Owen et al v. American Shipyard Co., LLC d/b/a Newport Shipyard, LLC et al

Filing 47

ORDER granting 29 Motion for Leave to File. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 11/29/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
_____________________________________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
AMERICAN SHIPYARD CO., LLC d/b/a
)
NEWPORT SHIPYARD, LLC, ASC REALTY
)
CO., LLC; CHARLES A. DANA, III
)
a/k/a CHARLES DANA, U.S. SECURITY
)
ASSOCIATES, INC. d/b/a D. B. KELLY
)
ASSOCIATES; U.S. SECURITY ASSOCIATES )
STAFFING, INC.; and JOSHUA CARLSON, )
)
Defendants.
)
)
_____________________________________)
SARAH MARGARET OWEN and JOHN NORTON
OWEN, as the Executors of the
ESTATE OF SARA LOUISE OWEN; and
in their individual capacity as
the beneficiaries of SARA LOUISE
OWEN, a deceased person,

C.A. No. 15-413 S

ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
This case involves the tragic death of three women in 2012
when the car in which they were riding drove off a pier in
Newport,

Rhode

Island.

Defendants

allege

that

the

driver,

Jennifer Way, was legally intoxicated at the time of the crash.
Defendants
Defendants

now
can

seek

leave

assert

to

implead

contribution,

Way’s

Estate

indemnity,

so

that

negligence,

negligence per se, and strict liability claims against it.

(See

Defs.’ Mot. for Leave to File a Third Party Compl., ECF No. 29.)

A defendant, acting as a third-party plaintiff, may implead
any

non-party

“who

is

or

may

be

liable

to

[the

third-party

plaintiff] for all or part of the [plaintiff's] claim against
[the third-party plaintiff].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1) (emphasis
added).

Defendants have fourteen days after submitting their

answer to bring a third party into the suit without leave of
court.

Id.

permission.
the

informed

Otherwise, the Defendant must obtain the court’s
Id.

“In that event, the determination is left to

discretion

of

the

district

court,

which

should

allow impleader on any colorable claim of derivative liability
that will not unduly delay or otherwise prejudice the ongoing
proceedings.”

Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389,

393 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
Notwithstanding

this “liberal standard,”

id., the Estate

argues that the Court should deny Defendants’ Motion because (1)
Defendants unreasonably delayed in initiating the complaint; (2)
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Estate; (3)
Defendants are improperly trying to reverse engineer a form of
“Mary

Carter

Agreement”;

and

(4)

Defendants

do

not

have

a

colorable claim against the Estate.
The
arguments.

Court

can

Despite

quickly
the

dispense

Estate’s

with

argument

the
to

first
the

three

contrary,

Defendants did not unreasonably delay in bringing their claims
against the Estate.

There was considerable delay in opening the
2

Estate,
The

which

Court

delay

in

resulted

finds

in

the

unconvincing

opening

the

Estate

timing
the

or

of

Estate’s
in

Defendants’
argument

bringing

this

Motion.
that

the

motion

was

caused by the Defendants or was unreasonable.

Second, with

regard

even

to

the

Estate’s

jurisdiction

argument,

if,

as

Plaintiff argues, admiralty jurisdiction fails, the Court would
still

have

supplemental

party complaint.

jurisdiction

over

Defendants’

third-

See Allstate Interiors & Exteriors, Inc. v.

Stonestreet Const., LLC, 730 F.3d 67, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2013);
Spark Energy Gas, LP v. Toxikon Corp., 864 F. Supp. 2d 210, 218–
19 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[N]o independent jurisdictional basis is
required for a defendant to implead a third party defendant.”
(internal citations omitted)).

And finally, the Estate’s “Mary

Carter” argument is without merit.

The Estate argues, rather

unclearly, that the Owens’ settlement with Way’s insurer amounts
to a “reverse Mary Carter Agreement.”
15, ECF No. 33.)

(See Owen’s Opp’n 3, 14-

The First Circuit summarized such agreements

in England v. Reinauer Transp. Co., L.P., 194 F.3d 265, 274 (1st
Cir. 1999).

Like in England, the settlement agreement on which

the Estate bases its argument is not secret, nor has the Estate
presented any evidence that the settlement amount is contingent
in any way on the outcome of this case.

See id. at 274-75.

Based on this, the Court fails to see how the Owens’ settlement
with the insurer amounts to a “Mary Carter” agreement.
3

It

is,

however,

a

much

closer

call

assert a colorable claim against the Estate.

whether

Defendants

The issue turns on

whether this Court has admiralty jurisdiction over the case.
Plaintiff

argues,

without

admiralty

jurisdiction,

As

Defendants’

claims fall squarely within the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
holding in Cooney v. Molis, 640 A.2d 527 (R.I. 1994), that a
settling joint tortfeasor, with no liability to any
parties to a suit, cannot be forced to defend a
lawsuit that was the basis for the joint-tortfeasor
release.
The remaining joint tortfeasor is free to
assert the settling joint tortfeasors’ liability in
their absence.
This holding, in our opinion,
encourages settlement but does not prejudice the
rights of the nonsettling defendants.
Id. at 530.
On the other hand, if admiralty law applies, Defendants’
claims turn on how a fact finder apportions fault and, thus,
would be inappropriate to decide at this juncture.
Reply 2-3, ECF No. 35.)
Plaintiff’s

Motion

to

(See Defs.’

As this Court held in its order on

Strike,

it

is

premature

to

determine

whether admiralty law applies to this action at this time.
ECF No. 36.)

(See

This is because the Court would benefit from a

more robust record as to the nature of the parties’ involvement
with their various vessels and the effect the accident had on
maritime activities.
Motion

with

the

Consequently, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

express

proviso

4

that

Plaintiffs

and/or

the

Estate may reassert their defenses to Defendants’ Third-Party
Complaint at summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: November 29, 2016

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