Warrener v. AAA of Southern New England et al
Filing
10
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 2 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 9/16/2015. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
AAA OF SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND;
)
JOHN NARDOLILLO, in his
)
individual and official
)
capacities,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
KERRI WARRENER,
C.A. No. 14-424 S
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff,
Defendants,
Kerri
AAA
of
Warrener,
Southern
has
New
filed
England
suit
(“AAA”)
against
and
John
Nardolillo, Vice President of Automotive Services, for sex and
disability
the
Rhode
(“RIPFMLA”)
(“FMLA”).
discrimination,
Island
and
retaliation,
Parental
the
and
federal
Family
Family
(Compl., ECF No. 1-3.)
Defendants’
Partial
Motion
to
and
violation
and
Act
Leave
Medical
both
Leave
Medical
of
Act
Now before the Court is
Dismiss
(ECF
No.
2),
seeking
dismissal of Counts 10 and 12 of the complaint for failure to
state
a
claim
for
interference
(collectively “Leave Laws”). 1
1
Defendants
also
moved
under
the
RIPFMLA
and
FMLA
For the reasons set forth below,
to
dismiss
Counts
1-9
as
to
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to Count 10 and DENIED as to
Count 12.
Background 2
I.
Warrener was hired by AAA as a Road Service Counselor in
1989, and was promoted to Assistant Manager of the Road Service
Call
Center
depression,
in
2007.
Warrener
substantially
suffered
limiting
her
from
major
anxiety
life
and
activities,
but not preventing her from performing the essential functions
of her job.
These conditions constituted disabilities of which
Defendants were aware, and Defendants considered her disabled.
On
July
absence
2,
as
2012,
a
she
requested
“reasonable
a
3-month
accommodation.”
medical
In
a
leave
memo
of
dated
October 1, 2012, the day before Plaintiff’s scheduled return
from medical leave, Defendant Nardolillo, the Vice President of
Automotive Services at AAA, recommended that she be fired based
on
“perceived
personal
relationships”
with
subordinates.
On
October 2, 2012, the day Plaintiff returned from leave, she was
fired.
Other
AAA
managers
who
engaged
in
“personal
Defendant John Nardolillo, but in the alternative, requested
that litigation be stayed on those counts pending decision of
the question certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
Mancini v. City of Providence, C.A. No. 13-92S.
This Court
denied the request for dismissal, but granted the stay.
This
Order thus addresses only Defendants’ arguments pertaining to
Counts 10 and 12.
2
The facts set forth here reflect those alleged in
Warrener’s complaint, and are limited to what is relevant for
purposes of ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
2
relationships” with subordinates, including Nardolillo, were not
fired.
II.
Discussion
Under
Rule
Procedure,
failure
this
to
12(b)(6)
Court
state
a
is
of
the
permitted
claim
upon
Federal
to
which
Rules
dismiss
relief
of
an
may
Civil
action
be
for
granted.
Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009).
A complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the claim and
the
grounds
for
the
claim,
entitlement to relief.
the
Court
must
allege
a
plausible
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 558 (2007).
dismiss,
and
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
accepts
as
true
the
well-pleaded
facts
alleged in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff.
Rodriguez–Reves v. Molina–Rodriguez,
711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013).
The Court need not, however,
accept legal conclusions as true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009), and a “formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” is not sufficient, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The
Leave
Laws
entitle
employees
to
leave
when
certain
conditions are met, and prohibit an employer from “interfer[ing]
with,
restrain[ing],
employee’s
rights
or
provided
deny[ing]
by
those
the
exercise
laws.
29
of”
U.S.C.
the
§
2615(a)(1); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-5(a); see also Carrero-Ojeda
v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 755 F.3d 711, 718 (1st Cir.
3
2014).
that
In Counts 10 and 11 of her complaint, Warrener claims
Defendants
Defendants
violated
“interfered
her
with,
FMLA
rights,
restrained
and
alleging
denied”
that
her
FMLA
rights (Count 10), and that Defendants retaliated against her
for exercising her right to medical leave (Count 11).
In Count
12, she alleges that Defendants “discriminated against” her and
“violated her statutory rights” under the RIPFMLA.
Defendants first take issue with the adequacy of Warrener’s
pleadings on her eligibility and entitlement to take leave.
An
employee must have worked 12 consecutive months, and at least
1,250
hours
during
leave
under
the
that
FMLA,
12-month
29
U.S.C.
period,
§
to
be
2611(2),
eligible
and
have
for
been
employed for 12 consecutive months under the RIPFMLA, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 28-48-2(a).
Defendants claim that Warrener did not plead
these facts with specificity.
They further claim that she did
not adequately plead her entitlement to leave because she did
not allege that her anxiety and depression made her unable to
perform her job, or that it is a “serious health condition” as
required by the FMLA.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
The Court finds that Warrener has pleaded sufficient facts
to
establish
her
entitlement
to
and
eligibility
for
leave.
Warrener alleged that she worked at AAA since 1989, was promoted
in 2007, and was fired in 2012, and that she was an employee
within the meaning of the FMLA and RIPFMLA.
4
Based on this, the
natural inference would be that her work at AAA lasted at least
12
consecutive
months.
She
also
alleges
that
AAA
“regarded
[her] as disabled,” that her anxiety and depression limited her
major life activities and were permanent conditions, and that
she
requested,
and
was
granted,
medical
“accommodation,” presumably for her disability.
evaluating
a
complaint
under
Rule
leave
as
an
For purposes of
12(b)(6),
these
facts
plausibly establish Warrener’s eligibility for and entitlement
to leave.
Defendants next contend that Warrener’s interference claims
fail because she received all of the leave to which she could
have been entitled.
A claim for interference under the FMLA
must
(1)
establish
Leave
Laws’
that:
protection;
the
(2)
plaintiff
the
was
employer
eligible
was
for
covered
the
by
the
Leave Laws; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to leave; (4) the
plaintiff gave her employer notice of intent to take leave; and
(5) the employer denied the plaintiff her right to the Leave
Laws’
benefits
to
which
she
was
entitled.
Surprise
v.
Innovation Grp., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 134, 145 (D. Mass. 2013).
The
FMLA
guarantees
the
right
to
reinstatement
to
position or its equivalent upon return from leave.
the
same
29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1); Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div.,
429 F.3d 325, 330 (1st Cir. 2005).
5
Warrener’s allegations make clear that she took a leave of
12 weeks, and thus, according to Defendants, she cannot claim
she was denied leave.
Her interference claims can therefore
only be based on Defendants’ failure to restore her to her prior
job.
However, Defendants argue, Warrener cannot have an FMLA
interference
claim
based
on
her
entitlement
to
restoration
alone, because such a claim is essentially a retaliation claim
“masquerading
as”
an
interference
claim.
Dressler
v.
Cmty.
Serv. Commc’ns, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 17, 24-25 (D. Me. 2003)
aff'd,
115
explicitly
F.
App’x
asserts
452
in
(1st
Count
Cir.
11
2004).
that
Warrener
Defendants
indeed
retaliated
against her for exercising her FMLA-protected right to medical
leave.
The First Circuit has recognized that a plaintiff may claim
both interference and retaliation.
Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 1998); Colburn, 429 F.3d at
332.
As
Colburn
states,
“[t]he
term
‘interference’
may,
depending on the facts, cover both retaliation claims [] and
non-retaliation
claims.”
Colburn,
Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159-60).
429
F.3d
at
331
(citing
The elements of interference and
retaliation claims differ in that, to establish retaliation, a
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an
employer’s adverse action was in retaliation for the exercise of
6
protected rights, whereas an interference claim does not depend
on the employer’s motive.
In
certain
Id. at 332.
instances,
however,
a
“non-retaliation”
claim
for interference cannot be supported, because the facts alleged
only substantiate a retaliation-based claim.
In Dressler, where
the plaintiff argued that his employer interfered with his FMLA
right to restoration, the court found that:
Dressler’s argument that he was “not restored” because
he was taking intermittent leave is really an argument
that an adverse employment action (layoff) was imposed
on him because he was taking leave. This argument is,
inherently, a retaliation argument. For if the taking
of leave was a material factor in the decision to
terminate
his
employment,
it
would
amount
to
retaliation, not mere interference with or denial of
the right to be restored.
Dressler, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
As Defendants point out, Warrener’s FMLA interference claim
could only be based on her right to reinstatement, given that
she was not denied leave.
She is only entitled to restoration,
however, if she was wrongfully terminated based on her having
taken leave under FMLA.
reasons
unrelated
to
Conversely, if she was terminated for
her
having
taken
leave
under
FMLA,
she
would not be entitled to restoration and thus could not claim
her FMLA rights were violated.
Supp.
2d
at
reinstatement
320
if
(FMLA
the
See, e.g., Carrero-Ojeda, 870 F.
does
not
employee
is
entitle
an
discharged
employee
for
to
reasons
unrelated to her leave); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152
7
F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998) (employees who request FMLA
leave do not have greater protection against termination for
reasons not related to the request than they would prior to
submitting
the
request).
Therefore,
while
motive
does
not
impact interference claims under Colburn, 429 F.3d at 331, in
this
instance,
retaliatory
relief.
only
reasons
if
Defendants
could
she
terminated
establish
her
Warrener
right
for
to
FMLA
Her claim is thus, in essence, a claim for retaliation.
See, e.g., Mellen v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 504 F.3d 21, 26-27
(1st
Cir.
2007)
(“[W]hatever
label
a
claim
is
given,
what
matters is ‘whether the plaintiff is, at bottom, claiming that
the employer denied his or her substantive rights under the FMLA
or that the employer retaliated against him or her for having
exercised
or
attempted
to
exercise
those
rights.’”
(quoting
Colburn, 429 F.3d at 332)); Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co.,
681
F.3d
274,
282
(6th
Cir.
2012)
(where
“the
essence
of
[plaintiff’s] claim is retaliation, not interference,” the claim
should be analyzed as a retaliation claim).
The Court thus agrees with Defendants that Warrener has not
alleged
facts
under
the
FMLA
sufficient
to
set
forth
interference claim separate from her retaliation claim.
an
Count
10, alleging interference under the FMLA, therefore fails to
state a claim, and must be dismissed.
8
Although Defendants refer to Warrener’s interference claim
under the RIPFMLA, it is not apparent to the Court that Warrener
has attempted to state such a claim.
discrimination
and
violation
of
Count 12, which alleges
Warrener’s
statutory
rights
under RIPFMLA, makes no mention of Defendants having “interfered
with” Warrener’s right to leave, as Count 10 does.
Nothing in
the language of Count 12 suggests that Warrener meant to set
forth a claim for interference.
Thus, Defendants’ arguments do
not warrant dismissal of Warrener’s RIPFMLA claims in Count 12.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED as to Count 10 and DENIED as to Count 12, and Count 10
of Warrener’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: September 16, 2015
9
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