Tavares v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Rhode Island
Filing
143
ORDER granting 117 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 119 Motion for Sanctions; adopting 138 Report and Recommendations. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 11/29/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
ROGERIO S. TAVARES,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
C.A. No. 13-521 S
)
ENTERPREISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY
)
OF RHODE ISLAND,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan filed a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) on June 16, 2016 (ECF No. 138), recommending
that the Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 117) and DENY Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 119)
as moot.
After careful consideration of the R&R and the objection
of Plaintiff, Rogerio Tavares (ECF No. 139), the Court hereby
accepts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the R&R for the reasons
that
follow.
The
relevant
facts,
procedural
analysis are fully set forth in the R&R.
background,
and
The Court limits its
discussion and presents only those facts pertinent to Tavares’s
objection. 1
1
Additionally, Magistrate Judge Sullivan thoroughly
Because this Court accepts the R&R in its entirety, it will
not review Tavares’s objection as it relates to Defendant’s Motion
for Sanctions.
explained the applicable legal framework, burdens of proof and
production, and affirmative defenses in her recommendation and so
this Court will not provide further explanation on those points
here. (See R&R 21-23, ECF No. 138.)
Magistrate Judge Sullivan read Tavares’s pro se Complaint
liberally and analyzed his six discrete claims as arising under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act
(“ADA”).
Specifically,
she
analyzed the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which protects
against employment discrimination based on national origin, race,
religion, and sex; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), which makes it unlawful
for an employer to retaliate against employees for opposing any
practice made unlawful by Title VII, or because the employee has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII; and
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a), which forbids a covered employer
from discriminating against a person with a disability who can
perform
the
essential
functions
of
her
job,
with
or
without
reasonable accommodations.
In accordance with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,
the
R&R
viewed
all
facts
inferences in Tavares’s favor.
and
drew
all
reasonable
The R&R found that Defendants
successfully demonstrated that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and that Tavares failed to submit competent evidence
2
to support the key elements of his claims.
This Court reviews the
R&R de novo. 2
As a preliminary matter, Tavares organizes his objection
according to the factual findings with which he takes issue and
uses his objection to re-argue each of his claims. 3 However, after
thorough review and accounting for Tavares’s pro se status, this
Court finds that Tavares’s objections are best addressed in the
following order: (1) objections asserting that Magistrate Judge
Sullivan’s
R&R
did
not
view
the
evidence
in
the
light
most
favorable to him; (2) objections asserting that Magistrate Judge
Sullivan’s
“reliance
on
statements
of
other
employees
who
witnessed some, but not all [Tavares’s] complaints” constituted a
credibility determination that was inappropriate at the summary
judgment stage (Tavares’s Obj. to the R&R 6, ECF No. 139); and (3)
objections asserting that Magistrate Judge Sullivan improperly
2
Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that this Court shall review a Magistrate Judge’s R&R de novo.
While the term “de novo” signifies that the magistrate judge’s
findings are not protected by the clearly erroneous doctrine, it
does not indicate that a second hearing is required. See United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
3
Tavares organizes his Objection as follows: (1) Sexual
Harassment and Hostile Work Environment, (a) No complaints about
accommodation after June 3, 2008 Doctor Letter, (b) Credibility
Determinations, (c) Disclosure of Plaintiff’s Medical Information,
(d) Conduct Resulting in Termination; (2) Analysis, (a) Post Leave
Retaliation, (b) Harassment by Co-workers and Religious Practice,
(c) Failure to Accommodate, (d) Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies.
3
considered the effects of his mental illness and incorrectly relied
on Wilson v. New York City Police Department 4 in assessing the
legal sufficiency of his claims, in light of that illness.
I. Magistrate Judge Sullivan Applied the Correct Legal Standard
for a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Tavares’s primary argument is that Magistrate Judge Sullivan
did not view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in his
favor, as required by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Tavares repeatedly avers that “Plaintiff’s version of
the facts must be accepted,” and that “[t]he only matter that
should have been considered was whether the sworn statements and
other statements provided by Plaintiff if they are taken as true
and all favorable inferences are drawn from those facts could a
reasonable jury find for Plaintiff.”
ECF
No.
139.)
Tavares
accuses
(Tavares’s Obj. to R&R 6, 7,
Magistrate
Judge
Sullivan
of
ignoring this legal standard when she considered other record
evidence contrary to Plaintiff’s own testimony and version of
events,
arguing
that
she
should
have
“simply
accept[ed]
Plaintiff’s statements as true as required by law.” (Id., ECF No.
139.) In essence, Tavares argues that Magistrate Judge Sullivan
improperly granted summary judgment because she considered record
evidence other than Plaintiff’s testimony.
4
This argument reflects
No. 09-Civ. 2632 (ALC) (HPB), 2013 WL 878585 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
6, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09 CIV. 2632 ALC
HBP, 2013 WL 929654 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2013).
4
a misunderstanding of the standard applicable at the summary
judgment stage.
The requirement that a judge must take all facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor dictates how the
judge must review the record evidence when reviewing a motion for
summary judgment; it does not dictate what record evidence she may
review.
At the summary judgment stage, a judge must review all of
the record evidence.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 5
Thus, the Court
may find that “a particular piece of evidence standing alone was
insufficiently probative to justify sending a case to the jury”
without “undermin[ing] the doctrine that all evidence must be
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment.”
(1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 261 n.2
This is precisely what Magistrate Judge Sullivan did in
this case:
after diligently reviewing all of the evidence before
her, including statements from other employees and Enterprise
personnel, she found that the particular pieces of evidence that
Tavares
presented
were
not
sending the case to a jury.
sufficiently
probative
to
warrant
Based on this review, Magistrate Judge
5
In fact, when assessing whether there is a genuine dispute
as to a material fact, the judge is required to look beyond a
plaintiff’s testimony. See Simas v. First Citizens’ Fed. Credit
Union, 170 F.3d 37, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he court [may not]
accept the nonmovant's subjective characterizations of events,
unless the underlying events themselves are revealed. . . .”)
(citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
5
Sullivan concluded that Tavares had not presented a genuine dispute
as to any material fact for any of his claims. 6
Similarly, Tavares argues that Magistrate Judge Sullivan’s
failure to draw all inferences in his favor was “[c]ontrary to
law.” (Tavares’s Obj. to the R&R 9, ECF No. 139.)
However, the
fact that there are conceivable inferences that could be drawn in
Plaintiff’s
favor
does
not
mean
that
those
inferences
are
“reasonable” enough to justify sending the case to the jury.
Here, the inferences Tavares urges the Court to draw in his favor
are simply not reasonable inferences in light of all the evidence. 7
6
At its core, Tavares’s objection is rooted in his
misunderstanding of the legal term of art “material facts.” “[A]
fact is ‘material’ only when it possesses the capacity, if
determined as the nonmovant wishes, to alter the outcome of the
lawsuit under the applicable legal tenets.” Roche v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added) (citing Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir. 1996)).
The facts Tavares argues are in dispute are simply not “material
facts” that preclude a grant of summary judgment.
For example, whether there were five incidents of harassing
behavior (Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶
20-24, ECF No. 126-1) or just the three incidents the R&R discusses
explicitly (R&R 26, ECF No. 138), does not change the outcome of
this case because “these incidents [. . .] are insufficient as a
matter of law to create the abusive work environment that is
actionable under Title VII.” (R&R 27, ECF No. 138.)
Likewise,
whether the supervisor, Whyte, knew of Tavares’s disability for
the first thirty days of his employment at Enterprise but
nonetheless refused to provide him an accommodation until he
provided a doctor’s note (Tavares’s Obj. to R&R 7, ECF No. 139) is
not material to the disposition of the case because the ADA
entitles an employer to request a doctor’s note before providing
that accommodation.
7
For example, Tavares argues that, because he disputes one
of several statements in the “Immediate Correction Notice,” the
6
II. Magistrate Judge Sullivan
Credibility Determinations.
Tavares
next
argues
Not
Make
Magistrate
that
Did
Judge
Impermissible
Sullivan
made
impermissible credibility determinations when she considered the
statements of other employees and other evidence in the record,
all of which contradicted Tavares’s testimony.
For example,
Tavares states that “[t]here are many times that [Magistrate Judge
Sullivan] describes the statements of other employees as though
they
are
not
disputed
even
though
testimony in whole or in part.
they
disputed
Plaintiff’s
Rather than simply accepting
Plaintiff’s statements as true as required by the law, [Magistrate
Judge Sullivan] weighed the conflicting testimony of [Defendant’s]
witnesses in reaching [her] conclusion.”
7, ECF No. 139.)
(Tavares’s Obj. to R&R
However, Tavares has mischaracterized the nature
of Magistrate Judge Sullivan’s findings and the bases of her
recommendation.
Where Magistrate Judge Sullivan credited evidence
that was contrary to Tavares’s testimony, she explained that
Tavares had offered no evidence to support his testimony and that
only “reasonable inference” Magistrate Judge Sullivan could
legally draw was that the entire Notice was “a complete fabrication
designed to set Plaintiff up for termination.” (Tavares’s Obj. to
the R&R 11, ECF No. 139.) This inference does not logically flow
from the inconsistencies in the Immediate Correction Notice or
from any other facts in the record. This example is representative
of the other, equally unreasonable inferences that Tavares urges
this Court to draw.
7
the
record
evidence
version of events.
neither
supported
nor
verified
Tavares’s
(See R&R 30, ECF No. 138.) 8
At the summary judgment stage, the non-movant bears the
burden of identifying some evidence in the record indicating that
there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.
See Curl v.
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he
party opposing summary judgment must be able to point to some facts
which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute the proof of
the moving party in some material portion, and . . . the opposing
party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and
have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually
uncontested proof.”) (quoting Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp.
469, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
Additionally, a statement, unsupported
by record evidence, that the Defendant’s witnesses are not credible
is not sufficient to establish that there are material facts in
dispute.
2010).
See Trentadue v. Redmon, 619 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir.
Here, Tavares simply has not produced any evidence to
8
For example, Tavares alleges that Whyte disclosed his mental
illness to his co-workers, but he does not have personal knowledge
of this and offers no evidence to support this allegation, other
than his own beliefs. (Tavares’s Obj. to the R&R 7, ECF No. 139.)
He then argues that Magistrate Judge Sullivan made an impermissible
credibility determination when she relied on conclusions and
documentary evidence from the Human Resources Manager who
investigated Tavares’s allegation because “[t]he only matter that
should have been considered was . . . the sworn statements and
other statements provided by Plaintiff.” (Tavares’s Obj. to the
R&R 7, ECF No. 139.)
8
support his version of events, and as a result there are no
material facts in dispute.
III. Magistrate Judge Sullivan Did Not Improperly Consider the
Effects of Tavares’s Mental Illness in Assessing the Legal
Sufficiency of His Claims.
Tavares argues that Magistrate Judge Sullivan “tries to use
Plaintiff’s mental health illness as a basis for ignoring the legal
requirement [to view facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff] and making credibility determinations,” and goes on to
argue
that
her
reliance
on
Wilson
v.
New
York
City
Police
Department 9 was inappropriate because there are factual differences
between the plaintiff in that case and Tavares.
to the R&R 5, ECF No. 139.)
(Tavares’s Obj.
We need not compare the facts of
Wilson to the facts here, however, because nowhere in the R&R did
Magistrate Judge Sullivan rely on Tavares’s mental illness, or the
holding in Wilson, to conclude that there were no genuine disputes
of material fact.
Rather, she merely acknowledged the reality
that “Tavares’s mental illness is a factor complicating this
Court’s consideration of the facts he has presented . . . .” (R&R
23, ECF No. 138.)
It seems that Magistrate Judge Sullivan’s purpose in citing
Wilson was to establish that courts may acknowledge the influence
9
No. 09-Civ. 2632 (ALC) (HPB), 2013 WL 878585 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
6, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09 CIV. 2632 ALC
HBP, 2013 WL 929654 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2013).
9
of a diagnosed mental illness when considering the record evidence
and determining whether the plaintiff has presented genuine issues
of material fact.
(See R&R 23, ECF No. 138.) 10
Because Magistrate
Judge Sullivan did not rely on Tavares’s mental illness when
determining whether there was a genuine dispute of any material
fact,
her
reference
to
Wilson
was
neither
inappropriate
nor
misplaced and does not constitute an impermissible credibility
determination.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby accepts the
R&R pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The R&R is ADOPTED;
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Defendant’s
Motion for Sanctions is DENIED; and FINAL JUDGMENT will enter in
favor of Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: November 29, 2016
10
In its discussion of Wilson, the R&R restates a number of
Tavares’s more bizarre claims, as well as statements from Tavares’s
psychiatrist that Tavares’s perceptions of his work environment
were not necessarily “grounded in reality”; the R&R provides these
examples only as evidence that Tavares’s mental illness has, in
fact, impacted his perception of and participation in this case.
(R&R 23, ECF No. 138.) This does not constitute error.
10
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