Thompson v. Rock Hill School District III et al

Filing 52

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 45 Report and Recommendation, granting 36 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. on 10/22/2014. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Martha L. Thompson,

C/A No. 0:13-cv-01889-JFA

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

Rock Hill School District III; Robert Beck,
Defendants.
In this employment discrimination case, Martha L. Thompson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, sues her former employer, Rock Hill School District III (“District”) and
her direct supervisor, Robert Beck (“Mr. Beck”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges
discrimination on the basis of age, sex, and race. (ECF No. 1, p. 5). The undersigned construes
Plaintiff’s claims as brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”), which forbids an employer from taking an adverse employment
action against an employee “because of” the employee’s age. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 48) to the Report
and Recommendation (“Report”) issued by the Magistrate Judge on August 27, 2014. (ECF No.
45). The Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 36). The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law on
this matter, and the court incorporate those without a full recitation. (ECF No. 45).
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Report and Recommendation

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The Magistrate Judge made her review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02. The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the court. It has
no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the
court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de
novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.

See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).
B.

Summary Judgment

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall
be rendered when a moving party has shown that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The court must determine whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). Summary judgment should be granted in those cases where it is
perfectly clear that there remains no genuine dispute as to material fact and inquiry into the facts is
unnecessary to clarify the application of the law. McKinney v. Bd. of Trustees of Mayland
Community College, 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992). In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
II.

DISCUSSION
The petitioner has made a number of specific objections to the Report. The court addresses

each of the specific objections below but finds that none of the petitioner’s objections overcomes

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the failure to show a prima facie case of discrimination or the failure to show that the reasons for
termination are pretextual.
A.

Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
i. Discrimination based on Race and Sex

In her Report, the Magistrate Judge opines that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted because Plaintiff has failed to show a prima facie case of race and sex
discrimination.

To state a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination, Plaintiff must

demonstrate: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; (3) she was performing her job duties at a level that met her employer’s legitimate
expectations at the time of the adverse employment action; and (4) the position remained open or
was filled by a similarly-qualified applicant outside of the protected class. Hill v. Lockheed
Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004).
The Magistrate Judge held that Plaintiff met two out of four prongs of the prima facie
case—namely (1) that Plaintiff is a member of the protected class, (2) that Plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action. (ECF No. 45, p. 8). However, the Magistrate Judge held that
Plaintiff failed to establish that she was performing her job duties at a level that met her
employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment act, and that her
position was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class.
1. Employer’s Legitimate Expectations
On its motion for summary judgment, the District alleged that Plaintiff was not performing
her job duties as a school bus aide at a level that met the District’s legitimate expectations at the
time of her termination. (ECF No. 36-2, Cauthen Aff. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7; ECF No. 36-8 (termination
letter)). The District argued that Plaintiff failed to perform her job duties, which included, inter
alia, (1) assisting school bus drivers in the transportation of all students riders, including

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physically and/or emotionally handicapped passengers, (2) assisting the driver in maintaining
proper student control on the bus at all times, (3) being physically and emotionally able to cope
with situations and problems encountered when transporting passengers in ambulatory appliances,
restraint systems, and with difficult behavior, and (4) performing other duties as assigned. (ECF
No. 36-5 (District’s Bus Aide Job Description)).
The Magistrate Judge found that the facts proved that Plaintiff refused to perform her job
duties on driver Elaine Russell’s bus. (ECF No. 36-3, Pl.’s Depo. 47–48). Plaintiff boarded Ms.
Russell’s bus, but refused to assist a student with a disability on the bus. Id. at 47–49. Plaintiff
exited the school bus and informed Mr. Beck, the school bus dispatcher, that she was giving up
and would not perform her duties. Id. at 49. On the next day after this incident, Plaintiff was
terminated for insubordination.
Based upon the evidence presented, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff was not
meeting her employer’s expectations. As such, the Magistrate Judge’s Report recommends that
this Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to
establish a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination.
Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that she was not meeting her
employer’s legitimate expectations at the time she was terminated. Plaintiff focuses much of her
argument on the issue that her employer’s expectations were misrepresented to her because she
was never trained on nor informed that she would be responsible for restraining, “wrestling, and
manhandling unruly out of control emotional[ly] disturbed students.” Further, Plaintiff complains
that she should not have to meet the District’s “illegitimate expectations” because she was in fear

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for her “personal safety” and that Defendants failed to provide a safe and secure workplace as
required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”).1
The court reviewed Plaintiff’s objection carefully and it finds no basis for disturbing the
Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition. The District hired Plaintiff as a bus aide, but
Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she exited the bus and informed her supervisor that she
would not get back on the bus. The next day, the District terminated her for insubordination.
Plaintiff fervently argues that the District’s expectations were illegitimate; however, at a
minimum, the District legitimately expected Plaintiff to be present on the bus and assist the driver
in the transportation of students. Plaintiff was not present on the bus, and therefore, did not assist
the driver in the transportation of students.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled and this Court concurs with the Magistrate
Judge’s assessment and agrees that the Plaintiff’s admitted refusal to stay on the bus and assist the
driver in the transportation of students is sufficient to show that she was not meeting her
employer’s legitimate expectations when she was terminated.
2. Position Filled by a Similarly Qualified Applicant Outside the Protected Class
The Plaintiff then objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that her position was filled by a
similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class.

Plaintiff acknowledged that Ms.

Takeemia Jamerson filled her position and that Ms. Jamerson is an individual in her protected
class. (ECF No. 48, p. 4). However, the Plaintiff argues that the reasons for hiring Ms. Jamerson
were pretextual in that Ms. Jamerson was only hired to cover up the alleged discrimination and
only after the District became aware of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.
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Any alleged violation of OSHA standards is not properly before the court. OSHA gives employees the right to file a
complaint and request an OSHA inspection of their workplace if they believe there is a serious hazard or their
employer is not following OSHA standards. Further, OSHA allows employees to file a “discrimination complaint” if
your employer has retaliated against you for exercising your rights as a worker. Such “discrimination complaint”
must be filed within 30 days of the alleged reprisal. All information on OSHA was gathered from the following
website: https://www.osha.gov/as/opa/worker/complain.html.

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In her Report, the Magistrate Judge noted that the District hired Plaintiff’s replacement on
February 4, 2013, some seven weeks prior to Plaintiff’s filing of her Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission charge. Further, the Magistrate Judge explained that Plaintiff provided
no evidence that the District was aware in February 2013 that she would be claiming
discrimination from her nine-day employment stint four months earlier; therefore, such hiring was
not done to cover up any alleged discrimination.
Based upon the evidence presented, the Magistrate Judge found that an applicant within
the protected class filled Plaintiff’s position; therefore, there is no question of material fact as to
this prong. As such, the Magistrate Judge’s Report recommends that this Court grant Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case of race
and sex discrimination.
The court reviewed Plaintiff’s objection carefully and it finds no basis for disturbing the
Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition. Plaintiff acknowledges that Ms. Jamerson is within
her protected class; therefore, she cannot establish this prong of her prima facie case.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled and this Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s
assessment and agrees that the Plaintiff failed to establish that her position remained open or was
filled by a similarly-qualified applicant outside of the protected class.
ii. Discrimination based on Age Discrimination
To state a prima facie case of age discrimination, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) she was a
member of the protected class—that is, older than 40; (2) she was discharged; (3) she was
qualified for the job and met her employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) her position remained
open or was filled by a similarly-qualified individual who was substantially younger. See Warch
v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 513 (4th Cir. 2006).

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In short, the Magistrate Judge found that the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination for the same reason stated above:

the failure to show she met her

employer’s legitimate expectations. Further, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to
establish that her position remained open or was filled by a similarly-qualified individual who was
substantially younger. Particularly, Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to suggest that Ms.
Jamerson was substantially younger.
Based upon the evidence presented, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff did not meet
her employer’s legitimate expectations and was not replaced by a person who was substantially
younger. As such, the Magistrate Judge’s Report recommends that this Court grant Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination. It appears that the Plaintiff does not make a specific objection to the Magistrate
Judge’s finding that she failed to establish a prima facie case based on age discrimination. The
court finds no basis for disturbing the Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition. Accordingly,
this Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s assessment and agrees that the Plaintiff failed to
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
B.

Burden-Shifting and Pretext

According to the Magistrate Judge, even assuming that Plaintiff has established a prima
facie case, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted because the District
has offered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s employment, and
Plaintiff is unable to show that the District’s reasons are pretextual. Again, this Court agrees with
the Magistrate Judge’s factual and legal conclusions and agrees that the Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the reasons for terminating
Plaintiff’s employment are both legitimate and non-discriminatory. Specifically, she argues that

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the reasons for hiring Ms. Jamerson were pretextual in that Ms. Jamerson was only hired to cover
up the alleged discrimination and only after the District became aware of Plaintiff’s Title VII
claims. However, it was established that the District hired Plaintiff’s replacement on February 4,
2013, some seven weeks prior to Plaintiff’s filing of her Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission charge.

Further, Plaintiff provided no evidence that the District was aware in

February 2013 that she would be claiming discrimination from her nine-day employment stint four
months earlier. Therefore, such hiring was not done to cover up any alleged discrimination.
Plaintiff argues further that the District attempted to create an adverse working
environment for Plaintiff. Plaintiff maintains that the District set her up for failure and for
termination by failing to establish a formal chain of command, failing to provide clear
instructions, and failing to provide any training. Plaintiff argued these same issues before the
Magistrate Judge on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Magistrate Judge held that
“even accepting as true all of Plaintiff’s foregoing allegations, it is undisputed that Plaintiff
refused to perform the bus aide duties . . . as directed.” Finally, the Magistrate Judge held that
“Plaintiff presented no evidence that the District’s decision to terminate her was other than
because it believed she refused to accept her assignment as a bus aid on Ms. Russell’s bus.”
Although Plaintiff believes that the facts show that the District had discriminatory and
illegitimate reasons for her termination, she has been unable to meet her burden and show that the
reasons given for terminating Plaintiff’s employment were false and pretextual. As such, this
Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, this court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment. (ECF No. 36).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 22, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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