Burns v. U-Haul of Providence et al

Filing 14

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Remand- So Ordered by District Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. on 1/2/2018. (Barletta, Barbara)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
____________________________________
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MARIANNE BURNS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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C.A. No. 17-513-JJM-LDA
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U-HAUL OF PROVIDENCE, alias,
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and JERRY H. GWYN,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)
ORDER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), Marianne Burns seeks to have her case
remanded to the Rhode Island Superior Court where it was originally filed, claiming
that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 7.
Ms. Burns alleges that she sustained personal injuries from an automobile
collision with a vehicle driven by Defendant Jerry H. Gwyn that was rented from
Defendant U-Haul of Providence. Her state court complaint alleges only state law
claims. There is no diversity of citizenship among the parties. The sole basis upon
which U-Haul removed this case to federal court was an assertion of federal
question jurisdiction: specifically, that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
because the Graves Amendment to the Federal Transportation Equity Act, 49
U.S.C. § 30106(a), preempts Ms. Burns’ state law claims.
This Court need only turn to United States Supreme Court precedent to
determine it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case:
Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal
court may be removed to federal court by the defendant. Absent

diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required. The
presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
“well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that federal jurisdiction
exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank,
299 U.S. 109, 112–113 (1936). The rule makes the plaintiff the master
of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive
reliance on state law.
Ordinarily federal pre-emption is raised as a defense to the allegations
in a plaintiff’s complaint. Before 1887, a federal defense such as preemption could provide a basis for removal, but, in that year, Congress
amended the removal statute. We interpret that amendment to
authorize removal only where original federal jurisdiction exists. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as amended by Act of Aug.
13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. Thus, it is now settled law that a case
may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense,
including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated
in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the
federal defense is the only question truly at issue. See Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 12
(1983).
There does exist, however, an “independent corollary” to the wellpleaded complaint rule, id. at 22, known as the “complete pre-emption”
doctrine. On occasion, the Court has concluded that the pre-emptive
force of a statute is so “extraordinary” that it “converts an ordinary
state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987). Once an area of state law has been
completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and
therefore arises under federal law. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at
24 (“[I]f a federal cause of action completely pre-empts a state cause of
action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause
of action necessarily ‘arises under’ federal law”).
The complete pre-emption corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule
is applied primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by § 301 of the
[Labor Management Relations Act].

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Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987) (footnotes omitted).1
No federal question is presented on the face of Ms. Burns’ complaint. Only
state law claims, common law and statutory, are asserted in the complaint. The
only interjection of a federal question comes in U-Haul’s anticipated assertion of a
federal statute as a defense. “Normally, federal defenses including preemption do
not by themselves confer federal jurisdiction over a well-pleaded complaint alleging
only violations of state law.” Hotz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 292
F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9–10, 25–27). UHaul does not assert complete preemption.

Instead it asserts that “it is the

interpretation of federal law—not state law—that will be critical to the resolution of
this case.” ECF No. 13 at 2. But the Supreme Court has decided that even where
“the federal defense is the only question truly at issue,” a federal defense does not
provide a basis for removal to federal court. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand this case to the Rhode Island
Superior Court (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________
John J. McConnell, Jr.
United States District Judge
January 2, 2018

The Court has also reformatted internal citations for consistency and to aid
the reader.
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