Daquay v. Electric Boat Corporation

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 6/19/2018. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
MARCEL R. DAQUAY,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
C.A. No. 18-2 WES
)
v.
)
)
)
GENERAL DYNAMICS ELECTRIC BOAT
)
CORPORATION,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
This case features an allegation that over forty years ago
Defendant Electric Boat Corporation (“Electric Boat”) promised
Plaintiff

Marcel

R.

Daquay

something

in

return

for

his

help

securing $850 million from the federal government. The alleged
promise went unfulfilled, prompting Daquay to file suit – in August
2017 - ten years after the company terminated his employment.
Electric Boat has moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 6.) Because the
statute of limitations has run on Daquay’s claims, the Court GRANTS
Electric Boat’s motion.

I.

Background
As alleged in the complaint, 1 Marcel R. Daquay began working

for Electric Boat as a Quality Control Analyst in May of 1975.
(Pl.’s

Compl.

¶

5,

ECF

No.

1-1.)

In

this

capacity,

he

was

occasionally asked to perform duties beyond the scope of his
contractual obligations. (Id. at ¶ 6.) On these occasions, Daquay
performed the requested services as directed, sometimes with and
other times without the promise of additional compensation. (Id.
at ¶¶ 6-7.)
In the late 1970s, it was discovered that a number of boats
Electric Boat had built for the United States Navy had structural
defects. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Electric Boat requested $1.5 billion from
the federal government to correct the problem. (Id.) This request
was promptly denied because Electric Boat was ostensibly at fault
for the structural issues. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Supervisors then told
Daquay that it would be “worth his while” to investigate the
structural issues, and that Electric Boat would be “more than
grateful” for his doing so. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-15, 22.)
Through research and testing, Daquay discovered that Electric
Boat was not in fact at fault, but rather third parties had
supplied low-grade steel, which was proven to be the cause of the

1

When deciding a motion to dismiss, “[n]on-conclusory factual
allegations in the complaint must . . . be treated as true.”
Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
2

boats’ structural issues. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.) Daquay never received
any form of additional compensation for these services. (Id. at ¶
16.) But Electric Boat received $850 million from the federal
government after a report was submitted to Congress on December
22, 1979, proving Electric Boat was not at fault. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
Daquay continued to work for Electric Boat until August 2007,
when his employment was terminated. (See id. at ¶ 5.) At the time
of termination, he received only his final paycheck, which did not
include any form of additional compensation. (See id. at ¶ 16.)
On August 31, 2017, Daquay brought suit to recover, inter
alia, the money Electric Boat allegedly promised him for his
aforementioned work in the late 1970s.
II.

Discussion
Electric Boat raises a statute of limitations defense as to

all counts. (Mot. to Dismiss 4); see R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a).
Daquay claims that his suit is timely because the applicable tenyear statute of limitations began to run from the termination of
his employment in August of 2007, when the breach came to light.
(Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss (“Response”) 6, ECF No. 9.)
Electric Boat, on the other hand, argues that the suit is untimely
because the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the
breach in 1979. (Mot. to Dismiss 1.) Electric Boat has the better
argument.

3

Statutes of limitation “are designed to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Ryan v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 181 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Order
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944)). Generally, in Rhode Island, “a cause of action accrues
and the applicable statute of limitations begins to run at the
time of injury to the aggrieved party.” Hill v. R.I. State Emps.’
Ret. Bd., 935 A.2d 608, 616 (R.I. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, “neither the ignorance of a person of his right to bring
an action nor the mere silence of a person liable to the action
prevents the running of the statute of limitations.” Swiss v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 559 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D.R.I. 1982) (quoting Kenyon
v. United Elec. Rys., 151 A. 5, 8 (R.I. 1930)).
There are exceptions to this rule, such as “‘where a defendant
conceals

from

a

plaintiff

by

actual

misrepresentation

the

existence of a cause of action,’ in which case ‘said cause of
action

is

deemed

to

accrue

at

the

time

the

plaintiff

first

discovers its existence.’” Waters v. Walt Disney World Co., 237 F.
Supp. 2d 162, 167 (D.R.I. 2002) (quoting Kenyon, 151 A. at 8).
This exception is limited, however, as “[m]ere silence or a failure
to

volunteer

information

does

not

constitute

an

‘actual

misrepresentation.’” Smith v. O’Connell, 997 F. Supp. 226, 238
4

(D.R.I. 1998) (quoting Kenyon, 151 A. at 8). Rather, “[w]hat is
required is ‘some express representation or other affirmative
conduct amounting in fact to such a representation which could
reasonably deceive another and induce him to rely thereon to his
disadvantage.’” Id. (quoting Caianiello v. Shatkin, 82 A.2d 826,
829 (R.I. 1951)).
Daquay avers that the statute of limitations began to run on
his claims in 2007 when Electric Boat did not include additional
compensation in his final paycheck. (Response 6.) But this is not
when the alleged injury occurred and the cause of action accrued,
which was when payment was allegedly due and not remitted. See
Bader v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 505 A.2d 1162, 1166-67 (R.I. 1986).
The time at which payment would have been due Daquay cannot
be determined by recourse to contractual language. Where, as here,
an

alleged

contract

does

not

specify

a

time

of

performance,

contract law states that performance should be completed within a
reasonable time. See Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Constr.
Co., 958 F.2d 1158, 1164 (1st Cir. 1992) (“Since the contract
contained no specific time limits, nor any clause stating that
time was ‘of the essence,’ [plaintiff] had a ‘reasonable time’
within which to perform . . . .”) (emphasis omitted)); Restatement
(Second)

of

(citations

Contracts

omitted)

§

33

(“Where

illus.
the

5

1d

(Am.

contract

Law

calls

Inst.
for

a

1981)
single

performance such as the rendering of a service or the delivery of
goods, the time for performance is a ‘reasonable time.’”).
Daquay alleges that, on December 22, 1979, a report was
submitted to Congress that demonstrated Electric Boat was not
entirely at fault for the boats’ structural issues. (Compl. ¶ 12.)
He further alleges that this report was “centrally based on the
critical information [he] generated.” (Id.) Following submission
of this report, Electric Boat received $850 million from the
federal government. (Id.) Based on Daquay’s own rendition of the
facts, he rendered services in this matter no later than December
22, 1979, as this was the date that proved Electric Boat’s lack of
fault. (See id.) Consequently, the additional compensation must
have been due at a reasonable time following this date. See Bader,
505 A.2d at

1167

(“[P]laintiff’s

cause

of

action

accrued

in

September 1973, the time when he could have reasonably anticipated
a bonus.”).
What constitutes a reasonable period to perform depends on
the facts of the case. See Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 815
F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[W]hen a contract is silent as to
time, the term shall be a reasonable time based on all the relevant
evidence.”).

Without

determining

the

exact

bounds

of

reasonableness here, the Court notes that the pleaded facts simply
do not support Daquay’s contention that a reasonable period for
Electric Boat to pay him for services rendered in 1979 would have
6

lasted until August 2007. Indeed, Daquay does not supply - and the
Court is unaware of - a case that finds reasonable performance
twenty-seven years after services were rendered. Cf. Vulcan Auto.
Equip., Ltd. v. Glob. Marine Engine & Parts, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
2d. 156, 165-66 (D.R.I. 2003) (finding sixty days a reasonable
time for payment under the U.C.C.); Empire Acquisition Grp., LLC
v. Atl. Mortg. Co., 35 A.3d 878, 884-85 (R.I. 2012) (finding sixty
days after agreed-upon performance under contract for sale of
property unreasonable).
Daquay’s reliance on Friedman v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc. is
misplaced. No. PB 05-1193, 2012 WL 274514 (R.I. Super. Jan. 26,
2012). There, the court tolled the statute of limitations until
the plaintiff’s discovery of the cause of action because the
defendant took affirmative steps to conceal its existence. Id. at
*7. Here, though, Daquay alleges no affirmative steps taken by
Electric Boat to conceal anything. The complaint claims that
supervisors told Daquay it would be “worth his while” and that
Electric Boat would be “more than grateful” for his help. (Compl.
¶ 22.) But Electric Boat did nothing to disguise the fact that the
company did not pay Daquay after he performed.
Because a reasonable period to remit payment under these facts
ended sometime before August 2007 – likely long before then –
Daquay’s claims accrued at least ten years before he filed his
complaint, and are therefore out of time.
7

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Electric Boat’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 6) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: June 19, 2018

8