Haptonstahal v. Pawtucket Police Department

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss; denying 11 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 14 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 16 Motion for Discovery. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 11/1/2018. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
______________________________________________

)

LUANDA HAPTONSTAHAL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
PAWTUCKET POLICE DEPARTMENT,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)

C.A. No. 18-184 WES

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
This case is before the Court on a motion from defendant
Pawtucket Police Department to dismiss (ECF No. 5) the complaint
(ECF No. 1) filed by plaintiff Luanda Haptonstahal. The Court GRANTS
the motion for the following reasons.
I.

Background
Haptonstahal’s

complaint

consists

of

33

handwritten

containing 103 paragraphs, some of which are illegible.
portion centers around three incidents.

pages

The legible

The first is an incident in

May 2017 involving Pawtucket officers asking Haptonstahal to lower
the volume on her television.

(Compl. ¶ 4.)

When she failed to

comply, the officers wrote her two citations, and then allegedly
loitered on her porch.

(Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 8.)

The second incident occurred in June 2017 when a Pawtucket
officer arrested Haptonstahal and held her in a hospital for nine
days.

(Id. ¶ 62.)

Haptonstahal alleges that “Officer Duffy had his

team raid her home” (id. ¶ 63); that the officers deliberately left
her pets in the home to die (id. ¶ 64); and that a female officer
“molested” her by “squeezing her braless breasts too hard” (id. ¶
65).

Also as part of this incident, Haptonstahal alleges that

“Pawtucket Prosecutors . . . in Providence District Court brain
washed the justice to demand that she have mental evaluation against
her will” (id. ¶ 52, 62), and that if not for Officer Duffy forcing
her to be held for nine days, his conspiracy to break into her home
would not have succeeded (id. ¶ 80).
The third constellation of events involved the police knocking
on

her

door

at

various

points

in

January

2018.

(Id.

¶

24.)

Haptonstahal never opened the door for the police, but heard from
her attorney that the officers were there because she had made too
many calls to the police.
II.

(Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 29.)

Discussion
The complaint purportedly contains fifteen counts. 1

1.)

(ECF No.

Since filing the complaint, Haptonstahal has thrice moved to

amend. 2 (ECF Nos. 11, 14, 16.)

Pawtucket moves to dismiss, primarily

1

The Court treats the intelligible of these below, renumbering
them when necessary to aid understanding. Any other purported claim
is dismissed as either “[1] so poorly composed as to be functionally
illegible . . . [or 2] so baldly conclusory that it fails to give
notice of the basic events and circumstances of which the plaintiff
complains.” Shuster v. Oppelman, 962 F. Supp. 394, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
2

The proposed amendments are DENIED as futile; none adds enough
to the initial complaint to state a claim.
See Glassman v.
Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that
2

because

the

illegibility

complaint

is

of

Defendant

what

“largely

indecipherable

presumes

to

the

Plaintiff’s

is

due

own

handwriting.” (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 5-1.)
The Court has deciphered enough of the complaint – both the facts
stated above and the legal claims addressed below – to say it fails
to state a plausible claim.

See Damon v. Moore, 520 F.3d 98, 103

(1st Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)).
A.

Count I:

Haptonstahal

Sexual Assault, Willful Trespass, and Stalking
brings

claims

for

sexual

assault,

willful

trespass, and stalking, but identifies no statutory basis for a
private right of action under the alleged criminal statutes.

See

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79–80 (1975) (holding no private action
under

criminal

statutes

absent

clear

statutory

basis

for

such

inference); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619,
(1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest
in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). Therefore, these
claims fail.
B.

Count II:

Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) states that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

a motion to amend may be denied as futile if “the complaint, as
amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted”). Consequently, the Court’s discussion is of Pawtucket’s
motion to dismiss the initial, operative complaint.
3

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
12132.

42 U.S.C. §

A qualified individual under the ADA is “an individual with

a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication,
or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
services,

meets

the

essential

eligibility

requirements

for

the

receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12131.

Here, Haptonstahal has not alleged facts, taken as true, that
would make her a qualified individual.

Indeed, Haptonstahal claims

(See Compl. ¶ 83.)

she does not have a disability.

She has not

stated an ADA claim.
C.

Count III:

Deprivation of Right to Privacy

There exists in Rhode Island a statutory right to privacy in
four areas:

one’s physical solitude, “appropriation of one’s name

or likeness,” unreasonable publicity of one’s private life, and
“publicity that reasonably places another in a false light before
the public.”

See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1; Lamarque v. Centreville

Sav. Bank, 22 A.3d 1136, 1140 (R.I. 2011).
The complaint contains no facts pertaining to any of these four;
this claim fails.

4

D.

Count IV:

Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights

Haptonstahal attempts a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985.
do

so

successfully,

she

“must

allege

the

existence

of

(1)

To
a

conspiracy, (2) a conspiratorial purpose to deprive a person or class
of persons, directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of the
laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) either (a) an
injury

to

person

constitutionally

or

property,

protected

right

or
or

(b)

a

deprivation

privilege.”

of

Aulson

a
v.

Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
Here, instead of pleading any facts pertaining to the above
elements, Haptonstahal has relied on mere conclusory and unsupported
allegations, which are not sufficient.

See Perry v. Gold & Laine,

P.C., 371 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D.N.J. 2005).
E.

Count V:

Violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42
U.S.C. Section 1993

Haptonstahal brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1993, but
this statute was repealed in 1957.
122, 71 Stat. 637. (1957).

See Pub. L. 85-315, Pt. III, §

So the Court will regard this count as

a Section 1983 claim in which Haptonstahal alleges she was deprived
of her Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 grants individuals the

right to sue those acting “under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia . . . [for] the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
5

42

U.S.C.

§

1983.

To

prevail,

a

plaintiff

must

show

that

“the

challenged conduct [is] attributable to a person acting under color
of state law" and that “the conduct . . . worked a denial of rights
secured by the Constitution or by federal law.”

Soto v. Flores, 103

F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997).
Here,

not

only

are

Haptonstahal’s

conclusory

accusations

unsupported by facts, her claims are misguided because “liability
can be imposed on a local government only where that government's
policy or custom is responsible for causing the constitutional
violation or injury.”

See Kelley v. Laforce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st

Cir. 2002) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690–91

(1978)).

And

she

has

not

alleged

that

her

purported

constitutional injuries were the result of the Pawtucket Police
Department’s policy or custom.
F.

Count VI:

Defamation

For a defamation plaintiff to prevail under Rhode Island law,
“she must prove the following elements:

(1) a false and defamatory

statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged communication to
a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and (4)
damages.”

Trainor v. The Standard Times, 924 A.2d 766, 769 (R.I.

2007) (citing Mills v. C.H.I.L.D., Inc., 837 A.2d 714, 720 (R.I.
2003)).
Haptonstahal has accused police officers of calling her crazy,
and informing her neighbors that she is crazy.
6

(Compl. ¶ 82.)

Haptonstahal claims her reputation in the community has been harmed,
and her desire to write poetry diminished.
pursuant

to

the

public-duty

doctrine,

(Id. ¶¶ 83, 90.)

Rhode

Island

But

government

entities are – subject to exceptions not applicable here – shielded
from tort liability when engaged in activities which “could not and
would not in the ordinary course of events be performed by a private
person at all.”

O’Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334, 336–37 (R.I. 1989);

see also Gray v. Derderian, 400 F. Supp. 2d 415, 427 (D.R.I. 2005).
Such activities include “the exercise of the police power through
officers authorized and empowered by the state to perform a police
function.”

O’Brien,

555

A.2d

at

337.

Because

Haptonstahal’s

allegations concern the behavior of police officers while performing
a police function, her tort claim is barred by Rhode Island’s publicduty doctrine.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, Pawtucket’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 5) is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: November 1, 2018

7