Steward Health Care System LLC et al v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island

Filing 154

ORDER dismissing 128 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court re: 126 Order on Motion to Compel. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 1/10/2017. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF
)
RHODE ISLAND,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
STEWARD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM LLC,
et al.,

C.A. No. 13-405 S

ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before

the

Court

is

Defendant’s

appeal

from

Magistrate

Judge Lincoln D. Almond’s August 4th, 2016 Memorandum and Order
denying Defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island’s
(“BCBSRI”) motion to compel the production of documents from
Plaintiff Steward Health Care System LLC (“Steward”). (ECF No.
128.)

BCBSRI had sought to compel Steward to produce all of the

written communications that Steward withheld on the basis of the
common interest doctrine. (Mot. to Compel Produc. from Pl. 1,
ECF No. 111.)
of

them)

were

(“Landmark”)
and

These written communications (approximately 3,000

Landmark

between

Special

Steward

Master,

employees

and

the

Landmark

Special

(collectively,

Medical

Master’s
the

Center’s

consultant,

“Special

Master

Parties”). (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Obj. to Mem. and Order

(“Obj.”) 1-2, ECF No. 128.)

Magistrate Judge Almond concluded

that Steward and the Special Master Parties shared “a common
legal interest in the operation of Landmark and the consummation
of the acquisition during the periods when the [Asset Purchase
Agreements] were in place.” (Mem. and Order 2-3, ECF No. 126.)
Magistrate Judge Almond also concluded that an agreement that
enabled

Steward

Landmark

during

to

participate

the

in

acquisition

the

daily

process

management

“reflect[ed]

of
an

interrelationship and commonality of interest well beyond just
being parties to a pending acquisition.” (Id. at 3.)
BCBSRI contends that Magistrate Judge Almond’s conclusions
were clearly wrong because the common interest doctrine cannot
serve

as

a

shield

against

the

production

communications. (Obj. 9, 11, ECF No. 128.)

of

these

written

BCBSRI asserts that,

because Steward has not yet produced any communications that
reveal

its

Landmark,

reasons

the

for

withheld

withdrawing

from

communications

the

must

acquisition

contain

reasons for Steward’s withdrawal. (Id. at 2.)

the

of

true

The Court is

sympathetic to BCBSRI’s frustration, but its role in this appeal
is circumscribed by 28 U.S.C. § 636.
A district judge may only reconsider a magistrate judge’s
pretrial ruling “where it has been shown that the magistrate
judge’s

order

is

clearly

erroneous

or

contrary

to

law.”

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

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The

Court “must accept both the [magistrate judge’s] findings of
2

fact

and

the

scrutinizing

conclusions

the

entire

drawn

record,

therefrom
[it]

unless,

‘form[s]

a

after
strong,

unyielding belief that a mistake has been made.’” Phinney v.
Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting
Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir.
1990)).
“The common-interest doctrine . . . is ‘not an independent
basis for privilege, but an exception to the general rule that
the

attorney-client

privilege

is

waived

when

privileged

information is disclosed to a third party.’” Cavallaro v. United
States, 284 F.3d 236, 250 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting E.S. Epstein,
The Attorney–Client Privilege and the Work–Product Doctrine 196
(4th ed. 2001)).

“The common-interest doctrine prevents clients

from waiving the attorney-client privilege when attorney-client
communications are shared with a third person who has a common
legal interest with respect to these communications . . . .” Id.
“The common-interest doctrine is typically understood to apply
‘[w]hen two or more clients consult or retain an attorney on
particular

matters

of

common

interest’”

or

when

a

client

or

client’s lawyer communicates with another lawyer representing a
different party in a matter of common interest. Id. at 249-50
(quoting 3 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 503.21[1], [2] (J.M.
McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2002)).
After carefully considering the record in this case, there
is simply no basis for the Court to conclude that Magistrate
3

Judge Almond clearly erred when he concluded that Steward and
the Special Master Parties shared a common legal interest at the
time that the written communications that BCBSRI seeks to compel
were exchanged.

The Court acknowledges the “pivotal role that

magistrate judges play in overseeing the conduct of the sort of
complex

pretrial

discovery

typified

by

this

case,”

Ferring

Pharm. Inc. v. Braintree Labs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 3d 355, 358
(D. Mass. 2016) (quoting Gargiulo v. Baystate Health Inc., 279
F.R.D. 62, 64 (D. Mass. 2012)), so it may not second-guess the
magistrate

judge’s

pre-trial

discovery

rulings

because

a

different conclusion could have been drawn. See Harvard Pilgrim
Health Care of New England v. Thompson, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.R.I. 2004).
The

Court

therefore

DISMISSES

BCBSRI’s

Appeal

from

Magistrate Judge Almond’s Memorandum and Order denying BCBSRI’s
Motion to Compel the production of documents from Steward. (ECF
No. 128.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: January 10, 2017

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