Mead v. Gaston County Police Department et al

Filing 44

ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE denying 29 Motion to Dismiss and transferring the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 02/27/2012.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Michael Mead,

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Plaintiff,
vs.

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GASTON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, WILLIAM J. FARLEY,
Individually, and in his capacity as the Chief of
Police for the Gaston County Police Department,
JAMES W. BUIE, Individually, and in his
capacity as the Assistant Chief of Police for the
Gaston County Police Department, CALVIN
SHAW, Individually, and in his capacity as
Captain of the Gaston County Police
Department, CHRISTOPHER REYNOLDS,
Individually, and in his capacity as a Sergeant
for the Gaston County Police Department,
CHRISTIE L. RHONEY, Individually, and in
her capacity as a Sergeant for the Gaston County
Police Department, REGINALD BLOOM,
Individually, and in his official capacity as a
Detective for the Gaston County Police
Department, CHRISTOPHER HASKETT,
Individually, and in his capacity as a Detective
for the Gaston County Police Department,
WILLIAM E. HOWELL, Individually, and in
his capacity as a Detective for the Gaston County
Police Department, WILLIAM SAMPSON,
Individually, and in his capacity as a Detective
for the Gaston County Police Department,
CHRISTOPHER McAULAY, Individually, and
in his capacity as a Detective for the Gaston
County Police Department, MATTHEW
HENSLEY, Individually, and in his capacity as a
Detective for the Gaston County Police
Department, J.K. SHAW, Individually, and in
his capacity as a Detective for the Gaston County
Police Department, WILLIAM GALLOWAY,
Individually, and in his capacity as a Detective
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C/A No.: 0:11-cv-3017-JFA

ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE

for the Gaston County Police Department,
CLYDE PUTNAM, Individually, and in his
capacity as an Employee for the Gaston County
Police Department, J.D. COSTNER,
Individually, and as an Officer for the Gaston
County Police Department, MARK STEWART,
Individually, and in his capacity as an Officer
for the Gaston County Police Department,
RENEE MULLIS, Individually, and in her
Capacity as an Investigator / Agent for the
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations,
JOHN and JANE DOE, Individually, and
in their capacities as employees of Gaston
County Police Department and/or the North
Carolina State Bureau of Investigations, and
DOE BOND COMPANY,

Defendants.

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This matter comes before the court pursuant to the defendants’ motion to dismiss
(ECF No. 29). The parties have fully briefed this matter, and the court also invited oral
argument. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that venue in the District of
South Carolina is improper but denies the motion to dismiss and elects instead to
transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this action in this court against the Gaston County Police

Department, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations, and numerous individual
defendants alleging violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 as well as state law claims
under the law of the state of North Carolina. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully
arrested, incarcerated, prosecuted for murder as a result of the defendants’ actions.

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Plaintiff is a resident of South Carolina. Plaintiff alleges that his girlfriend, Lucy
Johnson, was a resident of Gaston County, North Carolina. Johnson’s body was found in
the remains of her home after a fire. At the time of her death, Johnson was pregnant with
a child identified by DNA to be a match with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that the

defendants then began to investigate him as a suspect for that member.
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants came to his house in South Carolina to gather
evidence and that they interviewed witnesses in South Carolina including his minor son.
The defendants conducted several searches in South Carolina, and Plaintiff consented to
some searches while others were conducted pursuant to warrants.

The defendants

collected some evidence in South Carolina, but they evaluated all the evidence at their
offices in Gaston County North Carolina.

The defendants also conducted an

investigation at the site of Johnson’s home in North Carolina, which was the site of the
murder. They interviewed witnesses in North Carolina and directed the investigation
from their offices in North Carolina.

All of the defendants are residents of North

Carolina.
The Gaston Police defendants1 now ask this court to dismiss the action based on
improper venue. The defendants also—“out of an abundance of caution”—challenge
process and service of process. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 29.) Finally,
the defendants contend that the police department is not subject to suit and therefore that
this court has no personal jurisdiction over defendant Gaston County Police Department.
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The Gaston Police defendants include the Gaston Police Department, William J. Farley, James W. Buie, Calvin
Shaw, Christopher Reynolds, Christie L. Rhoney, Reginald Bloom, Christopher Haskett, William E. Howell,
William Sampson, Christopher McAulay, Matthew Hensley, J.K. Shaw, William Galloway, Clyde Putnam, J.D.
Costner, and Mark Stewart. The remaining defendants have not appeared.
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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
In a case that involves numerous defendants, upon a challenge to venue, the

plaintiff bears the burden of proving that venue is proper as to each claim and as to each
defendant. Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306
(D.S.C. 1992). In a federal question case such as this one where there is not a separate
venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides the applicable venue provisions:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in
the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (3) a judicial
district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which
the action may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2006).
If venue is improper, the court must then determine whether to transfer or to
dismiss a case. Jarrett v. North Carolina, 868 F. Supp. 155, 159 (D.S.C. 1994) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a)). If a district court determines that venue is improper, it may, “if it be
in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could
have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The decision to transfer a case or dismiss it is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Espinoza, 641
F.2d 153, 162 (4th Cir. 1981). A district court does not abuse its discretion when it
denies a plaintiff’s request to transfer rather than dismiss a case when it determines that
“the plaintiff’s attorney could reasonably have foreseen that the venue in which he filed
was improper.” Jarrett, 868 F. Supp. at 160–61 (citing Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
991 F.2d 1195, 1201 (4th Cir. 1993).

On the other hand, numerous courts have
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determined that it is in the interest of justice to transfer a case to a proper forum rather
than dismiss a case where the statute of limitations might prevent a plaintiff from
instituting a new suit. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 430 n.7 (1965);
14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3827 n.31 (3d. ed.
2011) (collecting cases).
III.

DISCUSSION
First, the court finds that venue in this district is improper. Both parties agree that

venue in this circumstance is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), but they disagree
whether a “substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred” in the District
of South Carolina. The defendants argue that a substantial part of the relevant events did
not occur in this district. The defendants note that Plaintiff alleges that they mishandled
the investigation, and they argue that all of the decisions surrounding the investigation
took place in North Carolina. Though there were some investigations in South Carolina,
the defendants argue that these were merely ancillary to the main investigation that
occurred in North Carolina. Plaintiff concentrates on the aspects of the investigation that
took place in South Carolina and details the numerous allegations stemming from
activities within this district. (See Pl.’s Mem. Opp. 6, ECF No. 33).
Though some action did take place in this district, the overwhelming majority of
actions occurred in Gaston County, North Carolina. The core allegations in this case stem
from an allegedly mishandled investigation—an investigation that was directed from
North Carolina and in which North Carolina defendants made the key decisions in North
Carolina. The murder scene was in North Carolina and evidence gathered from that
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scene—as well as any gathered in South Carolina—was evaluated at the defendant’s
offices in Gaston County. Finally, the subsequent indictment, incarceration, and trial all
took place in North Carolina. Though some investigation did occur in South Carolina,
the court finds that those activities do not constitute a substantial part of the events giving
rise to this claim. As a result, the court finds that venue in the District of South Carolina
is improper.
Next, the court must determine whether to transfer or dismiss the case. The
court’s power to transfer or dismiss a case pursuant to § 1406(a) arises when a defendant
timely objects to venue. See 28 U.S.C § 1406(b). In this case, the Gaston Police
defendants filed a motion to dismiss seeking outright dismissal of the action and arguing
that plaintiff should have reasonably foreseen that venue in this district was improper.
Defendants argue that this case is similar to Jarrett, where the district court dismissed the
case because of a lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue where the defendant’s
had only one “isolated contact” with South Carolina. 868 F. Supp. at 159.
Plaintiff argues that the court should consider transfer rather than dismissal of the
case. Plaintiff asserts that even if events in South Carolina do not rise to the level of
substantial, they do support a finding that plaintiff’s attempt to lay venue in this district
was made in good faith. Finally, Plaintiff argues against dismissal because the statute of
limitations may bar plaintiff from re-filing this case should it be dismissed. Plaintiff
points to the date of arrest, January 9, 2009, as a critical date and one where the statute of
limitations may have begun to run.

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The court finds that transfer rather than dismissal of the action is the appropriate
remedy. While the events in this case are insufficient to support venue in this district, the
numerous events that did occur in this state indicate that the plaintiff acted in good faith
in filing the case in this district. Also, unlike in Jarrett, the defendants in this case
challenge personal jurisdiction as to only one of the many defendants. See Jarrett, 868 F.
Supp. at 157 (finding that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over any of the
defendants). Moreover, Plaintiff points to a potential statute of limitations bar if the case
is dismissed, and the application of a statute of limitations has been one of the traditional
grounds cited for transfer rather than dismissal.
As noted above, the primary allegations in this case are directed at actions that
occurred in Gaston County, North Carolina. Accordingly, the court finds that the case
should be transferred to the Western District of North Carolina.
Finally, the court need not address defendants’ arguments regarding personal
jurisdiction as well as process and service of process. While a court will typically
consider jurisdiction first, the Supreme Court has recognized that a court may consider
venue before considering personal jurisdiction where the jurisdiction issue is novel or
complex. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) (noting that
the case before it was an appropriate one in which to reverse the normal order, since the
Court thought it clear that venue was improper while the question of personal jurisdiction
would have raised a novel constitutional question). Here, the personal jurisdiction issue
requires the application of disputed North Carolina law to one of the defendants.
Therefore, the court has chosen to address the venue objection first. As to process and
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service of process issues, the court merely notes that plaintiff’s time to effect proper
service has not expired and plaintiff appears engaged in ongoing efforts to effect such
service prior to that deadline.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court denies defendant’s motion to dismiss

the case and elects instead to transfer the case.
It is, therefore, ordered that this action be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
and that the Clerk of this court is directed to transmit to the Clerk of that court the
complete record in this case, including all papers filed, orders entered, and proceedings
had in this action in this court, certified under the seal of this court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 27, 2012
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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