McManus v. Wall
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 10 Motion for Evidentiary Hearing; denying as moot 13 Motion to Supplement the Record. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 5/10/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
ASHBEL T. WALL,
)
)
Respondent.
)
___________________________________)
JOSEPH McMANUS,
C.A. No. 14-338 S
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Joseph McManus has filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
For Writ Of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State Custody (“Habeas
Petition”), challenging his conviction on two counts of criminal
solicitation.
No. 4.)
The State has moved to dismiss that petition.
(ECF
Petitioner filed a Traverse to the Motion to Dismiss
(“Pet.’s Opp’n”) (ECF No. 8), and the State filed a Reply (ECF No.
9.)
For the reasons set forth below, the State’s motion is GRANTED
and McManus’s Habeas Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I.
Background
In the early morning hours of June 29, 1996, Kelly (McGinity)
McManus was brutally stabbed to death by her husband in front of
their
teenage
children,
the
tragic
physical and mental domestic abuse. 1
culmination
of
months
of
On September 6,
1996, a grand jury indicted Petitioner Joseph McManus for her
murder.
On July 2, 1997, after trial, a jury convicted McManus of
first-degree murder.
For his crime, the Rhode Island Superior
Court sentenced McManus to life in prison without the possibility
of parole.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
on February 21, 2008.
Rhode Island v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222 (R.I.
2008).
While awaiting trial for the murder of his wife, McManus was
housed at the Adult Correctional Institution (“ACI”). It was there
that he was alleged to have solicited four fellow inmates to murder
then-Attorney
General
Jeffrey
Assistant Attorney General. 2
Pine
and
assault
a
prosecuting
On August 28, 1997, a grand jury
indicted McManus on three counts of criminal solicitation and two
counts of threatening a public official.
On October 19, 2000,
after a trial, a jury convicted McManus of two counts of criminal
solicitation, finding that McManus offered Vincent Arruda $25,000
to murder the Attorney General and offered Robert Smith $5,000 to
1
The facts of this case are laid out in further detail by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. McManus, 941
A.2d 222 (R.I. 2008).
2
The facts of this solicitation conviction are described in
more detail by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Rhode Island v.
McManus, 990 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 2010).
2
assist in the murder of the Attorney General and assault an
assistant Attorney General.
year
sentences
to
run
The Superior Court imposed two ten-
consecutive
to
the
life-without-parole
sentence he was already serving for his murder conviction.
The
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the solicitation convictions
on April 2, 2010.
Rhode Island v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229 (R.I.
2010).
II.
Discussion
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a) allows for federal courts to “entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.”
However, “[b]efore a
federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the
prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court.”
Boerckel,
526
U.S.
838,
842
(1999).
It
is
O’Sullivan v.
undisputed
that
Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies with respect
to three of his four habeas claims.
(See Pet.’s Opp’n 9, ECF No.
8 (“The state contends that the petitioner did not exhaust his
state
remedies
with
respect
to
three
accordance with 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A).
of
his
four
claims
in
To that the petitioner
agree[s], and so states that in his habeas corpus application.”).)
Petitioner argues instead that he should be excused from the
exhaustion requirement because “(i) there is an absense [sic] of
3
available state corrective process; [and] (ii) circumstances exist
that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.”
(Pet.’s Opp’n 10, ECF No. 8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(b)(1)(B) 2006; Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)).)
Specifically, Petitioner claims that there has been “inordinate
delay” on the part of the state courts.
(Id. at 12.)
He states
that his case has been pending for seven years, and he attributes
the
delay
over
the
past
three
years
to
his
court-appointed
attorney, Mark Smith. (Id. (“Only attorney Smith knows the reasons
that he has failed to assert himself in his representation of the
petitioner.”).)
The exhaustion requirement is “a matter of comity between the
federal
and
state
courts,”
rather
limitation on the federal courts.”
than
“a
jurisdictional
Heon v. R.I. Attorney Gen.’s
Office, No. CA 12-44 ML, 2012 WL 3241919, at *7 (D.R.I. July 25,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 12-44 ML, 2012 WL
3235836 (D.R.I. Aug. 7, 2012) (quoting Harris v. Champion, 938
F.2d 1062, 1064–65 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Petitioner is correct that
in cases where “there is an absence of available State corrective
process,”
or
“circumstances
exist
that
render
such
process
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant,” exhaustion is
not required.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B).
However, “it is a
principle controlling all habeas corpus petitions to the federal
courts, that those courts will interfere with the administration
4
of justice in the state courts only in rare cases where exceptional
circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.”
Heon, 2012
WL 3241919, at *7 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987)).
Here, Petitioner is serving a life sentence without parole for
murdering his wife – a conviction not at issue in the instant
petition.
Even if he is successful in overturning the two ten-
year sentences that he received for the solicitation counts, his
prison time will not be affected.
Therefore, the Court finds that
there are no “exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency” in
this case that would justify interfering with the state court’s
process.
.
.
.
See id. (“Given that Heon is no longer confined in prison
,
this
Court
is
unable
to
find
that
‘exceptional
circumstances of peculiar urgency . . . exist’ . . . here to excuse
exhaustion.”). 3
The final question is whether Petitioner’s claims should be
dismissed without prejudice or stayed and held in abeyance while
he returns to the state courts to pursue his unexhausted claims.
“[T]o obtain a stay of a mixed petition, the petitioner must show
that there was ‘good cause’ for failing to exhaust the state
remedies, the claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no
indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory
3
Accordingly, the Court need not reach the State’s arguments
concerning the timeliness of McManus’s Habeas Petition.
5
tactics.”
Josselyn v. Dennehy, 475 F.3d 1, *4 (1st Cir. 2007)
(citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005)).
Petitioner
argues that “[t]he court(s) delays and attorney Smith’s inactivity
in the case should suffice as good cause for failure to exhaust.”
(Pet.’s Opp’n 13, ECF No. 8.)
However, “a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel alone does not present good cause for a stay
and abeyance.”
Womack v. Saba, Civil Action No. 11-40138-FDS,
2012 WL 685888, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2012) (citing Gaouette v.
O’Brien,
2010
WL
5376849,
at
*1
(D.
Mass.
Dec.
20,
2010)).
Moreover, as the State points out, the record shows that McManus,
not Attorney Smith, requested at least one stay, which the state
court granted for six months.
(See State’s Reply 5-6, ECF No. 9.)
Accordingly, at least some of the delay is attributable to his
actions.
For these reasons, the Court finds that a stay and
abeyance is not appropriate in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the State’s
Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Petitioner’s
Habeas Petition.
RULING ON CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule ll(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings in the United States District Courts, this Court hereby
finds that this case is not appropriate for the issuance of a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) because McManus has failed to
6
make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
as to any claim, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2).
McManus is advised that any motion to reconsider this ruling
will not extend the time to file a notice of appeal in this matter.
See Rule ll(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: May 10, 2016
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