other
two
Counts,
Count
VI
(Federal
constitutional claims as to the GAL Fee) and Count VII (Rhode
Island constitutional claims as to the GAL Fee). (See, e.g.,
Pl.’s Reply to Amicus Curiae State of Rhode Island’s Mem.
(“Pl.’s Reply”) 35-38, ECF No. 35; Amicus Curiae, State of
Rhode Island’s, Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def. (“State’s Opp’n”)
49, ECF No. 33.)
Based on Plaintiff’s briefing, the Court
considers Plaintiff to have moved for summary judgment on all
the Counts raised in her First Amended Complaint and considers
the merits of each.
2
The named Defendants in this suit, the City of
Providence and Providence Probate Court (collectively the
“City”) filed a Notice of Election Not to Defend Against
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Notice”). (ECF No. 24.) The
City made this election in an attempt to insulate itself from
Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.
According to the City, since
Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a state statute,
it had a choice: “[E]ither defend the state statute and risk
being liable for attorney’s fees or choose not to defend and
suffer no prejudice in cases involving declaratory and
2
I.
Background 3
The events leading up to this action commenced on May 24,
2012,
when
Patricia
Robishaw
filed
a
petition
with
the
Providence Probate Court asking the court to appoint Robishaw
as guardian of her aunt, H.E.R.
¶ 35, ECF No. 29.)
(Stipulation of Facts (“SOF”)
Robishaw accompanied the petition with a
$30.00 filing fee.
(Id. ¶ 38.)
Robishaw also included a
Decision Making Assessment Tool (“DMAT”) from Brian Ott, M.D.
(Id. ¶ 36.)
(see
Part
Dr. Ott was not H.E.R.’s primary care physician,
1
of
Ex.
to
SOF
PL0050,
ECF
No.
29-1),
but
nevertheless diagnosed H.E.R. with Alzheimer’s disease “which
will become progressively more severe over time.”
Ex. to SOF PL00143, ECF No. 29-2.)
(Part 2 of
Based on his assessment,
Dr. Ott concluded that H.E.R. required a substitute decision-
injunctive relief.”
(Id. at 7.)
The Court will not address
the merits of the City’s position. But in light of the City’s
election, and to ensure that the Court had an adequate record
on which to decide Plaintiff’s claims, it invited the State of
Rhode Island (“State”) to file a memorandum in response to
Plaintiff’s Motion.
Plaintiff did not object and the State
complied with the Court’s request.
(See generally State’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 33.)
Consequently, the Court considers the
State’s brief in deciding this Motion.
3
The Plaintiff and the State filed a Stipulation of
Facts (“SOF”) along with supporting exhibits from which the
Court draws the majority of this background.
(ECF Nos. 29,
29-1, and 29-2.)
The Court, however, does not rely on
statements that amount to legal conclusions, such as those
averring that H.E.R. was “substantially limited” in “one or
more of H.E.R.’s major life activities.”
(See SOF ¶ 37, ECF
No. 29.)
3
maker for financial matters, as well as limited assistance in
health care matters, relationships, and residential matters.
(Id. at PL00146.)
On May 24, 2012, in response to Robishaw’s petition, the
Providence
Probate
Court
appointed
Robert
R.
Nocera
as
H.E.R.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 33-15-7.
(SOF ¶ 43, ECF No. 29.)
After interviewing H.E.R.
and Robishaw, as required by statute, Nocera filed a Guardian
Ad Litem Report with the Providence Probate Court.
47.)
The
report
investigation
contained
into
H.E.R.’s
a
detailed
condition
account
and
(Id. ¶
of
Nocera’s
concluded,
inter
alia, that “[t]he guardian ad litem is of the opinion that
[H.E.R.] is in need of at least a limited guardian at this
time.”
(Part 2 of Ex. to SOF PL00129, ECF No. 29-2; Id. ¶¶
47-48.)
After Nocera filed his report, H.E.R. formally objected
to
the
primary
petition
care
and
submitted
physician,
Dr.
a
competing
Richard
psychologist, Dr. Eugene D’Andrea.
J.
DMAT
from
Ruggieri
and
her
a
(SOF ¶ 51, ECF No. 29.)
Drs. Ruggieri and D’Andrea concluded that H.E.R. did not need
a
substitute
decision-maker
in
financial,
relationships, or residential matters.
PL0117; ECF No. 29-2.)
4
health
care,
(Part 2 of Ex. to SOF
The probate court refused to credit Dr. Ruggieri’s DMAT
because it relied on guidance from Dr. D’Andrea and instead
ordered H.E.R. to submit to another examination by Dr. Ott.
(SOF ¶ 57.)
Dr. Ott examined H.E.R. on July 19, 2012 and
arrived at the same conclusions stated in his original DMAT.
(SOF ¶ 59; see Part 1 of Ex. to SOF Pl0090-91, ECF No. 29-1.)
With
Dr.
Ott’s
follow-up
report,
the
probate
conducted a chambers conference with counsel.
No.
29.)
Arlene
At
Violet
the
conference,
would
be
it
was
appointed
finances and health care.
(SOF ¶ 60, ECF
agreed
that
H.E.R.’s
(Id. ¶ 61.)
court
Attorney
guardian
for
They agreed not to
appoint a guardian to manage H.E.R’s personal relationships or
residential matters.
Pursuant
filed
a
to
(Id.)
her
Universal
guardianship
Inventory
of
H.E.R.’s
probate court on December 6, 2012.
inventory
and
pursuant
to
R.I.
responsibilities,
estate
(Id. ¶ 65.)
Gen.
Laws
§
Violet
with
the
Based on this
33-22-21,
the
probate court clerk’s office calculated the Probate Court Fee
due
on
H.E.R.’s
estate
as
$1,500.
(Id.
¶
67.)
After
subtracting the $30.00 paid when Robishaw filed the petition,
H.E.R. owed the probate court $1,470.
noted
that
H.E.R.’s
“inventory
additional percentage is paid.”
(Id. ¶ 68.)
[would]
not
be
The court
filed
(Id. (emphasis omitted).)
5
until
In a letter to the Clerk of the probate court, H.E.R.
objected to this fee, claiming it violated Title II of the ADA
and both the Federal and Rhode Island Constitutions.
of Ex. to SOF PL 000152, ECF No. 29-2.)
reflect
letter.
whether
the
probate
court
(Part 2
The record does not
ever
responded
However, H.E.R. never paid the fee.
to
this
(See Samos Aff.
¶ 18, Amicus Curiae, State of Rhode Island’s, App. 83, ECF No.
33-1.)
Around the same time, Nocera sought his GAL Fee in the
amount of $1,993.75 pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-7(h).
(SOF
¶
multiple
70,
ECF
No.
grounds,
29.)
including
H.E.R.
that
objected
it
to
violated
the
the
various provisions in the Rhode Island Constitution.
71.)
fee
ADA
on
and
(SOF ¶
The probate court denied H.E.R.’s objection and ordered
H.E.R. to pay a reduced $1,100 fee.
(Id. ¶ 74.)
H.E.R.
complied, but also appealed the probate court’s ruling to the
Rhode Island Superior Court.
(SOF ¶¶ 75-78.)
The appeal is
still pending.
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
Fed. R.
An issue of fact is only considered “‘genuine’
if it ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’”
6
Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting
Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st
Cir. 1994)).
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
court must “examine[] the entire record ‘in the light most
flattering
to
the
nonmovant
inferences
in
that
party’s
and
indulg[e]
favor.’”
Id.
all
at
reasonable
959
(quoting
Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581).
Further, “a district court has the legal power to render
summary
judgment
in
favor
of
the
party
opposing
a
summary
judgment motion even though [he or she] has made no formal
cross-motion
Crowley
Mar.
under
rule
Corp.,
824
56.”
Nat’l
F.2d
131,
Expositions,
133
(1st
Inc.
Cir.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
v.
1987)
To do so,
however, (1) there must have been “a reasonable opportunity to
glean the material” facts through the discovery process, and
(2) the targeted party must have received appropriate notice
and opportunity to present “evidence on the essential elements
of the claims or defense[s]” at issue.
Sanchez v. Triple-S
Mgmt., Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); accord Tucard,
LLC v. Fid. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 215,
222 (D. Mass. 2008).
For the “notice” requirement – at least
where the targeted party has moved for summary judgment - “the
question is whether, given the procedural circumstances of the
case,
‘the
original
movant
.
7
.
.
has
had
an
adequate
opportunity to show that there is a genuine issue [in the
case]
and
that
[his
or
her]
opponent
judgment as a matter of law.’”
133–34
(emphasis
in
is
not
entitled
to
Nat’l Expositions, 824 F.2d at
original)
(quoting
10A
Charles
Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2720, at 34 (1983)).
III. Analysis 4
The two fees that form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims
have different forms and functions.
The GAL Fee compensates
GALs for the advisory services they provide to Rhode Island’s
probate courts.
Under the State’s guardianship statute, the
probate court must appoint a GAL whenever a petition for an
4
The State begins its opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
by urging the Court to deny it on abstention and mootness
grounds.
The State argues that abstention is proper because
the GAL Fee involves a state court order “uniquely in
furtherance of the state court[’s] ability to perform [its]
judicial function[].”
(See State’s Opp’n 9, ECF No. 33
(quoting Sprint Comm., Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588
(2013)). The State, however, cites to no authority suggesting
that the GAL Fee falls into the same categories as contempt
orders, see generally Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977),
statues allowing courts to collect judgments, see generally
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), or in any way
implicates “the process[] by which the [s]tate compels
compliance with the judgments of its courts.”
Id. at 13-14.
Consequently, the State’s Younger abstention argument fails.
And Plaintiff’s other abstention arguments are unavailing. As
detailed herein, federal issues predominate Plaintiff’s claims
and the State cites to no authority that overcomes this
Court’s “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear cases over
which it has such jurisdiction. Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591.
The Court also declines to consider the State’s mootness
argument. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff’s claims are not
moot, Plaintiff’s Motion fails for the reasons outlined below.
8
adult guardianship is filed.
The
statute
then
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-7(a).
specifically
sets
out
a
GAL’s
responsibilities:
The duties of a guardian ad litem shall include all
of the following:
(1) Personally visiting the respondent;
(2) Explaining
to
the
respondent
the
nature,
purpose, and legal effect of the appointment of
a guardian;
(3) Explaining
to
the
respondent
the
hearing
procedure, including, but not limited to, the
right to contest the petition, to request
limits on the guardian’s powers, to object to a
particular person being appointed guardian, to
be
present
at
the
hearing,
and
to
be
represented by legal counsel;
(4) Informing the respondent of the name of the
person known to be seeking appointment as
guardian;
(5) Reviewing
the
decision
making
assessment
tool(s),
petition
for
guardianship/limited
guardianship, and the notice;
(6) Interviewing
the
prospective
guardian
by
telephone or in person; and
(7) Making determinations, and informing the court
of
those
determinations,
on
all
of
the
following:
(i)
Whether the respondent wishes to be
present at the hearing.
(ii)
Whether the respondent wishes to contest
the petition.
(iii)
Whether the respondent wishes limits
placed on the guardian’s powers; and
(iv)
Whether the respondent objects to a
particular
person
being
appointed
guardian;
(v)
Whether the respondent wishes to be
represented by legal counsel.
Unless waived by the court, at least three (3)
days prior to the hearing, the guardian ad
litem shall file a report substantially in the
form as set forth in § 33-15-47 with the court
9
and shall mail or hand deliver a copy to each
attorney of record.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-7(c).
For these services, the statute
entitles GALs to a fee that “shall not exceed four hundred
dollars
($400)
which
shall
be
paid
by
the
petitioner
for
guardianship if a permanent guardian is not appointed for the
respondent
or
by
the
guardian
of
permanent guardian is appointed.”
7(h).
the
ward’s
estate
if
a
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-
The probate court, however, retains discretion to award
fees in excess of $400 “if the circumstance[s] warrant.”
Id.
The Probate Court Fee, on the other hand, amounts to a
court filing fee and, unlike the GAL Fee, is not limited to
guardianship proceedings.
to
“every
petition
By its plain language, it applies
for
the
appointment
of
a
custodian,
administrator, guardian, or conservator, or for the probate of
a will” made in the probate court.
21(a).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-22-
To file a probate court petition, the court charges 1%
of a ward’s or decedent’s personal property that “in no event
shall
. . . be less than thirty dollars ($30.00) nor more
than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) . . . .”
Id.
Further, though not expressly stated in the statute, Rhode
Island
courts
authority,
have
courts
held
may
that
waive
behalf of indigent people.
pursuant
probate
to
court
their
common
filing
fees
law
on
See Burgos v. McElroy, No. C.A.
10
NO. 78-3857, 1979 WL 196097, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 26,
1979).
Title II of the ADA 5
A.
Plaintiff first alleges that the GAL and Probate Court
Fees violate Title II of the ADA, claiming that they amount to
surcharges assessed on the disabled for services required by
the Act.
Title II of the ADA provides that:
no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason
of
such
disability,
be
excluded
from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Under the regulations interpreting this
provision,
[a] public entity may not place a surcharge on a
particular individual with a disability or any group
of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs
of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids
or program accessibility, that are required to
provide
that
individual
or
group
with
the
nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or
this part.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f). 6
Put another way, charges for services
violate the ADA (1) when the fee pays for services required by
5
Although Plaintiff asserts separate claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation
Act, Plaintiff concedes that, at least as related to this
Motion, the analysis for both claims is the same and limits
her discussion to the ADA. (Pl.’s Mem. 1 n.1, ECF No. 31-1.)
The Court will do the same.
11
the ADA; and (2) when nondisabled people do not also incur the
fee.
See Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1711 (9th Cir.
1999); Duprey v. State of Conn., Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 28
F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (D. Conn. 1998); see also Klingler v.
Dir., Dep’t of Revenue, State of Mo., 433 F.3d 1078, 1082 (8th
Cir.), opinion supplemented on reh’g, 455 F.3d 888 (8th Cir.
2006).
The Court will assume, without deciding, that H.E.R. was
a
“qualified
requirement
individual
for
with
coverage
a
under
disability,”
the
ADA.
a
See
threshold
Parker
v.
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)
(reviewing the required elements of an ADA claim under Title
II).
has
Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s claim still fails because she
not
demonstrated
that
either
fee
is
a
discriminatory
surcharge against the disabled.
1.
The
GAL
Fee
pays
for
services
primarily
provided to the court, not to putative wards.
Plaintiff’s
argument
impermissible
surcharge
She
to
attempts
cast
that
fails
GALs
the
on
as
6
GAL
the
Fee
test’s
providing
constitutes
first
an
element.
communication
and
“Because Congress explicitly authorized the Attorney
General to promulgate regulations under the ADA, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12134(a), the regulations ‘must [be given] legislative and
hence
controlling
weight
unless
they
are
arbitrary,
capricious, or plainly contrary to the statute[.]’” Parker v.
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morton, 467
U.S. 822, 834 (1984)).
12
interpretive
services
for
disabled
individuals.
Though
Plaintiff’s argument is less than clear, she seems to assert
that these services are “services required by the ADA” for two
reasons:
(1) because they fall within Title II’s definition
of “auxiliary aids and services,” see 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1);
and
(2)
more
generally,
because
they
protect
disabled
individuals’ due process rights by providing them access to
the courts.
(Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Rule 56(a) Mot. for Summ.
J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) 23-24, 36, ECF No. 31-1.).
Neither argument
is convincing.
With
argument,
regard
to
Plaintiff
her
is
“auxiliary
correct
information to putative wards.
that
aids
GALs
and
services”
provide
some
Under the statute, they must
(1) explain to the respondent “the nature, purpose, and legal
effect” of a guardianship appointment; (2) explain the hearing
procedure to the respondent including the respondent’s rights
under the statute; and (3) inform the respondent of the name
of the person seeking appointment as the guardian.
Laws § 33-15-7(c)(2)-(4).
R.I. Gen.
But this does not transform a GAL
into a service akin to those defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1).
There,
the
statute
expressly
limits
“auxiliary
aids
and
services” to those “similar” to “methods of making” “aurally”
and
“visually”
delivered
materials
available
with “hearing” or “visual” impairments.
13
to
individuals
42 U.S.C. § 12103(1).
Plaintiff points to no authority that suggests this definition
is so broad as to include the explanations GALs provide to
putative wards.
And Plaintiff’s second argument – that GALs provide a
required ADA service by ensuring “pre-deprivation process and
intermediated [sic] access . . . to the probate court” (Pl.’s
Mem. 36, ECF No. 31-1) – fares no better.
She bases it on the
Supreme Court’s holding in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004),
where
the
Court
considered
whether
Title
II
constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ authority under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 533-34.
The Court held
in the affirmative, at least as applied “to the class of cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts[.]”
Id.
As the Court held, this is because Title II’s “duty to
accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established
due
process
principle
practicability,
a
State
that,
must
‘within
afford
to
the
all
limits
individuals
meaningful opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.”
of
a
Id. at
532 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
Seizing this language, Plaintiff argues that the GAL Fee is
impermissible
because
it
charges
the
disabled
for
services
that ensure they have adequate access to the probate court.
The Court agrees that the ADA requires public entities to
provide the disabled adequate access to courts.
14
But Plaintiff
fails
to
show
how
the
GAL
Fee
violates
this
requirement.
First, as explained in the Court’s subsequent discussion of
Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the GAL Fee did not affect
H.E.R.’s
access
to
the
Probate
Court.
(See
infra
Section
III.B.)
Prior to paying the fee, Plaintiff (1) brought her
petition, (2) the probate court appointed a GAL, (3) the GAL
performed his statutory services, and (4) H.E.R. was able to
contest
the
GAL’s
recommendations.
Indeed,
after
the
GAL
submitted his report to the probate court, H.E.R. objected to
the GAL’s recommendation, and ultimately, with the help of her
attorney, entered into a settlement to resolve the petition.
Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the GAL Fee created
an
“obstacle[]
judicial
to
[H.E.R.’s]
proceeding[]”
process rights.
that
full
in
any
participation
way
in
implicated
[the]
her
due
Lane, 541 U.S. at 523.
Further, and more to the point, Plaintiff overstates the
“communication”
provide
to
proceedings.
or
“interpretive”
putative
wards
in
services
Rhode
GALs
Island
actually
guardianship
Although, as detailed above, GALs do communicate
with putative wards, their primary purpose is to assist the
court in its guardianship determination.
when
communicating
with
a
information for the court.
putative
ward,
For example, even
GALs
must
gather
Among other things, they must find
out whether the putative ward wishes to contest a petition,
15
limit the powers of a guardian, object to a particular person
being appointed guardian, and be represented by counsel.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-7(c).
See
And GALs must also review the
information submitted in support of a guardianship petition
and
interview
the
prospective
guardian.
Id.
With
this
information, GALs provide a report to the court summarizing
their findings and send a copy of the report to each attorney
of record.
See id.
Submission of this report constitutes
GALs’ work product in the guardianship proceeding and ends
GALs’
statutory
involved
in
responsibilities.
the
proceeding
to
A
GAL
ensure
does
the
not
putative
remain
ward
understands them and does not advocate on the ward’s behalf.
These roles are left to the ward’s counsel, family members,
guardian,
or
the
court.
Thus,
as
multiple
courts
have
similarly concluded, GALs primarily function as the court’s
independent investigator.
See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1989) (discussing a GAL’s role in a Rhode Island
child
gathers
custody
action
information,
and
noting
prepares
that
a
“[a]
report
GAL
and
typically
makes
a
recommendation to the court regarding a custody disposition”);
see also Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 360 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he guardian ad litem has merely the same authority as a
court investigator, which is to investigate and report back to
the
judge
whether
the
evidence
16
warrants
appointment
of
a
guardian for the putative ward.”).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s
argument, GALs do not ensure disabled respondents’ access to a
court, at least not to a level that implicates Title II of the
ADA.
See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-32 (“But Title II does not
require States to employ any and all means to make judicial
services accessible to persons with disabilities . . . .”).
For this reason, the GAL Fee does not constitute an unlawful
surcharge
under
the
ADA
and
Plaintiff
is
not
entitled
to
summary judgment on Count V. 7
2.
The Probate Court Fee is paid by all users of
the probate court, not just disabled users.
Like the GAL Fee, the Probate Court Fee also does not
violate
the
ADA,
though
for
a
different
reason.
By
its
express terms, it fails to satisfy the second requirement of a
“surcharge” – that the fee apply only to the disabled.
As
noted above, the Probate Court Fee applies to all users of the
probate court, not just those involved in adult guardianship
proceedings.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-22-21(a) (“The fees in
probate courts shall be as follows:
for every petition for
the appointment of a custodian, administrator, guardian, or
conservator, or for the probate of a will . . . .”).
7
The State also argues that the GAL Fee is not
exclusively applied to the disabled and, thus, fails to
satisfy the second requirement of a surcharge under the ADA.
Since the fee does not satisfy the first element, the Court
need not reach this argument.
17
Plaintiff does not argue that each subset of individuals
subject to the probate court fees is “disabled” under the ADA.
Instead,
she
urges
the
Court
to
overlook
one
class
of
individuals who must pay the fee – those seeking to probate a
will.
According to Plaintiff, this group should not factor
into the Court’s analysis because it includes the estates of
the deceased.
But this argument is without merit.
the
which
case
on
“surcharge”
as
a
Plaintiff
fee
“that
principally
nondisabled
Although
relies
people
defined
would
not
incur,” the court does not distinguish between actual people
and
other
legal
entities,
such
as
corporations
or
an
individual’s estate:
[i]f nondisabled people pay the same fee for an
equivalent service, the charge to disabled people
would not constitute a surcharge on a “required”
measure. Thus, for example, a state can charge a fee
for disabled license plates so long as it charges
the same fee for nondisabled license plates.
Dare, 191 F.3d at 1171 (emphasis added); see also Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (collecting cases in
which the Supreme Court has recognized that First Amendment
protection extends to corporations).
What matters is whether
or not a fee is levied exclusively on the disabled or whether
it
is
shared
Plaintiff
has
among
not
all
shown
entities
that
using
Rhode
a
Island
service.
only
Since
levies
the
Probate Court Fee on the disabled, Plaintiff has failed to
18
establish the second element of a surcharge violative of Title
II
and,
accordingly,
Plaintiff
is
not
entitled
to
summary
judgment on Count I.
B.
Due Process and Equal Protection Claims
For her constitutional arguments, Plaintiff claims that
both
the
GAL
and
Probate
Court
Fees
restrict
disabled
individuals’ access to the courts, thereby offending their due
process and equal protection rights.
Plaintiff’s arguments,
however, are at best underdeveloped.
Her analysis provides
little
distinction
between
her
due
process
and
equal
protection claims and no distinction between the Federal and
State Constitutions under which she asserts them.
(See Pl.’s
Mem. 44-46, ECF No. 31-1; Pl.’s Reply to Amicus Curiae State
of Rhode Island’s Mem. (“Pl.’s Reply”) 35-38, ECF No. 35.)
Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts that the GAL and Probate
Court
Fees
violated
H.E.R’s
rights
because
they
amount
to
“surcharge costs, fees, and taxes” that “burden the right of
individuals
. . . .”
with
disabilities
to
access
probate
courts
(Pl.’s Reply 35, ECF No. 35.)
To be sure, Plaintiff’s basic premise is correct – fees
that deprive a class of individuals access to the courts can
offend
due
process
and
equal
protection
principles.
See
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110-15 (1996) (summarizing the
Supreme
Court’s
application
of
19
due
process
and
equal
protection principles to court fees in the civil and criminal
contexts).
narrow
Particularly
subset
violations.
of
fees
in
civil
actually
cases,
however,
presents
only
a
constitutional
Id. at 113; see also Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382
(cautioning
“[w]e
individuals
to
do
the
not
courts
decide
is
a
that
access
right
that
for
is,
all
in
all
circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause”).
And
Plaintiff has not articulated how the GAL and Probate Court
Fees fit into this narrow subset of fees.
For starters, Plaintiff has not established a threshold
requirement of her argument – that the fees deprived her of
access to the probate court.
Both Boddie and Lane, the two
cases on which Plaintiff principally bases her constitutional
arguments, turn on the fact that the barriers in each case
took
away
before
a
a
person’s
court.
ability
In
Lane
to
the
have
a
meaningful
barriers
were
hearing
physical
–
architectural structures (or the lack thereof) that prohibited
individuals
with
disabilities
court,
U.S.
at
541
financial
–
court
513-14;
from
physically
in
fees
filing
Boddie,
that
the
entering
barriers
precluded
the
were
indigent
individuals from pursing their divorce cases, 401 U.S. at 38081.
At least based on the record before the Court, the same
cannot be said for Plaintiff.
As noted above, before being
assessed the GAL and Probate Court Fees, H.E.R. received GAL
20
services,
objected
to
the
GAL’s
recommendation,
received
a
hearing before the probate court, and entered into a mutual
settlement of the guardianship petition.
The only evidence
Plaintiff claims shows she was somehow denied access to the
courts
is
the
probate
court’s
notation
that
it
would
not
process H.E.R’s inventory until she paid the Probate Court
Fee.
Plaintiff,
notation,
or
however,
Plaintiff’s
presents
failure
to
no
pay
evidence
the
that
fee,
this
actually
affected her access to the court, and based on the stipulated
facts before the Court, the Court can find none.
thus,
has
not
established
that
either
fee
Plaintiff,
violated
her
constitutional rights.
And even assuming that H.E.R.’s failure to pay one of the
fees deprived her of probate court services, Plaintiff has not
established that this deprivation offends her due process or
equal
protection
rights.
Plaintiff
relies
on
Harper
v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), to
argue “[i]t is axiomatic that fundamental rights, such as the
right to access courts, cannot lawfully be taxed.”
Mem. 45, ECF No. 31-1.)
This assertion, at least as applied
to court fees, is incorrect. 8
8
(Pl.’s
“[I]n the mine run of cases
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the
Supreme Court considered poll taxes and held “that a State
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
In
21
. . . [s]tates are not forced by the Constitution to adjust
all
[court]
tolls
circumstances.’”
v.
Illinois,
to
account
for
‘disparity
in
material
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123-24 (quoting Griffin
351
U.S.
concurring in judgment)).
12,
23
(1956)
(Frankfurter,
J.,
Instead, courts undertake a case-
by-case analysis of court fees to determine the scope of the
burden the fees place on litigants.
U.S. 102.
See generally M.L.B., 519
In civil cases, for a court fee to offend due
process and equal protection, it must “work a unique kind of
deprivation” such as depriving individuals of the ability to
defend
destroy
against
“the
permanently
relationship.”
Id.
awesome
all
at
authority
legal
127-28
recognition
(internal
alteration, and citation omitted).
no
argument
or
authority
the
of
[s]tate
the
to
parental
quotation
marks,
Here, Plaintiff provides
suggesting
deprivation rises to this level.
of
that
her
alleged
Consequently, Plaintiff has
payment of any fee an electoral standard.” 383 U.S. 663, 666
(1966). As the Court noted, “[w]e have long been mindful that
where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined.”
Id. at 670.
The Court then concluded that poll
taxes offended equal protection, because “wealth or fee paying
has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so
burdened or conditioned.”
Id.
As detailed in M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), and herein, the Court has not
extended this sweeping rule to court fees, but instead
analyzes court fees on a case-by-case basis to determine if
they offend equal protection or due process principles.
22
failed to carry her burden at summary judgment as to Counts
II, III, IV, VI, and VII.
C.
Defendants’ Entitlement to Summary Judgment
That Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden at summary
judgment on any of her claims, however, does not mean that
this case must proceed to trial.
As detailed above, district
courts have the authority to grant summary judgment to the
non-moving
party
opportunity
to
when
glean
“1)
there
material
has
facts
been
through
a
reasonable
the
discovery
process, and 2) the targeted party received appropriate notice
and opportunity to present evidence on the essential elements
of the claim or defense.”
Tucard, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 222
(citing Sanchez, 492 F.3d at 7).
Here, Plaintiffs had six
months to conduct fact discovery (see Standard Pretrial Order,
EFC No. 17), and ample opportunity to move to reopen discovery
had Plaintiff believed she needed additional information to
support
her
Further,
in
Motion
her
own
or
to
counter
briefs,
the
Plaintiff
State’s
had
“an
defenses.
adequate
opportunity to show that there is a genuine issue” and that
Defendants are “not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Nat’l Expositions, 824 F.2d at 133–34 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Wright et al., supra, § 2720, at 34).
As detailed
above, each of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law, and
summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants.
23
The
need
for
the
Court
to
sua
sponte
grant
summary
judgment to the Defendants here is made even more acute by the
Defendants’
“rope-a-dope” 9
strategy
of
non-engagement.
The
fact that the City felt it had so little at stake in the
outcome
of
possibility
this
of
a
challenge,
fee
and
wished
to
assessment
should
not
avoid
even
hamstring
the
this
Court from appropriately disposing of fully developed legal
issues.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED and the Court GRANTS, sua sponte, summary
judgment for Defendants on all counts.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: September 12, 2016
9
“Rope-a-dope” refers to a boxing style made famous by
Muhammad Ali during his “Rumble in the Jungle” in 1974 against
George Foreman. In it, a boxer assumes a defensive stance, in
which he or she lets his or her opponent attack so the
opponent exhausts himself or herself before the boxer counter
attacks. Unlike here, the counter-attack is typically mounted
by the boxer, not a friend or amicus curiae.
24
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?