Greenman v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company

Filing 44

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM ADOPTING 39 Report and Recommendations and GRANTING 20 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Senior Judge Mary M. Lisi on 6/6/2017. (Feeley, Susan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
LEIGH ANN GREENMAN,
Plaintiff
v.

C.A. No. 15-004-ML

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
This matter is before the Court on review of a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by Magistrate Judge Sullivan on March
22, 2017 (ECF No. 39). Because the Plaintiff filed a timely
objection to the R&R, the Court reviews de novo those portions of
the R&R to which an objection has been made. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). The Court has thoroughly reviewed and considered the R&R,
the Plaintiff’s objection thereto (ECF No. 41), and the Defendant’s
response (ECF No. 43), as well as the submissions by the parties in
connection with the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
Nos. 20-23, 33-35, 37-38). Having done so, the Court now adopts the
R&R in its entirety. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
I. Factual Background
Metropolitan

Property

and

Casualty

Insurance

Company

(“MetLife”), a Rhode Island corporation, operates as a personal
lines property and casualty insurer. Def.’s Statement of Undisputed
1

Facts

(“SUF”)

¶¶

1,

2.

MetLife

sells

and

services

auto

and

homeowner insurance and other miscellaneous personal lines of
insurance. SUF ¶ 3. During the time period in question,

MetLife

employed approximately 360 people at its Quaker Lane, Warwick,
Rhode Island office, including a 15-employee Product Marketing
group,

which

was

under

the

supervision

of

Robert

Lundgren

(“Lundgren”), Vice President of Marketing, and John Delemontex
(“Delemontex”) Director of Product Marketing. SUF ¶¶ 4-7. Within
the Product

Marketing

group are

(in

the

order

of increasing

seniority) the following positions: Marketing Analyst, Marketing
Consultant 1, Marketing Consultant II, Senior Marketing Consultant,
and Senior Marketing Consultant II.1 SUF ¶ 11. The entry level
position of Marketing Analyst requires 0-2 years of experience and
falls under the supervision of more senior employees, such as the
Marketing Consultants. SUF ¶ 12.

Marketing Consultants generally

have between 2-5 years of experience at the low end and 5-7 years
of

experience

at

the

more

advanced

level.

Senior

Marketing

consultants and Senior Marketing Consultants II have 7-8 or more
than 8 years of experience, respectively. They are also expected to
work more independently on project-based tasks without ongoing

1

Although Plaintiff does not disagree with this list, she notes
that the group also includes the position of administrative
assistant held by two temporary employees and unspecified positions
held by independent contractors. Pltf.’s Statement of Disputed
Facts (“SDF”) ¶ 11.

2

close supervision. SUF ¶¶13, 14. According to Plaintiff, she was
considered a Marketing Analyst but had more than two years of
experience,

provided

her

time

as

a

temporary

employee

were

included. She also maintains that she was able to work on projects
without supervision. SDF ¶ 12.
In early 2012, Lundgren was informed by MetLife of the need
to cut his budget by 8%, or $800,000, as part of an expense
reduction

plan, which

itself was

part of

a

larger

corporate

reorganization. SUF ¶¶ 15, 16, 18. According to MetLife, Lundgren
took into account the company’s changing shift in focus from retail
sales to the growth in group sales.2 SUF ¶ 20. Lundgren’s decision
as to which programs and personnel to cut were made in consultation
with Delemontex. SUF ¶ 19.
According

to

MetLife,

Lundgren

decided

to

eliminate

the

position of Marketing Consultant David Cleveland (“Cleveland”) and
that of the sole Marketing Analyst, the Plaintiff.3 SUF ¶¶ 24, 25.
MetLife maintains that Lundgren based his decision to terminate

2

Plaintiff’s contention that “[t]o the extent Ms. [sic]
Lundgren selected Ms. Greenman for termination based on her
pregnancy and FMLA leave, he did not take into account a shift in
the business emphasis,” assumes Plaintiff’s desired conclusion as
fact, but does not factually dispute the stated factor considered
by Lundgren in determining how to achieve the required deduction.
SDF ¶ 21.
3

Lundgren also decided to lay off Ron Mann (“Mann”), one of the
individuals in the research department who was focused primarily on
data analysis supporting retail sales. SUF ¶ 31.
3

these positions on what would have the least negative impact on the
Product Marketing Group, SUF ¶ 23. Plaintiff, however, insists that
her position was cut because she was pregnant and planning to take
FMLA leave. SDF ¶ 23. Plaintiff agrees, however, that the decision
to eliminate her position was made because she had less experience
in marketing relative to the other members of the Product Marketing
Group under Delemontex. She also acknowledges that in addition to
the two positions within Delemontex’s area, Lundgren decided to cut
one of the two individuals in the research area who was focused
primarily on data analysis supporting retail sales. SUF ¶¶ 29-31.
On

the

Friday

prior

to

the planned

layoffs,

which

were

scheduled to take effect on Monday, May 21, 2012, Kerri Gulesserian
(“Gulesserian”), who had previously assumed temporary supervisory
responsibilities in the Product Marketing group while Delemontex
was rotated to a sales assignment, SUF ¶7 n. 2, informed Delemontex
that Plaintiff’s spouse was about to be laid off from his position
as a contractor for MetLife. SUF ¶¶ 32, 33. Delemontex relayed the
information to human resource employee Deb Duchala (“Duchala”) and
also left a voice mail for Lundgren ¶¶ 34, 35. Concerned about the
effect of the loss of income to both Plaintiff and her spouse at
the same time, Lundgren decided to delay Plaintiff’s layoff. As a
result, only Cleveland and Mann were laid off on May 21, 2012. SUF
¶¶ 37-39.
Plaintiff calls these asserted facts into question because (1)

4

she herself had not informed Gulesserian about her husband’s
possible

layoff;

(2)

Duchala

only

learned

about

Plaintiff’s

pregnancy on the Friday prior to the planned layoff date; (3)
Lundgren learned the news from Ms. Ridley; and (4) “MetLife’s
stated policy does not allow for the effect of termination to be
factored into the termination decision.” SDF ¶¶ 33-37, Pltf’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 183. Plaintiff does not dispute,
however, that Lundgren learned about her husband’s layoff4 and that
Lundgren decided not to lay off Plaintiff as planned. Id.
On October 9, 20125, Plaintiff began her maternity leave. SDF
¶ 41. According to MetLife, it provided Plaintiff with appropriate
notice of the workplace leave that was available to her, SUF ¶ 42;
Plaintiff disagrees on the grounds that because she was terminated
in the course of her leave, the notice “was not actually notice of
‘leave

that

was

available

to

Plaintiff.’”

SDF

¶

42.

It

is

undisputed that Plaintiff initially received paid leave and that
her leave became unpaid as of December 21, 2013. SUF ¶ 44.
Likewise, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s twelve weeks of FMLA
leave was originally scheduled to conclude during the first week of

4

As it turned out, Plaintiff’s husband
scheduled to be laid off at that time.

was

actually

not

5

According to MetLife, Plaintiff’s maternity leave commenced on
October 5, 2012; the apparent discrepancy is explained by the fact
that it was the Columbus Day weekend. SUF ¶41.

5

January 2013, and that during the course of Plaintiff’s leave,
Lundgren became aware that an enhanced severance program provided
by Metlife would only be available for employees who were laid off
during 2012. SUF ¶¶ 45, 46. Lundgren sought to determine whether
making

the

layoff

date

in

2012,

rather

than

2013,

would

be

financially advantageous to Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff asserts
that Lundgren also considered whether the earlier date would
benefit MetLife by getting Plaintiff “off the books,” SDF ¶ 47, she
does not refute that Lundgren sought to make such a determination
or

that the

earlier layoff

date

would

have

been

financially

advantageous to her, when compared with a 2013 layoff date.6 Id.
Based on an analysis provided by Duchala, Lundgren determined that
the additional severance benefit available in 2012 would yield a
significantly better financial outcome for Plaintiff. SUF ¶48.
Plaintiff was laid off as of December 26, 2012, which rendered her
eligible to receive additional severance.7 SUF ¶ 49.
6

According to MetLife, the December 21, 2012 lay-off date
increased Plaintiff’s severance offer significantly. Def.’s Resp.
to R&R at 7 n.6 (ECF No. 43).
7

As Plaintiff continues to point out in her responses to
MetLife’s motion, it would have been more advantageous to her, had
her position not been eliminated at all. SDF ¶¶ 47-49, 70-72.
However, neither that assertion nor her general conclusory
statement that MetLife terminated her employment to “rid itself of
a pregnant woman who had taken FMLA leave” refutes Metlife’s
representation that the layoff was first delayed and then
accelerated to a date that would provide Plaintiff with additional
benefits that neither the May 2012 date nor the January 2013 date

6

Subsequently,

Plaintiff

reported

to

the

Rhode

Island

Department of Labor and Training that her job had been eliminated.
SUF ¶ 50. Plaintiff, who does not dispute this assertion, suggests
that she was replaced with temporary employees after her departure.
SDF ¶ 50.
It is undisputed that Gulesserian, who had taken maternity
leave twice while at MetLife, was not laid off during the Product
Marketing group budget reduction.

Two other female employees who

also had taken maternity leave while they were members of the
Product Marketing group were all subsequently reinstated and/or
promoted. SUF ¶¶ 68, 69.
II. Procedural History
On December 16, 2014, the Plaintiff filed a three-count
complaint (the “Complaint”) in Rhode Island state court, asserting
(Count I) Rhode Island Civil Rights Act Discrimination, (Count II)
Family Medical Leave Act Retaliation, and (Count III) Family
Medical Leave Act Interference (ECF No. 1). After removing the
Complaint to this Court, MetLife filed an answer on January 13,
2015, generally denying Plaintiff’s claims and raising a number of
affirmative defenses (ECF No. 2).
Following a lengthy and, at times, contentious discovery
period, MetLife filed a motion for summary judgment on August 26,

would have afforded her.

7

2016 (ECF No. 20). On December 8, 2016, the Plaintiff filed a
response in opposition to MetLife’s motion (ECF No. 33), to which
MetLife filed a reply on January 9, 2017 (ECF No. 37). In addition,
MetLife filed a motion to have portions of its Rule 56 SUF deemed
admitted and to strike Plaintiff’s SUF (ECF 38).
On March 22, 2017, following a hearing, the Magistrate Judge
issued a detailed 29-page R&R, in which she recommended that
MetLife’s

motion

for

summary

judgment

be

granted

“[be]cause

Plaintiff has presented no competent evidence that would permit a
reasonable fact finder to conclude that [MetLife’s] decision to
select her for lay-off was concocted to mask the improper goal of
getting rid of a pregnant worker or a worker entitled to FMLA leave
or that [MetLife] wrongly interfered with her right to an FMLA
leave.” R&R at 29 (ECF No. 39).
The Plaintiff filed a timely objection to the R&R on April 4,
2017 (ECF No. 41), to which MetLife filed a reply memorandum on May
5, 2017 (ECF 43).
III. Standard of Review
The Court, in considering a motion for summary judgment,
reviews the record “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.”

Merchants

Ins. Co. of New Hampshire, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 143
F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1998)(citing Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co.,
126 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)).

8

MetLife, as the party seeking summary judgment, bears the
burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of material
fact.

Merchants Ins. Co. of New Hampshire, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity

and Guar. Co., 143 F.3d at 7. “Once such a showing is made, ‘the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, with respect to
each issue on which [it] would bear the burden of proof at trial,
demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that
issue in [its] favor.’” Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 817 F.3d 849,
853

(1st

Cir.

2016)

(quoting

Borges

ex

rel.

S.M.B.W.

v.

Serrano–Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2010)).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such
that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the
non-moving party.”

Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir.

2008) (citations omitted).

“A fact is material if it has the

potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.”

Id.

(quoting Maymi v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.
2008)).
IV. Discussion
A. The Discrimination Claim
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that her employment by
MetLife was terminated “due to her gender and pregnancy” and “with

9

the intention of retaliating against [Plaintiff] for making plans
to take maternity leave and for taking maternity leave protected by
the FMLA.” Complaint ¶¶ 27, 34. Plaintiff further asserts that
“[b]y terminating [Plaintiff] without justification, Defendants
[sic]

avoided

their

responsibilities

under

the

FMLA,

causing

[Plaintiff] damages.” Id. at ¶ 38.
In response, MetLife submits that Plaintiff’s entry level
position was eliminated as part of an overall plan to reduce
expenses. Def.’s Mot. Sum. Judg. 1 (ECF No. 21). According to
MetLife, Plaintiff was the most junior employee in her workgroup.
The decision to eliminate Plaintiff’s position and lay her off was
made because she had less experience in marketing than the other
members in her group, a contention that Plaintiff does not dispute.
SUF ¶ 29, SDF ¶ 29. MetLife also points out that two of the three
employees affected by the budgetary reduction were male, neither of
whom had taken any parental leave, and that other individuals in
Plaintiff’s work group—who had taken maternity leave before—were
not laid off.
To prove her claim that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated
by MetLife on the basis of her pregnancy and/or because she is a
woman, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that MetLife
purposefully laid her off because of those reasons. Smith v. F.W.

10

Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir.1996)8.

To undertake

its analysis, the Court must apply the familiar McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Because Plaintiff has made no showing of the equivalent of a
“smoking gun” in this case, Plaintiff has the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case. Center for Behavioral Health,
Rhode Island v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 685 (R.I. 1998). To prove
that MetLife’s termination of Plaintiff’s employment constituted
discrimination based on her pregnancy, Plaintiff has to show that
“(1) she was pregnant at the relevant time, (2) her job performance
was satisfactory, but (3) her employer took some adverse employment
action

against

her

while

(4)

differently.”•Sanchez-Estrada
F.Supp.3d

220,

232

(D.P.R.

treating

v.

MAPFRE

2015).

non-pregnant

employees

Praico

Co.,

Because

Ins.
the

126

Plaintiff’s

employment was terminated during a layoff phase, she may establish
a prima facie discrimination case by “producing some evidence that
[her]

layoff

occurred

in

circumstances

that

would

raise

a

reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” Dunn v. Trustees

8

Although Plaintiff’s case was brought under the Rhode Island
Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”), it is well established that RICRA
provisions are construed under the guidance of federal courts
construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Newport
Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Com’n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d
893, 897-98 (R.I. 1984).

11

of Boston University, 761 F.3d 63, 68 (1st. Cir.2014).
If the Plaintiff can satisfy the prima face requirement, it
creates a “rebuttable presumption that discrimination prompted the
challenged adverse employment action.” Martinez-Burgos v. Guayama
Corp., 656 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
The burden then shifts to MetLife to rebut the presumption by
showing that it had “legitimate, non-discriminatory” reasons for
its actions. Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.
Ct. 1338, 1354, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015). If MetLife is successful in
rebutting the presumption, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff
to make a showing that MetLife’s proffered reasons were in fact
“pretextual.” Id. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)(Plaintiff
“now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.”). To
persuade the Court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination,

the

discriminatory

reason

Plaintiff
more

must

likely

prove
motivated

directly
the

that

“a

employer

or

indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.” Id.
In a thoroughly detailed, precisely analyzed, and thoughtfully
considered R&R, the Magistrate Judge concluded that “the record is
devoid of facts supporting inferences sufficient for a fact finder
to conclude that Plaintiff’s pregnancy was the reason she was

12

selected to be laid off.” R&R at 26. As to Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim, the Magistrate Judge noted that MetLife “manipulated the
timing of the lay-off so [Plaintiff] ended up getting almost all of
the FMLA leave (including all of the fully paid parental leave),”
and

she

further

determined

that

Plaintiff

failed

to

present

evidence that MetLife’s stated reason for Plaintiff’s selection to
be laid off was pretextual. Id. at 28.
The Plaintiff, in her 41-page objection to the R&R, maintains,
inter alia, that her employment was terminated because she was
pregnant and/or female and that MetLife’s articulated reason for
the termination was a pretext. Pltf.’s Obj. at 17-22 (ECF No. 411). With respect to the latter, Plaintiff suggests that if MetLife
had elected to terminate the most junior employee in the Lundgren
group, it would have terminated Diane Lange (an administrative
assistant

who

provided

administrative

support

to

several

individuals in the department) or one of the temporary workers. Id.
at 30-31. Plaintiff’s suggestion that MetLife’s stated reductionin-force-justification

was

pretextual

is

based

on

Plaintiff’s

belief that, after Plaintiff’s departure, MetLife hired temporary
or contract workers who may have performed some of the tasks that
had been previously done by Plaintiff. Id. at 34.
With respect to MetLife’s decision to delay the termination of
Plaintiff’s employment for several months and then to time the
termination in order to maximize Plaintiff’s financial benefits

13

under the 2012 enhanced severance program, Plaintiff notes that she
was denied more than a week and half of her leave and her group
health benefits and, more fundamentally, that she was not restored
to her job. Id. at 40.
It is undisputed that (1) at the time MetLife decided that
Plaintiff’s position would be eliminated, Plaintiff was pregnant
and thus a member of a protected class; (2) her layoff constituted
an adverse employment action; and (3) she was performing her job at
an acceptable level. The fourth factor under McDonnell is a closer
question in this case. There is no persuasive evidence contained in
the record that establishes that the Plaintiff was replaced; at
most it supports the contention that some of her tasks were taken
over by other employees and that others may have been performed by
temporary workers. As to the latter, is undisputed that MetLife
engaged temporary workers both during Plaintiff’s employment as
well as after her termination. Plaintiff’s contention that she was
generally treated differently than non-pregnant employees (who were
not laid off) is not supported by the record. One of those
employees

was

the

supported

several

administrative
members

both

assistant,

in-

and

Diane

outside

Lang,

the

who

Product

Marketing group but did not hold a comparable professional position
as the Plaintiff. As to the temporary employees (who were not
pregnant and not laid off), there is no indication that they were
employees of the Product Marketing group; rather, they worked on a

14

temporary basis as needed. Moreover, Gulesserian, an employee of
the Product Marketing group who took two separate maternity leaves
in relatively quick succession, retained her job and subsequently
received a promotion.
In sum, Plaintiff’s contention that she was replaced is not
supported by credible evidence. As to her suggestion that she was
treated differently than non-pregnant employees (who were retained
while Plaintiff was laid off) that too seems to call for an
inference that is not supported by the record. Assuming, without
deciding, that the question is close enough to allow Plaintiff to
meet the fourth hurdle, further analysis reveals that Plaintiff
nonetheless lacks sufficient facts to overcome MetLife’s motion for
summary judgment.
It is undisputed that in early 2012, before learning of
Plaintiff’s pregnancy, Lundgren was tasked by MetLife to reduce the
Product Marketing group by 8% or $800,000. In consultation with
Delemontex, Lundgren decided to eliminate a Marketing Consultant
(male, not pregnant, not on parental leave) and Plaintiff, the sole
Marketing Analyst. Although Plaintiff points at Lang and the
temporary employees as being less senior, it is undisputed that of
the employees in the Product Marketing group, Plaintiff had the
least marketing experience and was the most junior employee.
Neither Lang nor the temporary employees performed at the same
level as the other members of the Product Marketing team. Notably,

15

Plaintiff does not dispute that “[t]he decision to eliminate her
position was made because [she] had less experience in marketing
relative to the other members of the Product Marketing group under
Mr. Delemontex.” SUF ¶ 29, SDF ¶ 29.
None

of

Plaintiff’s

suggested

inferences

support

her

contention that Lundgren’s decision to eliminate her position was
based on Plaintiff’s pregnancy. As already noted, Lang was not in
the same position as Plaintiff, she provided administrative support
to various employees and her experience was not in the same
category as that of other Product Marketing members. Likewise, the
fact that other members of that group took over some of Plaintiff’s
tasks and that other tasks may have been performed by temporary
employees

is

not

proof

that

MetLife’s

asserted

reason

for

terminating Plaintiff’s employment is a pretext. See Dunn v.
Trustees of Brown University, 761 F.3d at 70 (quoting Lewis v. City
of Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 216 (1st Cir. 2003)(noting that, in the
context of a reduction of force, allocating duties of discharged
employees to other existing employees “‘does not itself raise a
reasonable inference that the employer harbored discriminatory
animus toward any one employee.’”)
As to Lundgren’s decision to delay Plaintiff’s layoff, this
resulted in her continued employment and health care coverage for
an additional four and a half months and throughout the remainder
of her pregnancy. Plaintiff also received her paid maternity leave

16

in full until December 21, 2012, after which her leave was unpaid.
Plaintiff’s FMLA leave was scheduled to conclude in the first week
of January. Only after Lundgren became aware that Plaintiff would
receive

enhanced

severance

benefits

provided

her

layoff

was

scheduled before the end of 2012, did he engage HR to make a
determination of when the layoff would be more beneficial to
Plaintiff.

It

is

understood

benefitted

by

continued

that

employment

Plaintiff
and

that

would
her

have

most

layoff

also

benefitted MetLife as a part of the budget reduction plan. However,
it is undisputed that, after the decision to eliminate her position
had been made, Lundgren’s decisions first to delay Plaintiff’s
layoff and then to accelerate it resulted in significant financial
benefits to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s suggestion that
Lundgren and/or Delemontex’s failure to advise HR about Plaintiff’s
pregnancy in April 2012 constitutes a cover-up is unsupported by
the actual events in this case.
As to Plaintiff’s assertion that MetLife discriminated against
another female employee in connection with a pregnancy, the record
again fails to support such a conclusion. According to Plaintiff,
Gulesserian told her that she was offered a demotion before her
second FMLA leave (an assertion that Gulesserian denies) but she
refused it. Moreover, Gulesserian was promoted between FMLA leaves
and received an increase in pay after her second FMLA leave. Given
those facts, no reasonable inference can be drawn that MetLife

17

treated

pregnant

employees

with

discriminatory

animus

and

Plaintiff’s claims cannot withstand MetLife’s motion for summary
judgment.
B. Retaliation and FMLA Interference
Finally,
interference

as

to

with

her

Plaintiff’s
FMLA

claims

leave,

no

of

retaliation

lengthy

discussion

and
is

required. Because of Lundgren’s efforts to maximize Plaintiff’s
benefits after the decision to eliminate her position in the
context of a mandated budget reduction had already been made, she
retained her job and benefits for an additional four and a half
months. She also received all of her fully paid maternity leave and
most of her FMLA leave. The decision to accelerate her layoff
shortly before her FMLA leave was scheduled to end was made only
after

Lundgren

significant

ascertained

financial

that

benefit

by

Plaintiff

would

qualifying

for

receive
an

a

enhanced

severance program that was available only through the end of 2012.
None

of

those

essential

facts

are

credibly

disputed

by

the

Plaintiff and she offers no facts that would allow a reasonable
inference that she was retaliated against because she chose to take
FMLA leave.
For all these reasons and for those set forth in the March 22,
2017 R&R, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s objections are
insufficient to defeat MetLife’s motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the Court adopts the R&R in its entirety. MetLife’s

18

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to
enter judgment for MetLife.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Mary M. Lisi
Senior United States District Judge
June 6, 2017

19