Sigui et al v. M+M Communications Inc. et al

Filing 37

ORDER adopting 29 Report and Recommendations; granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Cox Communications; granting 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by William Dowling; granting in part and denying in part 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by M+M Communications, Inc. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 3/30/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
M&M COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and
)
COX RHODE ISLAND TELCOM, LLC,
)
d/b/a COX COMMUNICATIONS, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
JUAN SIGUI, et. al.,

C.A. No. 14-442 S

ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
This is an FLSA misclassification case brought by a putative
class of former cable installation technicians (“Plaintiffs” or
“technicians”).

Each worked for M&M Communications (“M&M”) and

installed cable TV and internet services exclusively for Cox
Communications (“Cox”).
defendant,

William

M&M, Cox, and an individually named

Dowling,

moved

to

against them. (ECF Nos. 15, 16 and 17.)

dismiss

the

allegations

Magistrate Judge Lincoln

D. Almond issued a Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 29),
recommending that the Court grant Dowling’s motion in its entirety,
grant Cox and M&M’s motions as to Count IV, and deny the remainder
of Cox and M&M’s motions. (See R&R 23, ECF No. 29.)

No objections

were filed as to the R&R’s recommendations relating to Dowling and
M&M.

The Court, thus, adopts them without further comment.

See

LR Cv 72(d)(1). Cox, however, objected to the R&R’s recommendation
to deny its motion.

(Cox’s Objection to R&R (“Obj.”), ECF No.

33.)

Cox,

According

to

Magistrate

Judge

Almond

incorrectly

concluded that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Cox was their joint
employer under Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

(Id. at 1.)

Cox’s Objection is unpersuasive.
As recounted in the R&R, to determine if a joint employment
relationship exists under the FLSA, the First Circuit looks to the
“‘economic reality’ of the totality of the circumstances bearing
on whether the putative employee is economically dependent on the
alleged employer.”

Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163

F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998).

Under this so called “economic

realities test,” courts begin by analyzing four factors: “whether
the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the
employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules
or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of
payment; and (4) maintained employment records.”

Id. (citing

Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th
Cir. 1983)).

In applying these factors, however, “it is the

totality of the circumstances, and not any one factor, which
determines whether a worker is the employee of a particular alleged
employer.”

Id. at 676.

Considering the totality of the allegations in the Complaint,
Magistrate Judge Almond found that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient
2

facts to establish Cox as their joint employer. (R&R 14, ECF No.
29.)

Specifically, the R&R noted that Plaintiffs alleged Cox (1)

controlled

Plaintiffs’

schedules;

(2)

set

the

order

of

the

Plaintiffs’ jobs; (3) affected Plaintiff’s compensation through a
point system controlled by Cox; (4) required Plaintiffs to wear
certain uniforms containing Cox insignia; (5) provided Plaintiffs
with the equipment they gave to customers; (6) conducted Coxspecific

training

for

Plaintiffs;

and

reviews of Plaintiffs’ job performance.

(7)

conducted

quality

(Id.)

As Cox points out, Plaintiffs do not, in fact, allege that
Cox conducted Cox-specific training, eliminating one of the seven
factors the R&R relied upon.

Yet, even without this factor,

Plaintiffs still allege that Cox exercised control over their
schedules,

work

conditions,

compensation,

and

set

performance

standards.

As the majority of cases to consider similar facts on

a motion to dismiss have held, these allegations are enough to get
Plaintiffs over the hurdle of a 12(b)(6) motion and into discovery.
See Schmidt v. DIRECTV, LLC, CIV. NO. CV 14-3000 (JRT/JSM), 2016
WL

519654,

at

recommendation

*12

(D.

adopted,

Minn.

Civil

No.

Jan.

22,

14-3000

2016)

report

(JRT/JSM),

2016

and
WL

526210 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2016) (collecting cases); Chesley v.
DIRECTV, Inc., No. 14-cv-468-PB, 2015 WL 3549129 (D.N.H. June 8,
2015).

3

Cox’s

objections

are

OVERRULED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

and

the

R&R

is

ACCEPTED

William Dowling’s motion is

GRANTED and Dowling is hereby dismissed from this action. Cox and
M&M’s motions are GRANTED as to Count IV but otherwise DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: March 30, 2016

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