Brunson et al v. School District of Fairfield County, The et al

Filing 53

ORDER AND OPINION granting 28 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Honorable Margaret B Seymour on 1/31/2013.(asni, ) (Main Document 53 replaced on 2/1/2013) (asni, ). Modified to replace document to correct case caption on 2/1/2013 (asni, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Sharon Brunson, Annie Crandle,
and Patricia Patterson,

)
) C/A No. 0:11-1794-MBS
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ORDER AND OPINION
The School District of Fairfield County,
)
and Patrice Robinson, in her official
)
capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)
On June 9, 2011, Plaintiffs Sharon Brunson,1 Annie Crandle, and Patricia Patterson brought
this action against their former employer, Defendant The School District of Fairfield County
(“District”), and the Superintendent for the District, Defendant Patrice Robinson, in the Court of
Common Pleas for Fairfield County, South Carolina. Plaintiffs, who were employed pursuant to
one-year contracts, allege that their contracts were not renewed and that they were terminated for
exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association (First Cause of
Action). Plaintiffs further allege that they were discharged in violation of the public policy of South
Carolina (Second Cause of Action); that they were wrongfully terminated in breach of Defendant
District’s contractual obligations (Third Cause of Action); that the violation of their rights arise
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Cause of Action); that Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs’
contractual employment relations (Fifth Cause of Action); that Defendants gave false and defamatory
information regarding Plaintiffs (Sixth Cause of Action); and that Defendants engaged in civil
1

Plaintiff Brunson no longer is a party to this litigation.

conspiracy for the purpose of effecting Plaintiffs’ termination from employment (Seventh Cause of
Action). Defendants removed the action to this court on July 25, 2011, on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1441, and 1367.
This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which motion
was filed on July 30, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion on
October 3, 2012, to which Defendants filed a reply on October 15, 2012. The court held a hearing
on November 8, 2012.
I. FACTS
The facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint. In 2007, Samantha Ingram, Ph.D. was hired
as Superintendent for the District. She was tasked with improving the District’s poor educational
status and financial problems. Compl. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 1-1). Ingram hired a team of management
administrators, including Plaintiffs, to help her in redirecting the District.2 Id. ¶ 6. As part of their
employment, Plaintiffs provided information and reports to the School Board regarding policies and
procedures being implemented by Ingram. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs also assisted in making procedural
modifications under the direction of Ingram. Id. ¶ 8. According to Plaintiffs, they performed so well
that the District won an award for its efforts and the economic condition of the District improved
dramatically. Id. ¶ 9.
Eventually, however, the School Board became hostile to Ingram and decided to replace her.
Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs allege that the School Board took steps to isolate Ingram from her management

2

According to Defendants, Plaintiff Brunson was employed as an accounting manager who reported
to the Assistant Superintendent for Finance and Operations. Plaintiff Crandle was employed as
Assistant Superintendent for School Improvement. Plaintiff Patterson was employed as Secondary
Instructional Leader.
2

team, including Plaintiffs, and subsequently refused to approve Plaintiffs’ recommendations.
According to Plaintiffs, the School Board retaliated against Plaintiffs and conspired to terminate
them because they were politically associated with Ingram. Id. ¶ 11-13. On March 30, 2009, Ingram
recommended Plaintiffs be rehired for school year 2009-2010, but the School Board declined to
renew their administrative contracts.3 Plaintiffs allege that this was because of their association with
Ingram. Id. ¶ 16-17.
II. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Defendants filed their summary judgment motion as to all claims.
Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendants’ arguments regarding interference with contractual and
employment relations (Fifth Cause of Action), defamation (Sixth Cause of Action), or civil
conspiracy (Seventh Cause of Action). Counsel affirmed at the hearing that Plaintiffs had abandoned
these claims. Accordingly, the court turns to the remaining causes of action.
A.

First Amendment Claim (First and Fourth Causes of Action)
Although Plaintiffs allege violation of their right to free speech, they have identified no

speech that was suppressed by Defendants. Rather, the gravamen of the complaint is that they were
terminated for political reasons and because of their association with Ingram.
A public employee may not, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be
terminated for her political affiliation or lack thereof. Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir.
2007) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1976)). “[T]he First Amendment forbids
government officials to discharge or threaten to discharge public employees solely for not being

3

Defendants represent that Plaintiffs Crandle and Patterson were offered teaching contracts pursuant
to the South Carolina Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 59-24-15.
3

supporters of the political party in power, unless party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the position involved.” Id. (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1990)).
These cases concern the political practice of patronage, or conditioning public employment on party
membership or support. Patronage violates the First Amendment because of the “restraint it places
on freedoms of belief and association.” Id. (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355). Because patronage
forces employees to choose either to affiliate with a particular party or risk losing their jobs, it
compels speech and belief. Id. (citing Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356-57). However, patronage dismissals
of individuals in policymaking positions are constitutional “to the end that representative
government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new
administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate.” Id. (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at
367).

Elrod has come to stand for the proposition that under the First Amendment, “a

nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee” cannot be “discharged or threatened with
discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing on the sole ground of his political beliefs.”
Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 385 (4th Cir. 2009).
In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980), the Court held that “the ultimate inquiry is not
whether the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the question is
whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public office involved.” The rule of Elrod and Brandi was extended
in Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990), to encompass “promotion, transfer,
recall, and hiring decisions based on party affiliation and support[.]” Where there is no significant
question about the essential nature of an employee’s position, the court should determine the ultimate
issue of whether the position is protected from patronage dismissal. Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d
4

1329, 1336 n.9 (4th Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds, Jenkins v. Medford, 199 F.3d 115
(4th Cir. 1997).
In the Fourth Circuit, a court must first “examin[e] whether the position at issue, no matter
how policy-influencing or confidential it may be, relates to partisan political interests . . . or
concerns.” Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 960 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134,
141 (4th Cir. 1990)). In particular, the court must consider whether the position “involve[s]
government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or
their implementation [.]” Id. (quoting Stott, 916 F.2d at 141-42). If the position satisfies the first
part of the analysis, the court next must “examine the particular responsibilities of the position to
determine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to confidential information, a communicator,
or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally appropriate
requirement.” Id. (quoting Stott, 916 F.2d at 142). In judging whether the particular responsibilities
of a position meet this test, “courts focus on the powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the
functions performed by a particular occupant of that office.” Id. (quoting Stott, 916 F.2d at 142).
Even “if an officeholder performs fewer or less important functions than usually attend his position,
he may still be exempt from the prohibition against political terminations if his position inherently
encompasses tasks that make his political affiliation an appropriate requirement for effective
performance.” Id. (quoting Stott, 916 F.2d at 142).
In determining whether a particular position is that of a policymaker, “[a]n employee with
responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope” is more likely to be a policymaker,
and “consideration should also be given to whether the employee acts as an advisor or formulates
plans for the implementation of broad goals.” Id. (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368). Other relevant
5

factors in distinguishing a policymaker from a nonpolicymaker include: “relative pay, technical
competence, power to control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public
perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials and responsiveness to partisan
politics and political leaders.” Id. at 960-61 (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807
F.2d 236, 242 (1st Cir. 1986)).
Defendants contend that the positions at issue satisfy the two-prong Stott test. As to the first
prong, Defendants assert that each Plaintiff’s position involved decisionmaking on issues where
there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation. Defendants note that
education is a partisan issue, and observe that there existed a substantial disagreement among
members of the School Board and administration regarding the efficacy and cost of certain Districtwide tests implemented by Ingram.
As to the second prong, Defendants argue that each Plaintiff held responsibilities of
policymaker. Regarding Plaintiff Crandle, Defendants assert that she was on a leadership team,
reported directly to Ingram, and was required to attend all School Board meetings. In addition, her
position involved acting as an advisor or formulating plans for the implementation of broad goals.
She supervised principals to ensure that they had the resources they required. She made school visits
with a team from the District level to verify that the curriculum was being adhered to. She also
identified and addressed the need for professional development and other such duties.
Regarding Plaintiff Patterson, Defendants observe that she attended all School Board
meetings; monitored compliance with School Board policies and Department of Education
requirements by middle, high, and career center schools; monitored and approved budgets and
expenditures; made presentations to the School Board; worked with community organizations,
6

participated in the selection of instructional materials, and coordinated professional development.
Plaintiff Paterson also was involved in the hiring of personnel and served on state-wide educational
committees.
The court agrees with Defendants that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public offices involved. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is granted as to this issue.
B.

Public Policy Discharge Claim (Second Cause of Action)
The public policy exception to at-will employment was recognized by the South Carolina

Supreme Court in Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985).

In

Ludwick, the supreme court held that a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge arises when
a retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee constitutes a violation of a clear mandate of public
policy. Id. at 216. In South Carolina, the public policy exception has been applied “in cases where
an employer requires an employee to violate the law, and to situations where the reason for the
employee’s termination was itself a violation of the criminal law.” Nolte v. Gibbs Int’l, Inc., 515
S.E.2d 101, 103 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 456 S.E.2d 907,
909 (S.C. 1995)).
The court will assume for purposes of summary judgment that the public policy exception
to at-will employment is applicable in this case where Plaintiffs were employed pursuant to a
contract for a definite term. See Stiles v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 516 S.E.2d 449 (S.C. 1999)
(extending Ludwig to employment contracts that do not provide for a specific termination date, but
rather contain a notice provision); but see Cunningham v. Anderson County, 2013 WL 163836 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2013) (finding that employee who never claimed to be at-will employee may not obtain
7

relief based on the law governing at-will employment) (opinion not released for publication in
permanent law reports, and thus subject to revision or withdrawal).
Plaintiffs do not allege that they were asked to violate a law or that the decision not to renew
their administrative contracts violated a criminal law. Moreover, there is no action for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy when the employee has an existing remedy for a discharge that
allegedly violates rights other than the right to the employment itself. See Epps v. Clarendon
County, 405 S.E.2d 386, 387 (S.C. 1991). In this case, Plaintiffs have asserted their rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to this issue.
C.

Wrongful Termination Claim (Third Cause of Action)
Plaintiffs contend that their “pretextual termination was based upon breach of contract,

affiliation and association with the prior Superintendent Ingram and their right to freedom of speech;
all of which constitutes wrongful discharge and violates the Defendants’ duty to act in good faith.
Although it is not clear, the court construes Plaintiffs’ claim as alleging Defendants breached their
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the employment contracts.
Although implied covenants are not favored in the law, . . . there exists in every
contract an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Breach of this covenant
has been recognized as a cause of action in the employment context in South
Carolina. Specifically, [South Carolina courts] have stated, “[W]e find no
authoritative case law holding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
not applicable to employment contracts that alter the employee's at-will status.”
Williams v. Riedman, 529 S.E.2d 28 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “‘[i]n
the absence of an express provision therefor, the law will imply an agreement by the parties to a
contract to do and perform those things that according to reason and justice they should do in order
to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made.’” Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson

8

Motors, Inc., 147 S.E.2d 481, 484 (S.C. 1966) (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 328).
In this case, Plaintiffs’ one-year administrative contracts were honored. At the conclusion
of the contractual period, Plaintiffs were offered teaching contracts. Plaintiffs have provided no
authority, and the court is aware of no basis under the law, entitling Plaintiffs to renewal of their
administrative contracts. Further, Defendants lawfully considered Plaintiffs political affiliations in
determining whether Plaintiffs could effectively perform in the positions for which Ingram hired
them. The court discerns no basis to conclude that Defendants acted in bad faith.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 28) is granted
as to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action. The remaining causes of action have
been withdrawn by Plaintiffs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Margaret B. Seymour
Senior United States District Judge

Columbia, South Carolina
January 31, 2013.

9