Stephanie P. v. Kijakazi

Filing 18

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS recommend that Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate and Remand the Decision of the Commissioner (ECF No. 11) be DENIED and that the Commissioner's Motion to Affirm the Commissioner's Decision (ECF No. 13) be GRAN TED. I further recommend that Final Judgment enter in favor of Defendant. 11 MOTION to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner filed by Stephanie Picchioni. 13 MOTION to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner With Supporting Memo filed by Kilolo Kijakazi. Objections to R&R due by 2/20/2024. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond on 2/5/2024. (Noel, Jeannine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
STEPHANIE P.
v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

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C.A. No. 23-00190-MSM

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Lincoln D. Almond, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed her Complaint
on May 10, 2023, seeking to reverse the Decision of the Commissioner. On September 28, 2023,
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate and Remand the Decision of the Commissioner. (ECF No. 11).
On October 27, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Affirm the Commissioner’s Decision. (ECF
No. 13). Plaintiff filed her Reply on January 8, 2024. (ECF No. 17).
This matter has been referred to me for preliminary review, findings, and recommended
disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); LR Cv 72. Based upon my review of the record, the parties’
submissions, and independent research, I find that there is substantial evidence in this record to
support the Commissioner’s decision and findings that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning
of the Act. Consequently, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate and Remand (ECF No.
11) be DENIED and that the Commissioner’s Motion to Affirm (ECF No. 13) be GRANTED.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on May 7, 2020 (Tr. 204-213) alleging disability since
January 17, 2019. The application was denied initially on December 9, 2020 (Tr. 100-106) and on
reconsideration on February 25, 2021. (Tr. 108-114). Plaintiff requested an Administrative
Hearing. On January 13, 2022, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Imelda K.
Harrington (the “ALJ”) at which time Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a Vocational Expert
(“VE”) appeared and testified. (Tr. 34-73). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff
on March 7, 2022. (Tr. 7-19). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on
January 11, 2023. (Tr. 1-3). Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became final. A timely appeal was
then filed with this Court.
II.

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the severity and RFC findings in
a prior unfavorable decision or at least explaining how her condition had improved relative to that
decision. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that, independent of the prior decision, the ALJ erred at
Step 2 by finding no severe impairments based on the evidence in the current claim file.
The Commissioner counters that the ALJ was not bound by the prior decision and that
substantial evidence supports her Step 2 non-severity findings.
III.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla – i.e., the evidence must do more
than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Ortiz v. Sec’y of HHS,

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955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of HHS, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st
Cir. 1981).
Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must
affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact. Rodriguez Pagan
v. Sec’y of HHS, 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir.
1991). The court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as
well as unfavorable to the decision. Frustaglia v. Sec’y of HHS, 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st Cir. 1987);
Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177 (11th Cir. 1986) (court also must consider evidence detracting
from evidence on which Commissioner relied).
The court must reverse the ALJ’s decision on plenary review, however, if the ALJ applies
incorrect law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that he
or she properly applied the law. Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam);
accord Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). Remand is unnecessary where
all of the essential evidence was before the Appeals Council when it denied review, and the
evidence establishes without any doubt that the claimant was disabled. Seavey v. Barnhart, 276
F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2001) citing, Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985).
The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); or under both sentences. Seavey,
276 F.3d at 8. To remand under sentence four, the court must either find that the Commissioner’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the
law relevant to the disability claim. Id.; accord Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980)

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(remand appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm, but also was insufficient for district
court to find claimant disabled).
Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner’s decision, a sentence-four
remand may be appropriate to allow her to explain the basis for her decision. Freeman v. Barnhart,
274 F.3d 606, 609-610 (1st Cir. 2001). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the
case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726,
729 (11th Cir. 1983) (necessary for ALJ on remand to consider psychiatric report tendered to
Appeals Council). After a sentence four remand, the court enters a final and appealable judgment
immediately, and thus loses jurisdiction. Freeman, 274 F.3d at 610.
In contrast, sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides:
The court...may at any time order additional evidence to be taken
before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a
showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there
is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the
record in a prior proceeding;
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To remand under sentence six, the claimant must establish: (1) that there is
new, non-cumulative evidence; (2) that the evidence is material, relevant and probative so that
there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result; and (3) there is good
cause for failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level. See Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d
1086, 1090-1092 (11th Cir. 1996).
A sentence six remand may be warranted, even in the absence of an error by the
Commissioner, if new, material evidence becomes available to the claimant. Id. With a sentence
six remand, the parties must return to the court after remand to file modified findings of fact. Id.

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The court retains jurisdiction pending remand and does not enter a final judgment until after the
completion of remand proceedings. Id.
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. The impairment must be severe,
making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial gainful activity which
exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-404.1511.
A.

Opinion Evidence

For applications like this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Administration has
fundamentally changed how adjudicators assess opinion evidence.

The requirements that

adjudicators assign “controlling weight” to a well-supported treating source’s medical opinion that
is consistent with other evidence, and, if controlling weight is not given, must state the specific
weight that is assigned – are gone. See Shaw v. Saul, No. 19-cv-730-LM, 2020 WL 3072072, *45 (D.N.H. June 10, 2020) citing Nicole C. v. Saul, Case No. cv 19-127JJM, 2020 WL 57727, at
*4 (D.R.I. Jan. 6, 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)). Under the newly applicable regulations,
an ALJ does not assign specific evidentiary weight to any medical opinion and does not defer to
the opinion of any medical source (including the claimant’s treating providers). 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ evaluates the relative persuasiveness of the medical
evidence in terms of five specified factors. Id.
The five factors the ALJ considers in evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion
are supportability (the relevance of the opinion’s cited objective medical evidence), consistency

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(how consistent the opinion is with all of the evidence from medical and non-medical sources),
treatment/examining relationship (including length of treatment relationship, frequency of
examinations, purpose of treatment relationship, and existence and extent of treatment/examining
relationship), specialization (the relevance of the source’s specialized education or training to the
claimant’s condition), and what the Administration refers to as “other factors” (the medical
source’s familiarity with the claimant’s medical record as a whole and/or with the Administration’s
policies or evidentiary requirements). Shaw, 2020 WL 3072072 at *4 citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5) (emphasis supplied). Of the five factors, the “most
important” are supportability and consistency. Id. §§ 404.1520c(a), 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(a),
416.920c(b)(2).
While the ALJ must consider all five of the factors in evaluating the persuasiveness of
medical evidence, when preparing the written decision, the ALJ is, in most cases, only required to
discuss application of the supportability and consistency factors.

Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),

416.920c(b)(2). Only where contrary medical opinions are equally persuasive in terms of both
supportability and consistency is the ALJ required to discuss their relative persuasiveness in terms
of the treatment/examining relationship, specialization, and other factors. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3),
416.920c(b)(3). In addition, where a single medical source offers multiple opinions, the ALJ is
not required to discuss each opinion individually, but instead may address all of the source’s
opinions “together in a single analysis.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(1), 416.920c(b)(1).
Moreover, while the ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence in the record, Id. §§
404.1520b(a)-(b), 416.920b(a)-(b), the ALJ need not discuss evidence from nonmedical sources,
including, e.g., the claimant, the claimant’s friends and family, educational personnel, and social

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welfare agency personnel. Id. §§ 404.1502(e), 404.1520c(d), 416.902(j), 416.920c(d). And while
the regulations require the ALJ to discuss the relative persuasiveness of all medical source
evidence, Id. §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b), the claimant’s impairments must be established
specifically by evidence from an acceptable medical source, Id. §§ 404.1521, 416.921.
“Acceptable medical sources” are limited to physicians and psychologists, and (within their
areas of specialization or practice) to optometrists, podiatrists, audiologists, advanced practice
registered nurses, physician assistants, and speech pathologists. Id. §§ 404.1502(a), 416.902(a).
Evidence from other medical sources, such as licensed social workers or chiropractors, is
insufficient to establish the existence or severity of a claimant’s impairments. Id. Finally, the ALJ
need not discuss evidence that is “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive,” including decisions
by other governmental agencies or nongovernmental entities, findings made by state disability
examiners at any previous level of adjudication, and statements by medical sources as to any issue
reserved to the Commissioner. Id. §§ 404.1520b(c), 416.920b(c).
B.

Developing the Record

The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the record. Heggarty v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d
990, 997 (1st Cir. 1991). The Commissioner also has a duty to notify a claimant of the statutory
right to retained counsel at the social security hearing, and to solicit a knowing and voluntary
waiver of that right if counsel is not retained. See 42 U.S.C. § 406; Evangelista v. Sec’y of HHS,
826 F.2d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 1987). The obligation to fully and fairly develop the record exists if a
claimant has waived the right to retained counsel, and even if the claimant is represented by
counsel. Id. However, where an unrepresented claimant has not waived the right to retained
counsel, the ALJ’s obligation to develop a full and fair record rises to a special duty. See Heggarty,

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947 F.2d at 997, citing Currier v. Sec’y of Health Educ. and Welfare, 612 F.2d 594, 598 (1st Cir.
1980).
C.

Medical Tests and Examinations

The ALJ is required to order additional medical tests and exams only when a claimant’s
medical sources do not give sufficient medical evidence about an impairment to determine whether
the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.917; see also Conley v. Bowen, 781 F.2d 143, 146 (8th
Cir. 1986). In fulfilling his duty to conduct a full and fair inquiry, the ALJ is not required to order
a consultative examination unless the record establishes that such an examination is necessary to
enable the ALJ to render an informed decision. Carrillo Marin v. Sec’y of HHS, 758 F.2d 14, 17
(1st Cir. 1985).
D.

The Five-step Evaluation

The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. First, if a claimant is working at a substantial gainful activity, she is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if a claimant does not have any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limit her physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities, then she does not have a severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c). Third, if a claimant’s impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if a claimant’s
impairments do not prevent her from doing past relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(e). Fifth, if a claimant’s impairments (considering her residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work) prevent her from doing other work that exists in the national economy,
then she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). Significantly, the claimant bears the burden of

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proof at steps one through four, but the Commissioner bears the burden at step five. Wells v.
Barnhart, 267 F. Supp. 2d 138, 144 (D. Mass. 2003) (five-step process applies to both SSDI and
SSI claims).
In determining whether a claimant’s physical and mental impairments are sufficiently
severe, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant’s impairments and must
consider any medically severe combination of impairments throughout the disability determination
process. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). Accordingly, the ALJ must make specific and well-articulated
findings as to the effect of a combination of impairments when determining whether an individual
is disabled. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 534 (11th Cir. 1993).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden of proving the existence of a disability as defined
by the Social Security Act. Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5. The claimant must prove disability on or before
the last day of her insured status for the purposes of disability benefits. Deblois v. Sec’y of HHS,
686 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(3), 423(a), (c). If a claimant becomes disabled
after she has lost insured status, her claim for disability benefits must be denied despite her
disability. Id.
E.

Other Work

Once the ALJ finds that a claimant cannot return to her prior work, the burden of proof
shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant could perform other work that exists in
the national economy. Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5. In determining whether the Commissioner has met
this burden, the ALJ must develop a full record regarding the vocational opportunities available to
a claimant. Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989). This burden may sometimes
be met through exclusive reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “grids”). Seavey,

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276 F.3d at 5. Exclusive reliance on the “grids” is appropriate where the claimant suffers primarily
from an exertional impairment, without significant non-exertional factors. Id.; see also Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (exclusive reliance on the grids is appropriate in cases involving
only exertional impairments, impairments which place limits on an individual’s ability to meet job
strength requirements).
Exclusive reliance is not appropriate when a claimant is unable to perform a full range of
work at a given residual functional level or when a claimant has a non-exertional impairment that
significantly limits basic work skills. Nguyen, 172 F.3d at 36. In almost all of such cases, the
Commissioner’s burden can be met only through the use of a vocational expert. Heggarty, 947
F.2d at 996. It is only when the claimant can clearly do unlimited types of work at a given residual
functional level that it is unnecessary to call a vocational expert to establish whether the claimant
can perform work which exists in the national economy. See Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d
243, 248 (5th Cir. 1981). In any event, the ALJ must make a specific finding as to whether the
non-exertional limitations are severe enough to preclude a wide range of employment at the given
work capacity level indicated by the exertional limitations.
1.

Pain

“Pain can constitute a significant non-exertional impairment.” Nguyen, 172 F.3d at 36.
Congress has determined that a claimant will not be considered disabled unless he furnishes
medical and other evidence (e.g., medical signs and laboratory findings) showing the existence of
a medical impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms
alleged. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). The ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s statements about
his symptoms, including pain, and determine the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be

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accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 163p, 2017 WL 4790249, at *49462; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). In determining whether the
medical signs and laboratory findings show medical impairments which reasonably could be
expected to produce the pain alleged, the ALJ must apply the First Circuit’s six-part pain analysis
and consider the following factors:
(1)
The nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation,
and intensity of any pain;
(2)
Precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement,
activity, environmental conditions);
(3)
Type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any
pain medication;
(4)

Treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain;

(5)

Functional restrictions; and

(6)

The claimant’s daily activities.

Avery v. Sec’y of HHS, 797 F.2d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 1986). An individual’s statement as to pain is
not, by itself, conclusive of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). However, the individual’s
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limited effects of symptoms may not be disregarded
“solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate the degree of impairmentrelated symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 4790249, at *49465.
2.

Credibility

Where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s testimony about pain, the ALJ must
articulate specific and adequate reasons for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to the
credibility finding. Rohrberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 309. A reviewing court will not disturb a clearly
articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record. See Frustaglia,

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829 F.2d at 195. The failure to articulate the reasons for discrediting subjective pain testimony
requires that the testimony be accepted as true. See DaRosa v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
803 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1986).
A lack of a sufficiently explicit credibility finding becomes a ground for remand when
credibility is critical to the outcome of the case. See Smallwood v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 1349,
1352 (11th Cir. 1982). If proof of disability is based on subjective evidence and a credibility
determination is, therefore, critical to the decision, “the ALJ must either explicitly discredit such
testimony or the implication must be so clear as to amount to a specific credibility finding.” Foote
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1255
(11th Cir. 1983)). Guidance in evaluating the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of subjective symptoms is provided by SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL
4790249, at *49462 (Oct. 25, 2017). It directs the ALJ to consider the entire case record, including
the objective medical evidence; an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information provided by medical sources and
other persons; any other relevant evidence; and whether statements about the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings.
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 4790249, at *49465.
V.

APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS

A.

Administrative Background

Plaintiff filed a prior, unsuccessful application for SSI in 2018 alleging a disability onset
date of January 1, 2016. (Tr. 77). On January 16, 2019, an ALJ denied the application at Step 5.

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(Tr. 86-87). The ALJ on that prior application found at Step 2 that Plaintiff had multiple severe
impairments and assessed an RFC for a limited range of light work. (Tr. 79-81).
The application under consideration was filed in 2020 alleging a disability onset date of
January 17, 2019 (the day after the period adjudicated in the earlier application). (Tr. 10). The
ALJ on the instant application concluded at Step 2 that none of Plaintiff’s impairments met the
severity threshold and issued a no disability finding. (Tr. 18-19).
B.

Plaintiff Has Shown No Step 2 Error

Plaintiff’s first argument arises out of the differing Step 2 determinations made by the ALJ
in the instant case and those made in a prior unsuccessful claim. The prior decision covered the
period from January 1, 2016 (claimed onset date) through January 16, 2019 (decision date) and
found that at Step 2 Plaintiff had several “severe” impairments. (Tr. 77, 79, 87). The instant
decision covered the period from January 17, 2019 (claimed onset date) through March 7, 2022
(decision date) and found at Step 2 that Plaintiff had several medical impairments but no “severe”
impairments. (Tr. 10, 13, 19). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ, in the instant case, erred by failing to
properly consider the prior determination and was required to “at least explain” how her condition
had improved relative to that prior decision. (ECF No. 11 at p 2).
The law is clear that the ALJ was not bound by the prior ALJ’s findings and is tasked with
undertaking a de novo review of the record and issues before her. See Cameron v. Berryhill, 356
F.Supp.3d 186, 196 (D. Mass. 2019) (an ALJ is not required to “specifically explain how he
considered [a] finding of a prior disability adjudication”). Thus, the relevant issue in this appeal
is simply whether the ALJ’s Step 2 determination in supported by substantial evidence of record.1

1

This record includes the prior adjudication (Exh. B1A) and certain medical records predating the alleged onset
date in this case. (Exhs. B1F and B3F).

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In making her Step 2 determination, the ALJ relied upon the opinions of the state agency
consulting physicians (Dr. Laurelli and Dr. Pressman) that Plaintiff’s medically determinable
impairments were all non-severe. (Exhs. B4A and B6A). These physicians reviewed some
medical records relating to the prior adjudication period but also a significant amount of
subsequent treatment records. Id. They also had the benefit of reviewing the consultative
examination report of Ariana Colapietro, PA-C dated November 20, 2020 who assessed no
functional limitations for Plaintiff. (Exh. B7F). The ALJ also reviewed the Colapietro report and
found it to be persuasive since it was based on the results of an examination, supported by negative
x-rays, and consistent with other treatment notes showing minimal findings. (Tr. 18).
Plaintiff does not directly challenge any of these ALJ findings. Rather, Plaintiff identifies
“representative examples” of record evidence that arguably support a different Step 2 outcome.
At Step 2, an impairment is considered “severe” when it significantly limits a claimant’s physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). The Commissioner has
adopted a “slight abnormality” standard which provides that an impairment is “non-severe” when
the medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality that has “no more than a minimal effect
on an individual’s ability to work.” SSR 85-28. Although Step 2 is a de minimis standard,
Orellana v. Astrue, 547 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1172 (E.D. Wash. 2008) citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 153-154 (1987)), it is still a standard and a standard on which Plaintiff bears the burden
of proof. See Desjardins v. Astrue, No. 09-2-B-W, 2009 WL 3152808 (D.Me. Sept. 28, 2009).
Here, there is substantial evidence of record directly supporting the ALJ’s Step 2
determination as discussed above, and, thus, it must be affirmed. The fact that Plaintiff identifies
some select evidence that could reasonably support a different outcome is not determinative.
Further, the fact that an ALJ in a prior determination for a different time period made Step 2

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determinations in Plaintiff’s favor is also not determinative. Although the time periods were
consecutive, there was a significant amount of new treatment records available to the ALJ (and the
state agency consulting physicians) as well as a consultative examination report showing no
functional limitations. In the end, the ALJ’s Step 2 finding is supported by the weight of the
evidence, and Plaintiff has shown no error in the ALJ’s consideration of that evidence or any legal
support for her argument that the ALJ had any duty to “explain” the bases for the differing Step 2
determinations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate and
Remand the Decision of the Commissioner (ECF No. 11) be DENIED and that the Commissioner’s
Motion to Affirm the Commissioner’s Decision (ECF No. 13) be GRANTED.

I further

recommend that Final Judgment enter in favor of Defendant.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be served
and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen days of service of this Report and
Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); DRI LR Cv 72. Failure to file specific objections in
a timely manner constitutes waiver of the right to review by the District Court and the right to
appeal the District Court’s decision. See Brenner v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 867 F.3d 294, 297
n.7 (1st Cir. 2017); Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
/s/ Lincoln D. Almond
LINCOLN D. ALMOND
United States Magistrate Judge
February 5, 2024

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