Gulluscio v. Stryker Sales Corporation et al
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 6 Motion to Dismiss; granting 7 Motion to Amend/Correct. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 10/31/2016. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
STRYKER SALES CORPORATION;
)
STRYKER SUSTAINABILITY SOLUTIONS; )
and STRYKER ORTHOPEDICS CORP.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
JANICE GULLUSCIO,
C.A. No. 16-293 S
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff, Janice Gulluscio, filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1-1)
against Defendants Stryker Sales Corporation, Stryker Sustainability
Solutions,
Inc.,
“Defendants”)
manufactured,
and
alleging
and
sold
Stryker
that
the
Orthopedics
Defendants
Trident
Corp.,
(collectively,
negligently
Acetabular
System
designed,
(“Trident
System”); Defendants negligently failed to warn consumers of the
Trident System’s defect; and Defendants breached their express and
implied warranties that the Trident System was safe for its intended
use.
Plaintiff moves to amend her Complaint as a matter of course
pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Compl., ECF No. 7.)
Defendants move to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl., ECF No.
6.)
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is
GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Facts 1
I.
On or about September 23, 2003, Plaintiff underwent a complete
hip replacement surgery for her right hip at the Westerly Hospital.
Her hip was replaced with the Trident System, which was allegedly
designed, manufactured, and sold by one or more of the Defendants.
In
February
2013,
Plaintiff’s
hip
replacement
system
allegedly
failed, causing her to fall and suffer several serious injuries,
including a broken wrist, a broken tooth, a spinal fracture, and
various bruises and contusions. Plaintiff subsequently underwent
another hip replacement surgery and incurred the pain and suffering
attendant with such a procedure.
Plaintiff filed this suit in the Superior Court of the State of
Rhode
Island,
County
of
Washington,
on
January
27,
2016
and
Defendants timely removed the action on June 22, 2016.
II.
Discussion
A.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint
Plaintiff has moved to amend her Complaint as a matter of course
pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
1
Because this Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, the
Court gleans the instant facts from the Amended Complaint. Dresdner
Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006)
(An amended pleading supersedes the former pleading; the original
pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of
the pleader's averments against his adversary) (quotations omitted).
2
which provides that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint twentyone days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b).
See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B); see also Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d
82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is clear beyond hope of contradiction
that the Civil Rules permit a party to amend its complaint ‘once as
a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served.’”).
The Court therefore grants Plaintiff’s Motion and
considers the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint in determining
the merits of Defendants’ Motion.
B.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept the
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing factual allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.”
589 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2009).
dismiss,
a
complaint
must
Rederford v. US Airways, Inc.,
However, “[t]o survive a motion to
contain
sufficient
factual
matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim
is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citations omitted).
Defendants
argue
that
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
is
legally
insufficient because it fails to state facts that support all of the
3
elements of Plaintiff’s claims.
Reading the Complaint in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court disagrees and finds that
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim
for relief for each of her claims.
With
respect
to
Plaintiff’s
claim
for
negligent
design,
manufacture, and sale of the Trident System, Defendants argue that
“[n]owhere does the Complaint offer any facts specifying any way in
which [Defendants] breached a duty owed to Plaintiff, nor does the
Complaint even plead that such a duty existed.” (Mem. of Law in Supp.
of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 6.)
While the
Complaint does not explicitly state that Defendants owed Plaintiff
a duty of care, the Complaint nonetheless adequately establishes the
elements
of
her
negligence
claim.
The
Complaint
states
that
Defendants were manufacturers, designers, and sellers of the Trident
System, and implied that Plaintiff was the ultimate consumer of the
Trident System.
(Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 9.)
The Complaint further
alleges that Defendants knew or should have known of the Trident
System’s defective condition and that the defect caused Plaintiff’s
injuries. (Id. at 2.) These facts adequately allege that Defendants,
as manufacturers, had a duty to provide consumers, such as Plaintiff,
with products that were safe for their intended uses. See Crawford
v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co. Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 202, 210
(D.R.I. 1998) (holding that, under Rhode Island law, “[t]he legal
duty that is the predicate for the . . . negligent manufacturing
4
claim is the general duty of every manufacturer to use due care to
avoid foreseeable dangers in its products”) (quoting Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996)); see also Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 395.
The facts alleged in the Complaint clearly imply that
Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care in manufacturing the Trident
System and, therefore, Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claim for negligent failure to warn
of the Trident System’s defective condition, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff failed to “demonstrate that defendant had reason to know
about the product’s dangerous propensities which caused plaintiff’s
injury.”
(Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Compl.
as a Matter of Course 6, ECF No. 12.)
In her Complaint, Plaintiff
states that “the [Trident] System was designed and manufactured so
as to be insufficient to withstand the foreseeable use and placement
in the human body” and that Defendants “continued to sell and
distribute the System even though they knew of its unsafe nature.”
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 10, ECF No. 9.)
Based on these facts, Plaintiff
then alleges that Defendants “failed to properly warn consumers of
the dangers of the System.”
(Id. at ¶ 11.)
Contrary to Defendants’
argument, this last statement is not merely a legal conclusion.
is
a
factual
statement
particular action.
alleging
Defendants’
failure
to
take
It
a
Thus, taken as a whole, the Complaint states
sufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants knew
5
of the defect and negligently failed to warn Plaintiff of that
defect.
See Crawford, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (holding that “the
predicate for the failure to warn claim is the general duty to inform
users . . . of potentially dangerous items of the risks involved in
their use” (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 501)).
Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for breach of
express and implied warranty fail to meet the Twombly pleading
standard because they state only “bald, conclusory allegations.”
(Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Compl. as a
Matter of Course 4, ECF No. 12.)
In light of the facts Plaintiff
has alleged, the breach of warranty claims seem to be based on a
theory of strict products liability. Under Rhode Island law, a cause
of
action
for
damages
caused
by
a
defective
product
“may
be
predicated upon either a theory of breach of warranty or one of
strict liability in tort. . . the two theories, basically, are merely
different ways of describing the very same cause of action.”
Romano
v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 336 A.2d 555, 561–62 (R.I. 1975) (Joslin,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (quotations omitted);
see also Dooley v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 817 F. Supp. 245, 247–48
(D.R.I. 1993), aff'd, 7 F.3d 218 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that
“[r]esponsibility for personal injury caused by a defective product
. . . may be imposed on one who ‘sells’ the product on the theory of
strict liability in tort as set forth in Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A”) (citations omitted).
6
Thus, in Rhode Island, a
manufacturer who sells a defective product unreasonably dangerous to
the ultimate consumers may be strictly liable when the consumer of
that product suffers any harm as a result of the defect.
Ritter v.
Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 263 (R.I. 1971) (adopting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A).
Here, the Complaint states facts describing how the Trident
System allegedly was defective, that the alleged defect caused
Plaintiff’s injuries, that Defendants were aware of the defect, and
that Defendants nonetheless continued manufacturing and selling the
Trident System.
9.)
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5, 6(A)(2)-(5), 6(A)(10), ECF No.
Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Complaint has
alleged sufficient facts to support each of the elements of her
claims, whether interpreted as breach of warranty claims or as claims
for strict products liability.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend her
Complaint is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: October 31, 2016
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?