Gonsalves v. State of Rhode Island, State Police Department et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim: the Motion to Dismiss is denied with respect to Defendant Pacheco and granted without prejudice with respect to Defendant Little. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 12/12/2017. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
_____
)
TAJA GONSALVES,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
C.A. No. 17-346 WES
)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, STATE
)
POLICE DEPARTMENT, CAPITOL
)
POLICE DEPARTMENT, NEIL LAIRD,
)
alias, ROBERT TELLA, alias,
)
ROBERT PACHECO, alias, each
)
individually and in their
)
official capacities as police
)
officers in the Rhode Island
)
Capitol Police, ROBERT MARCHAND,
)
alias, individually and in his
)
official capacity as an officer
)
in the Rhode Island State
)
Police, ANN ASSUMPICO, alias,
)
in her capacity as the
)
Commissioner of the Rhode
)
Island Department of Public
)
Safety and the Superintendent
)
of the Rhode Island State
)
Police, JOSEPH T. LITTLE,
)
alias, individually and in his
)
capacity as the Chief of the
)
Rhode Island Capitol Police,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants Robert Pacheco’s and Joseph T.
Little’s, in their Individual and Official Capacities, Motion To
Dismiss (“Motion”).

(ECF No. 18.)

Defendants move to dismiss for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Id.)

For the reasons set forth below,

the Court DENIES the Motion with respect to Pacheco and GRANTS
without prejudice the Motion with respect to Little.
I.

Background
On

July

29,

2016,

Plaintiff

Taja

Gonsalves

went

to

the

Providence Regional Family Center (“Center”) for an appointment
with an employee of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
regarding benefits for herself and her three children.
10–11, 19, ECF. No. 1.)

(Compl. ¶¶

Rhode Island Capitol Police are assigned

to the Center to carry out duties such as locking and unlocking
the main entrance, staffing the metal detector, and monitoring the
building’s occupancy as per the State Fire Marshall.
15.)

(Id. ¶¶ 14–

On this day, Defendants Neil Laird, Robert Tella, and Robert

Pacheco, all members of the Rhode Island Capitol Police, were
posted to the Center.

(Id. ¶ 18.)

of the Capitol Police.

Defendant Little is the Chief

(Id. ¶ 6.)

When Plaintiff arrived at the Center, the front doors were
locked.

(Id. ¶ 21.)

Laird opened the door and informed Plaintiff

that no one could enter the building because it was over capacity
and would be shut down by the Fire Marshall. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff
informed Laird that she had an appointment with DHS and asked if
he could inform DHS staff that she had arrived for her appointment.
(Id. ¶ 25.) Laird refused. (Id. ¶ 26.) In additional interactions
with Laird when Plaintiff attempted to enter the building, Laird
2

similarly informed Plaintiff that she would be denied entry.

(Id.

¶¶ 31–33, 36–41.)
When Plaintiff entered the Center after the front doors were
unlocked, Laird was standing near the metal detector, Pacheco was
in the area near the metal detector, and Tella was on break in the
back of the Center.

(Id. ¶¶ 46, 49–52.)

As Plaintiff approached

the metal detector, Laird informed her that she would be arrested.
(Id. ¶¶ 53–54.)
to the front.

Then, Pacheco radioed Tella and told him to come

(Id. ¶ 54.)

Once Tella came out of the back office,

Plaintiff alleges that Laird and Tella used excessive force when
they arrested her.

(Id. ¶¶ 58–69.)

Describing her arrest, Plaintiff alleges that Laird grabbed
her right arm and twisted it sharply behind her back, which caused
her severe pain and an audible popping sound from her shoulder.
(Id. ¶ 59.)

Plaintiff alleges that she screamed out in pain and

said that she was not resisting arrest, which was followed by Laird
slamming her face and chest into the desk adjacent to the metal
detector.

(Id. ¶¶ 60–61.)

Plaintiff further avers that Laird and

Tella forced handcuffs onto her left wrist, over a brace she had
been wearing for medical treatment, pulled both of her arms behind
her back, and tightened the handcuffs so excessively that her
fingers turned blue.

(Id. ¶¶ 62–63.)

After being handcuffed,

Plaintiff asserts that Laird and Tella pushed and shoved her
through the reception area and waiting room of the Center, with
3

her arms pulled up at an angle that caused her pain, which was
exacerbated by the height difference between her and Laird.
¶¶ 64–66.)

(Id.

During this pushing and shoving, Plaintiff alleges

that Laird or Tella, or both, squeezed her upper left arm with
enough force to break the birth control device implanted therein,
and that Laird and Tella pushed her hard enough to cause her to
fall to the floor.

(Id. ¶¶ 67–68.)

Ultimately, Laird and Tella

brought Plaintiff to a small room at the back of the Center, where
Plaintiff claims that Laird pushed her into a chair. 1

(Id. ¶ 69.)

Plaintiff has since asserted claims through 42 U.S.C § 1983
for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, false
arrest and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and excessive force and malicious prosecution in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2

Relevant to this particular

motion are the claims brought through § 1983 for Fourth and
Fourteenth

Amendment

violations

for

excessive

force

brought

against Pacheco, and First and Fourth Amendment violations brought
against Little.

1

Plaintiff’s further factual averments that pertain to her
remaining time at the Center; her transportation to, time at, and
release from the Lincoln barracks; and the subsequent dismissal of
the charges against her, are not relevant to the motion at hand.
(See Compl. ¶¶ 70–90.)
2

Plaintiff also brings similar claims arising under the
Rhode Island constitution and the common law.
4

II.

Legal Standard
While deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court “accept[s] the truth of all well-pleaded facts
and draw[s] all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader’s
favor.”

García–Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st

Cir. 2013) (quoting Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44
(1st Cir. 2012)).

“[H]er claim must suggest ‘more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’”

Id. at 102–

03 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
words, “the claim must be ‘plausible on its face.’”
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

In other

Id. at 103

In determining plausibility,

“the reviewing court [must] draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679).

Additionally, “the complaint must be read as a

whole.”

Id. (citing A.G. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 78–79

(1st Cir. 2013)).

Moreover, the “plausibility inquiry properly

takes into account whether discovery can reasonably be expected to
fill any holes in the pleader’s case.”

Id. at 104–05 (citing Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
III.

Discussion
A.

Pacheco

Defendants argue that the allegations in the Complaint are
too tenuous and insufficient to support excessive-force claims
5

against Pacheco because of his mere bystander presence.

(Defs.

Robert Pacheco’s and Joseph T. Little’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. To
Dismiss

(“Defs.’

Memo”)

6–7,

ECF

No.

18.)

However,

while

Plaintiff’s allegations against Pacheco are slight, when viewed in
context of the alleged events as a whole, Plaintiff’s allegations
suffice at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

(See Compl. ¶¶ 4, 18, 51,

55.)
“An officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take
reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of
excessive force can be held liable under section 1983 for his
nonfeasance.”

Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203,

207 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990).

However, “[h]is mere presence at the

scene, without more, does not . . . render him legally responsible
. . . for the actions of a fellow officer.”

Calvi v. Knox Cty.,

470 F.3d 422, 428 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at
207 n.3).

Similarly, a “police officer cannot be held liable for

failing to intercede if he has no ‘realistic opportunity’ to
prevent an attack.”
O’Neill

v.

Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 207 n.3. (quoting

Krzeminski,

839

F.2d

9,

11–12

(2d

Cir.

1988)).

Although, “[a] constitutional duty to intervene may . . . arise if
onlooker

officers

are

instrumental

in

assisting

the

attacker to place the victim in a vulnerable position.”
v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995).

6

actual

Martinez

Reading the Complaint as a whole, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
against Pacheco, based on his presence as a bystander who failed
to intervene, is plausible on its face.
F.3d at 102—03.

See García–Catalán, 734

Initially, it can be inferred that Pacheco was

present at the scene of Plaintiff’s arrest because Plaintiff
alleges that he was “in the area near the metal detector and the
desk when Plaintiff entered the [Center],” which is the location
that Laird and Tella arrested Plaintiff.
While

his

“mere

presence”

is

itself

(Compl. ¶¶ 51, 58–69.)
insufficient

to

impose

liability, Pacheco’s proactive radioing of Tella to come to the
front

to

assist

in

Laird’s

arrest

of

Plaintiff

supports

the

inference that Pacheco was “instrumental in assisting the actual
attacker to place the victim in a vulnerable position.”

See

Martinez, 54 F.3d at 985 n.4; (Compl. ¶ 55).
Moreover, the alleged period over which Laird and Tella used
excessive force, coupled with Pacheco’s presence in the Center’s
entrance area where the force was used, suggests that Pacheco had
a “realistic opportunity to prevent [the] attack.” See Gaudreault,
923 F.2d at 207 n.3 (internal quotations omitted); (Compl. ¶¶ 51,
55, 58–69); see also Ledea v. Metro-Dade Cty. Police Dep’t, 681 F.
App’x 728, 729–30 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of motion to
dismiss because facts alleged bystander officers witnessed the
beating,

were

in

positions

to
7

intervene,

and

acted

with

indifference during the few minute beating); Detris v. Coats, 523
F. App’x 612, 616–17 (11th Cir. 2013) (reversing grant of motion
dismiss because facts alleged bystander officers were in a position
to intervene as they stood by and watched beating even after victim
was pinned to the floor and begging for help).

Finally, discovery

could “fill in the holes” of Plaintiff’s claim against Pacheco,
thus further elevating her claim’s plausibility.

See García–

Catalán, 734 F.3d at 104—05.
In sum, the factual allegations against Pacheco, considered
in the context of the entire Complaint, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, suggest a
plausible claim for failure to intervene under § 1983 against
Pacheco.

Accordingly, the Motion with respect to Pacheco is

DENIED.
B.

Little

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege that Little
took any affirmative action, was a direct participant in or in a
supervisory role for any supposed misconduct, and that Little is
not personally liable for acts of individual employees.
Memo 5–6.)

(Defs.’

ascertaining

Defendants note that the Complaint does not allow for
which

claims

Plaintiff

lodges

against

Little;

Plaintiff, however, argues that Little is liable as a supervisor
under § 1983 for failing to train Defendants Laird, Tella, and
Pacheco to properly facilitate interactions between benefits users
8

and the DHS.

(Id. at 5; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Her Obj. to the

Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl.’s Memo”) 7–9, ECF No. 19.))

Plaintiff,

though, fails to adequately plead such a claim.
“It is by now axiomatic that the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply to claims under section 1983.” Gaudreault,
923 F.2d at 209 (citing Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st
Cir. 1985)).
a

basis

“[I]nadequate training of a police officer cannot be

for

.

.

.

liability

under

section

1983

unless

a

constitutional injury has been inflicted by the officer or officers
whose training was allegedly inferior.”

Calvi, 470 F.3d at 429

(citing Young v. City of Prov. ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 25–
26 (1st Cir. 2005)).

“Supervisors . . . can be held liable only

on the basis of their own acts or omissions, amounting at the least
to ‘reckless’ or ‘callous’ indifference to the constitutional
rights of others.”

Id. (quoting Gutierrez–Rodriguez v. Cartagena,

882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1989)).
suffice . . . .”

“Mere negligence will not

Guadalupe-Báez v. Pesquera, 819 F.3d 509, 515

(1st Cir. 2016).
Moreover, “[i]f a plaintiff relies on a theory of deliberate
indifference,”

the

plaintiff

must

demonstrate

“(1)

that

the

officials had knowledge of facts, from which (2) the official[s]
can draw the inference (3) that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists.”

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Causation is also an

“essential element,” which requires “proof that the supervisor's
9

conduct led inexorably to the constitutional violation.”

Id.

(quoting Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir.
1995)).

The causation element is a difficult, but not impossible

bar to meet, which can be proved by “showing inaction in the face
of a ‘known history of widespread abuse sufficient to alert a
supervisor to ongoing violations’”; yet “‘isolated instances of
unconstitutional

activity’

will

not

suffice.”

Id.

(quoting

Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir.
1994)).
Little is mentioned specifically in only one paragraph of the
Complaint, which states: “Defendant Joseph T. Little, alias, is
sued individually and in his official capacity as the Chief of the
Rhode Island Capitol Police.”

(Compl. ¶ 6.)

Little is also

mentioned in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, where Plaintiff prays
for preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Little to
“properly select, train, instruct, supervise and/or discipline
officers” by enacting procedures that allow DHS clients to inform
DHS staff of their arrival when the building is closed due to
capacity.

(Id.

injunctive

at

relief

16.)

Additionally,

directing

officers

stationed

adequate

skills

at

in

the

Little

DHS

customer

so

to
that

service,

Plaintiff
train
the

prays

Capitol

officers

constitutional

for

Police
“exhibit
rights,

sensitivity, and cultural competence, with all curriculum approved
by Plaintiff.”

(Id.)
10

Even though the plausibility threshold to survive a motion to
dismiss

is

low,

Plaintiff’s

allegations

hardly

rise

to

the

suggestion of a “sheer possibility” that Little acted unlawfully.
See García–Catalán, 734 F.3d at 102–03.

The Complaint’s factual

allegations do not support Plaintiff’s argument that Little was
“deliberately indifferent” because the Complaint is devoid of any
suggestion

that

Little

had

any

“substantial risk of harm” existed.

knowledge

of

facts

that

a

See Guadalupe-Báez, 819 F.3d

at 515; (Pl.’s Memo 8–9).
Moreover,

the

allegations

insufficiently

support

the

causation requirement, as the allegations present nothing more
than an “isolated instance” of police misconduct.

See Flores v.

Cty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158–61 (9th Cir. 2013)
(affirming dismissal of failure-to-train claim because the one
alleged instance of misconduct was insufficient to show a pattern,
not so obviously unconstitutional in the absence of a pattern, and
so clearly criminal that its absence from the police training
manual could not support the claim); cf. Guadalupe-Báez, 819 F.3d
at

515–16

(reversing

dismissal

of

claim

against

police

department’s superintendent because police-misconduct allegations
were analogous to misconduct detailed in Department of Justice
report made a year before alleged misconduct); Battiste v. Sheriff
of Broward Cty., 261 F. App’x 199, 201–03 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
allegation that a report, made before defendant police chief took
11

position, detailing widespread police misconduct, could support a
failure-to-train claim).
In sum, the factual allegations do not suggest a plausible
claim for failure to train.

See, e.g., Detris, 523 F. App’x at

615 (affirming dismissal of supervisor-liability claim against
police chief because allegations lacked facts beyond reciting
elements of the cause of action). However, because discovery could
turn up facts sufficient to allege a plausible claim against
Defendant Little, the motion is granted without prejudice to allow
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Motion To Dismiss (ECF

No. 18) is DENIED with respect to Defendant Pacheco and GRANTED
without prejudice with respect to Defendant Little.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: December 12, 2017

12