Engert v. Dominion Diagnostics, LLC

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The Court DENIES the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30 ) - So Ordered by District Judge Mary S. McElroy on 9/23/2020. (Urizandi, Nisshy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
RICHARD A. ENGERT,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOMINION DIAGNOSTICS, LLC,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
) C.A. No. 16-cv-503-MSM-PAS
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Richard A. Engert has brought claims of age discrimination under federal
and state law against his former employer, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC
(“Dominion”). (ECF No. 1). Mr. Engert worked at Dominion as a medical
technologist from 2007 until his termination in 2015. Mr. Engert was terminated
after his employer learned that he, along with several other employees, were
leaving work before the end of their shifts. After the parties concluded discovery,
Dominion moved for summary judgment, arguing that the facts are largely
undisputed and do not sustain Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a trial worthy

prima facie case of a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). In support of its Motion Dominion also contends that Mr. Engert was
terminated because he failed to meet the legitimate expectations of his employment
and that there is no evidence to rebut its claim that he was terminated for
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

Because the Court finds that there exist genuine issues of material fact in
dispute that a jury must resolve, the Court DENIES Dominion’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 30).
Standard of Review
When making a summary judgment determination, the Court reviews the
entire record and considers the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Univ. Ins. Co., 924 F.2d
370, 373 (1st Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is warranted when “the pleadings
[and discovery], together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In employment cases, summary judgment is appropriate
when the party opposing the motion “rests merely upon conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Feliciano de la Cruz v. El

Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000); Bonilla v.
Electrolizing, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 307, 314 (D.R.I. 2009). The motion must be
denied if there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that
the adverse employment action was based on discriminatory animus or that the
employer’s articulated reason is a sham and the true reason is discriminatory.

Trainor v. HEI Hosp., LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2012); Smith v. F.W. Morse &
Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996).

2

Analysis
Because there is no direct evidence of discrimination alleged in this case, the
Court follows the analysis enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).1 Developed for cases like this one, with no “smoking gun,”

McDonnell Douglas sets out a three-step, burden-shifting framework. First, the
plaintiff must meet the threshold McDonnell Douglas step that requires him to
adduce a prima facie case. To do so, he must demonstrate that there is trial-worthy
evidence to establish that he suffered an adverse employment action and that the
adverse action is causally connected either to his status in a protected class or to his
having engaged in protected activity. Evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie
case creates a presumption of discrimination and moves the analysis to the second
McDonnell Douglas step, where the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. If the defendant clears
step two, the third and final step places the burden again on the plaintiff to present
trial-worthy evidence sufficient to amount to a preponderance that the proffered
reason for the adverse action is a sham or mere pretext and that the true reason is
unlawful discrimination or retaliation. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct
1338, 1354-55 (2015).
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a party needs to show
that “(i) [he] was over the age of forty, (ii) his work was sufficient to meet his

Mr. Engert’s state discrimination claims follow the same analysis. See Neri v. Ross–
Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 48 (R.I. 2006) (“This Court has adopted the federal legal
1

framework to provide structure to our state employment discrimination statutes.”)
3

employer’s legitimate expectations, (iii) his employer took adverse action against
him, and (iv) the employer sought a replacement with roughly equivalent job
qualifications, thus revealing a continued need for the same services and skills.”

Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991). Dominion asserts that
Mr. Engert has failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination because he
cannot show that his work was enough to meet his employer’s legitimate
expectations. (ECF No. 30 at 6). According to Dominion, Mr. Engert did not meet
its legitimate expectations because he left work before the end of his shift on several
occasions. Dominion also argues that, even assuming Mr. Engert has met his prima

facie burden, it has set forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
termination—Mr. Engert’s repeated violations of company policies. Finally,
Dominion contends there is no evidence in the record supporting Mr. Engert’s
argument that this reason was pretextual. Id.
Mr. Engert objects to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
maintains that he meets all four factors for proving a prima facie claim of age
discrimination.2 He argues that he met Dominion’s bona fide expectations by
completing his job responsibilities before leaving work and that Dominion did not
have an expectation that its employees would work their entire shift if they had
completed their assigned duties. (ECF No. 34-1). Further, he challenges Dominion’s
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination as pretextual and argues
that his termination was instead motivated by age, noting that two medical

2

Mr. Engert was fifty-one years old when he was terminated. ECF No. 31 at 1, ¶ 1.
4

technicians under the age of forty who engaged in the same alleged violations
received only written disciplinary actions instead of termination. Id. at 10.
After reviewing the filings and the record, listening to oral arguments, and
considering the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Engert, the
Court finds that a genuine dispute of material facts exist that must be resolved by a
jury. See Continental Cas. Co., 924 F.2d at 373. It is the jury’s role to determine
whether Mr. Engert met Dominion’s legitimate expectations of job performance as
well as to decide if the differing treatment by Dominion in disciplining its employees
over the age of forty (compared to the employees under the age of forty) tends to prove
discriminatory animus. The parties have presented sufficient evidence indicating
that these issues “may reasonably be resolved” by a jury “in favor of either party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. ECF No. 30.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
September 23, 2020

5