Jenkins v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 21

ORDER adopting 16 Report and Recommendation and affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Honorable David C. Norton on 02/21/2014. (gcle, 2/21/14)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
BETTY LOU JENKINS,
Claimant,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Respondent.

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No. 0:12-cv-02273-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on United States Magistrate Judge Paige J.
Gossett’s report and recommendation (“R&R”) that the court affirm the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny claimant Betty Lou Jenkins’
(“Jenkins”) application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Jenkins has filed
objections to the R&R. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R and
affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following background is drawn from the R&R.
A. Procedural History
Jenkins filed an application for DIB in September 2008, alleging that she had
been disabled since October 29, 2004. The Social Security Administration (“the
Agency”) denied Jenkins’ application both initially and on reconsideration. Jenkins
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and ALJ Frances
Williams presided over a hearing held on August 6, 2010. Tr. 25. In a decision issued on
September 3, 2010, the ALJ determined that Jenkins was not disabled. The Appeals

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Council denied review on June 21, 2012, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of
the Commissioner.
Jenkins filed this action for judicial review on August 8, 2012. Compl., ECF No.
1. On January 21, 2013, she filed a brief requesting that the Commissioner’s decision be
reversed and the case remanded to the Agency for further administrative proceedings.
Claimant’s Br., ECF No. 12. On March 6, 2013, the Commissioner filed a brief
contending that her decision should be upheld. Commissioner’s Br., ECF No. 13. On
December 4, 2013, the magistrate judge issued the instant R&R, recommending that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. R&R, ECF No. 16. Jenkins objected to portions
of the R&R on December 20, 2013. Claimant’s Objections, ECF No. 17. The
Commissioner replied to those objections on January 3, 2014. Commissioner’s Reply,
ECF No. 18. This matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for the court’s review.
B. Jenkins’ Medical History
Because Jenkins’ medical history is not relevant to the disposition of this case, the
court dispenses with a lengthy recitation thereof and notes only a few relevant facts.
Jenkins was fifty-eight years old on the date that she was last insured for DIB. Tr. 19.
She has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a teacher’s aide.
Id.
C. ALJ’s Findings
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.

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§ 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. The Social Security regulations establish a fivestep sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Under this process, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant: (1) is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpt. P, App’x 1, which warrants a finding of disability without considering vocational
factors; (4) if not, whether the claimant has an impairment which prevents her from
performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant is able to perform
other work considering both her remaining physical and mental capacities (defined by her
RFC) and her vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust
to a new job. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir.
1981). The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four steps of the inquiry,
while the burden shifts to the Commissioner for the final step. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d
1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992)).
To determine whether Jenkins was disabled from October 29, 2004, through the
date of her decision, the ALJ employed the statutorily-required five-step sequential
evaluation process. At step one, the ALJ found that Jenkins did not engage in substantial
gainful activity during the period at issue. Tr. 16. At step two, the ALJ found that
Jenkins suffered from the following severe impairments: obesity and osteoarthritis of the
small joints of the hands. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Jenkins’ impairments or
combination thereof did not meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in the
Agency’s Listing of Impairments. Tr. 17. Before reaching the fourth step, the ALJ
determined that Jenkins retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform

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unskilled medium work with a number of limitations. Tr. 17, 20. Specifically, the ALJ
found that Jenkins could lift and carry no more than 50 pounds occasionally and 25
pounds frequently; occasionally stoop, twist, crouch, kneel, crawl, and climb stairs or
ramps; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; perform fingering activities no more than
frequently; and never work around hazards such as heights or dangerous moving
machinery. Tr. 17. At step four, the ALJ found that Jenkins was unable to perform any
of her past relevant work. Tr. 19. Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ found that Jenkins
could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and
concluded that she was not disabled during the period at issue. Tr. 19-20.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). This court is not required to review the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the magistrate judge to which the parties have not objected. See id. The
recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976).
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision regarding disability benefits
“is limited to determining whether the findings of the [Commissioner] are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of
evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). “[I]t is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of

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the evidence, nor is it the court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the
[Commissioner] if his decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Jenkins makes two objections to the magistrate judge’s R&R. The court
considers these objections in turn.
A. Combined Effect of Impairments
Jenkins first argues that the ALJ improperly considered the combined effects of
all of Jenkins’ impairments, and that she inadequately explained her evaluation of those
combined effects. Specifically, Jenkins objects that “the Commissioner and the United
States Magistrate Judge primarily considered Plaintiff’s non-severe impairments of
hypertension, diabetes and varicose veins while discounting the effects of Plaintiff’s nonsevere arthritis in her knees and shoulder.” Claimant’s Objections 2.
The Agency has defined “a severe impairment or combination of impairments as
those which significantly limit an individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Luckey v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 890 F.2d 666, 669 (4th Cir.
1989) (citing 404 C.F.R. §1520(c)). In her decision, the ALJ discussed all of Jenkins’
impairments and explained why she considered Jenkins’ hypertension, diabetes, varicose
veins, osteoarthritis of the shoulders and knees, and hernia to be non-severe. With regard
to Jenkins’ arthritic shoulders and knees – the only impairments that Jenkins appears to
argue should be considered severe – the ALJ stated that “the evidence has not
demonstrated any significant limitations or restrictions due to osteoarthritis of the
shoulders and knees and therefore this is considered non-severe.” Tr. 16.

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There are no medical records showing that Jenkins has sought medical treatment
for her arthritic shoulders and knees and there is no evidence that these impairments limit
Jenkins’ activities in any way.1 As the magistrate judge explained, the ALJ did not err
when she determined that these impairments were non-severe. Likewise, the ALJ did not
improperly consider the combined effects of Jenkins’ impairments. This is particularly
true because the ALJ discussed all of Jenkins’ impairments, both severe and non-severe,
and considered all of Jenkins’ impairments when determining her RFC.
Jenkins’ first objection fails.
B. Classification of Jenkins’ Age
Jenkins next objects that the ALJ erred by improperly classifying her age when
determining that Jenkins was not disabled. Jenkins further argues that the Agency’s
“special rules for advanced age persons” dictate that she is disabled.
Jenkins was fifty-eight years old on the date she was last insured. Tr. 19. The
ALJ incorrectly listed her as a “person closely approaching advanced age,” a
classification that applies to people who are 50 to 54 years old. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d).
Jenkins should have been classified as a “person of advanced age,” a classification that
applies to people ages 55 and older. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e). This error, however, was
harmless, because the Agency’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines indicate that a person
with Jenkins’ education, skill set, and RFC would not be considered disabled under either
age category. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App’x 2. Moreover, the special rules for
advanced age persons apply only when those people are limited to sedentary or light
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(4). In this case, the ALJ found that Jenkins had the RFC
Jenkins argues that “The record does contain objective medical evidence of Plaintiff’s arthritis
in her knees,” citing to pages 492-494 of the transcript. Claimant’s Objections 2. As the
transcript the court received in this case is only 311 pages long, this argument is unavailing.
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to perform unskilled medium work. Tr. 20. As a result, the special rules found in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(4) do not apply to Jenkins.
Jenkins’ second objection also fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s report
& recommendation, ECF No. 16, and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 21, 2014
Charleston, South Carolina

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