Richardson v. City of Providence et al
Filing
18
ORDER granting Defendant State of Rhode Island's 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and dismissing Plaintiff's claims as against the State with prejudice. So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 10/30/2018. (Jackson, Ryan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
______________________________
)
WILBERT L. RICHARDSON,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
C.A. No. 18-253
)
CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and
)
through its treasurer, James )
J. Lombardi, III, alias;
)
EMILIO MATOS, alias, in his
)
individual and official
)
capacity as a Providence
)
Police officer; the STATE OF )
RHODE ISLAND; and JOHN DOES
)
1-10, individually and in
)
their official capacities,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)
ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant State of Rhode Island’s Motion to
Dismiss
and
for
Judgment
(“State’s Motion”).
Pursuant
to
Rule
54(b)
(ECF
No.
12)
Plaintiff opposed that Motion (ECF No. 15) and
the State filed a Reply (ECF No. 17).
For the reasons stated herein,
the State’s Motion is granted.
I.
Factual Background
This case arises out of the 2013 arrest and indictment of
Plaintiff due to his suspected involvement in a deadly home-invasion
robbery.
Plaintiff claims that he was arrested despite the fact
1
that he did not match the description of the perpetrator and that
the complaining witness was not credible. (Compl. ¶¶ 29-30, 37-38,
ECF No. 1.)
After his arrest on October 10, 2013, Providence Police
officers executed a search warrant on Plaintiff’s home, during which
Plaintiff alleges they “found no evidence of any kind connecting
[him] to the home invasion.” (Id. ¶¶ 56-57.) Additionally, Defendant
Matos allegedly made comments to Plaintiff’s wife throughout the
investigation indicating that he believed Plaintiff was innocent.
(Id. ¶ 62.)
Plaintiff
was
held
at
the
Adult
Correctional
Institution
(“ACI”) for approximately ten months before he received a bail
hearing on July 7, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44, 71.) At the conclusion of
the bail hearing, Plaintiff was ordered to be released to community
confinement.
He was not ultimately released, however, because, the
next day, the Attorney General filed an indictment against Plaintiff
for various crimes related to the home-invasion robbery. (Id. ¶¶ 71,
76.)
Shortly thereafter, on July 23, 2014, Plaintiff was released
to home confinement, where he remained until May 11, 2015, when the
charges against him were dismissed.
(Id. ¶¶ 78-79, 84.)
On May 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint alleging
three counts of malicious prosecution against all Defendants arising
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rhode Island Constitution, and Rhode
Island common law.
The Complaint alleges that Defendants continued
to detain Plaintiff and investigate his involvement in the home-
2
invasion robbery despite their “actual and constructive knowledge .
. . that there was no probable cause to connect [Plaintiff] to this
crime.” (Id. ¶ 82.)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive
damages and attorneys’ fees, a declaratory judgment that Defendants
violated his constitutional rights, and injunctive relief requiring
the “City and State to properly train, supervise, and discipline
their agents relative to the a) constitutionally protected rights of
individuals . . . b) the duty to continue to investigate where a
purported eye witness identification lacks credibility; and, c) the
duty to cease continued detention and prosecution” in the absence of
probable cause. (Id. at 17.)
Defendant State of Rhode Island (“the
State”) moved to dismiss the Complaint, alleging that it is not a
“person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that it is
entitled
to
absolute
prosecutorial
immunity
for
all
remaining
counts.
II.
Applicable Law
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept the
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing factual allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,
589 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2009).
dismiss,
a
complaint
must
However, “[t]o survive a motion to
contain
sufficient
factual
matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’ . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
3
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007)). Accordingly, in judging
the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must “differentiate between
well-pleaded
unsupportable
facts,
on
the
conclusions,
one
hand,
periphrastic
and
bald
assertions,
circumlocution,
and
the
like, on the other hand; the former must be credited, but the latter
can safely be ignored.” LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d
507, 508 (1st Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted).
III. Arguments
The State argues that the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for three
reasons.
First, the State is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and therefore cannot be sued under that statute. (See State’s Motion
6.)
Second, “Plaintiff’s claim against the State is based solely on
the alleged actions taken by the Department of the Attorney General
while functioning as a prosecutor; such a claim cannot proceed
because of absolute prosecutorial immunity.” (Id. at 1.)
“the
principles
[absolute
of
prosecutorial
prosecutorial]
immunity,
independence
coupled
with
And third,
which
support
sensitivity
to
separation of powers concerns and the reluctance of the federal
courts to interfere with state criminal process, counsel against any
injunctive relief in these circumstances.” (Id. at 10-11 (quoting
Harrington v Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1992).)
4
The State also
asks that judgment enter in its favor pursuant to Rule 54(b), which
provides that “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to
one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Plaintiff concedes that the State cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and that Count I must therefore be dismissed as against the
State.
Supreme
As to Counts II and III, he contends that the Rhode Island
Court
has
not
yet
“squarely
determined”
whether
prosecutorial immunity protects the State from “damages under the
State Constitution or common law for malicious prosecution.” (Pl.’s
Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n 10, ECF No. 15-1.)
In support of this point,
he argues that the Rhode Island General Assembly clearly intended to
extinguish prosecutorial immunity when it enacted the Governmental
Tort
Liability
Act,
R.I.
Gen.
Laws
§
9-31-1,
et
seq.,
which
eradicated sovereign immunity. (Id. at 11.)
Alternatively, Plaintiff contends that, even if the State is
entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, such immunity would
apply “only narrowly to actual prosecutorial functions” and not to
the investigative actions prior to Plaintiff’s indictment on July 8,
2014. (Id. at 15, 17.)
He also contends that the non-prosecutorial
actions of the John Doe defendants and of Defendant Matos “may be
imputed to the State” and that prosecutorial immunity would not
extend to those actors. (Id. at 17.)
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that
a Rule 54(b) judgment is inappropriate here because “there is simply
no special or compelling reason to enter the rare and disfavored
Rule 54(b) certification.” (Id. at 21.)
IV.
Analysis
A. Viability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the State
The parties agree that the State cannot be liable for damages
or injunctive relief in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 because the State is not considered a “person” under that
statute. (See State’s Motion 5-6; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n 10.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the State must be
dismissed.
See 42 U.S.C. §1983; Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”);
Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991) (“It is
settled beyond peradventure . . . that neither a state agency nor a
state official acting in his official capacity may be sued for
damages in a section 1983 action.”); Nicolas v. Rhode Island, 160 F.
Supp. 2d 229, 232 (D.R.I. 2001), aff’d, 37 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“[A] § 1983 suit can not be brought against a state for monetary
damages or for injunctive relief since a state is not considered a
‘person’ as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, plaintiff
cannot maintain a suit directly against the state.”) (citations
omitted).
6
B. Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Rhode Island
Constitution and common law.
Despite Plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary, the Rhode
Island
Supreme
determined”
Attorney
that
General
Court
has,
absolute
from
on
numerous
prosecutorial
having
to
occasions,
immunity
litigate
claims
“squarely
protects
of
the
malicious
prosecution that arise under the state Constitution and common law.
(Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n 10.); see Mall at Coventry Joint
Venture v. McLeod, 721 A.2d 865, 870 (R.I. 1998); Calhoun v. City of
Providence, 390 A.2d 350, 356-57 (R.I. 1978); Suitor v. Nugent, 199
A.2d 722, 724 (1964).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for malicious
prosecution arising under the Rhode Island Constitution and common
law are barred by the application of absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Such immunity protects the Attorney General from prosecution both as
an individual and as an entity. See Calhoun, 390 A.2d at 356 (“While
immunizing
officials
from
personal
liability
is,
of
course,
a
separate concept from governmental immunity . . . even when the state
is the defendant, recovery should be denied the injured party.”).
This
is
true
both
for
his
damages
claims
and
his
claims
for
injunctive and declaratory relief. See Harrington, 977 F.2d at 42
(“[T]he absolute immunity prosecutors enjoy from all civil actions
arising out of their charging decisions bars any damages . . .
Moreover, respect for the principles of prosecutorial independence
which support such immunity, coupled with sensitivity to separation
of powers concerns and the reluctance of the federal courts to
7
interfere
with
state
criminal
process,
counsel
against
any
injunctive relief . . . .”).
C. The State’s Liability for Pre-Indictment
Prosecutors and Actions of Other Defendants
Actions
of
The only remaining issues are whether the State in this case
can be held liable for investigatory actions taken by prosecutors
before Plaintiff’s indictment on July 8, 2014, and whether the State
can be held liable for the non-prosecutorial actions of Defendant
Matos and the John Doe defendants. The Court finds that the Complaint
does not plead facts sufficient to support these allegations.1
First, the Complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that
any state prosecutors participated in this case prior to the bail
hearing on July 7, 2014.
In fact, the only facts in the Complaint
implicating state actors relate to Plaintiff’s detention at the ACI,
testimony elicited at the bail hearing, and the filing of the
indictment. (See Compl. ¶¶ 63-67, 69-72, 74-84.) Conducting the bail
hearing
and
prosecutorial
filing
the
functions”
indictment
entitled
are
to
unequivocally
absolute
“core
prosecutorial
immunity. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)
(“We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting
the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit . . .
.”).
While Plaintiff’s detention at the ACI does not constitute a
It is worth noting that the State identified deficiencies in
this part of Plaintiff’s argument in its Reply (ECF No. 17), filed
on August 14, 2018, and yet, in the intervening two months, Plaintiff
has not moved to amend his Complaint to cure these deficiencies.
1
8
core prosecutorial function, it is also largely irrelevant to his
claims of malicious prosecution. Except insofar as they clarify that
he
was
detained
while
the
allegedly
malicious
prosecution
was
ongoing, Plaintiff’s allegations about his detention at the ACI are
beside the point. As such, the only relevant facts pled against state
actors pertain to “core prosecutorial functions” that are entitled
to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Second, the Complaint alleges no facts to support Plaintiff’s
argument that the State may be liable for the actions of Defendant
Matos.
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant Matos “is also, for the
purposes of this case, an agent of the State to the extent to [which]
he was directed by and worked at the behest of the Attorney General’s
office” cannot withstand even them most cursory scrutiny under
Twombly and Iqbal. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n 17.)
At the outset,
Plaintiff concedes that Defendant Matos was “an employee of the City
of Providence, and obviously an agent of said City.” (Id.) Moreover,
the Complaint includes no facts, much less well-pleaded facts,
showing that Defendant Matos was “work[ing] at the behest of the
Attorney General’s office.” (Id.)
The only facts in the Complaint
that pertain to Defendant Matos mention his involvement in witness
interviews,
conversations
with
Plaintiff’s
wife,
and
one
brief
comment to Plaintiff after his arrest – actions clearly within the
purview of his duties as an investigating police officer. (See Compl.
¶¶ 27-29, 32-33, 36-37, 52-59, 61-62, 69-70.)
9
While it is entirely
possible that Defendant Matos was working at the behest of the
Attorney General at some point during the investigation, the mere
possibility is insufficient; Plaintiff must state a claim for relief
that is plausible.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
He has not done so
here.
Finally, the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot maintain an
action against the State based on unpled, unspecified actions of
unserved and unidentified John Doe Defendants; doing so would turn
the pleading standard on its head. Plaintiff includes only one
allegation specifically against the John Doe Defendants:
“On information and belief, Defendants John Does
1-10, including but not limited to Defendant
City and Defendant State policy-makers and
decision makers, individually and/or jointly
with other Defendants, proximately caused,
materially
participated
in,
and/or
were
otherwise responsible for the arrest, detention,
prosecution
and
continued
detention
and
prosecution of Plaintiff without probable cause
as complained herein.”
(Compl. ¶ 91.)
However, the Complaint includes no specific facts
explaining what actions “State policy-makers and decision makers”
may have taken that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional or common
law rights. (see id.) In essence, Plaintiff asks the Court to guess
at what the State (or its alleged agents) may or may not have done
that could serve as the basis for Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff
counters that he is not required to plead specific facts because,
“at
this
early
stage,
he
lacks
information
relative
to
the
investigatory process and the roles of the various Defendants – both
10
known and unknown – in that process.”2 (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n
19.) However, Plaintiff’s contention that he should be able to engage
in discovery prior to alleging a plausible claim for relief is
precisely the argument that turns the pleading standard on its head.
Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that the State’s might possibly be
liable for the non-prosecutorial actions of other defendants does
not pass muster under Twombly and Iqbal.
D. Rule 54(b) Judgment
Because
there
is
a
“strong
judicial
policy
disfavoring
piecemeal appellate review,” Kersey v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 3 F.3d
482, 487 (1st Cir. 1993), the First Circuit has established a twostep
process
for
assessing
whether
Rule
54(b)
judgment
is
appropriate: (1) the district court must consider whether judgment
will dispose of all the rights and liabilities of at least one party
as to at least one claim; and (2) the district court must carefully
compare
the
dismissed
claims
with
the
unadjudicated
claims
to
determine whether there is substantial overlap between the two that
Plaintiff also claims that “he has been denied access to the
grand jury transcripts and has not had the opportunity to engage in
any discovery whatsoever.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n 17.) Per
the State’s request, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that the State provided grand jury transcripts to Plaintiff during
his underlying criminal proceeding in Providence County Superior
Court on August 7, 2014. See Order at 1, State of R.I. v. Richardson,
P1-14-2088B (August 7, 2014).
2
11
would hamper the equities and efficiencies of appellate review.
See
Credit Francais Int’l, S.A. v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 706 (1st
Cir. 1996).
Here, the State’s Motion is based on legal arguments that are
unique to it and not applicable to the remaining defendants and, as
such,
dismissal
would
resolve
all
claims
against
the
State.
Additionally, while the claims against the State and the claims
against the other Defendants arise out of the same general set of
circumstances, there is nothing to indicate that the claims so
substantially overlap that entering judgment in favor of the State
would hamper the equities and efficiencies of appellate review of
any
other
claims.
Accordingly,
the
doctrine
of
absolute
prosecutorial immunity entitles the State to judgment as a matter of
law and the Court sees “no just reason for delay” in entering that
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the State’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 12) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims as against the State are
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
IS IT SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: October 30, 2018
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