Saccoccia v. USA

Filing 15

ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction - So Ordered by Chief Judge William E. Smith on 3/27/2019. (Urizandi, Nisshy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
_______________________________________
)
STEPHEN SACCOCCIA,
)
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
C.A. No. 18-266 WES
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
)
STATES; UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR
)
THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND; and
)
TREASURER OF THE UNITED STATES,
)
Defendants/Respondents. )
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before the Court is the United States of America, Attorney
General of the United States, United States Attorney for the
District of Rhode Island, and the Treasurer of the United States’
(collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), ECF No.
10, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS

the Motion.
I.

Background
In 1991, Steven A. Saccoccia (“Plaintiff”) was convicted of

conspiracy

under

the

Racketeer

Influenced

Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).

and

Corrupt

See generally

United States v. Saccoccia, 823 F. Supp. 994, 997 (D.R.I. 1993).
The Court sentenced him

to 660 years’ imprisonment and, pursuant

to

18

U.S.C.

§§

1963(a)(3),(m),

$136,344,231.86

to

the

United

ordered

States

him

to

government.

forfeit
Mot.

2.

Plaintiff remains incarcerated. Compl. ¶¶ 1,7, ECF No. 1.
In May 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking writs of
error coram nobis and audita querela, along with other relief,
alleging that for the past two decades the United States government
has seized “millions of dollars of assets from the Saccoccias and
their

family

members.”

Compl.

¶

10.

Following

Plaintiff’s

conviction, this Court issued a substitution forfeiture order
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) that resulted in the United States
seizing many of Plaintiff’s assets including his home, broker
accounts, and personal jewelry and other effects from a safety
deposit box.

Compl. ¶ 10.

Plaintiff urges the Court to declare

the continued seizure of his assets contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding in Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626
(2017).

Compl. ¶¶ 11-16.

Plaintiff further requests the Court

invalidate the forfeitures resulting from his 1991 RICO conviction
and order the return of his assets and seized property.

Id.

In

response, Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing
that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter and,
even assuming it may exercise jurisdiction, Plaintiff has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6).

2

Mot. 1; see

II.

Discussion
A.

Jurisdiction under the All Writs Act

A common law writ is only available under the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651, where necessary to “fill whatever interstices
exist in the post-conviction remedial scheme made available to
federal prisoners by way of [28 U.S.C. §] 2255.”

Trenkler v.

United States, 536 F.3d 85, 97 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing United
States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

In other

words, if a claim may be properly brought under § 2255, it cannot
stand as a petition for a common law writ under the All Writs Act.
Id.
Here, Defendants cast Plaintiff’s Complaint as a thinlyveiled motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed as an endrun around the First Circuit’s prior ruling denying Plaintiff leave
to file a second or successive motion to vacate based on Honeycutt.
See Judgment, Saccoccia v. United States, No. 18-1172, slip op. at
1 (1st Cir. Mar. 29, 2018); see also Mot. 1-2.

Plaintiff counters

that his request for relief does not fall within the purview of a
motion to vacate because he challenges the non-custodial portion
of his sentence.

See Compl. ¶ 4.

The First Circuit has held that a defendant may not challenge
the restitution portion of his sentence under § 2255 because he
“is not claiming the right to be released from custody as required
by § 2255.”

Bartelho v. United States, No. 15-1988, 2016 WL
3

9584199, at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 8, 2016) (citing Smullen v. United
States, 94 F.3d 20, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1996)). 1

For this same reason,

the Court concludes the First Circuit would hold that a defendant
may not file a motion under § 2255 to mount a collateral attack
against a forfeiture order.

See, e.g., United States v. Fabian,

798 F. Supp. 2d 647, 684–85 (D. Md. 2011) (“Following the lead of
the courts cited above, the court concludes that a noncustodial
component of a sentence, such as a restitution or forfeiture order,
cannot be attacked in a § 2255 petition.”). Accordingly, the Court
will not recast this Complaint as a motion under § 2255 and
declines to dismiss the suit for failure to seek leave from the
First Circuit to file a second or successive motion under § 2255.

1

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) states:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject
to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
(Emphasis added.)
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B.

Writ of Error Coram Nobis

Even without recharacterizing the Complaint as a motion under
§ 2255, Plaintiff’s claim for coram nobis relief, Compl. ¶¶ 2233, fails on its own merits.
A court may grant relief under the writ of error coram nobis
only where a plaintiff “explain[s] his failure to seek earlier
relief from the judgment, show[s] that he continues to suffer
significant

collateral

consequences

from

the

judgment,

and

demonstrate[s] that the judgment resulted from an error of the
most fundamental character.”

United States v. George, 676 F.3d

249, 254 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Barrett, 178
F.3d 34, 56 n.20 (1st Cir. 1999)).

Moreover, “it is not enough

for a coram nobis petitioner to show that he can satisfy the
elements of the tripartite test:

he must also show that justice

demands the extraordinary balm of coram nobis relief.” Id. (citing
Hager v. United States, 993 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1993)).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that his criminal forfeiture
judgment

resulted

character.”

Id.

from

at 254.

an

“error

of

the

most

fundamental

Even if the Court’s ruling in Honeycutt

were to apply retroactively, a proposition this Court takes no
position on, courts have held that alleged errors in restitution
orders, criminal fines, and forfeiture orders are not “fundamental
to the underlying convictions.” United States v. Iacaboni, 592 F.
Supp. 2d 216, 221 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing United States v. Sloan,
5

505 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Keane, 852
F.2d 199, 204 (7th Cir. 1988); Lowery v. United States, 956 F.2d
227, 229 (11th Cir. 1992)).

Therefore, because Plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate that the Court’s ruling in Honeycutt impacts
the “fundamental character” of his 1991 conviction, he has not
succeeded in stating a plausible claim for coram nobis relief.
C.

Writ of audita querela

Plaintiff’s claim for relief under the writ of audita querela
fails for similar reasons.

See Compl. ¶¶ 34-40.

The First Circuit

has not spoken definitively on the availability of the writ of
audita querela for criminal convictions.
936 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1991).

United States v. Holder,

It has indicated, however, that if

the right case arose, it may be available in criminal cases “where
there is a legal objection to a conviction, which has arisen
subsequent

to

that

conviction,

and

which

pursuant to another post-conviction remedy.”

is

not

redressable

Id. at 5.

Here, Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to suggest that
this extraordinary writ, if it remains available at all, should
extend to the instant case; indeed “the equities do not favor
[Plaintiff] in this case.”

Id.; see also Iacaboni, 592 F. Supp.

2d at 221–22 (noting that “[t]hough the criteria to be satisfied
in order to invoke [the writ for audita querela] are not well
established, it seems they would be at least as stringent as those

6

identified for a writ of error coram nobis”)).

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s audita querela claim must be dismissed.
D.

28 U.S.C. § 1355

Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355, the
Court has jurisdiction to vacate a forfeiture order, and that
§ 1355 provides a private cause of action.

See Compl. ¶ 18; see

also Pl.’s Opp’n 12-13, ECF No. 12 (citing Elliot v. United States,
96 Fed. Cl. 666 (Fed. Cl. 2011)).

Even if Plaintiff is correct

that § 1355 contemplates a private cause of action, he provides no
authority suggesting that such relief would be available to mount
a collateral attack on a criminal forfeiture once judgment is
final.

Indeed, the Court could not find any cases providing a

defendant in this procedural posture such relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1355.
E. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also does
not provide Plaintiff an avenue for relief.
41; see also Compl. ¶¶ 41-44.

See Fed. R. Crim. P.

Where criminal proceedings have

concluded, a challenge under Rule 41 is treated as a proceeding
seeking equitable relief.

See Perez-Colon v. Camacho, 206 Fed.

App’x 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2006).

A plaintiff is not entitled to

equitable relief if the property at issue has been forfeited.

See

United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 518 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2008)
(“[A] Rule 41(g) motion is properly denied if the defendant is not
7

entitled to lawful possession of the seized property, the property
is contraband or subject to forfeiture . . . .”) (quoting United
States v. Pierre, 484 F.3d 75, 87 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also United
States v. Sims, 376 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The rule can
also be invoked after criminal proceedings have concluded to
recover the defendant’s property . . . unless, of course, it has
been forfeited in the course of those proceedings.”).

Here,

Plaintiff’s claim for relief under Rule 41 is barred and must be
dismissed because the property he seeks was forfeited as part of
his 1991 conviction.
E.

See Compl. ¶ 8.

Writ of Mandamus

Finally, Plaintiff requests mandamus relief pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1361.

See Compl. ¶¶ 50-57.

A court will only issue a

writ of mandamus where a plaintiff can prove that he is entitled
a clear right of relief, the defendant had a clear duty to act,
and there exists no other remedy.
453, 456 (1st Cir. 1986).

Chatman v. Hernandez, 805 F.2d

Taking all allegations in the Complaint

as true, Plaintiff has failed to establish even the first element,
that Plaintiff has a clear right to relief, and thus, this claim
too is dismissed.

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III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No. 10, is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Chief Judge
Date: March 27, 2019

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