DeSouza v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Administration

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS the State's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10 . So Ordered by Senior District Judge William E Smith on 1/29/2025. (Urizandi, Nissheneyra)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,
)
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
ANTONE DESOUZA,

C.A. No. 23-514 WES

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff

Antone

DeSouza

charges

his

employer,

Defendant

State of Rhode Island, Department of Administration (the “State”),
with violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and state employment law.
No. 1.

Compl. 1, ECF

DeSouza alleges that the State: (1) failed to reasonably

accommodate his disability when it first declined his request not
to work at a certain location and then did not respond to his later
request to work remotely, (2) retaliated against him for making
these

requests,

opportunities.
suit.

and

(3)

Id. at 6-7.

denied

him

promotion

and

transfer

The State now moves to dismiss this

State’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10.

Because DeSouza’s

Complaint does not state a plausible ADA claim and because state
court is the better forum to adjudicate his state law claims, the

Court GRANTS the State’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
DeSouza’s account is as follows.

Since 1999, he has worked

for the State in the Department of Administration, Division of
Capital Asset Management and Maintenance.

Compl. 2.

And as of at

least December 2020, he has had post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), which the State is aware of.

Id.

In early December of 2020, DeSouza’s supervisor asked him to
volunteer to transfer temporarily from his regular work site to
another location.

Id.

For DeSouza, the transfer would require a

“significantly further commute.”

Id.

Because he worried the

increased driving distance and corresponding traffic would worsen
his PTSD symptoms, he declined the request to transfer.

Id.

But his supervisor directed him to transfer anyway. Id. This
directive triggered an anxiety attack that caused DeSouza to miss
work for some time while receiving medical treatment. Id. Seeking
relief from the transfer order, DeSouza submitted a “Request for
Reasonable Accommodations/Modifications form” to the State’s Human
Resources Disability Management Unit.
Two

months

formally denied.

later,

DeSouza’s

Id. at 4.

Id.
accommodations

request

was

The denial letter advised DeSouza

“that the job description for [his position] stated that [the
Division] ‘is a state-wide operation which deploys Division staff
to any location where they are needed to manage and maintain State
2

buildings and premises.’”

Id. at 4.

DeSouza was thus officially

transferred to his new work site effective March 1, 2021.
That September, DeSouza fell and was injured on the job, also
requiring him to miss work for some period.

Id.

DeSouza “was

directed to work remotely,” but his supervisor explained that he
would need to return to work on November 1.

Id.

Then, in late

November, DeSouza informed his supervisor that he needed to have
surgery and the surgery was scheduled for December 1.

Id. at 5.

He expected to be out until December 16 and “requested to work
remotely thereafter.”

Id.

DeSouza never received “a meaningful

response” to this request and so he returned to work on December
15, “having never been allowed to work remotely following the
surgery.”

Id.

Meanwhile,

DeSouza

promotion and transfer.

had

his

eyes

See id. at 4-5.

on

opportunities

In March of 2021, “the

position of Chief Property Management was posted online.”
4.

for

Id. at

The same position was posted again that December, at which

time DeSouza “applied for the position and was placed on the
eligibility list but was ultimately not selected for an interview,”
Id.

at

5.

Overall,

“[s]ince

disclosing

his

disability

and

requesting an accommodation, [he] has been denied promotional and
transfer opportunities despite being qualified . . . .”

Id.

Sometime around May 10, 2022, DeSouza filed a charge of
discrimination against the State with the federal Equal Employment
3

Opportunity Commission and the R.I. Commission for Human Rights.
Id. at 2.

In turn, those agencies respectively issued him right

to sue letters and DeSouza subsequently filed this lawsuit.
II.

Id.

DISCUSSION
The State moves to dismiss DeSouza’s complaint on multiple

grounds.

See generally State’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s

Mem.”), ECF No. 10-1.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court

grants the Motion to Dismiss.
A. Service of Process
The State first moves to dismiss DeSouza’s case under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) because DeSouza failed to serve
a copy of the Summons and Complaint within ninety days.

Def.’s

Mem. 9-11; Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss. (“Def.’s Reply”) 1-4,
ECF No. 18; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), 12(b)(5).

Acknowledging

that his service was untimely by fifteen days, DeSouza asks the
Court for an extension.

Pl.’s Mem. L. Supp. Obj. Def.’s Mot.

Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”) 2-3, ECF No. 15-1; Pl’s Resp. Def.’s Reply
(“Pl.’s Sur-Reply”) 1-2, ECF No. 20.
The Court has discretion under Rule 4(m) to extend time of
service, even without good cause.

See Radfar v. Crowley, 568 F.

Supp. 3d 113, 115 (D. Mass. 2021); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

While

service of process here was late, it was eventually completed, and
the State does not argue that it suffered any prejudice as a
result.

See Def.’s Mem. 9-11; Def.’s Reply 1-4.
4

Dismissal on

this ground also would be unnecessarily prejudicial to DeSouza and
an inefficient use of judicial resources.

Thus, the Motion to

Dismiss is denied as to untimely service of process.
B. ADA Claims
The State next moves the Court to dismiss each of DeSouza’s
ADA claims (together, Count One of the Complaint) under Rule
12(b)(6) because he fails to allege sufficient facts to plausibly
claim that he is entitled to relief.

Def.’s Mem. 11-13; Def.’s

Reply 4-7; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To repeat, DeSouza’s ADA

claims

denied

are

that

the

State

unlawfully

him

reasonable

accommodations for his PTSD, retaliated against him, and denied
him promotion and transfer opportunities.

Compl. 6-7.

To survive the State’s Motion to Dismiss, DeSouza’s ADA claims
must be “plausible.”
(2009).

To

be

accepted

as

true,

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

“plausible,”
enable

the

DeSouza

must

Court

“to

plead
draw

facts

the

which,

reasonable

inference that [the State] is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
See id. at 678.

“Plausible, of course, means something more than

merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation’s plausibility is
a ‘context-specific’ job that compels [the Court] ‘to draw on’
[its]

‘judicial

experience

and

common

sense.’”

Schatz

v.

Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)

5

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
1. Alleged Denial of Reasonable Accommodations
To state a plausible ADA claim for failure to make reasonable
accommodations, DeSouza must allege facts sufficient to show that
(1) he suffers from a disability recognized by the ADA, (2) he is
otherwise qualified to perform the “essential functions” of his
job,

and

reasonably

(3)

the

State

accommodate

knew
it

of
upon

his

disability

request.

See

and
42

did

not

U.S.C.

§ 12112(b)(5)(A); Sepúlveda-Vargas v. Caribbean Rests., LLC, 888
F.3d 549, 553 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E.,
L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 454 (1st Cir. 2016)).
The State first attacks DeSouza’s reasonable accommodations
claim based on the denial of his request not to transfer work
sites, arguing that it is not plausible because DeSouza does not
show that he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of his job.

Def.’s Mem. 17-18.

DeSouza, it says,

provides no direct description of what his job duties are or
whether he could perform them; the only reference to job functions
is the request denial letter’s description of DeSouza’s position
being part of a “state-wide operation” that included deployment to
“any location” where he was needed.

Id.

Oddly, DeSouza does not contest this factual deficiency or
seek leave to amend his Complaint.

He instead counters that the

deployment-to-any-location requirement, despite being part of the
6

job description “in a state handbook,” is not necessarily an
essential job function.

Pl.’s Resp. 7.

He argues that because he

was initially asked only to “temporarily volunteer” to transfer
work sites, whether the requirement was essential is a “factual
question.”

Pl.’s Sur-Reply 3.

This dearth of facts dooms DeSouza’s claim.

Normally, the

determination of whether a job function is “essential” is a factintensive inquiry decided on a “case-by-case basis.”

Sepúlveda-

Vargas, 888 F.3d at 553 (citing Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv.,
Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 2002)).

But here, DeSouza’s

relevant alleged facts are only the context of the transfer and
the “state handbook” job description.

The argument that the

deployment at issue may not have been essential because it was
initially framed as a request is belied by the fact that it was
then turned into a directive.

And the Court gives special weight

to the written job description, as it must.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)

(“[I]f an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising

or

interviewing

description

shall

be

functions of the job.”).

applicants

considered

for

evidence

of

the
the

job,

this

essential

For these reasons, DeSouza’s reasonable

accommodations claim on this basis is not plausible.
The State next strikes at DeSouza’s reasonable accommodations
claim stemming from the effective denial of his request to work
remotely following his surgery, arguing that it is not plausible
7

because DeSouza fails to prove that the request was tied to his
PTSD.

Def.’s Mem. 18; Def.’s Reply 4-6.

It asserts that because

DeSouza “makes zero mention of what the surgery was for,” his claim
is “too vague” and he “failed to put [the State] on notice that
[he] was seeking a reasonable accommodation for his specific
disability.”

Def.’s Mem. 18; Def.’s Reply 5-6.

DeSouza parries by referencing the fact that the State knew
of his PTSD “at all relevant time[s].”
argues

that

the

State’s

construction

that

[the

position

State’s]

Pl.’s Sur-Reply 2.
“overlooks

the

discriminatory

motivated by an animus towards [his] disability.”

He

obvious

actions

were

Pl.’s Resp. 8.

DeSouza’s claim again fails for lack of sufficient factual
allegations.

Under the ADA, a person must “link the requested

accommodation to a disability, not merely invoke vague references
to medical conditions or unnamed medical treatments.”

Stratton v.

Bentley Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing Jones v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2012)).

In

his Complaint, DeSouza makes no reference to having told the State
what the surgery was for, nor to whether it related
or

another

ADA-recognized

disability.

In

to his PTSD

brief,

DeSouza’s

reasonable accommodations claim here is not plausible.
2. Alleged Retaliation
To establish a plausible claim for retaliation under the ADA,
DeSouza must allege facts to show that “he was engaged in protected
8

conduct, that he was subject to an adverse employment action, and
that there was a causal connection between the adverse employment
action and the conduct.”

Sepúlveda-Vargas at 555 (citing Freadman

v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 106 (1st Cir. 2007));
see 42 U.S.C. § 12203.

The challenged action must be “materially

adverse,” in that “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Sepúlveda-

Vargas at 555 (quoting Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 464 F.3d 14,
20 (1st Cir. 2006)).
As before, so too here: DeSouza’s retaliation claim is not
plausible

because

he

does

not

allege

sufficient

facts.

In

conclusory fashion, DeSouza states that the “State retaliated
against the Plaintiff for complaining about his discriminatory
work environment.”

Compl. 5.

While making a complaint about a

discriminatory work environment is “protected conduct,” nowhere in
his Complaint does DeSouza mention doing so.

See generally Compl.

And, even taking the accommodations requests as complaints and
assuming the failure to promote or transfer is an “adverse action,”
nowhere in DeSouza’s Complaint does he link the alleged complaints
to the adverse action.

Id.

This shortcoming is fatal.

See Colón-

Fontánez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 36-43 (1st Cir.
2011) (denying multiple ADA claims of retaliation for this reason).

9

Accordingly, DeSouza’s retaliation claim is dismissed.
3. Alleged Denial of Promotion and Transfer Opportunities
The Court need not take long on this claim; both parties agree
that it fails because DeSouza did not exhaust his administrative
remedies.

See Def.’s Mem. 11-13 (raising failure to exhaust

defense); Pl.’s Resp. 4 (noting that the State “is correct that
there might not have been appropriate exhaustion” for this claim);
Def.’s Reply 4 (commenting that DeSouza “concedes” this issue and
the claim should be dismissed); Pl.’s Sur-Reply (declining to
respond).

Thus,

DeSouza’s

ADA

claim

for

unlawful

denial

of

promotion and transfer opportunities is dismissed for failure to
exhaust.

See Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27,

31 (1st Cir. 2009).
C. Remaining State Law Claims
As for DeSouza’s state law claims (Counts Two, Three, and
Four of the Complaint), the State moves to dismiss them all under
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Def.’s

Mem. 13-16; Def.’s Reply 7-9; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Specifically, the State argues that it has not waived its sovereign
immunity and so the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
strips the Court of power to hear DeSouza’s claims.
13-16; Def.’s Reply 7-9.

DeSouza disagrees.

Def.’s Mem.

Pl.’s Resp. 4-6;

Pl.’s Sur-Reply 3-4.
But along with this unsettled jurisdictional question, arises
10

another: whether, following dismissal of DeSouza’s federal claims,
the

Court

should

continue

to

remaining state law claims.

exercise

jurisdiction

over

his

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim” when “the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.”).
address the latter question first.

The Court elects to

See Acheson Hotels, LLC v.

Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 4 (2023) (noting that courts “can address
jurisdictional issues in any order” they decide).
Because
state

law

these

that

claims

[are]

present

better

“substantial

addressed

by

the

question[s]
state

of

courts,”

continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is not proper
here.

See Zell v. Ricci, 957 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting

Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2017)); Royal Canin
U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullshcleger, No. 23-677, 2025 WL 96212, at *5
(U.S. Jan. 15, 2025) (explaining that in this context “the court
may (and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to state court”).
The remaining claims are dismissed for this reason.

11

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the State’s
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

William E. Smith
Senior District Judge
Date: January 29, 2025

12