Hanson v. RI Department of Corrections, et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 1/31/2019. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
ALLEN J. HANSON,
)
)
C.A. No. 17-598 WES
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT
)
OF CORRECTIONS et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Allen J. Hanson is an inmate at the Intake Service
Center in Cranston, Rhode Island.

On December 27, 2017, he filed

a

of

complaint

alleging

violations

Rhode

Island

officers

Corrections.

Compl. 2-8, ECF No. 1.

the

complaint

for

the

U.S.C.

correctional

dismiss

and

42

failure

remedies and deficient service.

§

1983

by

two

Department

of

These defendants move to
to

exhaust

administrative

See generally Mot. to Dismiss,

ECF No. 15.
The claim that Hanson has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies is an affirmative defense.
216 (2007).

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

As such, and because its merit is not obvious from

reading the complaint, the adjudication of this claim is not proper
on a motion to dismiss.

See Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp. v.

Lopez–Stubbe, 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the

resolution of an affirmative defense on a motion to dismiss is
inappropriate

unless

“conclusively

establish[ed]”

by

“the

allegations of the complaint, the documents (if any) incorporated
therein, matters of public record, and other matters of which the
court may take judicial notice”); Beltran v. O’Mara, 405 F. Supp.
2d 140, 149 (D.N.H. 2005) (“Whether an inmate has [exhausted
available administrative remedies] presents a question of law,
although the answer may depend on disputed factual issues.”).
The merit of defendants’ failure-to-exhaust defense is not
obvious at least in part because Hanson, while admitting he failed
to properly file a grievance, asserts that he has been denied the
forms necessary to do so.

Compl. 3, 6-8.

Assuming this is true,

as the Court must at the motion-to-dismiss stage, Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), Hanson had no administrative
remedies “available” to him to exhaust, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See,
e.g., Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Where
prison officials prevent, thwart, or hinder a prisoner’s efforts
to avail himself of an administrative remedy, they render that
remedy ‘unavailable’ and a court will excuse the prisoner’s failure
to exhaust.”); Kaba v. E.A. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir.
2006) (“If administrative remedies are not ‘available’ to an
inmate, then the inmate cannot be required to exhaust.”); Miller
v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).

Therefore,

the Court cannot dismiss Hanson’s complaint, at least in the case’s
2

current posture.

Defendants may reiterate their argument on

summary judgment or at trial.
Defendants also move that Hanson’s complaint be dismissed as
against the two correctional officers because they have only been
served in their official capacities, and therefore exist in this
suit outside the ambit of section 1983.

Mem. of Law in Supp. of

Mot. to Dismiss 9-10.

This part of defendants’ motion is granted,

but supererogatory:

the Court has already recognized Hanson’s

wish to proceed against only the Department of Corrections, Text
Order, Apr. 6, 2018, and indeed the summons he filled out directed
service only on the Department, Process Receipt and Return, ECF
No. 13.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF
No. 15, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: January 31, 2019

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