Mattatall v. Wall

Filing 20

ORDER: The Defendant's 3 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Mattatalls Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1 ) is DISMISSED without prejudice to being refiled if Mattatall obtains authorization from the First Circuit to file it in this Court - So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 2/22/2019. (Urizandi, Nisshy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
______________________________________
)
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
ASHBEL T. WALL,
)
)
Respondent.
)
______________________________________)
STEPHEN R. MATTATALL,

C.A. No. 17-468-WES

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
William E. Smith, Chief Judge.
Before the Court is the State of Rhode Island’s Motion to
Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss,” ECF No. 3) Stephen R. Mattatall’s
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(“Petition,” ECF No. 1). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion
to

Dismiss

prejudice
permission

is
to

GRANTED
being

from

the

and

the

refiled
Court

of

Petition

if

and

Appeals

is

when
for

DISMISSED

without

Mattatall

receives

the

Circuit,

First

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), to do so.
I.

Background 1
In late 1984, a jury found Mattatall guilty of second-degree

murder in Rhode Island Superior Court.

1

He was sentenced to a term

For a detailed account of the facts and travel of Mattatall’s
underlying conviction, see State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098 (R.I.
1992), the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision affirming
Mattatall’s conviction after his third trial; the Petition; and

of

forty

years’

suspended.
applicable

An

imprisonment,
additional

habitual

with

ten

offender

thirty

years

statute.

was

to

serve

imposed

Mattatall

and

ten

under

the

successfully

appealed the judgment to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and, after
granting

the

State’s

certiorari

petition,

the

United

States

Supreme Court vacated Mattatall’s 1984 conviction and remanded the
case to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

On reconsideration, the

court affirmed its prior ruling and remanded the case for a new
trial.

A second trial held in Superior Court in 1987 ended in a

mistrial.
against

In 1988, a third jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict

Mattatall

for

murder

in

the

second

degree.

He

was

sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment, with fifty to serve and
ten suspended, plus an additional twenty years under the habitual
offender statute.
Mattatall appealed his 1988 judgment of conviction to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1989.

The appeal was denied in 1991,

after which Mattatall filed a petition for reargument.

The Rhode

Island Supreme Court granted the petition for reargument.

At that

time, Mattatall argued that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to warrant a conviction of second-degree murder,
among

other

issues.

In

a

lengthy

order,

the

court

denied

the Court’s dockets in Mattatall v. Vose, C.A, No. 97-515-ML
(D.R.I. 1997), and Mattatall v. Wall, C.A. No. 16-012-WES (D.R.I.
2016).

Mattatall’s appeal and affirmed his judgment of conviction.

The

United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Mattatall states that he has filed a total of five postconviction applications in the Rhode Island state courts.

Three

of these attacked his criminal convictions, and the other two
apparently challenged decisions of the Rhode Island Parole Board.
In 1997, Mattatall filed his first petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. The petition
was denied because it was untimely filed, and, in 1999, the First
Circuit

denied

appealability.

Mattatall’s

motion

for

a

certificate

of

The Supreme Court denied further review.

In 2016, Mattatall filed a second § 2254 petition, which was
dismissed by the Court as a second or successive petition. The
First Circuit subsequently denied permission for Mattatall to file
it in this Court.
Mattatall has now filed a third Petition, which he titles
“Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241.”

He

alleges that he is “actually innocent” of second-degree murder and
being deemed a habitual offender. 2

2

The State has moved to dismiss

It is not clear from the Petition whether Mattatall is
seeking to use “actual innocence” as a “gateway” to having an
otherwise barred constitutional claim heard, see Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995), as opposed to raising a freestanding
“actual innocence” claim, see id. at 314-15; see also Pet. at 17.
Mattatall’s
Objection
to
the
State’s
Motion
to
Dismiss
(“Objection,” ECF No. 13) suggests that he is seeking to use
“actual innocence” as a “gateway.” (Obj. 2-5.) Mattatall also

the Petition on two grounds: first, that the Petition is an
impermissible second or successive petition; and, second, that it
is time-barred.

(Mot. to Dismiss 4-5.)

The Court need not address

the State’s argument that the Petition is untimely, as the first
ground is dispositive of the matter.
II.

Discussion
As noted above, this Petition is the third Mattatall has filed

seeking relief from his 1988 conviction.

See Mattatall v. Vose,

C.A. No. 97-515-ML (D.R.I. 1997); Mattatall v. Wall, C.A. No. 16012-WES (D.R.I. 2016).

Although styled as a § 2241 petition, in

reality the Petition is properly considered an application for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254.
Section 2254(a) provides, in relevant part, that:
[A] district court shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Section 2241, on the other hand, is the

proper vehicle “when the petition attacks the execution, rather

appears to present ineffective assistance of counsel and
insufficient evidence, or “actual innocence,” claims.
(Pet. at
10)(citing trial counsel’s failure to object to “confusing” jury
instructions); id. at 17 (alleging that “The State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Mattatall] shot [the victim] with
a specific intent to kill, and with malice aforethough[t] and
premeditation.”). The Court need not resolve this issue, given
its determination that the Petition is a second or successive
petition and must be dismissed on that basis.

than the validity of the sentence.”

Barr v. Sabol, 686 F. Supp.

2d 131, 133 (D. Mass. 2010)(citing United States v. Barrett, 178
F.3d 34, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Francis v. Maloney, 798
F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2015)(“Section 2241 . . . establishes a
mechanism for a federal inmate who is ‘in custody’ to challenge
the execution of (rather than the imposition of) his or her
sentence.”).
It is abundantly clear from the Petition that Mattatall is
challenging the validity of his conviction and sentence and not
the execution of that sentence.

(Pet. at 1)(alleging that he is

“actually innocent” of second-degree murder and being habitual
offender); id. at 33 (noting that he “is actually and factually
innocent of the charge of second-degree murder of which he stands
accused . . .”)).

“[I]t is the substance of the petition, rather

than its form, that governs.”

Pierce v. Spencer, Civil Action No.

05-10292-RWZ, 2006 WL 2121912, at *1 (D. Mass. July 28, 2006)
(quoting Cook v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d
Cir. 2003)); cf. Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 97 (1st
Cir. 2008)(stating, with respect to the federal counterpart of §
2254, that: “‘[A]ny motion filed in the district court that imposed
the sentence, and substantively within the scope of § 2255 ¶ 1, is
a motion under § 2255, no matter what title the prisoner plasters
on the cover.’”(quoting Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855, 857
(7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original))); Wherry v. Grondolsky,

Civil Action No. 10-40159-FDS, 2010 WL 4273807, at *2 (D. Mass.
Oct. 28, 2010)(noting, again in § 2255 context, that petitioner’s
“claims of actual innocence . . . are in substance legal challenges
to the rulings and procedures at trial.

These are the types of

claims properly brought under a § 2255 petition . . .”)(footnote
omitted).

Therefore, the Court construes Mattatall’s Petition as

a § 2254 petition, and, as such, it is a second or successive
petition subject to the restrictions imposed under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).
“In AEDPA, Congress established a ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for
the

consideration

applications’

in

of
the

‘second
federal

or

successive

courts.”

habeas

Stewart

v.

corpus

Martinez-

Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998)(quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 657 (1996)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In pertinent
part, §

2244

requires

that

“[b]efore

a

second

or

successive

application permitted by this section is filed in the district
court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals
for

an

order

application.”

authorizing

the

district

court

to

consider

the

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Martinez-

Villareal, 523 U.S. at 641.

This provision “strip[s] the district

court of jurisdiction over a second or successive habeas petition
unless and until the court of appeals has decreed that it may go
forward.”

Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997);

see also Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 149, 153 (2007)(per

curiam)(“[P]etitioner—a
relief

from

the

state

federal

prisoner

seeking

courts—failed

to

postconviction

comply

gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

with

the

That failure

deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to hear his claims.”).
Section 2244(b)(3)(A) applies so long as the earlier petition was
decided on the merits.
Not

all

See Pratt, 129 F.3d at 60.

numerically

“second”

petitions

are

considered

“successive.” If a petition attacks a different criminal judgment,
or if the earlier petition ended without a judgment on the merits,
a second petition is not considered “successive.”
F.3d at 43; Pratt, 129 F.3d at 60.

Barrett, 178

The dismissal of a first

petition as time-barred, however, qualifies as an adjudication on
the merits when considering a second or successive habeas petition.
See Cook v. Ryan, Civil Action No. 12-11840-RWZ, 2012 WL 5064492,
at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 15, 2012)(collecting cases); see also Pierce
v. Wall, C.A. No. 08-72S, 2008 WL 896148, at *1 (D.R.I. Apr. 2,
2008)(noting that dismissal of earlier petition as time-barred
rendered

subsequent

Mattatall’s

1997

petition

petition

“successive

was

dismissed

or
as

second”).

Since

time-barred,

the

current Petition is subject to the restrictions contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2244 regarding a second or successive petition.

See

Brennan v. Wall, 100 Fed. Appx. 4, 4 (1st Cir. 2004)(“A state
habeas petitioner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court may not evade the ‘second or successive’ restrictions of

§

2244

by

bringing

his

petition

under

§

2241

rather

than

§ 2254.” (citing Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1060-61 (11th
Cir. 2003); Cook v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d at 278-79
& n.4)); cf. Trenkler, 536 F.3d at 97 (“[C]ourts regularly have
recharacterized imaginatively captioned petitions to reflect that
they derive their essence from section 2255 and, thus, must satisfy
that section’s gatekeeping provisions.”). 3
The record does not reflect, nor does Mattatall assert, that
he has petitioned the Court of Appeals for authorization for the
Court to consider the Petition.

He alleges instead that “he has

satisfied his burden to make a ‘prima facie’ showing that he is
‘actually innocent’ of second-degree murder as well as being deemed
an habitual offender under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” (Pet. at 1.) Whether
Mattatall has made such a showing, however, is a matter for the
First Circuit, not this Court, to decide.

Therefore, the Petition

must be dismissed until such time as Mattatall obtains leave from
the Court of Appeals to file it in this Court.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3)(A); Burton, 549 U.S. at 152, 157 (“Burton neither
sought nor received authorization from the Court of Appeals before
filing

3

his

2002

petition,

a

‘second

or

successive’

petition

Section 2255 also requires that a second or successive
petition must be certified by the appropriate court of appeals
before being filed in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)
(“A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in
section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals
. . . .”).

challenging his custody, and so the District Court was without
jurisdiction to entertain it.”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3)
is GRANTED and Mattatall’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice
to being refiled if Mattatall obtains authorization from the First
Circuit to file it in this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: February 22, 2019