Merida v. Ashbel T. Wall
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying and dismissing 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Javier Merida. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 8/20/2015. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
JAVIER MERIDA,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
C.A. No. 14-339 S
)
ASHBEL T. WALL, DIRECTOR OF
)
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
)
)
Respondent.
)
)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Petitioner Javier Merida has filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1).
The Attorney
General of the State of Rhode Island (the “State”) responded
on
behalf of Respondent (ECF No. 3), seeking denial of Merida’s
Petition.
For the reasons set forth below, the State’s request
is GRANTED, and the Petition is DENIED and DISMISSED.
I.
Background
Merida was convicted by a jury in Rhode Island Superior
Court of two counts of first-degree child molestation and one
count of second-degree child molestation, in violation of R.I.
Gen.
Laws
§§
11-37-8.1
and
11-37-8.3,
respectively.
He
was
sentenced to two forty-year terms on the first two counts, and
one thirty-year term on the third, all to run concurrently.
See
State v. Merida (“Merida I”), 960 A.2d 228, 230 (R.I. 2008).
Merida
appealed,
arguing
that
the
trial
court
erred
by
improperly limiting the scope of cross-examination of two key
State
witnesses,
testimony
and
involving
by
allowing
uncharged
the
sexual
State
to
introduce
misconduct
prior
testimony directly involving the charged sexual misconduct.
id.
After
Merida’s
appeal
was
denied
and
his
to
See
convictions
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, id., Merida filed
an application for postconviction relief.
Merida raised a series of claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel in his postconviction relief application, asserting
that
his
trial
investigate
credibility
attorney
or
of
pursue
the
was
at
deficient
trial
complaining
for:
theories
witness,
(1)
failing
undermining
“Betsy”
(a
to
the
pseudonym
used by the state superior court); (2) failing to present a
defense expert; (3) failing to request a continuance to review
an article mentioned by the State’s expert in support of her
testimony;
(4)
preventing
Merida
from
testifying
on
his
own
behalf; and (5) failing to object to the order of presentation
of witnesses.
Both
Merida
and
his
trial
attorney
testified
at
a
subsequent evidentiary hearing before the superior court, which
issued a detailed decision denying postconviction relief.
See
Merida v. State (“Merida II”), 93 A.3d 545, 547-48 (R.I. 2014).
2
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Id.
Merida timely filed the § 2254 petition now before this
Court.
II.
Discussion
Section
2254
provides
a
petitioner
with
habeas
corpus
relief where a “state court’s decision, on any issue it actually
decided,
‘was
contrary
to,
or
involved
an
unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”
Epsom v. Hall, 330
F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1))
(internal citation omitted). 1
Where a state court has found that
a petitioner’s claim is meritless, federal courts cannot grant
habeas relief so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree on
the correctness of the state court’s decision” as to that claim.
1
Section 2254(d) provides in relevant part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
3
on an
of the
Harrington
v.
Richter,
562
U.S.
86,
101
(2011)
(internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
A.
Procedurally Defaulted Claims
Three
of
Merida’s
asserted
grounds
for
reiterate claims he made on direct appeal.
Superior
Court
deemed
these
claims
habeas
relief
The Rhode Island
procedurally
waived.
A
federal court may not address a state prisoner’s habeas claim
when
the
state
court
has
declined
to
address
the
claim
on
procedural grounds, if that decision is based on “independent
and adequate state grounds.”
550
(1st
Cir.
2009).
Glacken v. Dickhaut, 585 F.3d 547,
“One
such
ground
is
a
state
court’s
finding that a claim is forfeited due to a failure to object at
trial,”
so
consistently
decision.
long
as
the
applied,
and
contemporaneous
was
the
basis
objection
for
the
rule
state
is
court
Id. at 551.
Merida first claims that the trial court erred in allowing
the State to present Lisa’s testimony at trial about allegations
of uncharged sexual misconduct before the complaining witness,
Betsy, was called.
Merida claims that because Lisa’s testimony
was propensity evidence under R.I. Rule of Evidence 404(b), it
should
not
have
been
allowed
evidentiary foundation.
order
of
witnesses
court
found
that
without
laying
a
proper
Merida argued on direct appeal that the
constituted
under
first
Rhode
error,
Island’s
4
and
the
state
supreme
“raise-or-waive”
rule,
Merida
had
waived
the
claim
witnesses’ order at trial. 2
by
failing
to
object
to
the
Merida I, 960 A.2d at 238.
Merida’s second claim is that the superior court infringed
upon
his
confrontation
rights
by
unconstitutionally
limiting
cross-examination of the State’s two key witnesses, Lisa and
Betsy.
with
The state supreme court held on direct appeal that, as
his
testified,
claim
under
involving
Rhode
the
order
Island’s
had waived this argument.
in
which
Lisa
“raise-or-waive”
and
rule,
Betsy
Merida
Id. at 234-36.
Because the state supreme court found that both of these
claims
were
waived
under
Rhode
2
Island’s
consistently-applied
Merida also argued on direct appeal that Lisa’s testimony
constituted improperly admitted propensity evidence.
The state
supreme court found that this claim may also have been waived,
but that, regardless, there was no clear error in the trial
court’s determination.
Because the trial court had identified
multiple legitimate reasons that Lisa’s testimony fell under an
exception to Rule 404(b), had weighed the prejudicial nature of
the evidence against its probative value under R.I. Rule of
Evidence 403, and had given appropriate limiting instructions
concerning the evidence to the jury, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. Merida I, 960
A.2d at 238-39.
To the extent Merida’s habeas claim encompasses the
propensity evidence argument he made on direct appeal, the claim
has no merit.
The Court “must accept state court rulings on
state law issues” on habeas review, Rodriguez v. Spencer, 412
F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2005), unless the state court application
of law was so egregious that it constituted a violation of the
petitioner’s due process rights, Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640
F.3d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011). While “a misbegotten evidentiary
ruling that results in a fundamentally unfair trial may violate
due process,” id. at 484, the state courts’ sound rationale on
the admission of alleged propensity evidence plainly forecloses
any argument that Merida’s due process rights were violated.
5
“raise-or-waive” rule, federal habeas review of these claims is
precluded.
See Glacken, 585 F.3d at 550 (petitioner’s claim was
procedurally defaulted due to the state court’s finding that
petitioner
trial).
had
forfeited
the
claim
by
failing
to
object
at
The Court sees no reason not to apply the procedural-
default doctrine in Merida’s case, and thus will not reach the
merits of Merida’s claims involving the order of witnesses and
Confrontation Clause violations.
Merida additionally alleges that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing propensity evidence to come in against
him at trial prior to the complainant’s testimony, and that the
prosecutor was likewise at fault for presenting witnesses in
this order.
As noted by the state supreme court, Merida did not
develop these claims or present any evidence to support them.
Merida II, 93 A.3d at 552.
This failure constituted a waiver of
these claims, see, e.g., Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Bd.
of Review, 875 A.2d 1, 10 (R.I. 2005), and thus Merida’s claim
on the issue was procedurally barred.
waive
rule,
constitutes
this
consistently
“independent
and
As with the raise-or-
applied
adequate”
procedural
state
grounds
rule
that
warrant dispensing with Merida’s claims of misconduct without
substantive review.
See Glacken, 585 F.3d at 551.
6
B.
Ineffective-Assistance Claims
Merida’s remaining claim mirrors his postconviction relief
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
his
trial
reasons:
attorney
was
constitutionally
Merida argues that
defective
for
five
1) counsel failed to investigate, call witnesses, or
adequately
cross-examine
witnesses
to
challenge
Betsy’s
credibility; 2) counsel failed to present a defense expert to
rebut
the
State’s
expert’s
testimony;
3)
counsel
failed
to
request a continuance to review an article referred to by the
State’s exert; 4) counsel prevented Merida from testifying; and
5)
counsel
failed
to
object
to
the
order
of
the
State’s
witnesses.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington
sets
forth
assistance
(1984).
the
was
standard
for
determining
constitutionally
whether
inadequate.
466
counsel’s
U.S.
668
The petitioner must establish both that counsel made
serious errors rendering his or her performance constitutionally
deficient, and that this deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s
defense,
for
instance
trial.
Id.
at
687.
by
depriving
Applying
the
the
petitioner
Strickland
of
a
fair
standard
to
Merida’s ineffective-assistance claims, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court found them all to be without merit.
545.
7
Merida II, 93 A.3d
Merida’s
rely
first
primarily
findings.
on
and
fourth
disputing
ineffective-assistance
the
state
courts’
claims
credibility
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Merida II rejected
his first claim regarding counsel’s failure to bring to light
Betsy’s motive to lie.
Merida II, 93 A.3d at 549-50.
The
superior
Merida’s
his
court
credited
attorney’s
account
of
investigation and trial preparation, and found that his attorney
lacked the information Merida claimed he had.
findings,
the
state
supreme
court
Based on these
determined
that
defense
counsel had “adequately explored any motives Betsy may have had
to
fabricate
her
testimony,”
and
sufficiently
cross-examined
Betsy on the matter, thus meeting Strickland’s constitutional
standards.
Merida II, 93 A.3d at 549-50.
Similarly, the state supreme court rejected Merida’s fourth
assertion,
that
his
attorney
was
ineffective
prevented Merida from testifying at trial.
because
he
The superior court
did not credit Merida’s assertion that his attorney “prevented”
him
from
testifying,
but
rather
encouraged him not to testify.
these
findings,
reasonable
and
strategic
found
that
counsel
had
The state supreme court adopted
deemed
counsel’s
decision.”
Merida
recommendation
II,
93
A.3d
at
“a
551.
Thus, under Strickland, Merida failed to show any deficiency by
counsel.
Id.
8
Federal
courts
determinations
on
serious error.
defer
to
habeas
the
review,
state
courts’
absent
any
Glacken, 585 F.3d at 552.
credibility
indication
of
This Court thus
defers to the state courts’ finding that Merida’s attorney was
never informed of Betsy’s potential motive to lie, and to their
finding that Merida was not “prevented” from testifying on his
own behalf.
In light of these facts, the state supreme court’s
determination
that
Merida’s
counsel’s
actions
were
sufficient
under Strickland was in no way an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law.
See Glacken, 585 F.3d at 552.
Merida’s first and fourth claims of ineffective assistance thus
have no merit.
Merida’s second argument, that the State’s expert witness
testimony
witness,
compelled
likewise
the
cannot
assistance of counsel.
after
engaging
a
presentation
support
a
of
a
finding
defense
of
expert
ineffective
As set forth by the state supreme court,
defense
expert
and
evaluating
her
opinion,
Merida’s counsel decided that expert medical testimony would not
further Merida’s case. 3
strategic
prejudiced
counsel’s
decision
his
not
Merida has offered no reason counsel’s
to
defense.
decision
was
present
a
Because
defense
nothing
constitutionally
3
expert
may
indicates
deficient,
much
have
that
less
The Court defers to the state supreme court’s factual
determinations, which Merida has not challenged, as to the rest
of his ineffective-assistance claims.
9
that the state supreme court unreasonably applied federal law in
finding that no Strickland violation occurred, Merida’s second
argument is without merit.
Merida’s
third
ineffective-assistance
claim
relies
on
counsel’s failure to request a continuance to review an article
referred to by the State’s expert witness during her testimony.
Merida’s counsel testified that he did not request a continuance
in order to avoid prolonging the expert’s testimony, and because
he did not believe a continuance would have altered the expert’s
opinion.
Merida II, 93 A.3d at 551.
The Rhode Island Supreme
Court found that counsel’s strategic decision on this front was
reasonable under Strickland.
rationale,
this
finding
Id.
was
Given counsel’s commonsense
clearly
not
an
unreasonable
application of federal law.
Merida’s
based
on
final
his
attorney’s
witnesses at trial.
believe
the
order
Merida’s case.
object
on
a
allegation
of
failure
ineffective
to
object
to
assistance
is
the
of
order
Merida’s counsel testified that he did not
of
the
evidence
made
any
difference
to
As the state supreme court found, failing to
point
that
counsel
reasonably
determined
had
no
impact on his client’s case is not grounds for a claim that a
Strickland violation occurred.
The Court sees no way by which
the state court’s finding on this matter could be deemed an
unreasonable application of federal law.
10
For
the
above
reasons,
Merida’s
claims
of
ineffective
assistance of counsel are all without merit.
III. Conclusion
The Court determines that due to the nature of Merida’s
claims, a hearing is unnecessary. 4
For the reasons set forth in
this Order, Merida’s § 2254 Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus
is hereby DENIED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: August 20, 2015
4
The Rhode Island state courts have weighed all of the
matters Merida disputes here.
Given that Merida points to no
evidence or issues that the state courts have failed to fully
address, or any serious error in their determinations, there is
no reason to duplicate the state courts’ efforts.
11
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