Bussell v. State of Rhode Island et al
Filing
12
OPINION AND ORDER denying 10 Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 7/25/14. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
MARK BUSSELL,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
C.A. No. 14-109 S
)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE
)
POLICE DEPARTMENT; STEVEN G.
)
O’DONNELL, individually and as
)
Superintendent of the Rhode Island )
State Police; NICHOLAS MESSINGER, )
individually and in his official
)
capacity as a State Trooper
)
employed by the State of Rhode
)
Island; JOHN DOE, individually
)
and in his official capacity as a )
State Trooper employed by the
)
State of Rhode Island,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
OPINON AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff
Mark
Bussell
has
filed
a
Motion
to
File
an
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10) to substitute “Michael Capone”
for the unidentified defendant “John Doe.”
Because the statute
of limitations has expired and the proposed amendment does not
relate back to the date of the original Complaint, the motion to
amend is DENIED.
I.
Background
On
January
Providence
24,
County
2014,
Superior
Bussell
Court
filed
against
a
Complaint
the
State
in
of
the
Rhode
Island, the State Police Department, the Superintendent of the
State Police, and two State Troopers, one of whom was identified
at the time of filing simply as “John Doe.”
According to the
Complaint, Bussell was driving on Route 146 in North Smithfield,
Rhode Island, on February 3, 2011, when he suffered a diabetic
episode that caused him to lose control of his vehicle and drive
off the road.
Bussell alleges that he was severely injured as a
result of the actions of the two State Troopers who responded to
the scene, one of whom was the officer identified as “John Doe.”
Bussell brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of
his
Fourteenth
claims
of
Amendment
assault
and
rights,
as
battery,
emotional distress, and negligence.
this Court on February 27, 2014.
the
previously
unidentified
well
as
intentional
state
law-based
infliction
of
The case was removed to
Having learned the identity of
State
Trooper,
Bussell
filed
the
instant motion to amend his Complaint on June 10, 2014, seeking
to substitute “Michael Capone” for “John Doe.”
II.
Discussion
After the time to amend a pleading as a matter of course
has expired, a party may amend its pleadings only with consent
of the opposing party or with leave of court.
15(a)(2).
requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
“The court should freely give leave when justice so
Id.
If the amendment would be futile, however, the
court should refuse leave to amend.
2
Hatch v. Dep’t of Children,
Youth, and Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001);
Ferreira v. City of Pawtucket, 365 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216 (D.R.I.
2004).
The futility of an amendment is measured by the same
standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
at 19.
Hatch, 274 F.3d
For example, a proposed amendment is futile if the
claims are barred by a statute of limitations.
Ferreira, 365 F.
Supp. 2d at 216.
A.
The Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for personal injury cases in
Rhode Island bars claims asserted more than three years after
the accrual of the cause of action.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-
14(b); Ferreira, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 216; see also McIntosh v.
Antonino, 71 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that federal
courts
hearing
§
1983
claims
limitations of the forum state).
must
apply
the
statute
of
Here, the cause of action
accrued on the date of the incident, which was February 3, 2011.
The statute of limitations expired three years later on February
3, 2014.
Bussell filed this motion to amend on June 10, 2014,
putting his motion outside the statute of limitations.
B.
Relation Back of the Proposed Amendment
Bussell’s attempt to amend his Complaint can be saved from
the expiration of the statute of limitations if the amendment
“relates back” to the date of the original pleading under Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15.
Rule 15 allows an amendment to relate back only in certain
circumstances.
defendant,
the
When
an
amendment
amendment
will
not
changes
relate
the
back
name
of
unless,
a
among
other things, the party to be brought in “knew or should have
known that the action would have been brought against it, but
for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”
Civ.
P.
“mistake
15(c)(1)(C)(ii)
proviso
was
(emphasis
drafted
to
added).
resolve
This
the
Fed. R.
so-called
problem
of
a
misnamed defendant and allow a party to correct a formal defect
such as a misnomer or misidentification.”
Cholopy v. City of
Providence, 228 F.R.D. 412, 418 (D.R.I. 2005) (quoting Ferreira,
365 F. Supp. 2d at 217) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also
Fed.
amendment.
R.
Civ.
P.
15
advisory
committee’s
note
to
1991
Accordingly, an amendment to change the name of a
defendant relates back only “where there has been an error made
concerning the identity of the proper party,” and not “where
. . . there is a lack of knowledge of the proper party.”
Wilson
v. United States, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting
Worthington
v.
Wilson,
8
F.3d
1253,
1256
(7th
Cir.
1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
An amendment to substitute a named individual for a “John
Doe” defendant does not relate back to the time of the original
filing
because
identity
of
the
“plaintiff’s
a
defendant,
lack
unlike
4
of
knowledge
a
as
misnomer
to
the
or
a
misidentification of a defendant, does not constitute a mistake
under
[Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii)].”
Cholopy,
228
F.R.D.
at
418
(quoting Ferreira, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 217) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 1
This is true in “[t]he overwhelming majority of
federal appellate courts that have considered the issue.”
See
Ferreira, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (citations omitted) (collecting
cases).
This approach also makes sense as a matter of policy
“because
otherwise
any
complaint
with
‘John
Doe’
defendants
would have an indefinite and potentially infinite limitations
period.”
Cholopy, 228 F.R.D. at 418.
Here, as in Ferreira and Cholopy, there was no mistake in
the original complaint, as Bussell simply lacked knowledge as to
the identity of the proper party.
Because there was no mistake
as required under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), the proposed amendment
does not relate back to the date of the original complaint.
III. Conclusion
Bussell moved to amend his complaint after the applicable
statute of limitations had expired, and the amendment does not
relate back to the date of the original complaint.
1
For that
Ferreira and Cholopy are strikingly similar to this case.
Both cases involved alleged police misconduct by officers
identified originally as “John Doe.” See Cholopy, 228 F.R.D. at
414; Ferreira, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 216. In both cases, the court
held that a proposed amendment to substitute a named individual
for a “John Doe” officer did not relate back to the date of the
original filing. See Cholopy, 228 F.R.D. at 414; Ferreira, 365
F. Supp. 2d at 217.
5
reason, the amendment is futile.
Therefore, Bussell’s Motion to
File an Amended Complaint is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: July 25, 2014
6
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