Smith v. Murphy et al
Filing
102
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 08/29/2014. (bshr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Steve Randall Smith,
Plaintiff
v.
Major N.C. Murphy; Captain Charles Grant;
DeputyT.J. Murphy; and Alex Underwood,
Defendants.
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C/A: 0:11-2395-JFA
ORDER
GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Steve Randall Smith, was arrested for assault and battery on September 12,
2009 at the I-77 Speedway in Chester, South Carolina. In 2011, plaintiff initiated this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was subjected to false arrest without probable
cause and constitutionally excessive force during the course of his arrest. He also asserted
related state law claims against defendant Alex Underwood, Sheriff of Chester County.
After discovery was concluded, the parties prevailed upon the court to stay this action so that
the underlying state court criminal charges could be resolved. Finally, in August 2013, the
plaintiff’s state charges were dismissed.
Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims. For
the reasons which follow, the court will grant summary judgment as to the defendants on the
Fourth Amendment false arrest claim and the state law false arrest claim against Sheriff
Underwood. The court will deny summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment excessive
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force claim and state law battery claim.
B ACKGROUND
On the night of September 12, 2009, plaintiff was participating in the annual Shrine
race at the I-77 Speedway, a dirt track raceway in Chester, South Carolina. According to the
owner of the track, the Shrine Race is one of the bigger races held, with approximately 4,000
people in attendance. The gates open at 4:00 p.m. and the Shrine Race usually lasts until as
late as one or two o’clock in the morning. Track policy permits spectators and crew members
to bring an unlimited quantity of alcohol, as long as they do not bring liquor or glass-bottled
beer. Traditionally during races, the Chester County Sheriff’s Office has assigned police
officers to the race track to provide security.
On the night in question, there were to be six or seven vehicle divisions for the main
race and two qualifying races for each division. The prize money for the winner of plaintiff’s
division was $3,000. Defendants suggest that this prize for the Shrine Races is in the top
percentage of dirt tracks in the relevant racing circuit.
Plaintiff and Chad Paxton were both participants in the Late Model division. During
the qualifying race for their division (which determines positioning for the main race),
plaintiff and Paxton were side-by-side leading the pack. When the two came out of a turn,
Paxton used the front left fender of his car to push the right rear quarter panel of plaintiff’s
car. This caused plaintiff’s car to spin and turn headfirst into the wall, which he struck.
Although two wheels of plaintiff’s car left the ground, the car did not flip. Because of the
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damage to his car, plaintiff was unable to complete the qualifying race, thus placing him in
a disadvantageous position for the main race in the event he was able to repair his car in time.
Significant for purposes of this case, plaintiff eventually pulled his damaged car into
the pit area in the infield track, and began walking toward the scale area to confront Paxton.
The events that occurred from this point forward are sharply disputed by the parties. Plaintiff
essentially contends that the defendants—who were all uniformed law enforcement officers
providing security for the race—dragged him down from behind and began beating him for
no apparent reason. Plaintiff has secured the affidavits of numerous patrons who attended
the race which are said to verify the plaintiff’s version of events.
Defendants present a sharply contradictory series of events. They contend that around
the time that plaintiff was walking directly toward Paxton’s car, a track employee informed
Deputy T.J. Murphy that plaintiff was “probably going to come up here (to the scale area)
and cause a problem.”1 Deputy T.J. Murphy notified his father, Major N.C. Murphy, and at
least one of the officers relayed the same information to defendant Charles Grant, a third law
enforcement officer on the scene.2 Upon receipt of this information and observing plaintiff
walking towards Paxton, Deputy T.J. Murphy, in full police uniform, walked up to the
1
The scale area is a part of the infield, where the cars are weighed.
2
This racetrack employee was later identified as one “Charles Johnson.” Plaintiff makes much of
the fact that there was no racetrack employee by that name and suggests that Murphy has fabricated his
encounter with Johnson in an effort to justify the arrest and scuffle that ensued. It appears to be undisputed,
however, that Deputy T.J. Murphy notified the other officers that a racetrack employee had warned him of
ensuing violence, and these officers reasonably acted upon information provided by their colleague. It is well
settled that a law enforcement officer’s perceptions of the objective facts of the incidents in question are
relevant to the qualified immunity inquiry. Roland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994).
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plaintiff and told him that “they did not need any problems” and told the plaintiff to return
to his pit area. Despite this command, plaintiff allegedly walked around Deputy T.J. Murphy
and continued his approach toward Paxton’s car. Murphy attempted to grab the plaintiff to
prevent him from approaching Paxton’s car, but plaintiff shrugged away from Deputy T.J.
Murphy’s grasp. According to the officers, plaintiff approached Paxton’s window and
appeared to grab Paxton’s helmet and shake it. T.J. Murphy also thought that plaintiff looked
as though he were about to strike Paxton. Murphy thereupon grabbed plaintiff from behind
and pulled him away from Paxton’s car. Murphy and Paxton then fell to the ground and as
Murphy tried to get up and get a better position, plaintiff grabbed hold of both of Deputy T.J.
Murphy’s legs. At some point during the scuffle, Major Murphy and Captain Grant arrived
and tried to help control and handcuff plaintiff. According to the officers, plaintiff actively
resisted their attempts to cuff him, and kept trying to get up.
Eventually, plaintiff was handcuffed and cited for assault and battery and taken to the
Chester County Detention Center (“CCDC”). As noted previously, the state criminal charges
against the plaintiff were eventually dismissed. Following his release from CCDC, plaintiff
was seen by a physician, who diagnosed plaintiff with a right elbow contusion and contusion
on the ribs. Plaintiff contends that he additionally suffered two black eyes, abrasions, and
“dismissed use of his right arm from hyper-extension of his elbow.”
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against deputies Charles Grant, N.C. Murphy, and T.J. Murphy, in their individual
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capacities.3 Plaintiff also asserts analogous state law claims for false arrest and battery
against Sheriff Alex Underwood in his official capacity. The state law claims are brought
pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act which expressly provides that the Sheriff is
the proper defendant as to the state law claims.
On this record, the court determines that the defendants are all entitled to summary
judgment on the federal and state false arrest claims, but not the federal excessive force and
state battery claim.
S TANDARDS OF L AW
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper
when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material
fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Spriggs v.
Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if sufficient evidence
favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49.
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According to the defendants, the plaintiff has misidentified the father-son team that was included
in the security detail. Defendants assert that the person referred to in the caption as “N.C. Murphy” is Major
William Murphy and that the person referred to as “T.J. Murphy” is actually Torrey Murphy. Inasmuch as
no effort has been made by the plaintiff to amend the complaint to conform to facts uncovered during
discovery, the court will deal with the parties as alleged in the complaint.
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The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden and a
properly supported motion is before the court, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, but he “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere
speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213,
214 (4th Cir. 1985).
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects governmental officials performing
discretionary functions from liability for civil damages where “their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). When an official
properly asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the official is entitled to summary
judgment if either: (1) the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not
present the elements necessary to state a violation of a constitutional right; or (2) the right
was not clearly established, such that it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that
his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231–32, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009). As explained by the Fourth Circuit in Maciariello v. Sumner,
973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992), “[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas;
they are liable for transgressing bright lines.”
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C LAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The False Arrest Claim
It is well settled that when analyzing § 1983 claims, the court is required to view the
scene as perceived by the officers at the time, and not with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.
As indicated in the factual recitation above, the law enforcement officers assigned to provide
security on the night of the race were faced with a potentially volatile situation. They were
in charge of maintaining order for a crowd of approximately 4,000 people and it was
reasonable for the officers to assume that some of the spectators had probably imbibed in
alcohol on a Saturday night at a dirt racetrack. They saw one driver’s car pushed to the wall,
thereby causing significant damage, a not uncommon occurrence on dirt tracks where traction
is poor and visibility is impaired due to dust. At least one representative of the racetrack had
informed the officers that trouble was afoot.
On this record, the court determines that the law enforcement officers had probable
cause to arrest the plaintiff for assault and battery. While the precise events following the
collision on the track are sharply in dispute, it can be argued that plaintiff, by his own
admission, was extremely upset after the accident and was quite obviously headed directly
toward Paxton’s car in an effort to voice his displeasure. Whether he was partially inside of
Paxton’s car as the officers contend, or merely outside of the car making menacing gestures,
the officers had probable cause to arrest him for at least an assault. For this reason, the court
will grant summary judgment to the defendants on the § 1983 false arrest claim.
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Even if the officers did not have probable cause for an arrest, they are immune from
suit under the facts alleged here because of qualified immunity. The court cannot say that
the law enforcement officers violated the clearly established federal law in deciding to arrest
the plaintiff for assault and battery.
The Excessive Force Claim
According to plaintiff’s version of the events, even after he was subdued by the four
officers participating in the arrest, the officers continued to pummel the plaintiff with their
fists and shout obscenities towards him. The law is clearly established that an arrestee, after
being clearly subdued and handcuffed, should not be subjected to continued blows by the fist.
This being the case, the court cannot say that the defendants enjoy qualified immunity as to
the excessive force claim.
One other issue of the excessive force claim bears mention. At the time of the events
in question here (September 12, 2009), it was the law of the Fourth Circuit that, in a § 1983
case, if the plaintiff’s injuries were said to be “de minimis,” then the claim failed as a matter
of law. Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994). Five months later, the United
States Supreme Court, in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010), rejected the Fourth Circuit’s
de minimis rule and held that even plaintiffs in § 1983 actions who receive only de minimis
injuries could still maintain an action for excessive force. The defendants argued that at the
time of the arrest and ensuing scuffle, the established law in the Fourth Circuit was that an
arrestee who maintained only de minimis injuries could not survive summary judgment in
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a § 1983 excessive force claim. And, because this court is required to view the law as it
existed at the time of the event, this case must be decided upon pre-Wilkins law that prevailed
in the Fourth Circuit at the time. Hill v. Crumb, 727 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that,
in considering a defense of qualified immunity, Wilkins (and the abrogation of the de minimis
injury standard) does not apply retroactively to allegedly tortuous conduct that occurred prior
to that decision.) Id. at 322.
Defendants contend that the plaintiff’s injuries are “classic de minimis injuries.” The
court disagrees. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the court must view
them at this juncture, the facts indicate that plaintiff’s injuries, particularly regarding his
elbow dysfunction, constitute more than de minimis injury so as to survive summary
judgment.
T HE S TATE L AW C LAIMS
Plaintiff has asserted state law claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity, for
the actions of his deputies allegedly committing a battery and false arrest on the night in
question. Inasmuch as the court has determined that the officers did, in fact, have probable
cause for the arrest of the plaintiff, the state false arrest claim must fail. The state law battery
claim, which is roughly parallel to the federal excessive force claim, shall survive summary
judgment.
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For all the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 72) is granted in part and denied in part as set out herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
August 29, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge
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