Morris v. York et al

Filing 14

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 10 Report and Recommendation, dismissing case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Signed by Honorable G Ross Anderson, Jr on 6/12/2013. (jpet, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Joshual Morris, #314902,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Cynihia York, Case Manager;
)
Cecilia Reynolds, Warden;
)
Sgt. Pearson, Special Investigation Unit; )
Debbie Branwell, Director of Investigation; )
Individually and in their official capacities, )
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________ )

C/A No.: 0:13-cv-01031-GRA

ORDER
(Written Opinion)

Plaintiff Joshual Morris (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is an inmate at Kershaw Correctional Institution, a facility
of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages for an alleged violation of his due process rights by various SCDC
employees (“Defendants”). In accordance with established local procedure in this
judicial district, this case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paige J.
Gossett for all pretrial proceedings.

After making a careful review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321 (1996), Magistrate Judge Gossett recommends that Plaintiff’s Complaint be
summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
ECF No. 10.

After reviewing the record, the relevant law, and the Report and

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Recommendation,

the

Court

agrees

with

and

adopts

the

Report

and

Recommendation in its entirety.
Standard of Review
Plaintiff brings this claim pro se. This Court is required to construe pro se
pleadings liberally. Such pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). This
Court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow
for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him,
Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.1993), nor is a district court required to
recognize “obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to
unravel them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir.1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
Plaintiff also filed his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits
an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the
administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit.

To protect against possible

abuses of this privilege, the statute requires a district court to dismiss the case upon a
finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” “is
frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A Complaint is frivolous when it “lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992). Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may
be dismissed sua sponte. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

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Discussion
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.

The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71
(1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions
of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made, and this
Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court may
also "receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with
instructions." Id. Furthermore, in the absence of specific objections to the Report
and Recommendation, this Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting
the recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff timely filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation on June
4, 2013. ECF No. 12. Liberally construed, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
finding that Plaintiff’s placement in “security detention” for nineteen (19) months and
his inability to earn “good time credit” while in security detention do not rise to the
level of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. Id. However, the Court finds that this objection is without merit.
To prevail on a due process claim, “Inmates must first demonstrate that they
were deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property’ by governmental action.” Beverati v. Smith,
120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). In support of his argument that his liberty interests
have been violated by Defendants, Plaintiff cites to Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
(1983). In Hewitt, the Supreme Court held that despite the broad administrative and

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discretionary authority given to prison officials, states can create liberty interests for
prisoners through state statutes and regulations that repeatedly use “explicitly
mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates . . . .”
Id. at 472. For example, the Pennsylvania guideline at issue in Hewitt and quoted by
Plaintiff in his objection, required “that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be
employed . . . and that administrative segregation will not occur absent” a predicate
finding of “’the need for control,’ or ‘the threat of a serious disturbance.’” Id. at 471–
72. Plaintiff, however, does not cite to the applicable provisions of the South Carolina
Code governing prison procedures or argue that the applicable law or regulation is
mandatory.
In any event, the Supreme Court has retreated from Hewitt, and the liberty
interest determination no longer turns on whether or not a state law or regulation is
mandatory. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Court found that while
States could create liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause, “these
interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” Id. at 484. Thus, after Sandin, “the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence
of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of
confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the
nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.’” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222–23 (2005).
Courts have found that administrative segregation, without more, does “not
present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably

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create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486; see Beverati, 120 F.3d at 504 (holding that
administrative confinement in cells “infested with vermin . . . smeared with human
feces and urine . . . flooded with water from a leak in the toilet . . . [and] unbearably
hot . . . were not so atypical that exposure to them for six months imposed a
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”). In this case,
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his confinement to administrative segregation
imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on Plaintiff in relation to the general
prison population.

The Court, therefore, agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

Plaintiff did not have a liberty interest in remaining out of administrative segregation.
Moreover, as the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, even though Plaintiff
claims that he is denied the opportunity to earn good time credits while in security
detention, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”

Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
As such, Plaintiff has failed to present any cognizable due process claims
against Defendants. Therefore, his objection to the Report and Recommendation is
overruled.
Conclusion
After a review of the record, this Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation accurately summarizes this case and the applicable law.
Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the case is DISMISSED without prejudice
and without issuance and service of process.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

June 12 , 2013
Anderson, South Carolina

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Plaintiff has the right to appeal this Order within thirty (30) days from the date
of the entry of this Order, pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Failure to meet this deadline, as modified by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, will waive the right to appeal.

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