Joyner v. Patterson et al

Filing 41

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 35 Report and Recommendation and dismissing plaintiff's complaint; finding as moot 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; finding as moot 4 Motion for TRO; finding as mo ot 21 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; finding as moot 23 Motion to participate in pretrial proceedings; finding as moot 25 Motion for law library time ; finding as moot 29 Motion to preserve disciplinary hearing tape. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 8/11/2014.(cahe, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
BENJAMIN A. JOYNER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHARON PATTERSON, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 0:13-cv-2675-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett’s Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) that this court summarily dismiss the present action filed by
plaintiff Benjamin A. Joyner (“Joyner”). Joyner, an inmate who brought this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed written objections to the R&R. For the reasons set
forth below, the court adopts the R&R and concludes that summary dismissal is
appropriate.
I. BACKGROUND
Joyner is an inmate within the South Carolina Department of Corrections
(“SCDC”) who is currently incarcerated at Lee Correctional Institution. Joyner’s claims
derive from a series of incidents that he alleges violated his constitutional rights. Joyner
alleges that on August 22, 2012, he was placed in disciplinary detention rather than
administrative segregation without being afforded a disciplinary or pre-detention hearing.
Compl. 11-13.1 While in disciplinary detention, Joyner claims he was not given a “1969” pre-hearing detention form or other notice providing “the reason for [his] assignment

1

Citations to Joyner’s complaint refer to page numbers since Joyner’s complaint
lacks numbered paragraphs.
1

to administrative segregation.” Id. at 44. In addition, Joyner alleges he was never subject
to periodic classification review, in violation of SCDC policies. Id. at 68-69.
Joyner further alleges that he received a disciplinary charge on August 31, 2012
and appeared at an informal hearing on September 11, 2012 before defendant Sharon
Patterson (“Patterson”), a disciplinary hearing officer. Id. at 24. Patterson allegedly
conducted the hearing with various improprieties in SCDC procedure. Id. at 24-27.
Joyner also appeared at hearings before Patterson on September 18 and 19, 2012, and he
alleges that she and other defendants again violated several SCDC procedures. Id. at 2732. Following the hearings, Joyner was found to have committed a disciplinary offense
and as a sanction he received 360 days in the Special Management Unit, as well as 760
days without canteen, phone, or visitor privileges. Id. at 41. However, Joyner was
released to the prison’s general population after 90 days. Id. at 65. Joyner complains that
defendant Warden Mike McCall (“Warden McCall”) was complicit by affirming
Patterson’s actions. Id. at 70-81.
During his time in administrative segregation, Joyner alleges he was allowed
infrequent showers and no outdoor recreation privileges. Pl.’s Aff. 2-7. Additionally,
Joyner claims he was “subjected to filthy, deplorable living conditions,” including
unclean floors, showers, and food trays, as well as a cell that flooded with toilet water
containing urine and feces on “several occasions.” Id. at 4-6.
Joyner also alleges that his mattress was taken on the night of March 12, 2013 in
retaliation for Joyner filing grievances against Warden McCall and for filing a previous
civil complaint against defendant Linda Johnson (“Johnson”). Compl. 136-37; Pl.’s

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Objections 27-32. The following day, Joyner contends that his legs and back were “sore
and in severe pain.” Compl. 137. He received a 15-day supply of pain killers. Id. at 146.
Joyner filed the present action on October 2, 2013, alleging that prison personnel
violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Joyner amended his
complaint of November 4, 2013. On March 6, 2014, the magistrate judge issued the
R&R recommending that this court summarily dismiss Joyner’s complaint. Joyner filed
objections to the R&R on March 26, 2014. This matter is ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARDS
A.

Objections to R&R

This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). A party’s failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of
the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). In absence of a
timely filed objection to a magistrate judge’s R&R, this court need not conduct a de novo
review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s
note). The recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and
the responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). This court may accept, reject, or modify the report of the
magistrate judge, in whole or in part, or may recommit the matter to him with instructions
for further consideration. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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B.

Summary Dismissal

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to file in forma pauperis, which
allows a federal court action to be commenced without prepaying the administrative costs
of proceeding with the lawsuit. However, the statute limits the actions that may be filed
by permitting the court to dismiss the case upon finding that the action “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A complaint is frivolous when it is “clearly baseless,” which
includes allegations that are “fanciful” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 32-33 (1992) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-328 (1989)).
C.

Pro Se Plaintiff

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this case. Federal district courts are charged with
liberally construing complaints filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a
potentially meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980). Pro se
complaints are therefore held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.
Id. Liberal construction, however, does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure
in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
Joyner to object to the R&R primarily on three grounds: (1) the magistrate judge
erred in finding that Joyner failed to state a claim for violation of due process; (2) the
magistrate judge erred in finding that Joyner failed to state a cruel and unusual
punishment claim; and (3) the magistrate judge erred in determining that Joyner failed to
state a claim for retaliation. The court will consider these objections in turn.
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A.

Due Process Claim

Joyner first objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that Joyner lacked a
protectible liberty interest under the Due Process Clause because Joyner’s prison
conditions did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship, and that therefore
Joyner’s complaint was not actionable under § 1983. Pl.’s Objections 24.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guards against unlawful
deprivations of life, liberty, or property. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. There is a twostep process for analyzing alleged procedural due process violations. See Burnette v.
Fahey, 687 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2012). The court must first consider whether, and to
what extent, the inmate has a protectible liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
Id. If the court determines that the inmate has asserted a protectible liberty interest, the
court must then determine whether the government failed to afford him the minimum due
process protections required by the Fourteenth Amendment in depriving him of this
interest. Id.
In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court recognized that “States may under
certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process
Clause.” 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). However, the Supreme Court noted that “these
interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding
the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. After Sandin,
“the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty
interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of
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regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
222-23 (2005) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483). The Supreme Court in Wilkinson held
that, in order to measure whether an inmate’s custodial situation imposes “an atypical and
significant hardship within the correctional context,” it must be measured against a
“baseline.” 545 U.S. at 223-24. While Wilkinson did not establish a particular
“baseline,” the Fourth Circuit uses the conditions “imposed on the general population” as
the baseline for its analysis. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997).
“There is no single standard for determining whether a prison hardship is atypical and
significant, and the condition or combination of conditions or factors . . . requires case by
case, fact by fact consideration.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F. Supp. 2d
345, 356 (D. Md. 2007) (noting that Wilkinson “directs lower courts to consider the
totality of circumstances in a given facility”).
Joyner argues that the conditions he experienced in administrative segregation,
when taken together, constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.2 Joyner claims he was allowed no outside recreation;

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To the extent Joyner alleges that the conduct of his disciplinary proceedings or
inmate classification violated internal SCDC policies, he has failed to assert a protectible
liberty interest. Violation of internal prison policies do not constitute constitutional
violations and, therefore, are not actionable under § 1983. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.
Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (“Plaintiff completely misunderstands the scope of § 1983.
This statute guarantees a person’s constitutional rights against violation by state actors. It
does not provide any relief against prison rules violations assuming, arguendo, that such a
violation occurred.”); Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Va., 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir.
1990) (“If state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution would otherwise
require, a state’s failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue.”).
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provided infrequent and limited number of showers; subjected to filthy floors, showers,
and food trays; exposed to riot gas; and given a cell that, on several occasions, was
flooded with toilet water containing urine and feces. Pl.’s Aff. 2-9. Joyner alleges that
he has “a liberty interest to remain free from this type of treatment.” Pl.’s Aff. 9.
Although the atypical and significant hardship inquiry is “necessarily contextdependent and demands fact-by-fact consideration,” Prieto v. Clarke, 2013 WL 6019215,
at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013), two cases are particularly insightful for their analysis of
when administrative segregation gives rise to a liberty interest. The first is Wilkinson,
545 U.S. 209. In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court held that inmates had a liberty interest in
avoiding assignment to Ohio’s supermax prison. Id. at 224. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court distinguished the supermax facilities from normal segregation units on three
grounds. First, inmates in the supermax facility were “deprived of almost any
environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact.” Id. at 214. The
facility had solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which
prevented conversation or communication with other inmates. Id. Second, inmates were
assigned to the supermax facility for “an indefinite period of time, limited only by [the]
inmate’s sentence.” Id. at 214-15. Third, once assigned to supermax, “[i]nmates
otherwise eligible for parole [lost] their eligibility while incarcerated” at the facility. Id.

Additionally, Joyner’s reliance on Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), to establish a
liberty interest is misguided. While Hewitt held that a state’s prison regulations could
create protectible liberty interests, the Supreme Court abrogated Hewitt in Sandin,
holding that protectible liberty interests created by a state are “generally limited to
freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected
manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force,
nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S. at 484 (citations omitted).
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at 215. After noting other onerous conditions of confinement, including cells that were
lighted 24 hours per day and only one hour per day of exercise, the court stated held that
“[w]hile any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty
interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the
correctional context.” Id. at 224.
The second case that the court finds instructive is Beverati, 120 F.3d 500, which
the Fourth Circuit decided before Wilkinson.3 In Beverati, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether prisoners had a liberty interest when they were confined in administrative
segregation for six months in “unbearably hot” cells that were infested with vermin,
smeared with human feces and urine, and flooded with toilet water. 120 F.3d at 504.
The inmates were only allowed to leave their cells three or four times a week, were not
allowed outside recreation, were denied educational or religious services, and were given
cold food. Id. The Court held that “although the conditions were more burdensome than
those imposed on the general prison population, they were not so atypical that exposure

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Even though Beverati predates Wilkinson, at the very least it suggests that the
bar for proving an atypical and significant hardship is quite high in the Fourth Circuit.
Beverati, 120 F.3d at 504. Even after Wilkinson was decided, the Fourth Circuit has
cited Beverati in rejecting the notion that inmates enjoy a protected liberty interest in
avoiding confinement in administrative segregation, United States v. Daniels, 222 F.
App’x 341, 342 n.* (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (per curiam) (“Extended stays on
administrative segregation . . . do not ordinarily implicate a protected liberty interest.”
(citing Beverati, 120 F.3d at 502)). Courts in this district have also relied on Beverati in
procedural due process cases involving administrative segregation. See, e.g., Morris v.
York, No. 0:13-cv-01031, 2013 WL 2635610, *2 (D.S.C. June 12, 2013) (citing Beverati
and holding that “administrative segregation, without more, does ‘not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest’” (citation omitted)).
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to them for six months imposed a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” Id.
Many of the conditions in administrative segregation that Joyner points to as
posing an atypical and substantial hardship are similar to those discussed in Beverati,
including not being allowed outdoor recreation, a cell contaminated with human feces
and urine from a flooded toilet, and being given cold food. While these conditions are
more burdensome than those imposed on the general prison population, Joyner’s
exposure to these conditions does not amount to an atypical and significant hardship. See
Beverati, 120 F.3d at 504. Additionally, while the inmate in Beverati was exposed to
these conditions for six months, Joyner spent only 90 days in administrative segregation.
Moreover, the special circumstances existing in Wilkinson are not present here.
545 U.S. 224. The Supreme Court in Wilkinson looked at the presence of two additional
factors to find “an atypical and significant hardship” on inmates such that they had a
liberty interest in avoiding it. Id. Those factors were the potentially indefinite length of
detention and the fact that placement in administrative segregation disqualified otherwise
eligible inmates for parole consideration. Id. The first of these factors, indefinite
confinement, is absent in Joyner’s case. Joyner was sent to administrative segregation for
360 days, Compl. 41, but was released to the general prison population after 90 days.
Pl.’s Aff. 1. Therefore, unlike the inmates in Wilkinson, Joyner was not subject to
indefinite confinement. The second factor the Supreme Court found significant in
Wilkinson – automatic disqualification from consideration of parole – is also not present
in this case. There is no evidence that placement in administrative segregation impacts,

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influences, or eliminates parole consideration for SCDC inmates. Consequently, the
second factor is not relevant here.
Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding Joyner’s confinement in
administrative segregation, the court cannot find that the conditions of his confinement
rise to the level of an atypical and substantial hardship. Because the court has determined
that Joyner does not have a protectible liberty interest in avoiding administrative
segregation, it is not necessary to determine whether the government afforded him the
minimum due process protections required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Joyner has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted with regard to the
conditions of his administrative segregation.
B.

Eighth Amendment Claim.

Next, Joyner objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that he failed to state a
claim for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Pl.’s
Objections 27-28.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that “involve[s] the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in
prison and the conditions under which prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under
the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
The conditions of an inmate’s confinement violate the Eighth Amendment when
an inmate can show both “(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2)
deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.” Strickler v.
Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820,
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824 (4th Cir. 1991)). To demonstrate a serious deprivation of a basic human need, an
inmate must allege that prison officials failed to provide humane conditions of
confinement such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. This
component requires courts to look to “contemporary standards of decency” to determine
whether the challenged conditions resulted in a deprivation of “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities” or “basic human needs.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981). As the Supreme Court has stated, “extreme deprivations are required to
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim . . . [b]ecause routine discomfort is ‘part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). With regard to the
second component, a prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge
of a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner and disregards that substantial risk. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 832.
Joyner alleges that the removal of his mattress for one night constituted a serious
deprivation of a basic human need. However, numerous courts have held that depriving
an inmate of a mattress for short periods of time does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. See, e.g., Fisher v. Ellegood, 238 F. App’x 428, 433 (11th Cir. 2007)
(requiring an inmate to sleep on the floor of his cell for five days does not violate Eighth
Amendment); Schroeder v. Kaplan, 60 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (requiring
prisoner to sleep on floor for a four-week period without use of mattress does not violate
the Eighth Amendment); Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is
no absolute Eighth Amendment right not to be put in a cell without clothes or bedding.”);
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Mestre v. Wagner, 2012 WL 300724, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012) (“[D]enying a
prisoner a mattress for limited time periods is not a deprivation of a minimal standard of
living and does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.”); Thompson v. Patterson,
No. 9:10-cv-2381, 2011 WL 5024344, at * 5 (D.S.C. July 14, 2011) (“[M]erely being
deprived of a mattress for a short period of time . . . does not amount to a per se violation
of a prisoner’s constitutional rights where there is no resulting serious injury.”). This
court agrees. The removal of Joyner’s mattress for one night is insufficient to establish a
deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” or a “basic human
need[].” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
Joyner has failed to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
C.

Retaliation Claim

Last, Joyner objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that he failed to state a claim
for retaliation following the removal of his mattress. Pl.’s Objections 31-32.
To advance a retaliation claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege either that
the retaliatory act was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right or that the act itself violated such a right.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.
1994). Even if the alleged act was taken in response to exercising a constitutionally
protected right, the inmate must present “more than naked allegations of reprisal,”
Adams, 40 F.3d at 74, and the retaliatory act must “chill, impair, or deny [an inmate’s]
right to exercise his constitutional right.” Ballance v. Young, 130 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770
(W.D. Va. 2000). “A de minimis inconvenience in exercise of the right, caused by
defendants’ actions, does not constitute a cognizable retaliation claim.” Id. The Fourth
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Circuit regards inmate retaliation claims with skepticism because “[e]very act of
discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds
directly to prisoner misconduct.” Adams, 40 F.3d at 74.
In this case, Joyner asserts that his mattress was removed in retaliation for (1)
filing grievances against Warden McCall; and (2) filing a previous civil complaint against
Johnson. Pl.’s Objections 27-32. As discussed above, the removal of Joyner’s mattress
did not violate any constitutionally protected right. Therefore, in order to state a claim
for retaliation under § 1983, Joyner must show that the retaliatory act was taken in
response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. With regard to his first
argument, Joyner does not have a constitutionally protected right to file internal
grievances against Warden McCall. See Brown v. Angelone, 938 F. Supp. 340, 347
(W.D. Va. 1996) (“Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to participate in
a grievance procedure.” (citing Adams, 40 F.3d at 72)). Therefore, Joyner has not pled a
cognizable claim by alleging that his mattress was removed in retaliation for filing
grievances against Warden McCall.
With regard to his second assertion, while Joyner is correct that he has a
constitutional right to “file non-frivolous . . . lawsuits” and to have “access [to] the
courts,” Pl.’s Objections 29, he has not advanced any evidence other than “his bare
assertion” and speculation that the removal of his mattress was retaliatory. Adams, 40
F.3d at 74. Rather, Joyner merely alleges his mattress was “taken at least in part because
of” filing a civil complaint against Johnson. Pl.’s Objections 28 (emphasis added). Such
“naked allegations” fail to meet the standard set in Adams. 40 F.3d at 74.

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Joyner has failed to allege a cognizable claim that defendants retaliated against
him for filing a civil complaint against Johnson.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s R&R and
DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint.4 Because the court dismisses plaintiff’s complaint,
the remaining pending motions, ECF Nos. 4, 21, 23, 25, and 29, are MOOT.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 11, 2014
Charleston, South Carolina

4

Joyner’s 120-page complaint is difficult to discern and it is not obvious to the
court whether he is attempting to assert any state law causes of action. However, because
the court has summarily dismissed Joyner’s federal causes of action, to the extent that
Joyner does attempt to raise any state law causes of action, the court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over those causes of action. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1996); Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s dismissal of
state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case).
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