Stenmark et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Filing 5

ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 9/6/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
LISA STENMARK and
)
KEITH STENMARK,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
C.A. No. 16-194 S
SECRETARY OF VETERANS
)
AFFAIRS AS OFFICER OF THE
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
)
WELLS FARGO,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s (“Wells
Fargo”

or

“Defendant”)

Motion

to

Dismiss

Plaintiffs’

Amended

Complaint (“Motion”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

(ECF No. 4.)

Plaintiffs have not

opposed Defendant’s Motion.

For reasons that follow, Defendant’s

Motion is GRANTED.
I.

Facts
Plaintiffs Lisa and Keith Stenmark secured a loan and mortgage

on a property in Warwick from Defendant on February 29, 2012.
Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-1.)

(Am.

After that date, Plaintiffs defaulted

on the mortgage payment to Defendant.

(Id. ¶ 6.)

Around March 6,

2015, Defendant commenced foreclosure proceedings on the Warwick

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property.

(Id.

¶

7.)

After

learning

of

the

foreclosure

proceedings, Plaintiffs began negotiations for a loan modification
with Defendant.
2015,

Defendant

(Id. ¶ 8.)
again

While negotiations continued, in July

commenced

foreclosure

proceedings

and

eventually sold the property to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
(the “Secretary”) on August 10, 2015 at public auction.
9.)

(Id. ¶

The new owner of the property demanded that Plaintiffs vacate

it by December 2015.

(Id. ¶ 10.)

Plaintiffs filed this action in state court on December 22,
2015 and amended the Complaint on January 21, 2016.
Compl., ECF No. 1-1.)
action to this Court.

(See Am.

On May 2, 2016, Wells Fargo removed the
(Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.)

However,

just prior to removal, Plaintiff stipulated to dismissing the
Secretary from the case.
1-3.)

(See Ex. B to Notice of Removal, ECF No.

Consequently, only two counts remain before the Court.

Although the Complaint does not specifically identify the cause of
action under which Plaintiffs bring Count I, the Court gleans from
the language of the Complaint that it is a promissory estoppel
claim.

In Count III, Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment

from the Court that the foreclosure is void and that Plaintiffs
still own the property.
II.

Legal Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept the

well-pleaded facts as true, viewing factual allegations in the
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light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Rederford v. U.S. Airways,
Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2009).

However, “[t]o survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).

A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678.
Further, when assessing an unopposed 12(b)(6) motion, “the
mere fact that a motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve
the district court of the obligation to examine the complaint
itself to see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim.”
Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“This

obligation means that a court may not automatically treat a failure
to respond to a 12(b)(6) motion as a procedural default.”

Id.

III. Analysis
A.

Promissory Estoppel (Count I)

Under Rhode Island law, a claim for promissory estoppel must
include:

“(1) A clear and unambiguous promise; (2) Reasonable and

justifiable reliance upon the promise; and (3) Detriment to the
promisee, caused by reliance on the promise.”
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Filippi v. Filippi,

818 A.2d 608, 626 (R.I. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

As to

the first requirement, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated
that

the

“terms

“[p]romissory

of

the

estoppel

promise
cannot

must
be

be

certain”

based

upon

and

that

preliminary

negotiations and discussions or on an agreement to negotiate the
terms of a contract.”

B.M.L. Corp. v. Greater Providence Deposit

Corp., 495 A.2d 675, 677 (R.I. 1985).
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they “relied upon
their ongoing negotiations for the loan modification with Wells
Fargo that their Property would not be sold at foreclosure auction
on August 10, 2015.”

(Am. Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1-1.)

Plaintiffs,

however, cannot succeed on a claim for promissory estoppel if
reliance is based solely upon negotiations with Defendant.
B.M.L. Corp., 495 A.2d at 677.

See

Negotiations do not represent a

“clear and unambiguous promise.”

Id.; see Filippi, 818 A.2d at

626. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that comply
with the basic elements of the cause of action.
B.

Declaratory Judgment (Count III)

Plaintiffs’ request for Declaratory Judgment in Count III of
the Complaint depends upon the promissory estoppel claim in Count
I.

Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted in Count I, the Court need not address
Plaintiffs’ request for Declaratory Judgment.

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IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: September 6, 2016

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