Goulet v. The State of Rhode Island

Filing 5

ORDER granting 3 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 9/24/2015. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
EDGAR GOULET,

C.A. No. 14-466 S

ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil

Procedure.

Defendant’s

(ECF

Motion.

No.

(ECF

3.)

No.

Plaintiff

4.)

For

the

opposes
reasons

discussed below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I.

Background
In

2007,

Plaintiff

Edgar

Goulet

was

charged

with

malicious killing of an animal – his dog, Sparky - and
possession of a sawed-off shotgun.

The case was tried by a

jury in Rhode Island Superior Court in May 2008, and Goulet
was convicted of both counts.
Court

affirmed

the

Superior

The Rhode Island Supreme

Court’s

judgment

on

See State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302, 315 (R.I. 2011).
29,

2012,

Goulet

filed

a

Complaint

for

appeal.
On June

Post-Conviction

Relief

in

Rhode

Island

Superior

Court,

which

was

pending as of the filing of Defendant’s Motion.

still

(Def.’s

Mot. 3, ECF No. 3.)
On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in
this Court “seek[ing] monetary relief and post conviction
relief from the Defendant [State of Rhode Island] in the
erroneous
(Compl.

1,

conviction
ECF

No.

and
1.)

sentencing
Plaintiff’s

of

the

Plaintiff.”

Complaint

makes

a

number of allegations, the crux of which is that “Attorney
Generals and State Prosecutors and other State employees
have

intentionally

attempted

to

conspire

to

convict

the

plaintiff” and “[t]he State of Rhode Island was negligent
in controlling the Judicial officers of their State.”
at 2.)

(Id.

In the matter before this Court, Plaintiff proceeds

pro se.
II.

Discussion
“To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must

allege ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’”

Fitzgerald v.

Harris, 549 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)).

In reviewing

a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “assume the
truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, drawing
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.”
A pro se complaint must be “read liberally.”
2

Id.

Pavilonis v.

King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1078 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Haines v.
Kerner,

404

U.S.

519,

520-21

(1972)).

“[W]hile

such

litigants are not exempt from procedural rules, [courts]
hold

pro

se

pleadings

to

less

demanding

standards

than

those drafted by lawyers and endeavor, within reasonable
limits, to guard against the loss of pro se claims due to
technical defects.”

Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158

(1st Cir. 2008).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted 1 and that his
Complaint violates Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

(See Def.’s Mot. 5-6, ECF No. 3.)

For

the reasons that follow, this Court finds that Plaintiff
has not stated a claim on which relief may be granted, and
therefore

need

not

reach

the

question

of

whether

his

Complaint violates Rules 8 and 10.

1

Defendant advances a number of theories as to why
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim: 1) Plaintiff is
barred from recovering money damages for a conviction
and/or sentence that has been upheld on direct appeal; 2)
the doctrine of res judicata bars Plaintiff’s claim; 3) the
doctrines of judicial and prosecutorial immunity shield
Rhode Island Superior Court Judge Nugent and Attorney
General Peter Kilmartin from liability; 4) a § 1983 claim
cannot be maintained against a state official in his
official capacity; 5) the statute of limitations for the
instant claim has expired; 6) Plaintiff lacks standing to
sue; and 7) Plaintiff’s federal habeas petition is
premature. (Def.’s Mot. 5, ECF No. 3.)
3

Plaintiff’s

Complaint

asserts

that

this

Court

has

jurisdiction “pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 1341 - Mail Fraud,
18 USC § 3161 - Failure of Speedy Trial, 18 USC [§] 1503 Influencing a jury, 18 USC § 3162 - Sanctions, 18 USC § 241
- Conspiracy against rights.”

(Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)

As

Defendant notes, these are criminal offense sections of the
United States Code, and thus Goulet, as a private citizen,
lacks standing to sue for violation thereof.
13-14, ECF No. 3.)

(Def.’s Mot.

See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2

(1st Cir. 1989) (citing Keenan v. McGrath, 328 F.2d 610,
611

(1st

Complaint

Cir.

1964)).

liberally,

it

However,
appears

reading
that

Plaintiff’s

some

of

his

allegations may fall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as he accuses
state officials of violations including “abuse of process.” 2
(See Compl. 1-2, 7, 9-10, ECF No. 1.)

2

Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of
the
United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.”
4

Plaintiff is barred from recovering damages from the
State of Rhode Island or any of its employees in their
official

capacities

under

Section

1983.

See

Will

v.

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-71 (1989);
Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991)
(“It is settled beyond peradventure, however, that neither
a state agency nor a state official acting in his official
capacity

may

action.”).

be

sued

Although

for

damages

Plaintiff

in

a

identifies

section
a

1983

number

of

individuals in his Complaint, the State of Rhode Island is
the only named defendant. 3

(Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 1.)

Thus,

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for damages under
Section 1983.

3

Even if Plaintiff intended to allege claims against
the state officials mentioned in his Complaint in their
personal capacities, these claims would still be barred.
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)(“[I]n
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”).
Plaintiff’s Complaint
clearly states that his claims stem out of his “erroneous
conviction and sentencing.”
(Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff’s conviction was upheld by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court and thus he may not assert any claims under
Section 1983 arising out of that conviction.
5

Plaintiff
overturned.”
have

the

Section

also

seeks

“to

have

(Compl. 12, ECF No. 1.)

power

overturn

“[t]o

1983;

to

obtain

conviction

This Court does not

Plaintiff’s
such

his

conviction

relief,

the

under

plaintiff’s

‘sole remedy is to file a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus and fulfill all of the requirements for relief under
28

U.S.C.

§

2254,

including

exhaustion

remedies and time limitations.’”
2:15-cv-25-JHR,

2015

WL

of

state

court

Brown v. Duffett, No.

4065257,

at

*2

(D.

Me.

July

1,

2015) (quoting Thomas v. Reisch, No. 5:14 CV 1372, 2014 WL
6687248, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2014)); see also Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) (“In short, Congress
has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or
length

of

their

determination

must

confinement,
override

the

and

that

specific

general

terms

of

[§]

if

Court

were

to

1983.”).
Defendants
construe
Plaintiff
conviction

argue

Plaintiff’s
has

failed

remedies.

that,

even

Complaint
to

exhaust
(Def.’s

as

the
a

his
Mot.

habeas
state
14,

petition,

court
ECF

No.

post3.)

Regardless of whether or not Goulet’s state post-conviction
claim remains pending, his Complaint cannot succeed as a
habeas petition because he has failed to allege that he is
6

in

the

state’s

custody.

See

28

U.S.C.

§ 2254(a)

(“[A]

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is
in

custody

in

violation

of

the

Constitution

or

treaties of the United States.” (emphasis added)).

laws

or

Thus,

this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish any
claim on which relief may be granted. 4
III. Conclusion
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Defendant’s

Motion

to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: September 24, 2015

4

Accordingly, the Court need not reach Defendant’s
arguments
regarding
judicial
immunity,
prosecutorial
immunity, res judicata, and the statute of limitations.
7