DL Enterprises, Inc. v. Briden et al
Filing
9
ORDER denying 6 Motion for Summary Judgment and remanding the matter to the Rhode Island Superior Court. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 9/22/2015. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
DL ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a
)
EAST BAY TAVERN,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
C.A. No. 14-348
)
CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE
)
CITY COUNCIL; JAMES A. BRIDEN,
)
CHAIRMAN; THOMAS ROSE; CHRISTINE
)
ROSSI; HELDER J. CUNHA; AND TRACY )
A. CAMPOBIANO, ACTING AS LICENSING )
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE CITY OF EAST )
PROVIDENCE, BOARD OF LICENSES,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
___________________________________)
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Defendants move for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 6.)
For
the reasons that follow, that motion is denied, and the case is
remanded to Rhode Island Superior Court.
In
February
2014,
a
fight
occurred
at
Plaintiff’s
establishment in East Providence, Rhode Island.
Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 7.)
(See Defs.’
This incident
prompted the East Providence City Council (“City Council”) to
revoke
the
establishment’s
liquor
license.
(Id.
at
¶
2.)
Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Rhode Island Department
of
Business
Regulation
(“DBR”)
and
moved
for
a
stay
pending
appeal.
(Id. at ¶ 3.)
The DBR granted Plaintiff’s motion and
remanded the matter to the City Council for a hearing on the
imposition of any proper public-safety conditions on the liquor
license.
(Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)
At the hearing, the City Council
voted to revoke Plaintiff’s entertainment license as a permanent
public-safety condition on the liquor license.
(Id. at ¶ 6.)
The City Council determined that the fight “emanated from” the
live
entertainment
at
the
establishment.
(Id.)
Plaintiff
appealed to the DBR and moved for a stay of the revocation of
the entertainment license.
(Id. at ¶ 7.)
motion and dismissed the appeal.
The DBR denied the
(Id.)
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, the City Council
and
its
members,
in
Rhode
Island
Superior
Court,
alleging
procedural due process violations as a result of insufficient
and
inadequate
notice
entertainment license.
was
never
notified
and
seeking
reinstatement
of
its
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that it
that
the
entertainment
license
could
be
revoked because it was at all times under the impression that
only the liquor license was at stake.
1-2.)
(See Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No.
Defendants removed the case to this Court.
(ECF No. 1.)
They now move for summary judgment.
In their motion, Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff
failed to exhaust its procedural due process claim, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment.
2
Defendants are right about
one
thing:
remedies.
Plaintiff
indeed
failed
to
exhaust
its
state
Before Plaintiff can have its procedural due process
claim relating to the license-revocation proceeding reviewed in
federal court, it needs to exhaust state remedies with respect
to that claim.
2d
106,
109
exhausted
See D’Ambra v. City of Providence, 21 F. Supp.
(D.R.I.
its
1998).
state
At
remedies
present,
with
Plaintiff
respect
to
has
this
not
claim.
Accordingly, the Court cannot adjudicate it at this juncture.
The failure to exhaust state remedies does not, however,
entitle Defendants to summary judgment (or any other judgment on
the merits) because this failure renders the claim unripe, not
meritless.
See Gamble v. Eau Claire City, 5 F.3d 285, 286 (7th
Cir. 1993) (“[A] federal claim is unripe until state remedies
are exhausted.”).
“If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction” to adjudicate it.
Depositors
Econ.
Prot.
Corp.,
862
F.
Supp.
Ernst & Young v.
709,
717
(D.R.I.
1994); see also Verizon New England, Inc. v. Int’l Bd. of Elec.
Workers,
Local
(“Ripeness
is
No.
an
2322,
651
F.3d
176,
188
Article
III
jurisdictional
(1st
Cir.
2011)
requirement[.]”).
Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
claim, the case must be remanded to Rhode Island Superior Court. 1
1
The parties squabble over the procedure that
must follow in order to properly exhaust its state
Defendants assert that Plaintiff was required to seek
certiorari from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, while
3
Plaintiff
remedies:
a writ of
Plaintiff
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (“If at any time before final judgment it
appears
that
the
district
court
lacks
subject
matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); Perfect Puppy, Inc.
v. City of E. Providence, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, C.A. No. 14-257
S, 2015 WL 1474560, at *7-8 (D.R.I. March 31, 2015).
For
these
reasons,
the
Defendant’s
motion
for
summary
judgment is DENIED, and this case is REMANDED to Rhode Island
Superior Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED:
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: September 22, 2015
contends that its suit in Superior Court was the appropriate
avenue. (See Defs.’ Mot. 1, ECF No. 6-1; Pl.’s Opp’n 3, ECF No.
8.1.) This question is for the Superior Court, not this Court,
to resolve.
Irrespective of the precise state court to which
Plaintiff must bring its claim, the salient fact for purposes of
Defendants’ motion is that Plaintiff has not yet exhausted its
state remedies and that, consequently, the claim is unripe.
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?