Hutchison v. K-Mart Corporation
Filing
32
OPINION and ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS adopting in part 27 Report and Recommendations, granting 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie on 5/29/2012. (cbru, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Willie H. Hutchinson,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
K-Mart Corporation, et. al.,
)
)
Defendants.1
)
__________________________________ )
C/A NO. 0:12-cv-85-CMC-PJG
OPINION and ORDER
Through this action, Plaintiff Willie H. Hutchinson (“Hutchinson”) seeks recovery from his
former employer, Defendant K-Mart Corporation (“K-Mart”), for alleged wrongful termination.
Hutchinson, who is self-represented, alleges that he was terminated on December 10, 2008, either
in retaliation for his earlier complaint of sexual harassment, or based on his race, African American,
or for both reasons. The matter is before the court on K-Mart’s motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 13. For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is granted and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), DSC, this matter
was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett for pre-trial proceedings and a Report
and Recommendation (“Report”). Magistrate Judge Gossett issued a Report on May 4, 2012,
recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted to the extent Hutchinson was seeking relief
under federal law (specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
(“Title VII”)). Dkt. No. 27. She further recommended that any remaining state law claim(s) be
1
The court uses the caption as reflected in the complaint. Despite the inclusion of “et al.”
and plural “Defendants,” only one Defendant is named: K-Mart Corporation.
1
remanded to state court. An attachment to the Report advised the parties of the procedures and
requirements for filing objections to the Report and the serious consequences of failing to do so.
Both parties filed timely objections.
STANDARD
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has
no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court.
See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo
determination of any portion of the Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is
made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the
Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b). The court reviews the Report only for clear error in the absence of an objection. See
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that “in the
absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead
must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.”) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
Hutchinson’s Objection
Hutchinson filed a timely objection asking the “Court to continue [his] complaint in a Civil
Court in [its] entirety.” Dkt. No. 31 at 1. The court construes this as an objection to dismissal of any
claim which may be asserted in the complaint.
Hutchinson’s objection includes references to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and the rights to equal protection and due process guaranteed by that amendment.
2
Following these references, Hutchinson states that he has “hard evidence in the form of audio
recordings of [K-Mart’s agents] blatantly engaging in discriminatory acts against Plaintiff, all of
which were stated in Plaintiff’s complaint.” Dkt. No. 31 at 2-3 (capitalization modified).
Hutchinson argues that his “complaint should not be dismissed in [its] entirety in the York County
. . . Court of Common Pleas where [he] initially filed [the] complaint in a timely manner.” Id. at 3.
He also includes what appears to be a quotation from an article regarding a pro se litigant’s
fundamental right to meaningful access to the court and quotations of 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(supplemental jurisdiction statute ) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (rule setting standard for review of
Reports). Hutchinson concludes by stating that he
filed suit in the state court within the three year [statute] of limitations on December
9, 2011. Therefore stating Plaintiff[’s] complaints [were] made clear in the history
of the case and summary of events of the facts of the case. I the Plaintiff humbly and
respectfully move the courts to continue Plaintiff[’s] case and that Plaintiff[’s]
complaint be decided by a jury of taxpaying citizens[.]
Dkt. No. 31 at 6 (capitalization modified).
Hutchinson’s references to the Fourteenth Amendment and rights guaranteed by that
amendment do not provide any basis for relief against K-Mart as it is a private entity, not a state or
subdivision of a state. To the extent the references are directed to this judicial proceeding,
Hutchinson’s argument is also unavailing. Hutchinson has not been treated differently than any other
litigant under similar circumstances and has been provided a full and fair opportunity to present his
case in accordance with the rules of this court.2 Thus, Hutchinson’s constitutionally-based arguments
2
For purposes of this discussion, the court assumes Hutchinson relies on the Fifth, rather
than the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to any argument directed to this judicial proceeding.
This is because the Fifth Amendment is directed to the federal government while the Fourteenth
Amendment is directed to the states and their political subdivisions.
3
do not suggest any reason why his federal claim should not be dismissed.
The most relevant portion of Hutchinson’s objection is in his concluding statement which
confirms his continued reliance on a three-year statute of limitations under South Carolina law.3 This
reliance is misplaced with respect to Hutchinson’s federal claim for reasons explained in the Report.
See Dkt. No. 27 at 3 (noting “Title VII provides a ninety-day limitations period within which to file
suit after receiving a right to sue letter” which “Hutchinson acknowledges . . . was mailed to him on
January 6, 2010[,]” thus this action was filed “twenty months late”).
Having fully considered Hutchinson’s objection to the recommended dismissal of his federal
claim, the court finds it to be without merit.
The court, therefore, adopts the Report’s
recommendation that Hutchinson’s Title VII claim be dismissed for the reasons set forth by the
Magistrate Judge.
II.
K-Mart’s Objection
K-Mart objects to the recommended remand of any state-law claim(s) which may be asserted
in Hutchinson’s complaint.4 K-Mart argues that any such claim is barred by the applicable statute
3
In his memorandum in response to K-Mart’s motion to dismiss, Hutchinson cites to and
relies on S.C. Code § 15-3-530(5), which sets a three-year limitation period for certain personal
injury claims. Hutchinson argues that this limitations period applies to any claims he might assert
because they involve “injury to the person or rights of another.” See Dkt. No. 17 at 2 (response to
K-Mart’s motion to dismiss). Hutchinson continues his reliance on a three-year statute of limitations
in his objection, although he does not cite any statutory authority. Dkt. No. 31 at 6.
4
Despite his reliance on a South Carolina statute of limitations, Hutchinson has not
identified any specific state law basis for his complaint. His arguments also suggest he is relying
solely on federal law for his substantive claims. For example, in his response to K-Mart’s motion
to dismiss, Hutchinson states that he is seeking relief under “Title VII, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, or the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.” Dkt. No. 17 at 2. Thus, it is not at all clear that Hutchinson is asserting a state
law claim. Moreover, several of the referenced federal laws could not be implicated by the
complaint, which alleges only that Hutchinson was terminated in retaliation for a complaint of sexual
harassment or because of his race or for both reasons.
4
of limitations based on Hutchinson’s own allegations because the only state law claim arguably
supported by the complaint is an action under S.C. Code. Ann. § 1-13-10 et seq., which is the state
law comparable to Title VII. As K-Mart notes, such an action must be commenced, at the latest,
within one year after the event to which the claim is directed. See Dkt. No. 30 at 5 (discussing S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-13-90(a), (d)(6)).5
As noted above, Hutchinson alleges he was terminated on December 10, 2008, but he did not
file this action until December 9, 2011. This is obviously more than one year after the complained
of termination. Thus, to the extent Hutchinson is asserting a state-law claim, the basis of the claim
would appear to be the statute most comparable to Title VII, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-10 et seq., which
claim would be clearly time-barred.
The court agrees that it would not be in the interest of judicial economy and would be unfair
to the parties to remand this case to state court when it is clear that any state-law claim arguably
suggested by the complaint is time-barred. The court, therefore, declines to adopt the Report’s
5
As with Title VII, South Carolina law requires employees to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing a civil action. See S.C. Code § 1-13-90(a) (requiring charge be filed with the
State Human Affairs Commission (“SHAC”) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory event).
Any civil action must be filed “within one year from the date of the violation alleged, or within one
hundred twenty days from the date the complainant’s charge is dismissed, whichever occurred
earlier[.]” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-90(d)(6) (allowing private action in equity under specified
circumstances).
Hutchinson has not provided proof that he filed a claim with SHAC. He did, however, attach
a right to sue letter from the EEOC to his memorandum in opposition to K-Mart’s motion to dismiss.
Dkt. No. 17-1 (response to motion to dismiss). That letter, mailed January 6, 2010, stated that the
EEOC was “closing its file” because “[t]he EEOC has adopted the findings of the state or local fair
employment agency that investigated this charge.” Id. Thus, it may support an inference that
Hutchinson did file a charge with SHAC. Unfortunately for Hutchinson, it also suggests that SHAC
dismissed Hutchinson’s charge on or before January 6, 2010, making the claim untimely for failing
to file it within 120 days of that dismissal. Even without that inference, any claim under Section 113-90(d)(6) is untimely because this action was not filed “within one year from the date of the
violation alleged.”
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recommendation that the court remand any state-law claim which may be alleged in the complaint.
Instead, the court grants K-Mart’s motion and dismisses the only state law claim which might
reasonably be inferred, a claim under S.C. Code § 1-13-10 et seq.6
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, K-Mart’s motion to dismiss is granted in full and this matter
is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Cameron McGowan Currie
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Columbia, South Carolina
May 29, 2012
6
While the court concludes that, under the circumstances presented here, it should exercise
its discretion to resolve any state law claim which may be asserted, it does not agree with K-Mart
that failure to address the state law claim would be an abuse of discretion. In this regard, the court
finds K-Mart’s reliance on Ketema v. Midwest Stamping, Inc., 180 Fed. Appx. 427 (4th Cir. 2006)
misplaced. In Ketema, the Fourth Circuit found that a district court abused its discretion by
dismissing plaintiff’s state law claims after resolving the federal claims where (1) the action had
been pending for over four years, (2) discovery was complete, (3) the matter would need to be refiled
in state court which would cause all parties to incur additional costs, and (4) the statute of limitations
had run while the matter was pending in federal court. In this case, (1) the motion to dismiss was
filed and the Report recommended it be granted as to the federal claim very early in the proceedings,
(2) little if any discovery has been completed, (3) the matter would be remanded to, rather than
refiled in, state court, thus minimizing costs, and (4) remand would not raise any statute of
limitations concerns as no new action would be instituted.
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