Scocchi v. South Kingstown School Department
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 20 Report and Recommendations. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 3/17/2017. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SOUTH KINGSTOWN PUBLIC SCHOOL
)
DISTRICT, and/or, SOUTH KINGSTOWN )
SCHOOL COMMITTEE,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
JOANNA S., individually, and as
Parent and Guardian of P.J. S.,
a Minor Child,
C.A. No. 15-267 S
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
On January 11, 2017, Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan
issued
a
Report
and
Recommendation
(“R&R”)
(ECF
No.
20)
recommending that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 10) and GRANT IN PART Defendant’s Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13), affirming the administrative
hearing
officer’s
attorney’s
Plaintiff’s
fees.
decision
After
Objection
and
denying
careful
thereto
Defendant’s
consideration
(ECF
No.
23),
of
the
request
the
Court
R&R
for
and
hereby
ACCEPTS the R&R for the reasons that follow.
I. Background
Magistrate Judge Sullivan provided a comprehensive exposition
of the facts and procedural history of this matter in the R&R.
The Court therefore presents only those facts pertinent to frame
Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R.
Pursuant to the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”),
20
U.S.C.
§
1415(f),
and
R.I.
Gen.
Laws
§
16-39-1,
Plaintiff Joanna S. (“Parent”) initiated a due process proceeding
with the Rhode Island Department of Education (“RIDE”) in August
2014.
(Compl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 1.)
The Parent’s Complaint alleged
that Defendant deprived her minor son, P.J., of his right to a
free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA and that
she placed him in a private school in New York as a result. (Id.
¶ 9.)
After a hearing, RIDE issued an administrative decision in
Defendant’s favor, and the Parent filed a timely appeal with the
Court. (Administrative Decision, ECF No. 1-2; Compl.)
II. Standard of Review
The First Circuit has “characterized the appropriate level of
review
by
District
Courts
as
‘involved
oversight,’
a
standard
which ‘falls somewhere between the highly deferential clear-error
standard and the non-deferential de novo standard.” S. Kingstown
Sch.
Comm.
v.
Joanna
S.,
773
F.3d
344,
349
(1st
Cir.
2014)
(quoting Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d
79, 84 (1st Cir. 2012)).
“‘simply
a
vehicle’
for
Cross-motions for summary judgment are
providing
review
of
the
underlying
administrative ruling.” Id. (quoting Sebastian M., 685 F.3d at
2
85).
Thus, the typical summary judgment standard requiring the
Court to “consider the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party” is disregarded, and “‘[t]he party challenging
the outcome of the . . . administrative decision bears the burden
of
proof.’”
Bristol
Warren
Reg’l
Sch.
Comm.
v.
R.I.
Dep’t
of
Educ., 253 F. Supp. 2d 236, 240 (D.R.I. 2003) (quoting Heather S.
v. State of Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir. 1997) (brackets in
original)).
Sullivan
Applying this standard of review, Magistrate Judge
undertook
a
thorough,
well-reasoned
analysis
of
each
claim.
III. Discussion
The
properly
R&R
found
concluded
that
that
the
P.J.
administrative
received
an
hearing
officer
IDEA-compliant
during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years. (R&R 90.)
addition,
the
placement
was
accordingly,
R&R
not
that
found
an
the
that
P.J.’s
2014-2015
IDEA-appropriate
Parent
was
reimbursement (see id. at 79).
not
FAPE
In
private-school
placement
entitled
(id.)
to
and,
tuition
The R&R also concluded that the
Parent’s unexhausted claim for payment of P.J.’s special-education
services at the private-school placement pursuant to R.I. Gen.
Laws § 16-24-1(c) should be dismissed without prejudice. (Id. at
83-86, 91.)
Finally, the R&R determined that neither party was
3
entitled to an award of attorney’s fees at this time. (Id. at 9091.)
The Parent objects to the R&R on three bases.
contends
that
the
Magistrate
Judge
erred
in
First, she
finding
that
P.J.
received an IDEA-compliant FAPE during the 2014-2015 school year
because
of
substantive
and
procedural
deficiencies
in
his
individualized education plan (“IEP”). (Pls.’ Obj. 2-10, ECF No.
23-1.)
in
Second, the Parent argues that the Magistrate Judge erred
finding
that
because
P.J.’s
Parent,
IDEA
she
was
not
entitled
private-school
appropriate.
to
placement
(Id.
at
tuition
was,
10-11.)
reimbursement
according
Finally,
to
the
the
Parent
argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending that her
claim under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-24-1(c) be dismissed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. (Id. at 11-13.)
This Court
reviews the R&R de novo, addressing each of these arguments in
turn. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
A. 2014-2015 IEP
For a multitude of reasons, the Parent argues that P.J.’s IEP
for
the
2014-2015
school
year,
which
found
that
the
Academic
Success Academy (“ASA”) would be an appropriate placement, failed
to provide him an IDEA-compliant FAPE.
misclassified
based
on
his
P.J.’s
eligibility
anxiety,
an
for
emotional
4
Specifically, (1) the IEP
special-education
disorder,
rather
services
than
his
autism (Pls.’ Obj. 2-5); (2) the IEP’s proposed public high school
placement for P.J. at the ASA was not appropriate (id. at 8-10);
and (3) Defendant failed to meet certain procedural requirements
in developing P.J.’s IEP (id. at 6-7).
Magistrate Judge Sullivan provided a comprehensive discussion
of the IDEA statutory scheme in the R&R (R&R 48-53), and this
Court
agrees
2014-2015
IEP
afforded him an IDEA-compliant FAPE. (See R&R 70-75, 90.)
To
comply
be
with
with
the
her
conclusion
IDEA’s
FAPE
that
P.J.’s
requirement,
an
IEP
must
“‘reasonably calculated’ to deliver ‘educational benefits.’” C.G.
ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 284 (1st
Cir. 2008) (quoting Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 207 (1982)).
The Parent failed to meet her burden of
showing that P.J.’s IEP for the 2014-2015 school year was not
“reasonably calculated” to deliver “educational benefits.” See id.
(quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207).
Addressing
P.J.’s
“primary
the
Parent’s
diagnosis”
claim
in
that
Defendant
determining
his
misclassified
eligibility
for
special-education services (Pls.’ Obj. 2-5), the R&R notes that
“[n]o qualified expert or educator testified that the District’s
eligibility
determination
was
wrong
.
.
.
.”
(R&R
71.)
Nonetheless, even if the Parent’s assertion was true that “the
weight of the expert testimony and credible evidence of [P.J.’s]
5
performance”
supported
a
classification
for
services
based
on
P.J.’s autism (Pls.’ Obj. 5), the Parent failed to show how this
alleged error impacted her son’s educational benefits in any way.
(See R&R 71 (no evidence presented that P.J. failed to receive
needed
services
because
of
an
incorrect
eligibility
determination).)
The Parent also objects to the R&R’s finding that Defendant’s
proposed public-school placement at the ASA was appropriate. (Id.
at 8-10.)
The Parent contends that the ASA was not appropriate
because
was
it
[P.J.’s]
not
executive
an
“immersion
model
function/reading
.
.
.
geared
deficiencies,
towards
and
it
provide[d] P.J. with less services than his last IEP . . . .” (Id.
at 10.)
The Parent, however, failed to show how the proposed
placement was not “reasonably calculated” to provide “educational
benefits.” C.G., 513 F.3d at 284.
Indeed, the evidence appears
only to support the conclusion that the placement was appropriate.
(See
R&R
75-79.)
Although
the
Parent
was
dissatisfied
with
Defendant’s proposed public-school placement, the “IDEA does not
require
school
districts
to
provide
special
education
students
with the best education available or to provide instruction that
maximizes the student’s abilities.” (See id. at 48 (citing Rowley,
458 U.S. at 200-01).)
6
The
Parent
also
alleges
a
number
of
other
substantive
deficiencies in the 2014-2015 IEP, including that Defendant failed
to “comprehensively evaluate” P.J. to determine his needs and that
the
IEP
decreased
thoughtful
his
analysis
services.
of
P.J.’s
(Pls.’
IEP
Obj.
7-8.)
thoroughly
The
R&R’s
addresses
each
allegation of substantive deficiency and finds that, in each case,
the Parent failed to show how the alleged deficiency impacted her
son’s educational benefits.
Finally,
the
Parent
This Court agrees.
contends
that
Defendant
committed
numerous procedural violations that collectively “amount[ed] to a
denial of FAPE.” (Pls.’ Obj. 7.) Under the IDEA, a procedural
violation constitutes a denial of FAPE only if it “impede[s] the
child’s right to a [FAPE]; significantly impede[s] the parents’
opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding
the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents’ child; or cause[s] a
deprivation
of
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii).
educational
benefits.”
20
U.S.C.
This Court agrees with the R&R’s finding
that the alleged procedural violations do not constitute a denial
of FAPE. (See R&R 73-75.)
In conclusion, the Parent failed to show that P.J.’s 20142015 IEP was not “reasonably calculated” to provide “educational
benefits.”
Therefore,
Defendant
7
satisfied
its
obligation
to
provide P.J. an IDEA-compliant FAPE during the 2014-2015 school
year.
B.
Tuition Reimbursement
A parent who unilaterally enrolls their disabled child in a
private school “without the consent of or referral by the public
agency” may be entitled to tuition reimbursement for the private
school.
20
U.S.C.
§
tuition
reimbursement,
1412(a)(10)(c)(ii).
the
parent
must
In
order
prove
to
receive
that
her
child’s
public-school placement violates the IDEA and that the privateschool placement was appropriate.
Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four
v. Carter By & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
Here, because the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s
determination that P.J. received FAPE during the 2014-2015 school
year,
there
is
no
need
placement was appropriate.
to
address
whether
his
private-school
Accordingly, the Parent’s objection is
dismissed.
C.
Special-Education Services at Private School
The Parent also argues that, even if she is not entitled to
tuition
reimbursement
for
P.J.’s
private-school
placement,
the
South Kingstown Public School District is still required to pay
for
his
special-education
services
8
pursuant
to
R.I.
Gen.
Laws
§ 16-24-1(c). 1 (Pls.’ Obj. 11-12.)
The R&R recommended that the
Court dismiss this claim without prejudice because it was not ripe
for
judicial
review
for
failure
to
exhaust
administrative
remedies. (R&R 91.) The Parent contends that the Magistrate Judge
erred because this issue was part of the proceedings before RIDE’s
hearing officer. (Pls.’ Obj. 12.) There is no indication, however,
that
this
hearing
issue
officer.
has
not
The
yet
Court
been
finally
therefore
adjudicated
accepts
the
by
the
Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation to dismiss this claim without prejudice.
D.
Attorney’s Fees
The R&R found that the Parent was not entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees because she did not prevail on any of her claims.
(R&R 86, 91.) The R&R determined that Defendant was not entitled
to an award of attorney’s fees against the Parent. (Id. at 86-88,
90.)
an
In addition, the R&R found that Defendant may be entitled to
award
of
attorney’s
fees
against
the
Parent’s
attorneys
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II). (Id. at 88-90.)
1
Section 16-24-1(c) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Parents who unilaterally enroll their child in
a private school are required to pay the
tuition costs related to the child’s education
that are unrelated to the child’s disability,
and the public school district where the child
resides is responsible for payment of the
services related to the child’s disability as
developed
and
determined
in
the
child's
individual education plan.
9
The
Magistrate Judge recommended, however, that any determination of
whether such an award is warranted be deferred until Defendant
makes a motion under D.R.I. LR Cv 54.1(a), if any. (Id. at 90.)
In
her
objection,
the
Parent
raises
arguments
concerning
the
merits of an award pursuant to § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II). (Pls.’ Obj.
13-22.)
However,
because
this
Court
accepts
the
R&R’s
recommendation, it declines to address the Parent’s arguments at
this time.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the R&R (ECF No. 20) is ACCEPTED and its
recommendations are adopted in its entirety. Plaintiff’s Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
(ECF
No.
10)
is
DENIED,
and
Defendant’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED IN PART.
To the extent that Defendant’s Cross-Motion seeks attorney’s fees
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III), the Cross-Motion is
DENIED.
Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
judgment may enter in favor of Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
___
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: March 17, 2017
10
Final
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