United States of America v. State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections et al
Filing
99
ORDER granting 85 Joint MOTION for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement; adopting 88 Report and Recommendations. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 5/11/2018. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
C.A. No. 14-78 WES
)
v.
)
)
)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; RHODE
)
ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Magistrate
Judge
Lincoln
D.
Almond
filed
a
Report
and
Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 88) in this case, recommending the
Court overrule all objections to the terms of the proposed settlement
agreement and grant the parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of
the Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 85). Prospective claimant Jayson
Badillo has objected (ECF No. 93) to the R&R. For the following
reasons, the Court accepts the R&R over Badillo’s objection.
The United States brought this action against Rhode Island,
challenging aspects of the hiring process the state used to select
entry-level correctional officers. The United States alleged that
the at-issue processes had a disparate impact on minority candidates,
in violation of Title VII. After extensive discovery, some motion
practice, and one failed settlement conference, the parties reached
a settlement after Magistrate Judge Almond held a second conference.
The settlement agreement presented to the Court requires Rhode Island
to implement a hiring process that complies with Title VII, to hire
up to thirty-seven prospective claimants, and to provide monetary
relief of $450,000 to be distributed pro rata. (See ECF No. 80-1.)
Badillo objects that the proposed settlement is substantively
inadequate and the product of unfair procedure. The Court reviews
Magistrate Judge Almond’s recommended disposition de novo, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3), and decides whether the settlement is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate,” Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636
F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted), even if not
“the settlement . . . which the court itself might have fashioned,
or considers as ideal,” United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899
F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990). In so doing, the Court “must exercise
some
deference
to
the
[United
States]’s
determination
that
settlement is appropriate . . . and refrain from second-guessing the
Executive Branch.” Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v.
Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). The Court is also mindful of “the policy of the law
to encourage settlements,” especially where, as here, “a government
actor committed to the protection of the public interest has pulled
the laboring oar in constructing the proposed settlement.” Cannons
Eng’g, 899 F.2d at 84.
After
close
review
of
the
proposed
settlement,
hearing
transcript, and the relevant submissions, the Court concludes that
the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. As the parties
2
point out, Badillo objects to a different case. For example, he cites
myriad authority concerning the propriety of relief provided after
a finding as to liability. See, e.g., Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Brennan, 254
F. Supp. 3d 253, 255-56 (D. Mass. 2017); United States v. R.I. Dep’t
of Emp’t Sec., 619 F. Supp. 509, 511 (D.R.I. 1985). Here, there is
no such finding. The parties stipulated to the plaintiff’s prima
facie case, but did not do so as to the rest of plaintiff’s disparateimpact claim. See Jones v. City of Bos., 752 F.3d 38, 54 (1st Cir.
2014) (“Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of a
disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity. If the employer makes such a
showing, a plaintiff has one final path to success, by proving the
existence of an alternative employment practice . . . .” (citation
and
quotation
marks
omitted)).
On
the
contrary,
the
parties
aggressively litigated these issues. Unlike the cases Badillo cites,
the
merits
remained
unresolved
while
the
parties
negotiated
a
settlement. Entirely inappropriate, then, is a comparison between
what a plaintiff without a favorable liability judgment negotiated
and what plaintiffs who prevailed as to liability won in damages.
Badillo also cites cases involving only private parties. See,
e.g., In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 336 (3d Cir.
2010); In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Litig., 396 F.3d 922,
926 (8th Cir. 2005); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 931
3
(N.D.
Cal.
2016).
These
cases
are
inapposite
insofar
as
any
settlement reached is afforded less deference than the one here,
where a government plaintiff has done the negotiating.
Badillo highlights Ross v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 267 F. Supp.
3d 174 (D.D.C. 2017), as a case the Court should use to guide its
determination of the proposed settlement’s fairness. Ross is of
little help, however. In that case, the court rejected a proposed
agreement to settle a disparate-impact claim brought by a current
and former employee of Lockheed Martin against the company. Id. at
179-80.
But
there,
the
negotiated
settlement
contemplated
that
plaintiffs (and those in their proposed class) would “release a broad
swath of potential legal claims against the company, including claims
that ha[d] nothing whatsoever to do with [the employment practice at
issue].” Id. at 179. The Ross settlement also punished class members
who failed to respond to the class notice. Id. at 202. A nonrespondent would “release all of [her] race discrimination claims
against Lockheed Martin[, and would] also become ineligible to
recover any compensation from the settlement fund.” Id. (emphasis
omitted). In short, the similarities between Ross and this case begin
and end with the fact that, in both, plaintiffs bring disparateimpact claims.
Badillo also complains about Magistrate Judge Almond holding
the fairness hearing when he had previously held the settlement
conference from which the agreement sprang. Badillo again cites
inapposite cases – where, for example, a judge recused himself
4
because
his
prior
involvement
in
the
parties’
settlement
negotiations turned him into a potential fact witness on a subsequent
motion, Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 390 (6th Cir.
2014), or where a judge was to try a case he worked to settle, Becker
v. Tidewater, Inc., 405 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2005).
Here, Magistrate Judge Almond is not at risk of being called as
a fact witness. Nor is he in line to try this case. Indeed, he is
not
even
disposing
recommended
of
disposition.
it,
but
rather
Nothing
in
providing
the
record
this
Court
suggests
a
that
Magistrate Judge Almond did other than hear, carefully consider,
and, ultimately, overrule the objections made to the settlement
agreement.
The
Court
ACCEPTS
Magistrate
Judge
Almond’s
R&R
for
the
foregoing reasons. Objections to the settlement agreement are hereby
overruled, and the parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of
Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 85) GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: May 11, 2018
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
:
:
:
:
:
:
C.A. No. 14-0078-WES
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Lincoln D. Almond, United States Magistrate Judge
Pending before me for a report and recommendation (28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)) is the
parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement.
(ECF Doc. No. 85).
Pursuant to the Court’s Provisional Order of Entry dated October 20, 2017, a Fairness Hearing
on the Settlement Agreement was held on February 7, 2018. (ECF Doc. No. 82). A total of
fifty-five Objections were received by the parties and communicated to the Court. However,
only six (one anonymous) raise any substantive objection to the Final Settlement Agreement.
The remainder all reasonable appear to be potential claimants expressing an interest in relief
under the Final Settlement Agreement who have misunderstood the purpose of the Objection
Form and process. At the hearing, two individuals spoke in favor of the Proposed Settlement.
Only one objector (through counsel) appeared and addressed the Court.
Discussion
The pending Motion for Final Approval requires the Court to determine whether the
proposed settlement agreement is lawful, fair, reasonable, adequate and consistent with the
public interest. See Hutchinson v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011); Voss v. Rolland, 592
F.3d 242, 251 (1st Cir. 2010). Here, the parties have given reasonable notice to potential
objectors and, as noted, several Objections have been presented to the Court. After fully and
thoroughly reviewing the Final Settlement Agreement and the Objections, I conclude that the
terms of the Settlement Agreement (ECF Doc. No. 80-1) are lawful, fair, reasonable, adequate
and serve the public interest. Accordingly, I recommend that Chief Judge William E. Smith
enter the parties’ proposed Order GRANTING the Joint Motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement Agreement (see ECF Doc. 85-2) after reviewing this recommendation, the Settlement
Agreement, the relevant docket entries and the transcript of the Fairness Hearing.
As the Court knows, this has been a hotly-contested lawsuit with experienced and
competent attorneys on both sides of the case. While it is undisputed that there was a statistically
significant disparity in pass rates between African American/Hispanic and white applicants for
the pre-hire examinations in issue, the Court has not made any finding that such examinations
violated Title VII. The State of Rhode Island maintains its position that there is no Title VII
liability since the examinations are job-related and consistent with business necessity. The State
of Rhode Island also maintains its position that the United States unduly delayed its prosecution
of this lawsuit and that, even if Title VII liability were found, the Court should apply the
equitable doctrine of laches to limit potential monetary damages. As the Court knows from the
Motion for Provisional Entry, the Proposed Settlement is multi-faceted. It includes injunctive
relief aimed at remedying any legal deficiencies in the hiring process. It includes monetary relief
fund directed generally to unsuccessful applicants. Finally, it includes a preferential hiring
process which includes noncompetitive retroactive seniority. Although the Proposed Settlement
falls short of providing complete, make-whole relief to each potential claimant, it is a reasonable
arm’s-length compromise reached by government actors seeking to further the public interest.
See Conservation Law Found. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that where a
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governmental agency has committed itself to a consent decree, the Court “must exercise some
deference” to the agency’s determination that settlement is appropriate). As to the particular
Objections raised to the Settlement, I recommend that they each be overruled for the reasons I
articulated on the record during the Fairness Hearing as well as for the reasons articulated by the
parties at the hearing and in their filings.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Chief Judge William E. Smith overrule all
of the objections and GRANT the parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement
Agreement (ECF Doc. No. 85) by ENTERING the proposed ORDER (ECF Doc. No. 85-2)
presented by the parties.
Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed
with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen days of its receipt. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); LR Cv
72. Failure to file specific objections in a timely manner constitutes waiver of the right to review
by the District Court and the right to appeal the District Court’s decision. See United States v.
Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616
F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1980).
/s/ Lincoln D. Almond
LINCOLN D. ALMOND
United States Magistrate Judge
February 8, 2018
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