Boudreau v. Petit et al

Filing 207

ORDER denying 167 MOTION for Application of Collateral Estoppel. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan on 11/21/2024. (DaCruz, Kayla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
JASON BOUDREAU,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN PETIT, et al.,
Defendants.

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C.A. No. 17-301WES

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
Now pending before the Court is pro se 1 Plaintiff Jason Boudreau’s motion for
application of collateral estoppel. ECF No. 167. Plaintiff argues that, in the postconviction
proceeding in Plaintiff’s state child pornography case, the Rhode Island Superior Court made the
preclusive factual determination that Warwick Police Officer Kevin Petit (“Officer Petit”)
withheld evidence that was required to be provided to Plaintiff in response to his attorney’s
request for criminal discovery. See Boudreau v. Rhode Island, C.A. No. PM-2016-5158 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2021) (“Superior Court Decision), cert. denied, No. 2021-64-M.P. (R.I. May
19, 2022).
“It is black letter law that collateral estoppel can apply to preclude the relitigation in
federal court of issues previously determined in state court. In ascertaining whether issue
preclusion flows as a consequence of previous state court litigation, a federal court must look to
state law.” Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted). In order for collateral estoppel to apply under Rhode Island law there must be: (1) an
The Court has afforded Plaintiff such leniency as is appropriate in his circumstances as noted in other decisions
issued in this case. E.g., Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2024 WL 4279522, at *1 n.1 (D.R.I. Sept. 24,
2024).
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identity of issues, (2) the previous proceeding must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits, and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be the same or in
privity with the party in the previous proceeding. State v. Pacheco, 161 A.3d 1166, 1172 (R.I.
2017). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has subdivided the first element into three factors: “(1)
the issue sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue determined in the earlier
proceeding, (2) the issue must actually have been litigated in the prior proceeding, and (3) the
issue must necessarily have been decided.” E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.
of Newark, New Jersey, 635 A.2d 1181, 1186 (R.I. 1994). “The doctrine of collateral estoppel
provides that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”
Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rhode Island courts do not apply
the doctrine mechanically if it “would lead to inequitable results.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has declined to apply collateral
estoppel when it “hinges on the fact that an issue was ‘actually litigated’ when the evidentiary
threshold was not established and the [court] made only a general finding on the issue.” Id. at
1176.
Plaintiff’s argument founders because the proposition that he seeks to preclude Officer
Petit from relitigating was not “determined,” “actually . . . litigated” or “necessarily . . . decided”
by the Superior Court. E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc, 635 A.2d at 1186. Rather than focusing on
misconduct by Officer Petit, the Superior Court’s adverse finding is actually aimed at the
conduct of “the State[],” which turned over some of the inculpatory screenshots, but not a
complete set and not the flash drive “initially provided to the police,” conduct that the Superior
Court noted it “does not condone.” Boudreau, C.A. No. PM-2016-5158, slip op. at 23

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(emphasis added). There is no adverse finding regarding Officer Petit. Plaintiff’s motion
inaccurately represents that the Superior Court Decision contains the finding that Steven
Lussier’s testimony was inconsistent with that of Officer Petit regarding the allegedly withheld
flash drive and that Lussier was found to be the more credible of the two: “the hearing justice
fully credited . . . that . . . Kevin Petit . . . failed to disclose [the USB flash drive’s] existence
during discovery of Plaintiff’s 2011 criminal case.” ECF No. 167 at 2. The Superior Court
Decision contains no such finding. It actually holds that there were no factual disputes to be
resolved through a credibility assessment: “[d]espite universal agreement by all parties as to the
relevant facts, Mr. Boudreau insisted that the posttrial case continue along until each of the
witnesses testified before [the] Court.” Boudreau, C.A. No. PM-2016-5158, slip op. at 3 & n.3.
Most importantly, the Superior Court’s holding is that no person or entity committed any Brady
or other intentional violation of Plaintiff’s rights because the material that was omitted from the
set that was provided to Plaintiff’s criminal attorney was merely cumulative and “would not have
been exculpatory but would have only further confirmed Mr. Boudreau’s guilt [of possession of
child pornography].” Id. at 23.
Plaintiff counters that the evidence in the postconviction proceeding established that
Steven Lussier provided the USB flash drive to Officer Petit; therefore, Plaintiff contends, in
criticizing the “State[]” and the “police” 2 for the failure to produce the flash drive to Plaintiff’s
criminal attorney, “it is axiomatic” that the Superior Court necessarily found that Officer Petit
was at fault. ECF No. 195 at 2. Having carefully reviewed the Superior Court Decision, the

Confirming that the Superior Court Decision’s use of the phrase “the police” is not a reference to a single officer –
that is, to Officer Petit – is the Decision’s use of the plural pronoun “they” to complete the sentence referencing
“police” with the phrase, “they failed to provide to Mr. Boudreau.” Boudreau, C.A. No. PM-2016-5158, slip op. at
19.
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Court rejects this logic; there is no determination, finding, suggestion or implication that
whatever Steve Lussier gave to Officer Petit was withheld by Officer Petit from the prosecution
or later withheld by Officer Petit from the State’s discovery. Nor is Plaintiff helped by his
citation of Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009). Moldowan holds
that “a police officer sometimes may be liable if he fails to apprise the prosecutor or a judicial
officer of known exculpatory information.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added). But the Superior Court did not make such a finding regarding Officer Petit. 3
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that collateral estoppel should not be
applied in this case to estop Officer Petit from relitigating whether he withheld evidence that was
required to be provided to Plaintiff in response to his attorney’s request for criminal discovery in
Plaintiff’s child pornography prosecution. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for application of
collateral estoppel (ECF No. 167) is DENIED.
/s/ Patricia A. Sullivan
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN
United States Magistrate Judge
November 21, 2024

Because the Superior Court did not make the determination addressed by Plaintiff’s motion, there is no need for
the Court to analyze the complicated factual/legal question whether Officer Petit, who had been employed by a
municipality and a member of a State Police Task Force, but no longer served in either role at the time of the
postconviction proceeding, should be held to be the alter ego of the “State” for purposes of collateral estoppel.

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