LMG Rhode Island Holdings, Inc. v. RI Superior Court, et al

Filing 32

ORDER denying 29 Motion to Alter Judgment. So Ordered by District Judge Steven J. McAuliffe, District of NH on 4/24/2019. (Jackson, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

LMG Rhode Island Holdings, Inc.
v.

Case No. 18-cv-297-SJM-AKJ

Rhode Island Superior Court,
Providence County;
Hon. Netti C. Vogel; and
Eugene J. McCaffrey, III

O R D E R

The plaintiff newspaper’s (the “Journal”) motion to alter
the judgment reargues that which was previously asserted and
considered, and fails to identify any manifest errors of law or
fact necessary to the order of dismissal, nor has it presented
any newly discovered evidence of any significance.

But, to repeat and, perhaps, clarify: “In light of the
circumstances presented, the Journal has failed to persuade the
court that issuance of a ‘declaratory judgment’ (in the nature
of [prospective] injunctive relief) against a sitting Rhode
Island state court judge would constitute either a necessary or
appropriate exercise of this court’s discretion.”
Dismissal (document no. 27), at 6.

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Order of

Declaratory relief is intended to define legal rights with
respect to present and future conduct.

See e.g., Johnson v.

McCuskey, 72 Fed. Appx. 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003); Aldrich v.
Considine, 2013 WL 4679722 at 7 (D. Mass Aug. 29, 2013)
(collecting cases).

Declaratory relief is not meant to reach

past conduct.

Here, the Journal easily could have sought federal relief
in a timely manner when it thought its rights to juror access
were being infringed, but it failed to do so.

It did not file

its federal complaint in this case until after the perceived
infringement was fully abated, and, indeed, until after the
Journal already had access to the jurors at issue.

That is, the

state court orders about which it complains had already been
rescinded before the Journal sought federal relief from those
very orders. (As noted in its federal complaint, the Journal
filed an earlier suit in state court raising similar or related
issues, but voluntarily dismissed that suit without prejudice
before filing the complaint in this court.)

While the Journal now seems to be denying that it seeks
declaratory relief sounding like prospective injunctive relief,
that is precisely what the complaint, fairly read, seeks.

The

complaint seeks a declaration that “post-verdict, in the absence

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of a compelling government interest demonstrated by specific,
on-the-record factual findings, Judge Vogel may not prohibit the
media from contacting jurors or otherwise impede the jury
interview process.”

Complaint (document no. 1), at 17.

In its

memorandum in support of its motion to amend or alter the
judgment (document no. 29-1), the Journal writes: “To be clear,
the Journal does not seek injunctive relief and is not asking
this Court to direct Judge Vogel to do anything.

The Journal is

requesting a limited declaration to the effect that, in the
absence of a compelling government interest demonstrated by
specific, on-the-record factual findings, a judge may not
prohibit the press from contacting jurors or otherwise impede
the jury interview process after a verdict has been rendered in
a criminal case.”

Id. at 18 (emphasis in the original).

To be clear, the nature of the relief the Journal claims it
seeks is not clear.

Nevertheless, it seems evident to the court

that the declaration desired is intended and phrased in such a
way as to be seen as controlling future conduct by the state
judge in future cases.

But, if the Journal is not seeking

prospective relief sounding like an injunction with respect to
future conduct, then there is certainly no need to declare
rights with respect to the past conduct involved here.

If the

Journal is seeking prospective relief against the state judge,

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however, such relief is inappropriate for all the reasons
previously given, and the complaint does not describe a claim
warranting discretionary declaratory relief.

See, e.g., Stevens

v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1308-13 (11th Cir. 2017) (on similar
facts, with similar declaratory relief sought, declaratory
relief denied on grounds of judicial immunity, declaratory
judgment discretion, absence of necessity and usefulness, and
comity (separation of powers)).

The applicable law is reasonably clear with respect to
public trials and public access to jurors, and when jurors’
identities may be shielded from the public, as well as when
access to jurors may and may not be limited.

Future disputes

about such matters are better resolved in the context of the
particular facts and circumstances in which they arise.

Should

the Journal or any other interested party think that access to
jurors is being incorrectly impeded in some future case, there
are adequate remedies readily available, and capable counsel
surely will have an opportunity to seek such relief in a timely
fashion.

There is simply no need, and it would be inadvisable,

to attempt to fashion some declaration sounding like an
injunction that, at best, could only restate the presently
applicable law.

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“By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place
a remedial arrow in the district court’s quiver; it created an
opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief
to qualifying litigants.

Consistent with the nonobligatory

nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in the
sound exercise of its discretion, . . . to dismiss an action
seeking a declaratory judgment before trial.”

DeNovelis

v.Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 313 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995)).

Finally, because the Journal argues extensively that the
so-called (by the Journal) “gatekeeper” letter from Judge Vogel
to jurors dated April 26, 2018, somehow survived and remains an
obstacle to its ability to access the jurors at issue, that
point should be addressed.

The pleadings show that the state

court’s subsequent May 7 and May 16 actions vacated all
restrictions on juror access previously imposed by the court,
and the parties cannot reasonably dispute that the Journal was
free to access the jurors thereafter.

As the defendant points

out, the letter speaks for itself, and it does not appear to
this court to be an impediment to access, and it certainly was
not an impediment after the state court categorically vacated
its orders restricting access.

In any event, even that

possibility is not sufficient in context to warrant the exercise

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of discretion to grant declaratory relief in the form sought by
plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Taking the facts as pled in the complaint as true, and for
the reasons previously given, and discussed here, and included
in defendant’s memorandum in opposition, granting declaratory
relief as sought by plaintiff is unnecessary and would be
inappropriate.

The motion to amend or alter judgment (document no. 29) is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
April 24, 2019
cc:

Michael J. Grygiel, Esq.
Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Esq.
William E. O’Gara, Esq.
Marc DeSisto, Esq.
Thomas W. Lyons, III, Esq.

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