Garcia v. Edgefield Federal Prison et al

Filing 44

OPINION AND ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS declining to adopt 35 Report and Recommendations, granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissing Garcia's complaint without prejudice, re 18 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 26 Motion to Amend/Correct, denying as moot 38 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Honorable Henry M Herlong, Jr on 7/18/2011. (jpet, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION

Pedro I. Garcia, #16398-280,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Edgefield Federal Prison;
Mary Mitchell, Warden;
Mr. Acosta, Assist. Warden;
Mr. Collie, Captain;
Mr. Clark, Lt.;
Mr. Holet, Lt.;
Mr. Neal, C Unit Manager;
Mr. Mahomes, A Unit Manager;
Mr. Boltin, A 4 Counselor;
Mr. Johnson, C 1 Counselor;
Mr. Santiago, S.I.S.;
Roper, Unit Officer;
Upson, Unit Officer;
Flores, Unit Offficer;
Kate, Unit Officer;
Martin, Unit Officer;
Green, Unit Officer;
Evans, Unit Officer;
Mrs. Jones, A 4 Case Manager;
Morgan, Officer;
Kepner, Education,
Defendants.

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C.A. No. 0:10-2728-HMH-PJG

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the court with the Report and Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02 of the District of South Carolina.1 Pedro I. Garcia (“Garcia”), a federal
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The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final
determination remains with the United States District Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423
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prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), claiming deprivations of his Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants moved to dismiss Garcia’s complaint
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Magistrate
Judge Gossett recommends granting Defendants’ motion. For the reasons explained below, the
court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Garcia alleges that following an altercation between inmates at Edgefield Federal Prison,
between 100 and 125 Mexican prisoners were segregated from the general prison population and
placed in a special housing unit (“SHU”) for six months pending an investigation. (Compl. 1-2.)
While confined in the SHU, Garcia claims that he and other Mexican prisoners were denied
access to legal materials and outside recreation, and that they went on food strike “to get the
officers[’] attention.” (Id. at 3.) Garcia maintains that none of the prisoners confined in the
SHU ultimately were charged with misconduct. (Id.) Therefore, he alleges “this warden and her
staff has [sic] violated the rights of the inmates that she has locked down for no reason; she has
also made a racial thing out of this whole matter.” (Id.) He seeks $175,000.00 in actual and
punitive damages. (Id. at 5.)

U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of
those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made. The
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the
magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
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II. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Magistrate Judge Gossett found that Garcia failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
and therefore, she recommends granting Defendants’ motion. Garcia timely filed objections to
the magistrate judge’s Report on June 22, 2011.2 Objections to the Report and Recommendation
must be specific. Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a party’s right to
further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the
district judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984). In the
absence of specific objections to the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, this
court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
In his objections to the Report and Recommendation, Garcia contends that dismissal for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is inappropriate because there is a genuine factual
dispute “as to whether his remedies were made unavailable through no fault of his own.”
(Objections 2.) Defendants alternatively argue that dismissal is warranted because Garcia’s
factual allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. (Def. Mot. Dismiss 923; Def. Resp. Opp’n Pl. Mot. Am. Compl. 3.) For the reasons explained below, the court finds
that, liberally construing Garcia’s complaint, the allegations fail to give rise to a plausible claim
of relief. Because the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds distinct from those
recommended by the magistrate judge, the court declines to adopt the Report and
Recommendation.

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See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
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III. DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this plausibility
standard, the court should “assume th[e] veracity” of well-pled factual allegations “and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950. While a
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, pleadings that contain mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Although the court must consider all well-pled factual allegations in a complaint as true,
the court need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. The
pleadings of pro se prisoners, moreover, are afforded a liberal construction, Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but it is not the task of the court “to conjure up questions never
squarely presented” or “to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Garcia brings this Bivens action against Edgefield Federal Prison and twenty prison
officials. In a Bivens action, “liability is personal, based upon each defendant’s own
constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). Consequently,
Garcia “is required to allege facts indicating that defendants were personally involved in the
claimed constitutional violation.” Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Garcia contends that Warden Mary Mitchell (“Warden Mitchell”) ordered her staff to
segregate Mexican inmates from the general prison population pending an investigation into an
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altercation. (Compl. 2.) He further alleges that Warden Mitchell “has . . . made a racial ‘thing’
out of this whole matter.” (Id. at 3.) Garcia, however, fails to allege how any of the other
individual defendants were personally involved in the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Because Garcia’s complaint is devoid of factual allegations that personally connect any of the
named defendants other than Warden Mitchell to his claimed constitutional violations, the court
dismisses Garcia’s Bivens claims against those defendants. Furthermore, Garcia’s claim against
Edgefield Federal Prison is squarely barred by Supreme Court precedent restricting liability in
Bivens actions to individuals. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001).
Edgefield Federal Prison, therefore, also must be dismissed as a defendant.
Garcia contends that his confinement in the SHU violated his Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. As explained below, Garcia’s allegations, accepted as true, fail
to show that he is plausibly entitled to relief.
A. Fifth Amendment Claims
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of one’s
liberty without due process. A prisoner’s liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause is
“generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted).3 “[A]dministrative segregation,” the Supreme
Court has observed, “is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate
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Although Sandin addressed state-created liberty interests secured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts have extended its application to prisoners’
Fifth Amendment claims challenging confinement in federal prisons. See, e.g., Ware v.
Morrison, 276 F.3d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 2002); Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir.
1996).
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receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)
(reviewing prison regulations authorizing administrative segregation “to protect the prisoner’s
safety, to protect other inmates from a particular prisoner, [or] to break up potentially disruptive
groups of inmates”), receded from by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84 & n.5. Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit has found that prisoners’ six-month confinement in administrative segregation
does not constitute an “atypical and significant hardship” necessary to confer a liberty interest
upon a prisoner despite allegations that (1) the prisoners were afforded no outside recreation and
no educational or religious services and (2) the cells were invested with vermin, smeared with
human feces, flooded with water from a broken toilet, and considerably hotter than cells in the
general population. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997).
Garcia alleges that while housed in the SHU, inmates were denied outside recreation and
access to legal materials, and that inmates had to go on food strike “in order to get the officers[’]
attention.” (Compl. 3.) These conditions, however, are significantly less onerous than those the
Fourth Circuit found insufficient to rise to the level of an atypical hardship in Beverati.
Accepting Garcia’s factual allegations as true, he has failed plausibly to show that he endured an
“atypical and significant hardship” while confined in the SHU. Garcia’s Fifth Amendment due
process claim against Warden Mitchell, therefore, must be dismissed. Pichardo v. Kinkler, 73
F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court’s dismissal of prisoner’s Fifth
Amendment claim premised upon administrative segregation).
To the extent Garcia’s Fifth Amendment claim is premised upon the Equal Protection
Clause, S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 n.21 (1987), he
has failed to plead facts showing that such a claim is plausible on its face. A prisoner claiming
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an equal protection violation must allege facts demonstrating “that he has been treated
differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the
result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731 (4th
Cir. 2002). The complaint, moreover, must contain “facts that, if found to be true, would
demonstrate that the disparate treatment lacks justification under the requisite level of scrutiny.”
Id.
Garcia’s complaint contains no allegations that prison officials treated him and the other
Mexican inmates differently than prisoners with whom they are similarly situated. Furthermore,
his own allegations undermine the plausibility of his equal protection claim. Garcia concedes
that Mexican prisoners were transferred to an SHU to allow prison officials to conduct an
investigation following an altercation among inmates. (Compl. 2.) The Supreme Court has
emphasized that prison officials have a compelling government interest with respect to prison
security and discipline. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005). Garcia’s conclusory
allegation that Warden Mitchell placed him and other Mexican prisoners in the SHU to “ma[k]e
a racial ‘thing’ out of this whole matter” is insufficient to state an equal protection claim that is
plausible on its face. (Compl. 3.)
B. Eighth Amendment Claim
Garcia next alleges that his confinement in the SHU violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. A plaintiff challenging prison conditions under
the Eighth Amendment must show “(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and
(2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.” Strickler v.
Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). “The Constitution . . . does not mandate
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comfortable prisons, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, under the first prong, “[o]nly extreme deprivations” such as “a serious or
significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions” suffice to
establish an Eighth Amendment claim. Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997).
To demonstrate deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the defendant subjectively
knew of and disregarded “an objectively serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm.” Id.
Garcia has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that he was deprived of a basic human
need. Significantly, Garcia does not allege any physical or emotional injury whatsoever.
Instead, he merely claims that Defendants deprived him of outside recreation and access to legal
materials. (Compl. 3.) Such deprivations, however, do not amount to extreme deprivations of
basic human needs sufficient to give rise to an Eight Amendment violation. Garcia’s Eighth
Amendment claim, therefore, lacks facial plausibility and must be dismissed.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Garcia further claims that his confinement in the SHU violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, applies only to states and state actors.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973) (“[A]ctions of the Federal Government
and its officers are beyond the purview of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”). Consequently,
Garcia’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails.

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D. Motion to Amend Complaint
Garcia contemporaneously filed with his objections a motion for leave to file an
amended complaint. With the motion, he attached a proposed amendment specifying that his
claims against Defendants are in their individual rather than official capacities. (Mot. Leave
File. Am. Compl. Ex. 1 (Proposed Amendment, generally).) Because Garcia’s proposed
amendment fails to cure any of the deficiencies explained above, the court denies the motion as
moot.
Garcia’s complaint, liberally construed, fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. Based on the foregoing, the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, docket number 18, is granted, and
Garcia’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Garcia’s motions for leave to file an amended complaint, docket
numbers 26 and 38, are denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Henry M. Herlong, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge
Greenville, South Carolina
July 18, 2011

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Plaintiff is hereby notified that he has the right to appeal this order within sixty (60)
days from the date hereof, pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

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