Andreozzi, et al. v. Synrgy Health and Fitness, LLC et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 40 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Andreozzi is awarded $4,120 in wages and compensation and $8,240 in liquidated damages. Plaintiff Tripp is awarded $17,781 in wages and compensation and $35,562 in liquidated damages. Plaintiffs are also awarded costs and reasonable attorney's fees - So Ordered by District Judge Mary S. McElroy on 9/21/2020. (Urizandi, Nisshy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
____________________________________
MARCIANE ANDREOZZI, et al.
Plaintiffs

)
)
)
v.
)
)
SYRGY HEALTH AND FITNESS,
)
LLC, et al.
)
Defendants
)
)
v.
)
)
THE TOP STRENGTH PROJECT,
)
LLC, et al.
)
Third Party Defendants )
____________________________________)

No. 1:17-cv-00129-MSM-LDA

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Defendants Synrgy Health and Fitness, LLC (“Synrgy”) and
Michael T. Owen, Jr. (“Mr. Owen”).1 (ECF No. 40). Neither Synrgy nor Mr. Owen
have responded to the Plaintiffs’ Motion.
The issue before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs2, Marcianne Andreozzi

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362, this case is automatically stayed as to Defendant
Deborah Owen following her Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West
2010).
2 The Complaint indicates that the Plaintiffs seek to institute both a collective action
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
However, the Plaintiffs have not complied with the procedural requirements for
confirming either a collective action or establishing a class pursuant to Rule 23.
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(“Ms. Andreozzi”) and Steven Tripp (“Mr. Tripp”), are entitled to summary judgment
with respect to liability for their Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Rhode Island
Minimum Wage Act (“RIMWA”), and breach of contract claims against Synrgy and
Mr. Owen.
For the following reasons, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 40) is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint on April 4, 2017 in
which the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act, §29 U.S.C. 201 et. seq. (FLSA) and Rhode Island’s Minimum Wage Act, RIGL
§28-12-1, et. seq. and §28-14-1, et. seq (RIMWA) as well as breached their
employment contracts.

Thereafter the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment to which the Defendants have failed to respond.3 The Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment is accompanied by affidavits of both plaintiffs wherein they
swear to the truth of the factual allegations set forth in their complaint. (ECF 40-2
and ECF 40-3).
It is undisputed that Ms. Andreozzi and Mr. Tripp were employed by Synrgy,
which operated a health and fitness club in Providence, Rhode Island. (ECF No. 7).
The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by all plaintiffs on November 25, 2019.
Defendants were given until December 9, 2019 to respond. When no response was
forthcoming the Court, on March 18, 2020, entered an order directing Defendants to
respond on or before April 17, 2020. As of the date of this Order the Defendants have
not responded, nor have they sought additional time in which to do so.

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Synrgy was both owned and managed by Mr. Owen. (ECF No. 7). Beginning in
January 2013, Synrgy and Mr. Owen employed Ms. Andreozzi and then in 2014,
Synrgy hired Mr. Tripp.

(ECF No. 1).

The Defendants acknowledge that Ms.

Andreozzi worked as Group Fitness Manager and as a fitness instructor, but they
have denied Ms. Andreozzi’s allegation that her annual salary was $52,000.00 (Fiftytwo Thousand) dollars. (ECF No. 7). With respect to Mr. Tripp, the Defendants admit
to his employment as Director of Personal Training but claim his salary was
$26,000.00 (Twenty-six Thousand) dollars and not the alleged $30,000.00 (Thirty
Thousand) dollars. (ECF Nos. 1, 7).
Ms. Andreozzi complains that in late 2013, Synrgy and Mr. Owen failed to pay
her salary for five weeks, amounting to $5,000.00 (Five Thousand) dollars in unpaid
wages. (ECF No. 1).

The Defendants deny the allegation.

The Defendants do,

however, admit to Ms. Andreozzi’s allegation that two checks, dated November 6,
2015 and January 5, 2016, totaling $2,800.00 (Two Thousand Eight Hundred) dollars,
were returned to her due to insufficient funds. (ECF No. 7). Ms. Andreozzi continued
working between December 2015 and February 2016, allegedly teaching thirty fitness
classes for which she did not receive payment. The Defendants deny that allegation
but admit that “Andreozzi complained repeatedly to Defendant Michael T. Owen, Jr.
about the back wages owed to her and each time he assured her that he would pay
off the balance owed to her.” (ECF Nos. 1, 7).
Mr. Tripp makes allegations like those of Ms. Andreozzi. He complains that
checks, one for $582.69 and another for $786.05, issued by Defendants in October
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2015, and two checks, one for $608.90 and another for $353.46, issued in December
2015, were returned for insufficient funds. (ECF No. 1). The Defendants admit to
issuing the checks, but not to their return for insufficient funds. (ECF No. 7). Like
Ms. Andreozzi, Mr. Tripp continued working for a short time after these alleged
incidents of unpaid wages and asserts that Synrgy and Mr. Owen failed to
compensate him for ten personal training sessions provided in January 2016
amounting to owed wages of $450.00. (ECF No. 1). Unlike Ms. Andreozzi, Mr. Tripp
further asserts that Synrgy and Mr. Owen withheld $82.00 per week from Mr. Tripp’s
paychecks during a six to eight-month period for health insurance coverage, however
when he attempted to use his insurance, Mr. Tripp was told that he did not have
insurance. (ECF No. 1). The Defendants acknowledge the healthcare deductions but
have denied that Mr. Tripp was uninsured.

(ECF No. 7).

Finally, Mr. Tripp

complains that payroll taxes were withheld from his paychecks, but that Synrgy and
Mr. Owen failed to submit those withholdings to the Internal Revenue Service or
Rhode Island Department of Taxation. (ECF No. 1). In their Answer, the Defendants
deny that allegation.
Ms. Andreozzi and Mr. Tripp claim they are owed back wages totaling
$9,120.00 and $17,781.10, respectively, and that the failures to compensate violate
FLSA and RIMWA and amount to breaches of contract. (ECF No. 1).
The Defendants answered the Plaintiffs Complaint and filed a third-party
complaint against TOP Strength, LLC, and Mr. Tripp. The Defendants’ Third-Party
Complaint claims tortious interference and breach of contract based on allegations
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that Mr. Tripp operated his own fitness center while providing services at Synrgy and
that he solicited clients from Synrgy. (ECF No. 7). Since filing the answer and
counterclaim, Defendant Deborah Owen has filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. Mr.
Owen and Synrgy are not parties to the bankruptcy proceeding and have failed to
respond in any way to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories, this Court’s orders granting the
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Interrogatories, and this Court’s order requiring Synrgy
and Mr. Owen’s response to the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Attempts to
reach Synrgy and Mr. Owen, both pro se, have resulted in returned mail and
otherwise have elicited no response.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In ruling on motions for summary judgement the Court must examine the
documents submitted by the parties to determine whether there exists a disputed
issue of material fact. The court reviews the record evidence “in the light most
favorable to, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party.” Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Mulero–Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 672 (1st Cir.
1996)). “[W]hen the facts support plausible but conflicting inferences on a pivotal
issue in the case, the judge may not choose between those inferences at the summary
judgment stage.” Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 460 (1st Cir. 1995).

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Furthermore,
[s]ummary judgment is not appropriate merely because the facts offered
by the moving party seem more plausible, or because the opponent is
unlikely to prevail at trial. If the evidence presented is subject to
conflicting interpretations, or reasonable [people] might differ as to its
significance, summary judgment is improper.

Gannon v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 777 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.R.I. 1991).
This case presents a somewhat unusual scenario as the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment has remained without response for many months. The motion
was filed on November 25, 2019 with notice mailed to the defendants at the address
that had been provided to the court in compliance with Local Rule Gen. 302. (ECF
40). Responses were due on December 9, 2019. Having received no response from
the defendants by March 18, 2020, the Court, sua sponte extended the time for
response until April 20, 2020. At the same time the Court mailed notice of this order
to the defendants. That notice was returned as undeliverable on March 30, 2020.
Since that time, almost six months ago, the Court has not had any contact from the
defendants in this case and they have not updated their contact information with the
Court. Having waited a sufficient time, the Court will treat this motion as unopposed.
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment
Although the motion is unopposed, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an
automatic grant of summary judgment. Aguiar–Carrasquillo v. AgostoAlicea, 445
F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). “Before granting an unopposed summary judgment

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motion, the court must inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to
demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law.”
Id. (quoting López v. Corporación Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st
Cir.1991)).
When a non-moving party fails to file a timely opposition to an adversary's
motion for summary judgment, the court may consider the summary judgment
motion unopposed, and take as uncontested all evidence presented with that motion.

NEPSK, Inc. v. Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir.2002). The defendants’ denials
contained in their answer to the complaint are insufficient to sustain their burden of
showing that there are material issues of fact that remain in dispute. (See Colon-

Perez v. Dep't of Health of Puerto Rico, 623 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238 (D.P.R. 2009) “Once
a properly supported motion has been presented, the opposing party has the burden
of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the court's
denial of the motion for summary judgment.”). “The adverse party cannot defeat a
well-supported motion by ‘rest[ing] upon the mere allegations or denials of [its]
pleading.’” Data General v. Grumman, 36 F.3d 1147, 1159 (1st Cir. 1994)(abrogated
on other grounds by: 559 U.S. 154 (2010)).
B.

Fair Labor Standards Act and Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act
Claims
1. Employer

Both the FLSA and the RIMWA require employers to pay covered employees
the mandated minimum wage. Federal law includes “any person acting directly or
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indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee” in the definition
of employer. 29 U.S.C.A. § 203 (d). Rhode Island law has an analogous provision
defining an employer as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation,
business trust, or any person, or group of persons, acting directly, or indirectly, in the
interest of an employer, in relation to an employee.” R.I.G.L. §28-12-2 (7). The test
for individual liability for the failure to pay minimum wages is whether the officer
exerted operational control over the business entity. In such a case a manager can
be held individually liable for the failure to pay appropriate wages and courts have
interpreted this test expansively. Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir.
1983).
In this case the only evidence is that Mr. Owens was a part owner of defendant
Synergy and exercised operational control over the business. As a result, he is jointly
and severally liable, along with Synergy for any unpaid wages.
2. Minimum Wage
The plaintiffs have alleged a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. 201 (FLSA), et seq as well as Rhode Island’s Minimum Wage Act, RIGL §2812-1, et seq (RIMWA) and Rhode Island’s Payment of Wages Act (PWA) §28-14-19.2.
Since both claims arise from the same set of facts and the RIMWA utilizes the same
structure and many of the same definitions as the FLSA, they will be examined
together. An individual employee is entitled to bring a claim against an employer for
a failure to pay minimum wage under both §29 U.S.C. 206 and Rhode Island’s PWA
§28-14-19.2 If the action is sustained, the employee is entitled to the amount of wages
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owed as well as liquidated damages. “Any employer who violates the provisions of
section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime
compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.“ 29 U.S.C.A. § 216.4
In this case the plaintiffs each allege that they were not paid their agreed upon
salaries for several weeks or months and were further not compensated for fitness
classes or instruction given. Ms. Andreozzi alleges she was salaried as the Group
Fitness Director/Manager and was also compensated separately at the rate of $40 per
hour for the group classes she taught. Similarly, Mr. Tripp alleges he was salaried
as the Director of Personal Training for some period but was also compensated at a
rate of 60% of gross revenue for personal training sessions that he held with clients
of the defendants. While Mr. Owen disputes the agreed upon amount of both salaries
and denies the allegation of non-payment; either of salary or for individual fitness
classes, he has provided nothing more than a bare denial. In contrast the plaintiffs
have each supported their allegations with affidavits swearing to the truth of their
allegations.
The court looks to the record evidence to determine if the defendants have
failed to pay minimum wages as required by both federal and state law.

The

RIMWA provides an analogous remedy in the Payment of Wages Act (PWA) RIGL
28-14-19.2(a) “An aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover any unpaid wages
and/or benefits, compensatory damages, and liquidated damages in an amount up to
two (2) times the amount of unpaid wages and/or benefits owed…”

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defendants’ denials in this case cannot overcome the sworn affidavits of the plaintiffs.
The Court finds that the plaintiffs were not paid at all for many weeks. Ms. Andreozzi
was not paid her salary for five weeks in late 2013 and Mr. Tripp was not paid his
salary for the six months that he acted as the Director of Personal Training beginning
in January 2015. The failure to pay these employees at all for their hours worked
clearly violates both federal and state minimum wage laws It also violates Rhode
Island’s PWA. The relevance of the violations of multiple statutes is that a violation
of the minimum wage laws would only compensate plaintiffs for hours at the relevant
minimum wage.

On the other hand, a violation of the PWA entitles them to

compensation at the agreed-upon rates.
Both plaintiffs worked for defendants in two capacities; their salaried roles as
well as in separate roles for which defendants had agreed to separate compensation.
When salaried employees also work in a different capacity for an hourly wage for the
same employer, they are entitled to be compensated for the second capacity work in
addition to their salaries for their primary role; the failure to compensate them for
both, regardless of what they were paid in their primary role, is a violation of the
FLSA and the RIMWA.
Unfortunately, the only evidence of Ms. Andreozzi’s claim that she is owed five
weeks of pay totaling $5,000 is her assertion that this occurred in “late 2013.” The
PWA imposes a three-year statute of limitations which is not met by the April 4, 2017,
filing of this complaint. R.I.G.L. §28-14-19.2(g). While the defendants have failed to
defend this case in almost any way, they did answer the complaint and have raised
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the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Therefore, the Court must hold
that Ms. Andreozzi’s claim for unpaid wages for five weeks in “late 2013” is barred by
the statute of limitations.
Breach of Contract
When the law provides a remedy under the PWA, the plaintiff cannot sustain
a separate cause of action for breach of contract.

Brisbano v. Strine Printing Co.,

Inc., 135 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2016). Because the Court has found a violation of the
RIMWA and an attendant right to bring suit under the PWA, R.I.G.L. §28-14-19.2,
the claim for breach of contract must fail. Although the plaintiffs have argued that
the actions by the defendants amounted to a breach of contract, the court must look
beyond the language of the complaint to the specific allegations and the injury
alleged. In this case it is clear that all of the claims arose out of the defendants’
failure to pay wages as promised, as both salary and payment for individual teaching
and coaching sessions.

In rejecting a duplicative complaint for breach of contract,

the Court must also deny the plaintiffs the benefit of the ten-year statute of
limitations for such actions. See Brisbano v. Strine Printing Co., Inc., 135 A.2d 1202,
1208-09 (R.I. 2016).
Damages
Rhode Island PWA provides for compensatory damages as well as liquidated
damages for up to two times the amount owed. Wages are also defined broadly and
include salary and other forms of compensation. For that reason, the Plaintiff’s
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Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Andreozzi is
awarded $4,120 in wages and compensation and $8,240 in liquidated damages.
Plaintiff Tripp is awarded $17,781 in wages and compensation and $35,562 in
liquidated damages. Plaintiffs are also awarded costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED:

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Mary S. McElroy
S. McElroy
United States District Judge
September 21, 2020

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