Walker v. Chafee

Filing 42

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 9 Motion to Dismiss for failure to State a Claim filed by Gina Raimondo, 1 Motion for TRO, Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Calvin Walker, 36 Report and Recommendations. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 4/12/2016. (Cavaco, Janice)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
CALVIN WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.

C.A. No. 15-087L

GOVERNOR GINA RAIMONDO,
Defendant.
O R D E R
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Objection
to the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Lincoln
Almond, dated September 11, 2015 (ECF #36).

In the Report and

Recommendation (“R & R”), Judge Almond recommends that
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction be granted.

The

Court hereby affirms and accepts the R & R, granting Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, but on grounds
additional to those articulated by Magistrate Judge Almond.
Background and travel
Plaintiff Calvin Walker has been a frequent litigant in
Rhode Island’s courts.

In 1987, he was convicted of nine related

counts of first degree sexual assault, and breaking and entering
with intent to commit larceny in connection with a violent home
invasion of a family of vacationers in Newport.

He is currently

incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Facilities (the “ACI”) in
Cranston, Rhode Island, where he is serving a sixty-year

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sentence.

He appealed several aspects of his conviction,

including the legality of the search of his hotel room where he
was apprehended shortly after the home invasion, issues with the
pretrial line-up, and objections to the jury instructions
provided at trial.

His appeal was delayed due to the relocation

of the trial stenographer, but was ultimately denied by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in 1995.

State v. Walker, 667 A.2d 1242

(R.I. 1995).
In 2006, Walker began a campaign of litigation concerning
his treatment at the ACI, starting with a 45-page petition for
post-conviction relief filed in the Rhode Island Superior Court
for Newport County.

He explained that he had been working on an

initiative concerning improving prison conditions that included a
proposed pay increase for prison guards to be achieved by
exempting them from federal income tax, and a plan to create a
national military force of former inmates to fight in Iraq.

In

December 2005, on the instruction of then-Lieutenant Walter
Duffy,1 prison personnel searched Walker’s cell and confiscated
all his written materials, including his 600-page book on prison
reform.
In addition, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
him and he was charged with “Engaging in or Encouraging a Group

1

In his present Motion, Walker identifies Walter Duffy as a
captain.
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Demonstration and/or Activities,” as well as theft of photocopies
and other prohibited conduct.

He was put in solitary confinement

for 68 days.
In his petition, Walker alleged that he was denied his
constitutional right to due process at the ACI’s disciplinary
hearings, and that his solitary confinement was wrongfully
imposed.

In a written decision, Judge Edwin Gale described

Walker’s Petition as “devoid of merit.”

The Petition was denied,

based on Walker’s failure to state a claim that was actionable
under post-conviction statutes, and based on the Superior Court’s
lack of jurisdiction to provide post-conviction relief.

The

Superior Court indicated that complaints such as Walker’s, if
sufficiently egregious to state a constitutional claim, should
proceed in federal court.
In 2008, Walker filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
in Rhode Island Supreme Court.
conduct of Lieutenant Duffy.

This action again focused on the

Walker stated that he had

complaints about Duffy’s treatment of him and that he had been
assembling documentation, draft pleadings, exhibits and research
in order to file civil action against Duffy.

However, in the

midst of this, Duffy ordered guards to raid Walker’s cell and
confiscate these materials, as well as correspondence Walker was
preparing to send to news reporters. In his Petition, Walker
characterized this confiscation as an unreasonable search

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undertaken in the course of denying Walker his constitutional
right of access to the courts.

The Petition was denied by the

Supreme Court without prejudice to Walker seeking relief in the
appropriate forum.
In 2009, Walker filed a 75-page Petition for a Writ of
Mandamus in the Rhode Island Supreme Court, naming as defendants
ACI Director Ashbel T. Wall and then-governor Donald Carcieri.
In this filing, Walker maintained that white and non-white
inmates at the ACI were treated disparately at the ACI, with
different sets of rules and punishments.2

According to Walker,

non-white inmates were significantly more limited in their
permitted use of the prison’s law library.

Whereas white inmates

were permitted to assist their fellow inmates with legal
projects, Walker had been punished by being placed in solitary
confinement for 21-day periods after being found with legal
materials relating to other inmates.

Further, he alleged that

white inmates were allowed to use the library’s computers and
word processors, whereas non-white inmates were only permitted to
share a couple of old typewriters.

In his Petition, Walker

padded his central complaints with many pages of documentation
concerning national rates of incarceration analyzed by race.
Walker’s Petition was summarily denied by the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.

2

Walker is African-American.
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Walker brought similar allegations in 2010, in the form of a
Motion for a Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
against Director Wall, in Newport County Superior Court.
Walker’s primary focus was on prison staff’s retaliation against
non-white inmates who attempted to use the law library.

Wall’s

motion to dismiss Walker’s motion was granted in 2011.
Walker’s persistence has now brought him to federal court,
with a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction containing allegations similar to those in his prior
lawsuits.

According to the civil cover sheet, Walker’s Motion

sets forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “denial of access
to courts by state prison officials.”3

Five additional inmates

filed motions to intervene in the lawsuit and these motions were
denied by Magistrate Judge Almond in July 2015.

As outlined in

his Petition, Walker seeks to enjoin certain discriminatory
practices concerning access to the prison law library and its
equipment.

Walker also seeks copies of documents previously

confiscated by prison staff, including legal documents and
correspondence.

In addition, Walker would like to be able to

make telephone calls to certain prison advocacy groups, and be
provided with certain books and research papers that he would
like to review.

He also seeks $50 million in compensatory

3

The Petition originally named Governor Lincoln Chafee as
the sole defendant. He has since been replaced by Governor Gina
Raimondo.
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damages, and $50 million in punitive damages.
Walker alleges an ongoing practice of prison staff limiting
his access to the law library, confiscating and destroying his
legal documents when he does manage to produce them, and then
wrongfully punishing him with solitary confinement.

Since he

began to keep a log of punishments in 2005, Walker has spent over
645 days in solitary confinement.

Walker alleges that the law

library’s typewriters produce automatic carbons, allowing the
staff to monitor his, and other inmates’, paperwork.

That, along

with the collusion of white inmates who work in the library in
exchange for their cooperation with the guards, enable the prison
guards to identify and seize any legal draftings that relate to
the guards’ conduct.

Much of Walker’s present 99-page brief

includes the same incidents complained of in his previous
lawsuits.

In addition, the brief is replete with quotations,

excerpts from other publications, and statistics concerning the
state of race relations in the United States.

For the most part,

it makes for troubling and compelling reading.
Constitutional right of access to the courts
Walker’s charges implicate several constitutional
provisions.

Among them are: the Fourth Amendment’s protections

against unreasonable searches and seizures; the First Amendment’s
right to be protected from retaliation for petitioning the
government for redress; and the Fourteenth Amendment’s rights to

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procedural due process and equal protection of the laws
regardless of race.

Walker correctly states that the right of

access to the courts, in order to pursue post-conviction relief,
is a fundamental right afforded by the Constitution.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).

Johnson v.

After Johnson, the Supreme

Court elaborated on this right in Bounds v. Smith where it held
that:
...the fundamental constitutional right of access to
the courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation of and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained
in the law.
430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).

However, that right has not been

interpreted to mean unfettered access to a prison law library.
See Bradley v. Mason, 833 F.Supp.2d 763, 774 (N.D.Ohio 2011).
Prison officials may restrict “the time, place, and manner in
which library facilities are utilized,” and “even highly
restrictive procedures do not violate constitutional mandates if
inmates still have ‘meaningful access’ to the courts.”
Nicholas, 847 F. Supp. 109, 112 (C.D.Ill. 1994).

Eason v.

Of course, the

analysis becomes more rigorous if restrictions are imposed on the
basis of race.

Bradley, 833 F.Supp.2d at 774.
Defendant’s arguments

The State of Rhode Island does not address any of Walker’s
complaints about access to the law library or its alleged racist

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policies, but instead argues that the Motion must be denied on
three technical grounds.

First, Walker’s claims, recycled from

his earlier lawsuits, are barred by Rhode Island’s three-year
statute of limitations.

Second, his long-winded and meandering

pleading violates Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires “a short and plain statement of the
claim.”

Not only is it difficult to identify the precise claims

being made, but the pleading’s wild assertions and conclusory
allegations are not in conformity with the Supreme Court’s
requirements that a complaint state a plausible claim for relief
supported by specific facts, as set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Finally, the State argues that

Walker’s motion for a temporary restraining order does not meet
the criteria for injunctive relief; specifically, Walker has not
demonstrated a potential for immediate, irreparable injury, or a
likelihood of success on the merits.
Magistrate Judge Almond generally concurs with the State’s
arguments.

Walker has been making the same claims of

constitutional deprivations since at least 2010, and getting
nowhere with them.
of limitations.

These incidents are now outside the statute

His Petition runs afoul of Rule 8(a) in that it

is unnecessarily long, it’s conclusory and it’s confusing to the
extent that it fails to put Defendant on sufficient notice of the
claims against her.

Finally, Magistrate Judge Almond suggests

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that Walker has chosen the wrong legal vehicle to achieve the
remedy he seeks, because a motion for injunctive relief, if
successful, only preserves the status quo.

Moreover, Walker

fails to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, as his
claims are time-barred.
Although Walker, as a pro se plaintiff, with additional
barriers imposed by his incarceration, is entitled to liberality
and leeway in imposing legal standards, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.
5, 9 (1980), it is hard to dispute the State’s arguments or Judge
Almond’s analysis.

As for the statute of limitations, this Court

recognizes that Walker has indeed been making many of the same
allegations of constitutional deprivations since 2006.

On the

other side of the coin, it is ironic, and no doubt intolerably
frustrating to Walker, that his state court lawsuits were tossed
out for various technical shortcomings, including the directive
that his complaint belonged in federal court.

Now, in federal

court, he is instructed that he has waited too long to bring his
complaint.

Moreover, Walker is complaining of an ongoing pattern

of misconduct, and a couple of instances he has described have
taken place within three years of his Motion.

Walker claims that

in 2012 Captain Jeffrey Aceto instructed prison guards to enter
his cell and destroy evidence concerning his conviction that
Walker claims was exculpatory.

In 2013, Lieutenant Oden

instructed prison guard Michael Hetu to confiscate a legal

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document in Walker’s possession that he intended to use to expose
racist prison policies.

Following the confiscation, Walker was

disciplined for “misusing electronic equipment,” and put in
solitary confinement.

And, in 2014, Lieutenant Boffi ordered

guards to confiscate NAACP pamphlets that Walker intended to use
as an exhibit in the present lawsuit.4

Walker had photocopied

these documents in the prison law library and was disciplined for
“Disobeying a Clearly Stated Order in a Manner that Conveys a
Deliberate Challenge to Authority and Jeopardizes the Safety,
Security, and/or Orderly Operation of the Facility.”
Nonetheless, it is the opinion of this Court that quibbling
over whether or not Walker’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations sidesteps the most significant reason that the
State’s motion to dismiss Walker’s Petition must be granted.
That reason is that Walker has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as required by federal law, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (“the PLRA”).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The PLRA was enacted by Congress in 1995 to eliminate
federal court interference in prison management, and to slow the
flow of frivolous prisoner litigation.

The Act imposes a strict

requirement that prisoners must exhaust all available

4

Walker states that he is the president of the Rhode Island
Prison Chapter of the NAACP.
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administrative remedies prior to filing any lawsuit based on
federal law concerning prison conditions.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a).

In Woodford v. Ngo, the Supreme Court explained the Act’s impact:
Requiring proper exhaustion serves all of these goals.
It gives prisoners an effective incentive to make full
use of the prison grievance process and accordingly
provides prisons with a fair opportunity to correct
their own errors. This is particularly important in
relation to state correction systems because it is
“difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has
a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately
bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures,
than the administration of its prisons.”
548 U.S. 81, 94 (2006), (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 491-2 (1973)).

The newly-strengthened exhaustion provision

was intended to be mandatory, thereby eliminating discretion on
the part of the district courts.

Id. at 85.

Moreover, a

prisoner is required to pursue administrative procedures
regardless of whether or not those procedures can afford him or
her the sought-for relief.

“There is no futility exception to

the PLRA exhaustion requirement.”

Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-

Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2002).

While the failure to

exhaust administrative remedies is generally an affirmative
defense that must be established by the defendant, “[A]n inmate’s
complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under the PLRA if the allegations in the
complaint, taken as true, suffice to establish the failure to
exhaust.”
2012).

Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347, 354 (D.Mass.

Such is the case herein.
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Defendant has not raised Walker’s failure to exhaust as an
affirmative defense.

However, Walker, a practiced jailhouse

lawyer, raises the issue himself in his Motion:
Plaintiff Walker is, by law, excused from complying
with P.L.R.A.’s “EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT”. As the
above-stated paragraphs have clearly set forth, state
prison employees have EFFECTIVELY “INHIBITED” Plaintiff
Walker from utilizing the administrative grievance
process; as the said state employees (with the full
backing of ASHBEL T. WALL, II, the Director of the
Rhode Island Department of Corrections) have carried
out a pattern of DENYING Plaintiff Walker, among other
things, “ACCESS TO THE COURTS” (by DENYING him ACCESS
TO THE PRISON’S “Inmate Law Library”, where the said
grievances are obtained, as the said prison employees
have established that they will throw Plaintiff Walker
in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT if and when he steps foot into
the said Inmate Law Library and begins to type or make
copies on the copy machine).
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, p.68, ¶46.
In the last ten years, Walker has filed four lawsuits, containing
hundreds of pages of allegations and supporting material.

For

example, Walker’s present Motion is 76 pages long and is typewritten.

It is accompanied by a 23-page attachment of

photocopied exhibits.

Although the Court has no doubt that the

relationship between Walker and ACI staff is adversarial, the
Court does not find Walker’s explanation for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies to be credible.

This Court does not

intend to micro-manage the ACI’s regulations concerning use of
the law library and its equipment.

For these reasons, the Court

dismisses Walker’s Motion without prejudice, and with the hope

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that the thorough pursuit of the appropriate administrative
remedies will result in the successful resolution of his claims.
Conclusion
The Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge
Lincoln D. Almond on September 11, 2015, in the above-captioned
matter is accepted pursuant to Title 28 United States Code
§ 636(b)(1).

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Motion

for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is
granted.

Therefore, this case is dismissed in its entirety.

It is so ordered.
/s/Ronald R. Lagueux
Ronald R. Lagueux
Senior United States District Judge
Date: April 12, 2016

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