Mazyck v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 33

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 8/12/2014. (cwil, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Sorel Mazyck,
Plaintiff,
v.
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 0:13-1696-TMC

ORDER

The plaintiff, Sorel Mazyck (“Mazyck”), brought this action pursuant to the Social
Security Act (“SSA”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying her claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), DSC, this matter was referred to a magistrate
judge for pretrial handling.

Now before this court is the magistrate judge’s Report and

Recommendation (“Report”), recommending that the court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
(ECF No. 28.)1 In the Report, the magistrate judge sets forth the relevant facts and legal
standards, which are incorporated herein by reference. Mazyck has filed objections to the Report
(ECF No. 30) and the Commissioner has responded to those objections (ECF No. 31).
Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for review.

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The magistrate judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final
determination remains with the United States District Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The
court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is
made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the magistrate
judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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BACKGROUND
Mazyck applied for DIB and SSI in February 2011, alleging disability beginning
February 16, 2004, due to fibromyalgia, migraines, arthritis, degenerative disc disease, a bulging
disk, bad knees, hernia, high blood pressure, pulmonary arrhythmia, sleep problems, and an
enlarged lymph node. Mazyck’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration. On
February 10, 2012, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) heard testimony from Mazyck,
Mazyck’s mother, and a vocational expert. Subsequently, the ALJ issued a decision denying
Mazyck’s claim.
In his decision, the ALJ found that Mazyck suffered from severe impairments, including
fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, obesity, hypertension, headaches, and hernia, but that
medical evidence did not support the alleged severity of those impairments. As a result, the ALJ
limited Mazyck to sedentary work and found that, despite her limitations, jobs existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Mazyck could perform. The Appeals Council
denied Mazyck’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. This action followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal judiciary has a limited role in the administrative scheme established by the
SSA. Section 405(g) of the Act provides, “the findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence has been defined . . . as more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). This standard
precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the court’s findings for
those of the Commissioner. Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971). Thus, in its review,

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the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations,
or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996).
However, “[f]rom this it does not follow . . . that the findings of the administrative
agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates
more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative agency.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d
278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). Rather, “the courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give
careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the
[Commissioner’s] findings, and that this conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58.
DISCUSSION
Mazyck asserts three main objections: (1) the Report does not sufficiently address
Mazyck’s contention that the ALJ improperly supported his RFC analysis with contradictory
findings, (2) the ALJ erred in failing to request additional records from Dr. Okonofua and Dr.
Edwards, and (3) the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
After conducting the requisite review, the court finds that the Report thoroughly and accurately
addresses Mazyck’s second and third objections. And, for the reasons that follow, the court does
not find Mazyck’s first objection persuasive.
In her initial brief (ECF No. 23), Mazyck argued that the ALJ undermined his RFC
analysis by relying on contradictory findings. In particular, the ALJ found that Mazyck’s
allegations of debilitating pain were supported by only minimal treatment notes and clinical
findings in the record, despite also noting that Mazyck had visited the emergency room
frequently during the relevant period for pain treatment. In evaluating this claim, the Report
found that the ALJ expressly considered and discussed Mazyck’s frequent emergency room

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visits and observed that the visits consistently revealed normal musculoskeletal examinations
with no limitations. Mazyck objects to this reasoning, asserting that it fails to address her initial
argument.
In assessing Mazyck’s RFC, the ALJ found that “[while] the claimant visited the
emergency department 29 times between September 2008 and March 2011, it appears that the
claimant uses emergency services as her primary care physician and to obtain narcotic pain
medication.” The ALJ goes on to observe that “[m]ost of these visits have lasted, at the most, a
few hours, as the claimant indicates that she is in chronic pain, is found to be in no acute distress,
is given narcotic pain medication as requested, and is released,” and “[c]onsistently, despite her
complaints of pain and tenderness, the claimant has had normal musculoskeletal examinations
with no limitations.” This is an accurate summary of the hundreds of pages of notes from
various emergency departments. While those records reflect that Mazyck did seek medical
attention, they do not provide any clinical evidence or treatment information that supports her
disability claim.2 Accordingly, the court finds that the Report properly found that the ALJ fully
complied with all applicable standards.
CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the record, the court finds that the ALJ, in reviewing the
medical history and subjective testimony, conducted a thorough and detailed review of Mazyck’s
impairments and functional capacity. Likewise, the magistrate judge considered each of
Mazyck’s arguments and properly addressed each in turn, finding them without merit. Having
conducted the required de novo review of the issues to which Mazyck has specifically objected,
the court finds no basis for disturbing the Report. Accordingly, the court adopts the Report and

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The court has thoroughly reviewed all of these records. Not one references a possible functional limitation and
several suggest a history of drug-seeking behavior.
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its recommended disposition. Therefore, for the reasons set out above and in the Report, the
Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
Anderson, South Carolina
August 12, 2014 

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