Waterbury v. City of East Providence et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting Plaintiff's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying Defendants' 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 7/12/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
KATHLEEN T. WATERBURY,
C.A. No. 16-142 S
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed
by Plaintiff and Defendants.
(ECF No. 10 (“Plaintiff’s Motion”)
and No. 11 (“Defendants’ Motion”).) Defendants filed an Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 16) and Plaintiff filed a Reply
(ECF No. 20).
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is
GRANTED and Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
I.
Background
Plaintiff alleges that the City of East Providence (“the
City”)
violated
her
procedural
due
process
rights
when
terminated her without cause or any opportunity to be heard.
it
The
facts of this case are laid out in detail in the parties’ briefs;
the Court will only recount those facts relevant to this Order.
The narrow question at issue is whether Plaintiff was an at-will
employee at the time of her termination, in which case she would
have
no
constitutionally
protected
property
interest
in
her
continued employment.
See King v. Town of Hanover, 116 F.3d 965,
969
(“An
(1st
Cir.
1997)
at-will
employee,
however,
has
no
reasonable expectation of continued employment.”).
Plaintiff was hired as Director of Human Resources by the
City Manager on January 24, 2013.
10-3.)
(Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No.
Plaintiff’s letter of appointment clearly states the Human
Resources Director is a “non-union, full-time position with an at(Id. (emphasis added).) 1
will employment status.”
However, the
letter of appointment further states: “The term and removal of the
Human Resources Director shall be in accordance with Chapter 11,
Personnel, of the Revised Ordinances of the City of East Providence
[(“Chapter 11”)].”
(Id.)
Chapter 11 defines the “[c]lassified service” as “all offices
and positions of trust or employment in the city service, whether
paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, temporary or permanent,
existing or hereafter created, except elected officials, those
appointed by the city council and those appointed or employed by
the school committee.”
3.)
(Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mot. § 11-1, ECF No. 10-
A “[c]lassified employee means any employee occupying a
1
In addition to signing the letter of appointment, Plaintiff
submitted a “Certification for Medical Insurance Benefits” in
which she checked off that her position was “at will.” (Ex. B to
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 12-2.)
2
position in the classified service.” (Id.) Section 11-62 – Status
of employees – states:
All employees holding positions in the classified
service shall:
(1) Have permanent status if they have held their present
positions or have been employed continuously in a
position in the city service for at least six months
immediately preceding the effective date of this
chapter.
(2) Serve a probationary period of six months before
acquiring permanent status if they have held their
positions for less than six months immediately preceding
the effective date of this chapter.
(Id. § 11-62.)
With respect to discharge of classified employees
who have completed their six-month probationary period, Chapter 11
provides:
An employee may be discharged by the appointing
authority for activities prohibited in the Charter and
for insubordination, inefficiency, abuse of sick leave,
misconduct, disloyalty or other similar just cause. No
discharge of a permanent classified employee shall take
effect, unless five days prior to the effective date
thereof the appointing authority shall give to such
employee a written statement setting forth in detail the
reasons therefor and shall file a copy of such statement
with the director.
Any permanent classified employee
shall have the right to appeal to the city manager and
further appeal to the hearing board in accordance with
provisions of this chapter.
(Id. § 11-69(d).)
II.
Discussion
Plaintiff argues it is Chapter 11, not the stated “at-will
employment status” in her appointment letter, that controls:
[L]ike all permanent, classified City employees – which,
incontrovertibly, Ms. Waterbury was beginning in August
2013, when she completed her probationary period – Ms.
3
Waterbury
reasonable
the City’s
that, once
could only
became a tenured public employee with a
expectation in continued employment because
Charter and Revised Ordinances make it clear
her probationary period ended, Ms. Waterbury
be terminated for cause.
(Pl.’s Mot. 2-3, ECF No. 10-1.)
Plaintiff further notes that
“those words [‘at will’] appear in the very same paragraph of the
agreement in which the City explicitly and expressly agrees that
Ms.
Waterbury
can
only
be
terminated
in
accordance
with
the
procedural protections against removal set forth in the Revised
Ordinances.”
(Id. at 3.)
Thus, according to Plaintiff, “[t]he
City’s putative position that the appearance of the words ‘at will’
in the agreement negate entirely the City’s express agreement that
Ms. Waterbury’s term and removal would be in accordance with the
City’s personnel ordinances is absurd and unavailing.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff further offers affidavits from herself and former City
Manager Peter Graczykowski stating that “reference to ‘at will’ in
Ms. Waterbury’s contract was nothing more than a shorthand means
of distinguishing her individually negotiated contract from those
of
other
City
employees
whose
agreements
bargained by City unions and associations.”
were
collectively
(Id. at 4.)
Defendants counter that “[P]laintiff is confusing the process
owed with whether a constitutionally protected property interest
exists.”
(Defs.’ Mot. 7, ECF No. 11-1.)
The letter clearly states
that her position has “an at-will employment status,” and thus,
say Defendants, the reference to Chapter 11 merely establishes
4
that she is entitled to the procedural protections outlined in the
ordinance.
Even if she were entitled to those procedures by
contract, she could not make out a constitutional due process claim
without
a
property
interest
in
her
continued
employment.
Defendants further argue that, because the text of the letter is
unambiguous, it would be improper for the Court to consider the
affidavits Plaintiff submitted.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the plain text of the
contract
is
unambiguous
external evidence.
and,
therefore,
it
may
not
consider
See Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I.
2004) (“If the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, judicial
construction is at an end for the terms will be applied as
written.”).
Recognizing that “ambiguity lurks in every word,
sentence, and paragraph in the eyes of a skilled advocate,” the
Court must consider “whether the language has only one reasonable
meaning when construed, not in a hypertechnical fashion, but in an
ordinary, common sense manner.”
(R.I.
2010)
(quoting
Garden
Paul v. Paul, 986 A.2d 989, 993
City
Treatment
Ctr.,
Inc.
v.
Coordinated Health Partners, Inc., 852 A.2d 535, 542 (R.I. 2004)).
Here, “at-will employment” has a clear and unambiguous common
meaning.
to
The Court need not look outside the contract as written
interpret
this
term.
Furthermore,
the
Court
agrees
with
Defendants that, in light of the clear intention to make Ms.
Waterbury’s employment “at will,” the reference to Chapter 11
5
attempts to invoke procedural protections only, and does not intend
to create a constitutional property interest in her continued
employment.
absurd.
Beyond that, the affidavits are self-serving and even
No experienced human resources professional worth his or
her salt would dare use the term “at will” in an employment
contract as short hand for anything.
Rhode Island law has been
clear for decades that the term “at will” means an employer may
fire an employee for good reason or bad, or no reason at all, as
long as it is not a legally prohibited one.
See Roy v. Woonsocket
Inst. for Sav., 525 A.2d 915, 917, 918 n.2 (R.I. 1987).
But this does not end the matter.
While it is clear to the
Court that the parties intended to form an at-will employment
relationship, the question of whether the “at will” clause of the
contract is valid lingers because Chapter 11 is so restrictive and
explicit with respect to City employment.
City ordinances are, in
effect, statutes in their application to the municipality.
They
are the law of the land, at least that bounded by the municipal
boundaries.
And just as the at-will rule in Rhode Island is
clearly understood, so is the principle that parties may not
contract around the law.
See, e.g., State v. Rhode Island Alliance
of Soc. Serv. Emp’ees, Local 580, SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 469 (R.I.
2000) (“Thus, if a statute contains or provides for nondelegable
and/or
nonmodifiable
duties,
rights,
and/or
obligations,
then
neither contractual provisions nor purported past practices nor
6
arbitration
awards
enforceable.”).
that
would
alter
those
mandates
are
Therefore, if Chapter 11 prohibits hiring an
employee in Ms. Waterbury’s position at will, then she became a
permanent tenured employee upon completion of her probationary
period, notwithstanding the language in the letter.
Chapter 11 identifies only two types of employees: classified
and unclassified.
Unclassified employees are clearly delineated
as:
(1) Elected officials;
(2) City manager;
(3) Officers and officials appointed by the city
council;
(4) Employees appointed by the school committee;
(5) Consultants, counsel and other professional persons
rendering temporary service;
(6) Such positions involving seasonal or part-time
employment or which consist of unskilled work as may be
specifically placed in the unclassified service by the
city council.
(Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mot. § 11-1, ECF No. 10-3.)
All other employees
are part of the classified service, and can only be fired for cause
after completion of a six-month probationary period.
11-1, 11-62, 11-69(d).)
(See id. §§
Ms. Waterbury’s position does not fall
into any of the unclassified categories.
Therefore, pursuant to
Chapter 11, she could only be hired as a classified employee; the
City did not have authority to hire her as an at-will employee,
and the statement in her employment contract letter is a nullity.
7
At oral argument, Defendants contended that § 11-61(a) of
Chapter 11 – Classification of positions – compels a different
conclusion.
Section 11-61(a) states:
The director, or a person or agency employed for that
purpose, shall ascertain the duties and responsibilities
of all positions in the classified service and after
consultation
with
the
appointing
authority
and
department heads shall recommend a classification plan
for such positions.
The plan shall be based upon
similarity of duties performed and responsibilities
assumed so that the same qualifications may reasonably
be required for and the same schedule of pay may be
equitably applied to all positions in the same class.
After such classification has been approved by the city
manager, the director shall allocate the position of
every employee in the classified service to one of the
classes in the plan.
(Id. § 11-61(a).)
According to Defendants, because there was no
classification plan recommended for Ms. Waterbury’s position and
she was not assigned to one of the classes in the plan,
she was
not part of the classified service.
Nothing
The Court disagrees.
in § 11-61(a) alters the clear definitions of classified and
unclassified employees under Chapter 11.
Even if the director
failed to follow the protocol set out in § 11-61(a) with respect
to Ms. Waterbury (or anyone else for that matter), this does not
change the fact that the City had no authority to exclude Ms.
Waterbury’s position from the classified service or to create a
third
category
of
employees
outside
ordinance.
8
the
requirements
of
the
Ms. Waterbury completed her six-month probationary period in
August 2013.
Because she could only be fired for cause after
completing her probationary period, she had a property right in
her continued employment and the City was required to afford her
due process in her termination.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
There is no dispute that
the City did not afford Ms. Waterbury “notice and an opportunity
to
respond,”
as
required
by
Loudermill.
See
id.
at
546.
Accordingly, the Court finds that her termination was in violation
of due process, and is void. 2
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion hereby GRANTED
and Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: July 12, 2016
2
Nothing in this Order prevents the City from terminating
Ms. Waterbury if it provides her with the required process.
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