Adams et al v. Melnick, D.O. et al

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Plaintiffs' 39 Motion to Amend the Complaint. So Ordered by Judge Mary M. Lisi on 2/18/2015. (Duhamel, John)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

JERRY ADAMS and
CIRA GONZALEZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.

C.A. No. 13-802-ML

SIMON MELNICK, D.O.; RHODE ISLAND
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
ASHBEL T. WALL, Individually and in his official
capacity as director of the Rhode Island Department
of Corrections; CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS JOHN
AND/OR JANE DOE, Alias; JOHN AND/OR JANE DOE,
M.D., Alias; JOHN AND/OR JANE DOE, RN, Alias; and
JOHN DOE CORPORATION, Alias,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint. For the
reasons stated herein Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.
I. Background
This matter was originally filed in Rhode Island Superior Court and removed to this
Court. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff Jerry Adams received inadequate medical care from
Defendants. Plaintiffs seek to add a new cause of action alleging that Defendant, Simon
Melnick, D.O., (“Melnick”) committed unprofessional conduct in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §
5-37-5.1(19). Defendant Melnick objects.
II. Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) reflects a liberal amendment policy and provides that a court

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“should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Even so, the
district court enjoys significant latitude in deciding whether to grant leave to amend” and the
First Circuit “defer[s] to the district court’s decision if any adequate reason for the denial is
apparent on the record.” United States ex rel. Gagne v. City of Worcester, 565 F.3d 40, 48 (1st
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Reasons for denying leave include undue delay
in filing the motion, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Id.
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs move to amend the complaint by adding a claim pursuant to the statutory
scheme governing the Rhode Island Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline (“Board”). See
R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-1 et seq. The new count in the proposed amended complaint alleges that
Melnick committed unprofessional conduct and thus violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-5.1(19).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-5.1(19) defines unprofessional conduct as including the:
[i]ncompetant, negligent, or willful misconduct in the practice of medicine which
includes the rendering of medically unnecessary services, and any departure from,
or the failure to conform to, the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing
medical practice in his or her area of expertise as is determined by the [B]oard.
The [B]oard need not establish actual injury to the patient in order to adjudge a
physician . . . guilty of the unacceptable medical practice in this subdivision[.]
R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-5.1(19).
When a court construes a statute, its role is to “determine and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious
purposes.” Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I. 1987). When language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous a court must interpret the statute literally and give the words their plain

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and ordinary meaning. Such v. State, 950 A.2d 1150 (R.I. 2008). A court “shall not interpret a
statute to include a matter omitted unless the clear purpose of the legislation would fail without
the implication.” State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1264 (R.I. 1980). “A court’s duty is to construe
a statue, not to redraft it.” Reid v. Citizens Savings Bank/Citizens Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 43, 46
(D.R.I. 1995). Under Rhode Island law, the task of assigning remedies for statutory rights is a
legislative responsibility and not a judicial function. Narragansett Pellet Corp. v. City of East
Providence, C.A. No. 06-464-ML, 2007 WL 2821538 (D.R.I. Sept. 25, 2007). When a statute
does not plainly provide for a private right of action for damages, such a right cannot be inferred.
Id.
The Rhode Island General Assembly has prescribed two enforcement provisions for
unprofessional conduct as alleged in the proposed amended complaint.
Violations – Penalties. – Unless another penalty is provided by the laws of this
state, any person who violates any provision of this chapter or any rule or
regulation adopted under this chapter, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-25 (emphasis added). In addition to these penalties, when
it appears to the [Director of the Department of Health] or [B]oard that any person
is violating any of the provisions of this chapter, the director or [B]oard may
institute an action to enjoin the violation in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
the court may restrain, and/or enjoin any person . . . from violating any of the
provisions of this chapter without regard to whether proceedings have been or
may be instituted before the [B]oard or whether criminal proceedings have or may
be instituted.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-25.1.
The Court’s ultimate goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent – in accordance with
the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. The legislature has clearly prescribed

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remedies for the alleged violation: a fine, imprisonment, and an action for injunctive relief
brought at the discretion of the Director of the Department of Health or the Board. It is clear that
the Legislature has not provided for a private right of action for damages as a remedy for a
violation of the statutory scheme and this Court declines to infer a private right of action.
Because the statute does not provide for a private right of action, the proposed amendment is
futile.1
For these reasons the motion to amend is denied.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Mary M. Lisi
Mary M. Lisi
United States District Judge
February 18, 2015

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The proposed amendment is also duplicative as the complaint includes a claim for negligence.

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