Holmes v. Dorchester County Detention Center et al

Filing 70

OPINION AND ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS accepting 60 Report and Recommendations, granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by T A Van Doran, Richard Darling, denying 53 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Abdullah Mallick Holmes. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 6/5/2012. (jpet, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Abdullah Mallick Holmes,

)
)
Plaintiff,
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v.
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T.A. Van Doran, Detention Director;
)
Richard Darling, Operations Lieutenant,
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)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________ )

C.A. No. 0:11-cv-01325-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is now before the court upon the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 60] filed
by United States Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett on March 28, 2012.

Pro se plaintiff

Abdullah Mallick Holmes (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging that
Defendants T.A. Van Doran and Richard Darling (collectively, “Defendants”) violated his
constitutional rights by exhibiting “deliberate indifference” and failing to follow prison policy in
dealing with altercations which occurred while he was a pre-trial detainee at the Dorchester
County Detention Center. The Report recommended that the court grant Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 39] and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 53].
The court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. “The Court is
not bound by the recommendation of the magistrate judge but, instead, retains responsibility for
the final determination.” Wallace v. Hous. Auth., 791 F. Supp. 137, 138 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing

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Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976)). The court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections
are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
DISCUSSION
The court incorporates by reference the Magistrate Judge’s statement of the facts. [Doc.
60, at 1-3].
After receiving the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on the pending
motions, Plaintiff timely filed objections.

[Doc. 62].

Failure to file specific objections

constitutes a waiver of a party’s right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the
recommendation is accepted by the district judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91,
94 n.4 (4th Cir. 1984). In the absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation, this court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the
recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
Upon review, this court finds that the majority of Plaintiff’s objections are non-specific,
unrelated to the dispositive portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, or
merely restate his claims. However, the court was able to discern two specific objections to
portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff specifically objects that the Magistrate Judge failed to properly consider
Plaintiff’s contention that his Complaint may be construed to seek damages for a due process
violation in connection with his disciplinary conviction arising out of the November 13, 2010,
incident because Plaintiff never received the appropriate forms to appeal it.

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Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record indicates that on
November 13, 2010, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation where several inmates entered
Plaintiff’s cell, allegedly assaulting him.

Plaintiff received a disciplinary conviction in

connection with this incident. Subsequently, on November 15, 2010, and December 3, 2010,
Plaintiff requested forms to appeal his disciplinary conviction in connection with the November
13th incident, however he allegedly never received them.
The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff is barred from recovering damages on his §
1983 civil rights claim arising from his alleged unconstitutional disciplinary conviction. In
making this observation, the Magistrate Judge noted “that a Plaintiff cannot recover damages on
a § 1983 civil rights claim for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction without first having that
conviction reversed, expunged, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.” See Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Assuming that Plaintiff is correct in his assertions that he

never received the proper forms to appeal his disciplinary conviction, which assertions are
disputed by Defendants, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he ever sought relief from
the conviction through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, this court finds that
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’ failure to provide him with proper appeal forms are
not dispositive to the resolution of his § 1983 claim.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge

appropriately found that Plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages on his § 1983 civil
rights claim for an allegedly unconstitutional disciplinary conviction because that conviction has
not been reversed, expunged, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.
Plaintiff also objects that the Magistrate Judge erred in not fully addressing his claims for
deliberate indifference. To hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional violation of a pre-trial
detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, a plaintiff must show that the official obdurately and

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wantonly failed to take precautions for the prisoner’s safety in deliberate indifference to a
specific risk of known harm. See Matheny v. Fields, No. 4:09-cv-644-RBH, 2010 WL 844600,
at *6 (D.S.C. 2010) (citing Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 828 (1991)). Additionally, negligence is not actionable under § 1983, whether in the
context of prisoner failure to protect cases under the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986) (citing Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986)).
Plaintiff contends that, with respect to the July 13, 2010, incident, Defendants exhibited
deliberate indifference by failing to protect him while he was housed in protective custody.
Plaintiff asserts that, since he was housed in protective custody, he was afforded more protection
than the average inmate. First, nothing in the record explicitly suggests these Defendants knew
that Plaintiff was housed in protective custody, since the incident occurred during recreation
time. Second, even if Defendants knew Plaintiff was under protective custody, Plaintiff still fails
to show that Defendants were aware of any specific risk as required to exhibit deliberate
indifference. Based on the evidence in this case, Plaintiff has neither shown that Defendants
exhibited deliberate indifference nor that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 39] and
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 53]. This action is hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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United States District Judge

June 5, 2012
Greenville, South Carolina

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