Owen et al v. American Shipyard Co., LLC d/b/a Newport Shipyard, LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 27 Motion to Strike ; denying 17 Motion to Strike ; denying 19 Motion to Strike. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 4/14/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
_____________________________________
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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AMERICAN SHIPYARD CO., LLC d/b/a
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NEWPORT SHIPYARD, LLC, ASC REALTY
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CO., LLC, CHARLES A. DANA, III
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a/k/a CHARLES DANA, U.S. SECURITY
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ASSOCIATES, INC. d/b/a D. B. KELLY
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ASSOCIATES, U.S. SECURITY ASSOCIATES )
STAFFING, INC., JOSHUA CARLSON,
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Defendants.
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_____________________________________)
SARAH MARGARET OWEN and JOHN NORTON
OWEN, as the Executors of the
ESTATE OF SARA LOUISE OWEN, and
in their individual capacity as
the beneficiaries of SARA LOUISE
OWEN, a deceased person,
C.A. No. 1:15-CV-413 S
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ three motions to strike
Defendants’ affirmative defenses (collectively “Motions”).
Nos. 17, 19, 27.)
(ECF
Since each motion makes similar arguments, the
Court considers them together.
For the reasons that follow, the
Court DENIES the Motions.
I.
Background
The tragic facts that gave rise to this action occurred on
October 4, 2012.
That evening, Sara Owen and two others, Jennifer
Way and Femmetje Staring, were returning from an evening out in
Newport, Rhode Island.
Construction Management.
Way was a Senior Yacht Manager at Marine
Owen and Staring were crewmembers on two
of the yachts managed by Way.
While driving into Newport Shipyard
to drop off Owen and Staring, Way drove off of a pier into
Narragansett Bay.
The vehicle landed upside down, and the three
women drowned while trapped inside.
Defendants claim that alcohol
played a large part in the accident.
On September 30, 2015, Owen’s estate filed this action,
alleging, in a twenty six count complaint, that Newport Shipyard
and its affiliated entities are liable for the wrongful death of
Sara Owen based on theories of premises liability and negligence.
(See Compl., ECF No. 1.) In the alternative, Owen’s estate alleges
that
U.S.
Security
Associates,
through
its
employee
Joshua
Carlson, is liable for her wrongful death based on a negligence
theory.
(Id.)
Defendants timely filed separate answers in which
they asserted a number of affirmative defenses to the Complaint.
(ECF Nos. 6, 7, 14.)
Plaintiffs now move to strike all of Defendants’ affirmative
defenses for two reasons.
First, Plaintiffs argue they do not
conform to the pleading standards established in Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009), and, thus, should be stricken.
seek
to
strike
Defendants’
affirmative
2
Second, Plaintiffs
defenses
that
invoke
maritime law, claiming that maritime law is inapplicable.
As
detailed below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motions as to both
grounds.
II.
Discussion
A.
Application of the Plausibility Pleading Standard to
Affirmative Defenses
No United States Court of Appeals has weighed in on whether
the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard applies to affirmative
defenses, and the district courts that have considered it do not
agree on an answer.
See Stephen Mayer, Note, An Implausible
Standard for Affirmative Defenses, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 275, 276
(2013) (“More than one hundred federal cases have contemplated
whether the plausibility standard outlined in [Twombly and Iqbal]
applies to affirmative defenses, yet the districts remain divided,
and no court of appeals has yet addressed the issue.”); see also
Justin Rand, Tightening Twiqbal: Why Plausibility Must Be Confined
to the Complaint, 9 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 79 (2016).
in the First Circuit are no exception.
District Courts
Compare Kaufmann v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civil Action No. 09-10239-RGS, 2009 WL
2449872, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009) (assuming that plausibility
standard applied to affirmative defenses) with Hansen v. Rhode
Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119,
122-23 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that the plausibility pleading
standard did not apply to affirmative defenses) and Traincroft,
3
Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, Civil No. 14-10551-FDS, 2014 WL
2865907, at *3 (D. Mass. June 23, 2014) (same).
Yet even in
reaching different conclusions, courts that have considered the
issue focus on two things.
First, courts compare the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
— the rule Twombly and Iqbal considered – and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)
and 8(c), which address the pleading of defenses. Courts extending
Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses generally note that since
Rule 8(a) and 8(b) both require a “short and plain” description of
the claim, complaints and affirmative defenses should be subject
to the same standards.
See, e.g., Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc.,
263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009); Castillo v. Roche Labs. Inc.,
No. 10–20876–CIV, 2010 WL 3027726, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010);
Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., Civil Action No. 5:10cv00029, 2010
WL 2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010); see also Kaufmann,
2009 WL 2449872, at *1 (“[a]ssuming, without deciding, that sauce
for the goose is sauce for the gander”).
On the other hand, courts
refusing to extend Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses rely
on a key difference in the language of the two rules.
They note
that Rule 8(a) requires plaintiffs to plead a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
8(b)
defenses.
and
(c)
only
require
defendants
to
Conversely,
“state”
their
See Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 122-23; Falley v. Friends
4
Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1257-58 (D. Kan. 2011); Lane v. Page,
272 F.R.D. 581, 588–97 (D.N.M. 2011); Traincroft, 2014 WL 2865907,
at *3; McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08–cv–0021, 3:08–cv–1003,
2010 WL 1010092, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010); First Nat’l
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Serv., Ltd., No. 08–cv–12805, 2009 WL
22861, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009).
According to these courts,
the different language creates a separate standard for complaints
and affirmative defenses, with the “showing” language in Rule 8(a)
requiring plaintiffs to plead facts that Defendants need not plead
for affirmative defenses.
The second factor courts often consider is the policy behind
Twombly and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard.
F.R.D. at 595-96; Castillo, 2010 WL 3027726 at *3.
See Lane, 272
A key rationale
for the new standard is concern over the high cost of discovery
associated with boilerplate claims.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-
59 (discussing the potential for high discovery costs to force
undeserved settlements).
Courts that apply Twombly and Iqbal to
affirmative defenses reason that boilerplate affirmative defenses
have the same detrimental effect on the time and cost of litigation
and, thus, should be subject to the same standard.
See Palmer,
2010 WL 2605179, at *4 (“‘[b]oilerplate defenses clutter docket;’
they ‘create unnecessary work,’ and ‘in an abundance of caution’
require significant unnecessary discovery.” (quoting Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48399, *2–3 (E.D.
5
Mich. 2008)).
Courts that reject the heightened pleading standard
disagree. As an initial matter, they hold that, unlike boilerplate
claims in a complaint, affirmative defenses generally add little
marginal costs to litigation.
Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 123; See also
Leon v. Jacobson Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010 WL 4810600, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010) (“The [Supreme] Court . . . has never
once
lost
sleep
worrying
affirmative defenses.”).
about
defendants
filing
nuisance
And, more importantly, these courts note
that any additional cost added by boilerplate affirmative defenses
is far outweighed by fairness concerns regarding the timing in
which defendants must respond to a complaint.
See Hansen 287
F.R.D. at 122-23; Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 595-96.
As these courts
reason, while plaintiffs have the statute of limitations period to
gather facts for their complaint, defendants have only 21 days to
research, draft and file their answer.
This relatively short
turnaround time puts defendants at a disadvantage with regard to
their ability to gather sufficient facts to support potential
defenses under Iqbal and Twombly.
Id.
This Court agrees with those cases declining to apply Twombly
and Iqbal to affirmative defenses.
First, holding complaints and
affirmative defenses to different standards comports with the
language differences in the applicable rules.
As detailed above,
Rule 8(a) requires a statement “showing” that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief; Rule 8(b) merely requires that a defendant
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“state”
its
defenses.
Applying
different
pleading
standards
recognizes the differences between these words; “showing” requires
some factual underpinnings to plead a plausible claim, while
“stating” contemplates that defendants can plead their defenses in
a more cursory fashion.
Policy considerations further support construing Rule 8(a)
and 8(b) differently.
It is inappropriate to hold plaintiffs and
defendants to the same pleading standard when a plaintiff has the
entirety of the statute of limitations period to gather facts for
its complaint
and
the
defendant
has
only
twenty-one
days
to
ascertain its defenses, some of which are in danger of being waived
if not asserted in the answer.
Accordingly, considering the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
and the policy considerations outlined above, the Court declines
to extend the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standards to affirmative
defenses.
The Court, thus, denies the Plaintiffs’ Motions as to
this basis.
B.
Application of Maritime Law to this Action
As for Plaintiffs’ arguments relating to Defendants’ maritime
law-related affirmative defenses, it is premature to determine
whether maritime law applies to this action as a matter of law.
Consequently, the Court will defer deciding the issue for another
day.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motions to Strike
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses (ECF Nos. 17, 19, and 27) are
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: April 14, 2016
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