Channing v. Town of South Kingstown et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 23 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part ORAL Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order denyingDefendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness. So Ordered by District Judge William E. Smith on 6/21/2021. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
TOWN OF SOUTH KINGSTOWN, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)
FREDERICK CHANNING,

C.A. No. 18-004 WES

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
ECF No. 23.

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is

DENIED as to the claim of excessive force against Defendant John
T. D’Agostino and GRANTED in all other respects.
I.

BACKGROUND
Following

a

disputed

series

of

events,

D’Agostino

(a

patrolman with the South Kingstown Police Department), Plaintiff
Frederick Channing, and a car all ended up at the driveway of 260
Columbia Street.

See Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”)

¶¶ 1-6, ECF No. 23-2; Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“SDF”) ¶¶
1-6, ECF No. 27.

At some point, Defendants Montafix Houghton and

Jerome Gillen also arrived on the scene.

SUF ¶ 9; SDF ¶ 9.

Based

on his initial observations of Channing, D’Agostino believed that
Channing may have been operating the vehicle while intoxicated.

SUF ¶ 10; SDF ¶ 10.

D’Agostino approached Channing and asked for

his registration and insurance.

SUF ¶ 11; SDF ¶ 11.

According to

(vaguely) disputed testimony, D’Agostino smelled a strong odor of
alcohol on Channing, who forgot what he was doing while trying to
retrieve the documents, and who could not remember where he was
coming from.

SUF ¶ 12-15; SDF ¶ 12-15.

D’Agostino then took

Channing through a series of field sobriety tests, which Channing
allegedly failed.

SUF ¶ 16-26; SDF ¶ 16-26. D’Agostino therefore

decided to arrest Plaintiff on suspicion of driving under the
influence of alcohol.
Next

came

the

SUF ¶ 27. 1
focus

of

our

inquiry:

the

handcuffing.

According to D’Agostino, he handcuffed Channing without incident,
double locking the handcuffs per standard protocol.
31.

SUF ¶¶ 29-

Channing “vaguely” remembers a conflicting series of events.

SUF ¶ 44; SDF ¶ 44.

He states that the handcuffs “pinched” him,

causing him to jump, which, in turn, led D’Agostino to apply
greater force.

SDF ¶ 29.

He also maintains that D’Agostino

twisted his arm in the process and that he experienced shooting
pain and numbness in his arms, wrists, and hands during the arrest.
SUF ¶ 45; SDF ¶ 45.

Although Plaintiff disputes that he drove while intoxicated,
he does not meaningfully contest that he was arrested based on
D’Agostino’s belief that he had committed that crime. SDF ¶ 27.
1

2

The next day, according to evidence submitted by Channing, he
sought treatment for numbness, bruising, redness, and intermittent
pain in his arm and wrists.

SDF ¶ 29.

Despite ongoing treatment,

he continues to suffer from “chronic pain in both hands, both
wrists, and [his] right arm.”

Id.

He has also submitted a report

from an expert on police practices who opines that D’Agostino used
unreasonable

and

Channing’s injuries.
II.

improper

handcuffing

techniques,

causing

See Rivera Suppl. Report, ECF No. 23-9.

LEGAL STANDARD
To succeed on their Motion, Defendants must show that “there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that they are
“entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The Court views “the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving part[y].”

Pippin v. Blvd. Motel Corp., 835 F.3d 180,

181 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Walsh v. TelTech Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d
155, 157–58 (1st Cir. 2016)).

However, “a nonmovant cannot rely

merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and
unsupported speculation.”

Garmon v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

844 F.3d 307, 313 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Pina v. Children’s
Place, 740 F.3d 785, 795 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Where, as here, the ultimate burden of proof in the case lies
with the nonmovant, the movant “bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
3

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

If the movant

makes that showing, the nonmovant must demonstrate the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.

Dow v. United

Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 1 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir.
1993).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Daubert

In support of his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Channing submits the expert report of Richard Rivera,
M.S.

See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.

(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) 7-8, ECF No. 26-1. 2 Defendants argue that Rivera’s
opinions do not meet the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and therefore cannot
be considered.
Rule

702

See Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 11, ECF No. 23-1.
of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Evidence

provides

the

following:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d)
Although the report was co-authored by Elena Gonzalez,
Channing seeks to offer expert testimony from Rivera only.
2

4

the expert has reliably applied
methods to the facts of the case.
To

satisfy

this

inquiry,

“an

the

expert

principles
must

and

vouchsafe

the

reliability of the data on which he relies and explain how the
cumulation of that data was consistent with standards of the
expert’s profession.”

Zachar v. Lee, 363 F.3d 70, 75–76 (1st Cir.

2004) (quoting SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 1999)).

Any type of “technical

or otherwise specialized knowledge” will suffice.

Id. (citing

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)).
Rivera has multiple decades of experience as a police officer,
police researcher, and consultant on a variety of police-related
topics.

See Rivera Curriculum Vitae 1-2 (ECF No. 23-9 at 95-96).

His master’s and bachelor’s degrees are both in the field of
criminal justice, and he has published several papers on police
practices.
based

on

concludes

See id. at 1, 3-4 (ECF No. 23-9 at 95, 97-98).
his

education,

that

Rivera

training,

has

and

expertise

experience,
in

policing

the

Thus,
Court

generally,

including the usage and dangers of handcuffs.
Here, the key issue for the jury to determine will be whether
D’Agostino used excessive force in handcuffing Channing.

In other

words, did the manner in which D’Agostino applied the handcuffs
unreasonably expose Channing to a risk of serious injury? Clearly,
the

mechanisms,

risks,

and

proper
5

procedures

involved

with

handcuffs fall outside the ken of the average juror.

Thus,

Rivera’s technical knowledge in this area would assist the jury in
determining multiple facts at issue.
Moreover, the opinions contained in Rivera’s report are based
on reliable principles and methods derived from handcuff-related
literature - including manuals, books, and standards from the
National Institute of Justice – and Mr. Rivera’s substantial
experience in the field of policing.
7 & nn.7-14.

See Rivera Suppl. Report 6-

For the most part, the Court concludes that Rivera’s

handcuff-related

opinions

stem

from

the

application

of

these

reliable principles to sufficient facts and data.
However,
conclusion

there

that

is

one

“[t]here

exception:

exists

a

Rivera’s

causal

link

ultimate

between

the

misapplication of handcuffs and harms suffered by Mr. Channing.”
Id. at 3.

There is no direct evidence (besides D’Agostino’s

testimony that he followed standard procedures) regarding the
exact manner in which the handcuffs were applied.

Thus, Rivera’s

opinion as to the techniques utilized by D’Agostino is necessarily
based on inference. Despite the complexity of reconstructing these
events based on spotty evidence, Rivera’s report does not reveal
that his inferential leap is based on reliable principles or
methods (e.g., studies or personal experiences with large numbers
of

handcuffing

incidents,

with

varying

techniques,

and

the

injuries or lack thereof that resulted from those respective
6

techniques).
reliable

Accordingly, Rivera’s ultimate conclusion lacks a

factual

Nonetheless,

with

basis,
this

a

reliable

principle,

or

both.

one

important

exception,

the

Court

concludes that Rivera’s report is properly considered. 3,4
B.

Excessive Force

Defendants

argue

that

Channing

has

failed

to

D’Agostino utilized excessive force during the arrest.
Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 7-12.
D’Agostino

is

protected

by

show

that

See Mem.

Defendants further contend that

qualified

immunity

because

any

constitutional right that may have been violated was not clearly
established.

Id. at 12-15.

To determine whether D’Agostino is shielded by qualified
immunity, the Court applies the familiar two-prong analysis.

See

Mitchell v. Miller, 790 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cr. 2015) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).

Channing must show (1) that D’Agostino

violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly
established.

See id.

These related questions “need not be

Defendants do not argue that Rivera’s opinions regarding
the broader policies and practices of the South Kingstown Police
Department fail to vault the Daubert bar.
See Mem. Supp. Mot.
Summ. J. 11. For the reasons set forth below, however, Plaintiff’s
policy and practice claims do not survive summary judgment, so the
Court need not address this issue.
3

During oral argument on September 9, 2020, Defendants made
an Oral Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order denying
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert Witness, ECF No.
21. For the reasons stated, the Oral Motion for Reconsideration
is granted in part and denied in part.
4

7

considered in any particular order . . . .”

Raiche v. Pietroski,

623 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2010).
For a claim of excessive force via handcuffing, “a plaintiff
must establish that the defendant’s actions in handcuffing [the
plaintiff]

were

objectively

unreasonable

in

light

of

the

circumstances and the facts known to the officer at the time.”
Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 428 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).

The reasonableness

of the officer’s actions is “viewed from the perspective of a
prototypical

officer

circumstances.”
inquiry

must

confronted

with

the

same

or

similar

Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

respect

the

fact

that

“the

right

to

This

make

an

arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
In Calvi, the plaintiff – who had reportedly brandished a
knife just before the officers’ arrival - claimed that the police
officer should have handcuffed her hands in front of her (instead
of behind her back) because she had a hand deformity.
F.3d at 428.

See 470

The First Circuit held that the officer did not use

unconstitutional force because “[s]tandard police practice called
for cuffing an arrestee’s hands behind her back and [the officer’s]
decision not to deviate from this practice was a judgment call,
pure and simple.”

Id.

Based on that holding, this Court concludes
8

that where an officer unreasonably deviates from standard police
handcuffing

protocols

designed

to

protect

arrestees,

and

the

deviation causes physical injury, the officer has violated a
clearly

established

Fourth

Amendment

right

to

be

free

from

excessive force. 5
Here, D’Agostino testified that he handcuffed Channing’s arms
behind his back, checked for tightness, and double locked the
cuffs, as he had been trained to do.
66-70, ECF No. 23-4.

SUF ¶ 29-30; D’Agostino Dep.

Although Channing has no direct evidence to

the contrary (which is unsurprising given that the main event

Cf. Fernandez-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha, 790 F.3d 312,
327 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that arrest did not constitute
constitutional violation, in part because there was “no evidence
in the record that [the officer's handcuffing] technique deviated
from standard police practice” (citing Calvi 470 F.3d at 428));
Hunt v. Massi, 773 F.3d 361, 370 (1st Cir. 2014) (“In this circuit,
the controlling case is [Calvi,] in which we found no
constitutional violation when officers handcuffed an allegedly
injured arrestee according to standard police practice.”); Cardoso
v. City of Brockton, CIV.A. 12-10892-DJC, 2014 WL 6698618, at *15
(D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2014) (stating that no excessive force was
demonstrated where, inter alia, there was “no evidence that
plaintiff injured his wrist”); see also Aceto v. Kachajian, 240 F.
Supp. 2d 121, 126–27 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding to be clearly
established “that when a non-threatening, non-flight-risk,
cooperating arrestee for a minor crime tells the police she suffers
from an injury that would be exacerbated by handcuffing her arms
behind her back, the arrestee has a right to be handcuffed with
her arms in front of her even if the injury is not visible”);
McPherson v. Auger, 842 F. Supp. 25, 30 (D. Me. 1994) (“If a jury
believes Plaintiff's version of events, it could determine that
Defendant handcuffed Plaintiff’s wrists too tightly and then
refused to loosen the handcuffs despite verbal complaints and
crying and that an objectively reasonable officer would not view
such use of force as necessary.”).
5

9

occurred behind his back), he testified at his deposition that the
handcuffing cause immediate pain, that he jumped in response, and
that D’Agostino applied greater force in response.

SDF ¶ 29.

After being placed in a police vehicle, Channing “remember[s] . . .
[the police officers] saying something like that didn’t go well.”
Id. ¶ 45.

Moreover, Channing avers that he suffered numbness and

pain following the arrest, and that some symptoms have lingered
despite medical treatment.

Id. ¶ 29.

Thus, a reasonable jury

could conclude based on circumstantial evidence that D’Agostino’s
application of the handcuffs caused Channing’s injuries.
Additionally, Rivera opines that, absent resistance from an
arrestee, handcuffs should not cause injury if the officer properly
applies the handcuffs and conforms with standard protocols.
Rivera Suppl. Report 9-10.

See

Rivera further opines that Channing’s

wrist injuries, as documented in photographs, are consistent with
injuries caused by handcuffs.
when

combined

with

Id. at 10.

Channing’s

testimony

These expert opinions,
suggesting

a

causal

relationship between the handcuffing and his injuries, could lead
a reasonable jury could conclude that D’Agostino deviated from
standard handcuffing protocols, injuring Channing in the process.
Of course, certain departures from standard protocol, even
ones that place the arrestee at risk of injury, can be justified
based on the behavior of the arrestee and other dangers to the
officers or bystanders.

See O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, 943
10

F.3d 514, 531 (1st Cir. 2019) (“Application of the reasonableness
test ‘requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396)); Lucas v. City of Boston, CIVA 07-CV-10979-DPW, 2009 WL
1844288, at *22 (D. Mass. June 19, 2009) (denying defendants’
motion

for

summary

handcuffing,

judgment

on

distinguishing

claim

cases

of

such

excessive

as

Calvi

force
where

in
the

arrestees “posed ongoing threats to the officers,” and noting that
defendants

“acknowledge[d]

threat).

Here,

though,

that

[plaintiff]

D’Agostino

did

testified

not”
that

pose

a

Channing

followed his instructions and the handcuffing occurred “without
any stress.”

SUF ¶¶ 28, 31.

As such, D’Agostino’s defense is not

that greater-than-usual force was justified by the circumstances;
rather, he contends that greater-than-usual force did not occur.
See Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 9-10.
Therefore,

a

reasonable

jury

could

conclude

that

the

deviation from standard handcuffing techniques was unreasonable
and constituted a violation of Channing’s clearly established
constitutional rights.

See Calvi, 470 F.3d at 428; see also

Bastien v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that
“the severity of the injury” is relevant to the question whether
11

an officer’s actions constituted excessive force (citing Dean v.
City of Worcester, 924 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 1991)); id. at 16
(reversing judgment for defendant officer because, if properly
instructed,
painful

jury

could

handcuffing,

have

which

found
had

that

plaintiff’s

lingering

physical

“lengthy,
effects,

amounted to unreasonable force in the particular circumstances”).
In sum, the Court concludes that there are genuine disputes
as to the material facts of the excessive force claim such that
judgment cannot enter as a matter of law.

See Bastien v. Goddard,

279 F.3d 10, 12 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting factual dispute
regarding whether officer checked to make sure handcuffs were not
too tight).
C.

Vespia, Houghton, and Gillen

Channing also claims that Houghton and Gillen are liable
because of their presence during the arrest.
No. 1-2; Pl.’s Opp’n 12.

See Compl. ¶ 18, ECF

However, Channing offers no evidence

that either officer participated in or contributed to the allegedly
unconstitutional handcuffing.

See SDF ¶¶ 29-31.

Thus, neither is

liable for directly contributing to the alleged misconduct.
Calvi

v.

Knox

County,

470

F.3d

422,

428

(1st

Cir.

See
2006)

(“[Officer’s] mere presence at the scene, without more, does not
by some mysterious alchemy render him legally responsible under
section 1983 for the actions of a fellow officer.”).

12

Furthermore, Channing alleges that Defendant Vincent Vespia,
Jr., the former Chief of Police, and Houghton are subject to
supervisory liability.
where

(1)

the

“[A] supervisor may only be held liable

behavior

of

[his]

subordinates

results

in

a

constitutional violation and (2) the [supervisor’s] action or
inaction was affirmatively link[ed] to the behavior in the sense
that

it

could

be

characterized

as

supervisory

encouragement,

condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence . . . amounting to
deliberate indifference.”

Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d

1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation omitted).

Although

Channing has presented evidence of a purported department-wide
policy

or

practice

that

led

to

his

alleged

physical

and

constitutional injuries, he has presented no evidence showing an
affirmative link with Vespia or Houghton specifically.

In fact,

Vespia’s name does not appear a single time in either the Statement
of Undisputed Facts or the Statement of Disputed Facts. The single
reference to Houghton merely states that he “arrived on scene as
D’Agostino approached the car.”

SUF ¶ 9.

Accordingly, judgment must enter for Vespia, Houghton, and
Gillen on all counts.
D.

Personal Injury and Respondeat Superior Claims

Channing

also

“Personal Injury.”

pleads

a

count

of

negligence,

labeled

as

“[A] plaintiff may not advance claims of

excessive force and negligence predicated on identical facts.
13

Rather, to maintain claims of both negligence and excessive force,
a plaintiff must allege at least one fact that is distinct in one
claim from the other.”

Mucci v. Town of N. Providence ex rel.

Vallee, 815 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548 (D.R.I. 2011) (citations omitted).
Here, Channing’s negligence claim is based on facts identical to
his excessive force claim, and judgment therefore enters for
Defendants on Count II (“Personal Injury”).
In Count III, Channing claims liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.

As pled, the negligence claim is the only

foundation upon which a respondeat superior claim could possibly
be built.
769

(1st

See Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 756,
Cir.

2010)

(explaining

that

respondeat

superior

is

inapplicable to constitutional claims under § 1983 (citing Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).

Thus, judgment

must also enter for Defendants on Count III.
E.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Count VI, Channing alleges that Defendants are liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Compl. ¶¶ 45-47.

Under this theory of liability, Channing must show that Defendants
acted

in

an

extreme

and

outrageous

manner,

intentionally

or

recklessly causing emotional distress, and that the distress was
severe.

Shannahan v. Moreau, 202 A.3d 217, 230 (R.I. 2019).

At

bottom, Channing’s claim is that D’Agostino improperly handcuffed
him.

This claim (and the evidence submitted in support) fails to
14

paint a picture of outrageousness.

Thus, judgment must enter for

Defendants on Count VI.
F.

Municipal Liability

In Count IV, Channing alleges that South Kingstown and its
police department, by and through Vespia and Houghton, negligently
failed to “hire, retain, train and/or supervise its police officers
in the proper use of force and handcuffs[.]”

Compl. ¶ 31.

Relatedly, in Count V, Channing alleges that Vespia and Houghton
bear supervisory liability based on actions and/or inactions that
allegedly caused his injuries.

Id. ¶¶ 38-42.

In their Motion for

Summary Judgment, Defendants generously interpret these two counts
to allege, in conjunction, a claim of municipal liability under
§ 1983 based on South Kingstown’s failure to train its police
officers regarding proper handcuffing techniques.

Channing adopts

this framing as well, see Pl.’s Opp’n 12-17, so the Court will
follow suit. 6

Defendants also argue that because the claims for municipal
liability are premised on the allegation that Defendants “deprived
[him] of his right to be free from unreasonable seizure secured by
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,” Channing’s municipal claims
are premised on a non-existent claim that Defendants lacked
probable cause to arrest him.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 19-20
(quoting Compl. ¶ 41). However, Channing’s excessive force is a
claim that D’Agostino effected the seizure in an unreasonable
manner. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Thus, it
is clear to the Court that Channing’s municipal claims are premised
on the excessive force claim, not a claim of lack of probable
cause.
6

15

A

municipality

bears

liability

under

§

1983

for

the

constitutional torts committed by its employees “only when the
governmental employees’ ‘execution of a government's policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury’ and is the ‘moving force’ behind
the constitutional violation.”
rel.

Napolitano,

404

F.3d

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

Young v. City of Providence ex

4,

25

(1st

Cir.

2005)

(quoting

Furthermore, “a claim of failure to

train requires a showing that municipal decisionmakers either knew
or should have known that training was inadequate but nonetheless
exhibited deliberate indifference to the unconstitutional effects
of those inadequacies.”

Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 14 (1st

Cir. 2019) (quoting Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 52 (1st
Cir.

2011)).

“[W]hen

city

policymakers

are

on

actual

or

constructive notice that a particular omission in their training
program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the
policymakers choose to retain that program.”

Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation omitted).
“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees

is

indifference

ordinarily
for

purposes

necessary
of

to

failure

demonstrate
to

train.”

deliberate
Id.

at

62

(citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the Supreme Court
has left open a narrow window for single-incident claims, stating
that “evidence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied
16

by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees
to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for
such a violation, could trigger municipal liability.”

Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)
(citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 & n.10
(1989)).

“The Court sought not to foreclose the possibility,

however rare, that the unconstitutional consequences of failing to
train could be so patently obvious that a city could be liable
under

§

1983

violations.”

without

proof

of

a

pre-existing

pattern

of

Connick, 563 U.S. at 64.

In general, single-incident liability for failure to train
attaches only where the municipality does not provide any training
on the topic at issue.

See, e.g., Shadrick v. Hopkins Cty., Ky.,

805 F.3d 724, 740 (6th Cir. 2015) (denying defendants’ motion for
summary judgment where defendant “did not have a training program”
to

guide

nurses

at

detention

center

in

treating

inmates

and

avoiding constitutional violations); Thomas v. Cumberland Cty.,
749 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2014) (vacating grant of defendant’s
motion for summary judgment where prison with frequent fights among
inmates failed to provide de-escalation and intervention training
to correctional officers); Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F.
Supp. 3d 925, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that successful singleincident claims “generally involve incidents arising from a total
lack of training, not simply an assertion that a municipal employee
17

was

not

trained

about

‘the

specific

scenario

related

to

the

violation’” (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 67)); Jenkins v. Woody,
3:15CV355, 2017 WL 342062, at *17 (E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2017) (denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment where “subordinates did
not receive any training

on

the

particular

issue

at

stake”

(emphasis omitted)).
Conversely, where a municipality trains its employees on the
topic at issue, single-incident liability generally cannot be
established, even if the plaintiff asserts that more training was
necessary,

because

it

is

not

“patently

constitutional violation would result.

obvious”

that

the

See, e.g., Connick, 563

U.S. at 64, 67 (affirming summary judgment for defendants, despite
evidence

that

employees

“were

not

trained

about

particular

[applications of the constitutional rule] or the specific scenario
related to the violation in [plaintiff’s] case[,]” because “[t]hat
sort of nuance simply cannot support an inference of deliberate
indifference”); Leibel v. City of Buckeye, CV-18-01743-PHX-DWL,
2020 WL 516671, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2020) (dismissing claim
that city failed to sufficiently train officers regarding autism
where “the City provided crisis intervention training to its
officers
touch[ed]

and
upon

separately
autism

provided

specifically”

additional
(citation

materials
and

that

quotations

omitted)); Serna v. City of Bakersfield, 117CV01290LJOJLT, 2019 WL
2164631, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2019) (granting summary judgment
18

where “Plaintiffs d[id] not argue that [the municipality] utterly
failed to train [the officer] on how to interact with individuals
with dementia, but instead rest[ed] their argument on a failure to
do ‘post-academy’ training”).
Here,

Channing

sufficiently

train

alleges
its

that

police

the

municipality

officers

regarding

failed

to

handcuffing

techniques, and that this deficiency led to the application of
excessive force.

See Pl.’s Opp’n 12-14.

He does not, however,

point to any other instances of unconstitutional handcuffing by
South Kingstown police officers, thus leaving him with a singleincident theory of liability. 7

See id. at 12-17.

Importantly,

there is undisputed evidence that D’Agostino received training
regarding

handcuffing

techniques

at

the

police

academy,

and

Channing does not point to any specific deficiencies in that
training.

See D’Agostino Dep. 23:24-24:13, ECF No. 23-4; Pl.’s

Opp’n 12-14.

Channing’s main contention is that D’Agostino should

have been given refresher courses to make sure that he maintained
his skill and knowledge of safe handcuffing protocols. Pl.’s Opp’n
14.

However, without a pattern of previous violations, the lack

Based on a review of records from the South Kingstown Police
Department, Rivera states that twenty-three use-of-force incidents
between 2009 and 2017 South Kingstown “were the result of officers
attempting to handcuff individuals.”
Rivera Suppl. Report 20.
However, there is no evidence that any of these incidents involved
excessive force or any other constitutional violations. See id.
7

19

of periodic trainings does not evince deliberate indifference on
the part of municipal policymakers.

Accordingly, judgment enters

for Defendants on Counts IV and V. 8
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, ECF No. 23, is DENIED as to the claim of excessive force
as pled against Defendant John T. D’Agostino and GRANTED in all
other respects.
Motion

for

Additionally, Defendants’ September 9, 2020 Oral

Reconsideration

of

the

Court’s

Order

denying

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert Witness is GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: June 21, 2021

Rivera’s report also delves into purported deficiencies in
the department’s documentation of uses of force and the reviews
and investigations of those reports conducted by supervisors.
Specifically, he opines that the two-page use-of-force form used
by the police is insufficiently detailed, and that the department’s
yearly analysis of use-of-force trends is too infrequent. Rivera
Suppl. Report 16-18. Channing’s papers do not make clear whether
he is arguing that these policies and practices form a separate
basis of liability. See Pl.’s Opp’n 16-17. Nevertheless, these
practices are too distant from the operative facts at bar to
qualify as the moving force behind the manner in which Channing
was handcuffed.
8

20